Com. v. McGruder, L.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 6, 2024
• Docket: 2845 EDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S11041-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LAKESHA MCGRUDER : : Appellant : No. 2845 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 14, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005032-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J. *

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2024

Appellant, Lakesha McGruder, appeals, pro se, from the order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that dismissed her first petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) 1 without a hearing. After

careful review, we affirm.

In 2019, Appellant was charged with murder, conspiracy, burglary, and

robbery for the 2017 shooting death of a 65-year-old woman (Victim) during

a home invasion burglary. On December 1, 2021, Appellant entered a

negotiated guilty plea to one count each of third-degree murder, conspiracy

to commit burglary, and burglary in exchange for the Commonwealth dropping

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. J-S11041-24

all other charges, which included first-degree and second-degree murder, and

the imposition of an aggregate sentence of 10 to 30 years’ incarceration. N.T.

Guilty Plea and Sentencing at 24-27. On the same day, the trial court

sentenced Appellant in accordance with the plea agreement. Id. at 44-46.

Appellant filed no post-sentence motions and no direct appeal.

On July 6, 2022, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition claiming

that her trial counsel was ineffective with respect to her guilty plea. The court

appointed PCRA counsel to represent Appellant, and PCRA counsel on August

9, 2022 filed a no-merit letter and application to withdraw as counsel. On

September 8, 2022, the PCRA court issued a notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.

907 of its intent to dismiss this PCRA petition without a hearing on the ground

that the PCRA petition raised no meritorious claims. Appellant filed a response

asserting that trial counsel was ineffective in advising her to enter the

negotiated plea because the evidence set forth at her plea hearing was

allegedly insufficient to support a conviction of any of the crimes with which

she had been charged. On October 14, 2022, the PCRA court granted PCRA

counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. This

timely appeal followed.

In this Court, Appellant argues that her ineffective assistance of counsel

claim was meritorious and that the PCRA court therefore erred in dismissing

her PCRA petition because the crimes were committed by other individuals

and that she was merely present in the area where the crimes were

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committed. We review the dismissal of a PCRA petition to determine whether

the court’s decision is supported by the record and free of legal error.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277, 283 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth

v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012). A court may properly dismiss

a PCRA claim without a hearing where it is clear from the record that the claim

is patently without merit. Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1); Wah, 42 A.3d at 338.

Appellant’s only PCRA claim was that trial counsel was ineffective in

advising her to enter the negotiated guilty plea. To be entitled to relief on a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove: (1) that

the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s action had

no reasonable basis; and (3) that she suffered prejudice as a result of

counsel’s action. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 618 (Pa. 2015);

Commonwealth v. Velazquez, 216 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2019);

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2018); Wah,

42 A.3d at 338. The defendant must satisfy all three prongs of this test to

obtain relief under the PCRA. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Commonwealth v.

Pitt, 313 A.3d 287, 293 (Pa. Super. 2024); Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1158.

In addition, ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to a plea of

guilty can be a basis for PCRA relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the

defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Velazquez, 216 A.3d

at 1149; Commonwealth v. Orlando, 156 A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super.

2017); Wah, 42 A.3d at 338. To establish that a guilty plea is voluntary and

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knowing, the trial court must conduct a colloquy that shows the factual basis

for the plea and demonstrates that the defendant understands the nature of

the charges to which he is pleading guilty, his right to a jury trial, the

presumption of innocence, the permissible sentencing range for the charges,

and the court’s power to reject the terms of a plea agreement.

Commonwealth v. Felix, 303 A.3d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. 2023);

Commonwealth v. Jamison, 284 A.3d 501, 506 (Pa. Super. 2022);

Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en

banc); Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. These matters may also be shown by

a written plea colloquy read and signed by the defendant that is made part of

the record and is supplemented by an on-the-record oral examination.

Jamison, 284 A.3d 506; Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782 (Pa.

Super. 2015); Morrison, 878 A.2d at 108-09; Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590.

A defendant is bound by her statements during her plea colloquy and cannot

assert challenges to her plea that contradict the statements that she made

when she entered the plea. Jamison, 284 A.3d at 506; Commonwealth v.

Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 506 (Pa. Super. 2018); Orlando, 156 A.3d at 1281.

The record here demonstrates that Appellant’s guilty plea was voluntary

and knowing. The factual basis for the plea and the nature of the charges to

which Appellant was pleading guilty were placed on the record, and Appellant

confirmed that she understood the factual basis for the plea and the nature of

those charges. N.T. Guilty Plea and Sentencing at 11-13, 17-24. The

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maximum sentence for each of those charges was also explained to Appellant.

Id. at 11, 17-19. At the plea hearing and in the written colloquy that she

signed, Appellant was advised of her right to a jury trial and the presumption

of innocence, confirmed that she understood those rights and that she was

giving them up in pleading guilty, and confirmed that she understood that the

trial court was not required to accept the plea agreement. Id. at 8-11; Written

Plea Colloquy at 3-6. Appellant also confirmed that she wished to plead guilty,

that she was not suffering from any condition that impaired her ability to make

this decision, and that she was pleading guilty of her own free will. N.T. Guilty

Plea and Sentencing at 8-9, 25-26; Written Plea Colloquy at 1-2.

Moreover, Appellant’s argument that trial counsel was ineffective in

advising her to enter the negotiated plea also fails because the record

establishes that counsel had a reasonable basis for this advice. The factual

basis set forth at Appellant’s plea hearing showed the following: that Appellant

suggested to Nelson Giddings and Isaiah Reels that the three of them

burglarize the home of Victim’s next-door neighbor, who Appellant knew from

a prior romantic relationship, and rob him, that Appellant drove Giddings and

Reels to the scene of the crime, that Giddings broke into Victim’s home, rather

than the intended victim’s home, by mistake and shot and killed Victim, that

Reels acted as a lookout and fled after hearing gunshots, and that Appellant

drove Giddings away from the area after he burglarized Victim’s home and

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shot her. N.T. Guilty Plea and Sentencing at 20-24. Appellant agreed at her

plea hearing that these facts were true. Id. at 24.

Those facts were sufficient to convict Appellant of second-degree

murder. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b), (d) (“A criminal homicide constitutes murder

of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a

principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony”); Commonwealth

v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1022-25 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (evidence

was sufficient to convict defendant of second-degree murder where defendant

drove person who committed home burglary and killed occupant to and from

the home and did not break into the home or shoot any occupant). The fact

that the person whose home was burglarized and who was murdered in the

course of that burglary was not the intended victim does not change this.

Under the doctrine of transferred intent, the intent to commit a crime can

be found where the crime that the defendant intended harms a victim who

was not the intended target of the crime. 18 Pa.C.S. § 303(b)(1);

Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 279-80 (Pa. 2006).

The record from the plea hearing demonstrated that the Commonwealth

had ample evidence to prove these facts from prison phone calls between

Giddings and Appellant, letters that Giddings sent to Appellant, and the

testimony of Reels, who had agreed to testify against his co-conspirators. N.T.

Guilty Plea and Sentencing at 23, 32. A conviction for second-degree murder

carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole. 18 Pa.C.S.

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§ 1102(b). Given the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence to prove

second-degree murder and the substantial risk of being convicted of that

offense and receiving a life sentence, counsel’s advice to plead guilty to third-

degree murder, conspiracy to commit burglary, and burglary, in exchange for

a sentence of only 10 to 30 years was patently reasonable. Indeed, it was

clear from the plea hearing that Appellant was pleading guilty to receive a

much more lenient sentence than the mandatory life sentence that she risked

if she went to trial. N.T. Guilty Plea and Sentencing at 24-25.

For the foregoing reasons, the PCRA court correctly concluded that the

record from Appellant’s plea hearing demonstrated that her claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel was without merit. Accordingly, we

affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition without a

hearing.

Order affirmed.

Date: 9/6/2024

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