J-S31008-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : GENESIS J. MATOS-RAMIREZ : : Appellant : No. 786 EDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 17, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0002157-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2023
Appellant, Genesis J. Matos-Ramirez, appeals pro se from the order
entered on February 17, 2023 in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common
Pleas of Northampton County that dismissed, as untimely, Appellant’s latest
serial petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with attempted homicide, and
related offenses, after she stabbed three neighborhood women during a fight.1
On November 4, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve 17½ to 40
____________________________________________
1 Appellant’s failure to supply this Court with a certified record has severely
hampered our ability to prepare a thorough and verified recitation of the facts and to undertake meaningful appellate review. It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a complete record to the appellate court on appeal. See McNeal v. Eaton Corp., 806 A.2d 899 (Pa. Super. 2002). Where defects in the record impede review of an appellant’s claim, the claim is subject to waiver. See Bennyhoff v. Pappert, 790 A.2d 313, 318 (Pa. Super. 2001). J-S31008-23
years’ incarceration pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Appellant did
not file a direct appeal. Instead, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on
August 15, 2016. Counsel was appointed but, ultimately, counsel filed a
Turner/Finley2 no merit letter. Following a review of Appellant’s claims, the
PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant did not appeal the
dismissal order.
Appellant filed her second petition for collateral relief on May 14, 2018.
Again, the court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. Counsel advised
the court that Appellant’s claims either lacked merit or were previously
litigated. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s second petition on July 18,
2018. Again, Appellant did not appeal.
Appellant continued to file requests for collateral relief. All were
untimely and none alleged an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional timeliness
requirement. Appellant filed the instant petition on November 18, 2022. The
current petition consisted solely of a letter asking the court to “waive guilty
plea” and order a new trial. The letter also noted alleged inconsistencies in
the evidence showing that Appellant stabbed all three victims but did not
allege an exception to the PCRA’s time bar.
On January 5, 2023, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss
Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant responded to the court’s
2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).
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notice on January 26, 2023. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s
petition on February 17, 2023. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant’s brief raises several claims for our review.
[Did Appellant file a timely petition for collateral relief]?
[Was the evidence sufficient] to sustain [the Commonwealth’s] burden of proof for conviction?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it accepted Appellant’s guilty plea?
Did Appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel during her [guilty plea] proceedings?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (re-ordered).
We first consider whether Appellant’s November 18, 2022 petition was
subject to dismissal as untimely and without exception to the PCRA’s
jurisdictional time bar. Our standard of review regarding an order dismissing
a petition under the PCRA requires us to ascertain whether “the determination
of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
error. The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt,
74 A.3d 185, 191-192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception
to the time limitation for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
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§§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), is met. The exceptions to the timeliness requirement
are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference of government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or,
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii). A PCRA petition invoking one of
these statutory exceptions must be filed within one year of the date the claims
could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Claimed exceptions
to the PCRA’s time restrictions must be included in the petition and may not
be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d
90 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on or around December
4, 2015, or 30 days after the trial court originally imposed its sentence on
November 4, 2015.3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(3) (for purposes of the
PCRA, “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review . . . or at
the expiration of time for seeking the review”). Thus, for purposes of the
3 Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
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PCRA's time bar, Appellant needed to file her PCRA petition by December 4,
2016. Appellant filed her current petition on November 18, 2022. Thus, the
petition is patently untimely, unless Appellant satisfied her burden of pleading
and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies.
Appellant neither plead nor proved a timeliness exception. Within her
letter submission to the PCRA court, Appellant simply asked the court to set
aside her guilty plea and order a new trial. As grounds for relief, Appellant
cited alleged uncertainties about her role in stabbing the victims; she omitted
any allegation that would support the application of an exception to the PCRA’s
one-year time bar. Without an averment purporting to establish jurisdiction
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J-S31008-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : GENESIS J. MATOS-RAMIREZ : : Appellant : No. 786 EDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 17, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0002157-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2023
Appellant, Genesis J. Matos-Ramirez, appeals pro se from the order
entered on February 17, 2023 in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common
Pleas of Northampton County that dismissed, as untimely, Appellant’s latest
serial petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with attempted homicide, and
related offenses, after she stabbed three neighborhood women during a fight.1
On November 4, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve 17½ to 40
____________________________________________
1 Appellant’s failure to supply this Court with a certified record has severely
hampered our ability to prepare a thorough and verified recitation of the facts and to undertake meaningful appellate review. It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a complete record to the appellate court on appeal. See McNeal v. Eaton Corp., 806 A.2d 899 (Pa. Super. 2002). Where defects in the record impede review of an appellant’s claim, the claim is subject to waiver. See Bennyhoff v. Pappert, 790 A.2d 313, 318 (Pa. Super. 2001). J-S31008-23
years’ incarceration pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Appellant did
not file a direct appeal. Instead, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on
August 15, 2016. Counsel was appointed but, ultimately, counsel filed a
Turner/Finley2 no merit letter. Following a review of Appellant’s claims, the
PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant did not appeal the
dismissal order.
Appellant filed her second petition for collateral relief on May 14, 2018.
Again, the court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. Counsel advised
the court that Appellant’s claims either lacked merit or were previously
litigated. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s second petition on July 18,
2018. Again, Appellant did not appeal.
Appellant continued to file requests for collateral relief. All were
untimely and none alleged an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional timeliness
requirement. Appellant filed the instant petition on November 18, 2022. The
current petition consisted solely of a letter asking the court to “waive guilty
plea” and order a new trial. The letter also noted alleged inconsistencies in
the evidence showing that Appellant stabbed all three victims but did not
allege an exception to the PCRA’s time bar.
On January 5, 2023, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss
Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant responded to the court’s
2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).
-2- J-S31008-23
notice on January 26, 2023. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s
petition on February 17, 2023. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant’s brief raises several claims for our review.
[Did Appellant file a timely petition for collateral relief]?
[Was the evidence sufficient] to sustain [the Commonwealth’s] burden of proof for conviction?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it accepted Appellant’s guilty plea?
Did Appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel during her [guilty plea] proceedings?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (re-ordered).
We first consider whether Appellant’s November 18, 2022 petition was
subject to dismissal as untimely and without exception to the PCRA’s
jurisdictional time bar. Our standard of review regarding an order dismissing
a petition under the PCRA requires us to ascertain whether “the determination
of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
error. The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt,
74 A.3d 185, 191-192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception
to the time limitation for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
-3- J-S31008-23
§§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), is met. The exceptions to the timeliness requirement
are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference of government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or,
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii). A PCRA petition invoking one of
these statutory exceptions must be filed within one year of the date the claims
could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Claimed exceptions
to the PCRA’s time restrictions must be included in the petition and may not
be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d
90 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on or around December
4, 2015, or 30 days after the trial court originally imposed its sentence on
November 4, 2015.3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(3) (for purposes of the
PCRA, “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review . . . or at
the expiration of time for seeking the review”). Thus, for purposes of the
3 Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
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PCRA's time bar, Appellant needed to file her PCRA petition by December 4,
2016. Appellant filed her current petition on November 18, 2022. Thus, the
petition is patently untimely, unless Appellant satisfied her burden of pleading
and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies.
Appellant neither plead nor proved a timeliness exception. Within her
letter submission to the PCRA court, Appellant simply asked the court to set
aside her guilty plea and order a new trial. As grounds for relief, Appellant
cited alleged uncertainties about her role in stabbing the victims; she omitted
any allegation that would support the application of an exception to the PCRA’s
one-year time bar. Without an averment purporting to establish jurisdiction
to entertain claims for collateral relief outside the PCRA’s one-year time limit,
the PCRA court had no choice but to summarily dismiss Appellant’s most
recent serial petition.
In her brief to this Court, Appellant offers two arguments to support
jurisdiction over her claims for collateral relief. First, she maintains that
SCI-Muncy created an impediment to a timely filing when the facility failed to
provide Appellant the materials and assistance needed to challenge her
convictions earlier. See Appellant’s Brief at 32. Second, Appellant claims that
she received information from one of the victims which suggested that she
was not responsible for violence directed toward the other two victims. See
id.
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These contentions merit no relief. As a preliminary matter, Appellant
raises them for the first time on appeal; hence, they are waived. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (matters raised for the first time on appeal are waived).
Second, neither claim is supported by sufficient factual detail, citation to
pertinent legal authority, and references to a certified record. Therefore, both
claims are woefully underdeveloped and subject to waiver for this independent
reason. Commonwealth v. Deible, 300 A.3d 1025, 1035 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(generalized assertions and insufficient legal support compel waiver of claim).
Finally, neither claim possesses substantive merit under Section
9545(b)(1). Appellant’s claim that unidentified officials at SCI-Muncy failed,
in unspecified ways, to assist her with filings before the PCRA court overlooks
the fact that Appellant received the benefit of counsel on her first two petitions
for collateral relief. Stated differently, Appellant has not alleged, much less
demonstrated, that the failure to raise her current claims earlier resulted from
“interference” by officials at SCI-Muncy who acted in violation of the laws of
Pennsylvania or the United States. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i).
Appellant’s claim based on newly obtained information from one of her victims
is also fatally flawed. There can be little doubt that Appellant, at the time of
the fight with her neighbors, was keenly aware of her own role in the
altercation, i.e. who she attacked and who she did not. Pennsylvania courts
have said repeatedly that previously known information derived from new
sources does not trigger the timeliness exception set forth at Section
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9545(b)(1)(ii). See e.g., Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720
(Pa. 2008) (focus of new facts timeliness exception “is on [] newly discovered
facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously
known facts”) (emphasis in original). For each of these reasons, we discern
no basis to disturb the PCRA court's denial of post-conviction relief.
Order affirmed.
Date: 12/15/2023
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