J-S04003-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NATHANIEL MCFADDEN : : Appellant : No. 1309 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered May 1, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012458-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2024
Nathaniel McFadden appeals from the order that dismissed his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.
Briefly, the history of this case is as follows. Appellant stabbed his
sister, was charged with aggravated assault and possession of an instrument
of crime, and pled guilty. On January 31, 2012, he was sentenced to eleven
and one-half to twenty-three months of incarceration followed by ten years of
probation. He did not file an appeal. In 2016, while serving the probationary
tail of his sentence, Appellant murdered his grandmother. Consequently, his
probation was revoked and he was resentenced in 2018 to a term of one day
to fifteen years of imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction.
Appellant filed a PCRA petition on January 7, 2022, pleading an after-
discovered evidence claim based upon his plea counsel’s failure to obtain a J-S04003-24
mental health evaluation. See PCRA Petition, 1/7/22, at 4. Appellant
asserted that the fact that he needed to have a mental health professional
examine him in connection with the instant case was previously unknown to
him, and that he learned of it on an undisclosed date “through the assistance
of the law library and case law.” Id. at 3-4 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362 (2000) (holding capital defendant denied effective assistance of
counsel by failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at penalty
phase of trial), and Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2010)
(regarding counsel’s effectiveness in deciding how to present mental health
mitigation evidence)). He additionally attached to his PCRA petition a mental
health evaluation report that was conducted in 2017 in connection with his
murder case. Id. at Exhibit A.
The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed a motion to withdraw and
a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en
banc), indicating that Appellant’s petition was untimely. Appellant submitted
a response reiterating that he “did not know that [he] was supposed to receive
a mental health evaluation until [he] was doing a PCRA for a case [he] was
convicted of after this case.” Response, 1/11/23, at unnumbered 1. The PCRA
court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition
as untimely. Appellant filed a pro se response indicating on the one hand that
he and his attorney could not have ascertained his mental state at the time of
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his plea because Appellant “did not know there was anything wrong with [him]
at the time,” and on the other hand that he had informed his attorney that he
took “medication for [his] mental illness which is schizophrenia.” Response,
3/9/23.
By order of May 1, 2023, the court dismissed Appellant’s petition and
permitted counsel to withdraw. This timely appeal followed. The PCRA court
directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and Appellant
complied.1 Appellant presents the following question for our review: “[Were
Appellant]’s Fifth Amendment rights violated due to the fact that he did not
receive a mental health evaluation?” Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 2.
We begin with a review of the pertinent legal precepts. “In general, we
review an order dismissing or denying a PCRA petition as to whether the
findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are free from legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022)
(cleaned up).
As to legal questions, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions, and this Court may affirm a PCRA court’s order on any legal basis. As to factual questions, our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and ____________________________________________
1 In his 1925(b) statement, Appellant again represented that he had informed
plea counsel that he suffered from schizophrenia and was on medication for it, but counsel never sought a mental health investigation. He attached to the statement a 2012 chemical dependency evaluation which stated, inter alia, that Appellant acknowledged his diagnosis of schizophrenia, that he took prescription medication to treat it, and that he received monthly Supplemental Security Income benefits for it. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 6/2/23, at Exhibit B.
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the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the lower court. Great deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the certified record.
Id. (cleaned up). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA
court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d
157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).
It is well-settled “that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional
and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition
and cannot grant relief.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994
(Pa.Super. 2022). Any PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date
that the underlying judgment of sentence became final unless the petitioner
pleads and offers to prove an enumerated timeliness exception. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, a petition invoking a timeliness exception
“shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, since Appellant did not file an appeal from his January 31, 2012
judgment of sentence, it became final for purposes of challenges to his
underlying convictions on March 1, 2012.2 Accordingly, his January 2022
____________________________________________
2 Appellant’s subsequent probation revocation and resentencing in this case
started a new clock for PCRA claims related to the revocation proceeding and the new sentence. However, regarding challenges to his underlying convictions, “the revocation of Appellant’s probation did not ‘reset the clock’ for PCRA purposes.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059, 1062 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011).
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PCRA petition is facially untimely. In an attempt to obtain substantive review
of his petition, Appellant invoked the PCRA’s newly-discovered-facts
exception. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (providing an exception where
“the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner
and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”). As
we have summarized:
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J-S04003-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NATHANIEL MCFADDEN : : Appellant : No. 1309 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered May 1, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012458-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2024
Nathaniel McFadden appeals from the order that dismissed his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.
Briefly, the history of this case is as follows. Appellant stabbed his
sister, was charged with aggravated assault and possession of an instrument
of crime, and pled guilty. On January 31, 2012, he was sentenced to eleven
and one-half to twenty-three months of incarceration followed by ten years of
probation. He did not file an appeal. In 2016, while serving the probationary
tail of his sentence, Appellant murdered his grandmother. Consequently, his
probation was revoked and he was resentenced in 2018 to a term of one day
to fifteen years of imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction.
Appellant filed a PCRA petition on January 7, 2022, pleading an after-
discovered evidence claim based upon his plea counsel’s failure to obtain a J-S04003-24
mental health evaluation. See PCRA Petition, 1/7/22, at 4. Appellant
asserted that the fact that he needed to have a mental health professional
examine him in connection with the instant case was previously unknown to
him, and that he learned of it on an undisclosed date “through the assistance
of the law library and case law.” Id. at 3-4 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362 (2000) (holding capital defendant denied effective assistance of
counsel by failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at penalty
phase of trial), and Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2010)
(regarding counsel’s effectiveness in deciding how to present mental health
mitigation evidence)). He additionally attached to his PCRA petition a mental
health evaluation report that was conducted in 2017 in connection with his
murder case. Id. at Exhibit A.
The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed a motion to withdraw and
a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en
banc), indicating that Appellant’s petition was untimely. Appellant submitted
a response reiterating that he “did not know that [he] was supposed to receive
a mental health evaluation until [he] was doing a PCRA for a case [he] was
convicted of after this case.” Response, 1/11/23, at unnumbered 1. The PCRA
court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition
as untimely. Appellant filed a pro se response indicating on the one hand that
he and his attorney could not have ascertained his mental state at the time of
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his plea because Appellant “did not know there was anything wrong with [him]
at the time,” and on the other hand that he had informed his attorney that he
took “medication for [his] mental illness which is schizophrenia.” Response,
3/9/23.
By order of May 1, 2023, the court dismissed Appellant’s petition and
permitted counsel to withdraw. This timely appeal followed. The PCRA court
directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and Appellant
complied.1 Appellant presents the following question for our review: “[Were
Appellant]’s Fifth Amendment rights violated due to the fact that he did not
receive a mental health evaluation?” Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 2.
We begin with a review of the pertinent legal precepts. “In general, we
review an order dismissing or denying a PCRA petition as to whether the
findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are free from legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022)
(cleaned up).
As to legal questions, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions, and this Court may affirm a PCRA court’s order on any legal basis. As to factual questions, our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and ____________________________________________
1 In his 1925(b) statement, Appellant again represented that he had informed
plea counsel that he suffered from schizophrenia and was on medication for it, but counsel never sought a mental health investigation. He attached to the statement a 2012 chemical dependency evaluation which stated, inter alia, that Appellant acknowledged his diagnosis of schizophrenia, that he took prescription medication to treat it, and that he received monthly Supplemental Security Income benefits for it. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 6/2/23, at Exhibit B.
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the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the lower court. Great deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the certified record.
Id. (cleaned up). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA
court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d
157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).
It is well-settled “that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional
and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition
and cannot grant relief.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994
(Pa.Super. 2022). Any PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date
that the underlying judgment of sentence became final unless the petitioner
pleads and offers to prove an enumerated timeliness exception. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, a petition invoking a timeliness exception
“shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, since Appellant did not file an appeal from his January 31, 2012
judgment of sentence, it became final for purposes of challenges to his
underlying convictions on March 1, 2012.2 Accordingly, his January 2022
____________________________________________
2 Appellant’s subsequent probation revocation and resentencing in this case
started a new clock for PCRA claims related to the revocation proceeding and the new sentence. However, regarding challenges to his underlying convictions, “the revocation of Appellant’s probation did not ‘reset the clock’ for PCRA purposes.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059, 1062 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011).
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PCRA petition is facially untimely. In an attempt to obtain substantive review
of his petition, Appellant invoked the PCRA’s newly-discovered-facts
exception. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (providing an exception where
“the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner
and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”). As
we have summarized:
A petitioner satisfies the newly discovered facts exception when the petitioner pleads and proves that (1) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown and (2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the particular circumstances, to uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief, but does not require perfect vigilance or punctilious care.
Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up).
“[T]he due diligence inquiry is fact-sensitive and dependent upon the
circumstances presented. A petitioner must explain why he could not have
obtained the new facts earlier with the exercise of due diligence.”
Commonwealth v. Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440, 449 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en
banc).
Here, the documents proffered by Appellant established that he was
aware of his schizophrenia diagnosis at least since 2013, and he underwent a
mental health evaluation concerning his mental illness in 2017. Plainly, the
fact of his illness was not newly discovered by Appellant in the year prior to
the filing of his petition, and he does not assert that his condition prevented
him from raising the claim earlier. As such “[a]ll the facts regarding
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Appellant’s mental state, if not known, surely were ascertainable by the
exercise of due diligence before Appellant’s [conviction].” Commonwealth
v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 787 (Pa. 2000).
Further, neither Appellant’s discovery that his plea counsel may have
been ineffective in not seeking a mental health evaluation, nor his unearthing
of judicial decisions from 2000 and 2010 leading him to that discovery, could
be utilized as “newly-discovered facts” to satisfy the § 9545(b)(1)(ii)
exception, even if Appellant filed his petition within one year of ascertaining
them. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1285 (Pa. 2016)
(“[A] conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not a newly
discovered ‘fact’ entitling Appellant to the benefit of the exception for newly-
discovered facts.” (cleaned up)); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d
1128, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2021) (“Our Supreme Court has consistently held that
judicial opinions do not amount to new ‘facts’ under [§] 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the
PCRA.”).
In sum, Appellant failed to plead and offer to prove that the claim raised
in his PCRA petition was premised upon newly-discovered facts that he could
not have discovered earlier though the exercise of due diligence, and that he
brought the claim within one year of the date it could have first been
presented. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly dismissed his petition as
untimely.
Order affirmed.
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Date: 3/26/2024
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