J-S35012-22
2023 PA Super 105
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : MICHAEL T. MARTIN, JR. : No. 791 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0002065-2019
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: JUNE 12, 2023
The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s May 13, 2022 order
granting the post-sentence motions filed by Appellee, Michael T. Martin, Jr;
vacating the jury’s August 31, 2021 verdict finding Appellee guilty of
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child (“IDSI”) and indecent
assault,1 with prejudice; and discharging him from custody. Following our
careful review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s post-
sentence motions and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to
enter an order reinstating the jury’s guilty verdict and re-committing Appellee
to serve the balance of his sentence.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b) and 3126(a)(7), respectively. J-S35012-22
The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of
this case as follows:
Sometime in 2019, eleven-year-old J.K. indicated to her mother that [Appellee, her uncle,] had behaved inappropriately with her sexually. After an interview at Over the Rainbow Children’s Advocacy Center, which lasted just under an hour, J.K. did not disclose any abuse. However, on November 16, 2019, in a thirty-minute interview with the same interviewer, J.K. disclosed several incidents of abuse. As a result of her second interview, on November 25, 2019, [Appellee] was charged with one count of [IDSI], a felony of the first degree, and Indecent Assault of a Person Less than 13 Years of Age, a felony of the third degree. The offense date listed for each of these offenses is September 11, 2013, although the Commonwealth acknowledges repeatedly, as discussed below, that this date was set arbitrarily.
After numerous continuances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, [a jury] trial on these charges commenced on August 31, 2021, and [Appellee] was convicted. [Appellee] was sentenced on December 15, 2021, to an aggregate sentence of 75 to 150 months in a State Correctional Institution. That same day, [Appellee] filed three [post-sentence] motions. The first was a Motion for Bail Pending Appeal, which was ultimately denied following a hearing. The second and third, filed together as Post Sentence-Motions Filed on Behalf of [Appellee], included the instant Motion Alleging Verdict was Against the Weight of the Evidence and Motion Alleging Verdict was Against the Sufficiency of the Evidence. Oral argument on the instant Motions occurred on February 2, 2022, after which we Ordered the parties to submit briefs. [Appellee] timely submitted his brief on February 11, 2022. The Commonwealth untimely submitted their brief on March 11, 2022, nine (9) days after their deadline set by Order of Court dated February 2, 2022.
On April 6, 2022, [Appellee] filed a Motion Requesting Order of Court Granting Court Extension of Time,
-2- J-S35012-22
requesting that we grant ourselves an additional thirty (30) days to render a decision for good cause[….] We found good cause to have been shown because we had only twenty-four (24) weekdays to render a decision following the filing of the Commonwealth’s brief, which was not sufficient time due to the nature of the Court’s calendar. Therefore, we granted the Motion, extending our deadline to May 14, 2022.
Trial court opinion, 5/13/22 at 2-3 (footnotes, internal citations, and emphasis
omitted).
On May 13, 2022, the trial court entered an opinion and order granting
Appellee’s post-sentence motions. Within this opinion and order, the trial
court found the weight and sufficiency of the evidence did not support
Appellee’s convictions for IDSI and indecent assault. Therefore, the trial court
vacated the jury’s verdict with prejudice. See id.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on May 20, 2022. On
May 25, 2022, the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). The Commonwealth filed its timely Rule 1925(b) statement on June
13, 2022. On June 15, 2022, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion,
incorporating the analysis in the opinion authored in support of its May 13,
2022 order granting Appellee’s post-sentence motions.
Thereafter, on July 21, 2022, Appellee filed a motion seeking to either
quash the Commonwealth’s appeal or find the issues waived due to the
Commonwealth’s purported failure to comply with Rule 1925(b). On August
-3- J-S35012-22
2, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a response. On September 29, 2022,
Appellee’s motion to quash was denied by per curiam order of this Court.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issues for our
review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it granted [Appellee’s] post-sentence motions on the basis that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to warrant the jury’s verdict of guilty to one count each of [IDSI] and indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age?
2. Whether the trial court erred when it granted [Appellee’s] post-sentence motions on the basis that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
Prior to addressing the merits of the Commonwealth’s claims, we must
first address Appellee’s contention that the May 13, 2022 order is
unappealable because it risks subjecting him to retrial in violation of double
jeopardy principles. Appellee’s brief at 7-9.
It is well settled that “the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following
a court-decreed acquittal, even if the acquittal is based upon an egregiously
erroneous foundation.” Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 318 (2013)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The same is not true when a
trial court grants a motion for discharge after the jury has convicted. The
difference is the latter scenario does not involve an acquittal, and thus no
retrial will occur. Thus, a ruling in favor of the Commonwealth on appeal
-4- J-S35012-22
merely restores the jury’s verdict. See id. at 330, n.9 (stating, “[i]f a court
grants a motion to acquit after the jury has convicted, there is no double
jeopardy barrier to an appeal by the government from the court’s acquittal,
because reversal would result in reinstatement of the jury verdict of guilt, not
a new trial.”). This Court has recognized that “[t]he law in Pennsylvania is
consistent with the federal decisions.” Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660
A.2d 90, 94 (Pa.Super. 1995) (en banc), affirmed, 683 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1996).
Appellee’s argument that the May 13, 2022 order is not appealable is
confusing; the bulk of his argument discusses the “critical distinction between
challenges to the weight of the evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence.”
Appellee’s Brief at 7. Appellee quotes caselaw holding that claims “challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence, if granted, would preclude retrial under the
double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution[.]” Id. at 7-8; Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751
(Pa. 2000). Appellee misapprehends the relevance of these observations. The
quoted portion of Widmer merely discusses what happens if an appellate
court determines and/or agrees with a trial court that the evidence was
insufficient to convict. In that case, retrial is barred. But here the question
is simply whether the trial court was correct that the jury’s verdict is
unsupported by sufficient evidence. Because Appellee was not acquitted, the
order is appealable. We now turn to the Commonwealth’s claims on appeal,
which can be divided into three distinct subsections.
-5- J-S35012-22
I.
The Commonwealth first argues that in assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence, the trial court improperly engaged in a sua sponte examination of
the legal issues discussed in Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888 (Pa.
1975) and its progeny. Commonwealth’s brief at 15. The Commonwealth
avers that Appellee’s post-sentence motions did not in any way challenge that
aspect of the Commonwealth’s case. Id.
In the instant matter, the trial court’s sufficiency analysis focused
primarily on three cases: Devlin, supra; Commonwealth v. Groff, 548
A.2d 1237 (Pa.Super. 1988); and Commonwealth v. Jette, 818 A.2d 533
(Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 833 A.2d 141 (Pa. 2003). Devlin involved
a victim who “had the mental ability of a first or second grade child and the
emotional stability of an even younger child.” Devlin, 333 A.2d at 889. In
Devlin, the victim stated that Devlin had sexually assaulted him on one
occasion but could not place the date. Other evidence suggested that if the
act occurred it would have been over a fourteen-month period. The Devlin
court held that Devlin’s due process rights were violated and ordered
discharge.
Groff involved a seven-year-old child testifying to multiple sexual
crimes that all occurred “on only one occasion.” Groff, 548 A.2d at 1239.
Applying Devlin, the Groff Court held that the Commonwealth “should …
come forward with any evidence which indicates when the alleged crime is
-6- J-S35012-22
most likely to have taken place.” Id. at 1241. The Groff Court further
concluded that Groff’s due process rights were not violated because the
Commonwealth presented other evidence narrowing the timeframe down to a
three-month period.
Finally, in Jette, the appellant was convicted of, inter alia, one count
of IDSI. The victim, who was eight-years old at the time of the incidents,
testified to a continuing course of sexual abuse, detailing “four of the worst
incidents, [and] describing generally when they occurred by month and
generally what time of the year.” Jette, 818 A.2d at 535. The Jette Court
affirmed the convictions, concluding that the Commonwealth “must be
afforded broad latitude when attempting to fix the date of offenses which
involve a continuous course of criminal conduct.” Id., quoting Groff, 548
A.2d at 1242.
Here, the trial court found that “the Commonwealth failed to meet its
burden to prove a continuing course of conduct in a case involving the abuse
of a young child pursuant to [Jette].” Trial court opinion, 5/13/22 at 1.
Alternatively, “even if the Commonwealth had proven a continuing course of
conduct,” the trial court concluded that the Commonwealth was not entitled
to “‘the broad leeway’ afforded to them in setting the approximate time and
place[.]” Id. Finally, “even if the Commonwealth had proceeded at trial under
a theory pursuant to [Groff],” the trial court determined that the
-7- J-S35012-22
Commonwealth failed to meet its burden to provide corroborating evidence.
Id.
Following our careful review, we agree with the Commonwealth’s
contention that the trial court erred by engaging in a sua sponte examination
of legal issues that were not raised by Appellee. We begin our analysis of this
issue by quoting Appellee’s post-sentence motion for relief:
6. [Appellee] alleges that the verdict was against the sufficiency of the evidence.
7. The law related to said claim is as follows:
a) It is appropriate for the trial court to determine if the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdict. Commonwealth v. Martin, [101 A. 3d 706 (Pa. 2019)].
b) The court must review the evidence in the aggregate in order to determine the propriety of the Defendant's motion. In Interest of J.B., [189 A.3d 390 (Pa. 2013)].
Post-Sentence Motions, 12/15/21, at unnumbered 2-3 (citation formatting
amended).
Appellee’s motion then cited a series of facts in paragraph eight, all of
which may fairly be summarized as attacking the plausibility of J.K.’s
testimony. The motion concluded:
9. Applying the law and facts, as set forth above, warrant[s] relief for [Appellee]. It is clearly evident that the evidence against the defendant was “tenuous,” “vague,” and “uncertain[,]” Commonwealth v. Talbert, [129 A.3d 536
-8- J-S35012-22
(Pa.Super. 2015)], and [the verdict] was so contrary to the evidence as to sho[ck] one’s sense of justice. Commonwealth v. Morales, [91 A.2d 80 (Pa. 2014)]. It is imperative that the [c]ourt enter a directed verdict or one of aquital [sic] so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, [84 A.3d 736 (Pa.Super. 2014)]. To fail to do such would be to deny justice. Commonwealth v. Green, [204 A.3d 469 (Pa.Super. 2019)]; Commonwealth v. Williams, [176 A.3d 298 (Pa.Super. 2017)]; Commonwealth v. Miller, [172 A.3d 632 (Pa.Super. 2017)].
Post-Sentence Motions, 12/15/21, at unnumbered 6 (citation formatting
While styled as a sufficiency claim, both the facts cited in support of
Appellee’s claim and the law in support largely attack the weight of the
evidence. An argument that goes purely to weight, even if styled as
sufficiency, necessarily fails. See Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666,
672 (Pa. 1999) (stating, “[a]lthough [the] appellant phrases this as a
sufficiency argument, the challenge goes to the weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, [the] appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must
fail.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829 (2000). That Appellee’s
complaints went to the weight is evident from the citations in the ninth
paragraph of his post-sentence motions. The complete sentence Appellee
cited from Talbert states, “[i]n order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge
to the weight of the evidence, ‘the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and
uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.’” Talbert, 129
-9- J-S35012-22
A.3d at 546 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Antidormi citation discusses
the relief applicable to a successful weight challenge, a retrial, whereas the
remedy for a successful challenge on sufficiency grounds is discharge.
Even though Appellee raised, at best, only a generic sufficiency of
evidence claim without reference to any element(s) of the crime, the trial
court’s analysis had almost nothing to do with whether the evidence would
enable a rational fact-finder to convict. The “Devlin claim” explored by the
trial court does have a connection to a general sufficiency of the evidence
challenge in that both are grounded in due process. However, their
commonality ends there, as Devlin is about the fundamental right to present
a defense.
The United States Supreme Court held in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979), that the Due Process Clause as incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that all convictions be supported by “sufficient proof —
defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable
doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” Id. at 316. We follow
that approach, as stated in Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139 (Pa.
2012):
First, our standard of review, like the Jackson standard, recognizes the proper regard an appellate court must give to the fact-finder’s evaluation of all of the evidence received at trial and, therefore, requires scrutiny of the totality of that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth. Further, our Court’s
- 10 - J-S35012-22
determination of the ultimate question of evidentiary sufficiency parallels the central inquiry under the Jackson standard, namely, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 1164 (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted).
The Jackson decision protects due process in a particular way: it
operates as a check on the quality of the government’s evidence in proving
the crimes. Separately, due process requires that the Commonwealth give
fair notice in the charging instrument. “In criminal … matters, the United
States Supreme Court has discerned a due process requirement that alleged
misconduct must be identified with particularity in the essential notice
conferred.” In re R.M., 790 A.2d 300, 305 (Pa. 2002). The criminal
information “sets the stage for trial and what the Commonwealth intends to
prove.” Commonwealth v. King, 234 A.3d 549, 563 (Pa. 2020). This
implicates basic due process protections. “No principle of procedural due
process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and
a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired,
are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding
in all courts, state or federal.” Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948).
These due process protections are linked to the due process protections
encompassed by a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. The charging document
puts the defendant on notice of what the Commonwealth intends to prove,
and, in turn, the evidence presented at trial must be of sufficient quality to
- 11 - J-S35012-22
enable a rational fact-finder to conclude that the Commonwealth has proved
the crimes specified within the information beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court addressed the fact that the criminal information
encompassed a nine-month period of time and opined that this “shifted the
burden” to the defense. “It is ... beyond cavil that it is the Commonwealth’s
burden to prove guilt, rather than the defendant’s duty to establish
innocence.” Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 453 A.2d 927, 929 n.2 (Pa.
1982). The Devlin Court recognized that, under the circumstances of a
particular case, a defendant’s due process right to present a defense may be
violated, but that does not shift the burden to the defendant. Devlin, 333
A.2d at 891 (stating, “[t]he State Constitution is violated where the defendant
is substantially denied an opportunity to present a defense.”) (citation
omitted); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006)
(stating, “[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation
Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”)
(citation omitted). The trial court’s belief that the Commonwealth “shifted
tactics” midtrial is more accurately described as a potential due process
violation relating to the validity of “variances” between the information and
the evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 82 (1935) (stating, “[t]he true inquiry … is not whether there has
- 12 - J-S35012-22
been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to
‘affect the substantial rights’ of the accused.”).
Instantly, we agree with the Commonwealth that the issues raised by
Appellee in his post-sentence motion cannot be interpreted as a claim that he
was denied an opportunity to present a defense. Moreover, our assessment
that the legal theory explored in Devlin and its progeny is a distinct due
process claim is corroborated by the fact those cases suggested that a
defendant must preserve and raise that specific issue. The Devlin opinion
makes clear that the appellant therein explicitly cited the inability to raise a
defense, not that the evidence was insufficient to convict: “At the close of the
Commonwealth’s case, the defense demurred to the prosecution’s evidence
on the ground that the Commonwealth had not fixed the date of the crime
with sufficient particularity, and thus the charge was impossible to defend.”
Devlin, 333 A.2d at 890.
Likewise, in Jette, the appellant therein clearly raised that specific
theory: “Jette does not argue that the Commonwealth failed to prove any
element of the crimes of which he was convicted. Instead, [the a]ppellant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because
the victim’s testimony was not sufficiently specific regarding the dates of the
incidents of abuse.” Jette, 818 A.2d at 534. It also bears noting that the
Devlin Court emphasized that the due process inquiry must be analyzed with
reference to the specific facts of the case. Devlin, 333 A.2d at 892 (stating,
- 13 - J-S35012-22
“[h]ere, as elsewhere, ‘[t]he pattern of due process is picked out in the facts
and circumstances of each case.’” (citation omitted)). The Commonwealth’s
contention that the trial court exceeded its authority thus has substantial
force, as the trial court determined sua sponte that Appellee’s due process
rights were violated under the facts of the case without the benefit of
adversarial positions by the parties.
The trial court attempted to answer whether the convictions for two
counts could stand, accepting that J.K.’s testimony was sufficient to meet the
elements of the charged crimes for a subset of the entire timeframe charged.
We need only determine that Appellee did not make that claim. Instead, he
claimed that J.K. was not credible in total. Thus, whether a “variance” was
justifiable under these circumstances or whether Appellee’s ability to offer a
defense was hampered were issues not raised by Appellee. Accordingly, we
agree with the Commonwealth’s first argument that the trial court improperly
addressed issues that were not raised in Appellee’s post-sentence motions.
II.
The Commonwealth next contends that the trial court erred in granting
Appellee’s post-sentence motions on the basis that the Commonwealth failed
to present sufficient evidence to support Appellee’s convictions for IDSI and
indecent assault. Commonwealth’s brief at 12, 25.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
- 14 - J-S35012-22
verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact- finder. Any question of doubt is for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citations
omitted), appeal denied, 4 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2010).
A person will be found guilty of IDSI “when the person engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13 years of
age.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b). “Deviate sexual intercourse” is defined as
“[s]exual intercourse per os or per anus…. The term also includes penetration,
however slight, of the genitals or anus of another person with a foreign object
for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement
procedures.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
Additionally, “[a] person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has
indecent contact with the complainant … for the purpose of arousing sexual
desire in the person or the complainant and … the complainant is less than 13
years of age[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7). Indecent contact is defined as
“[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the
purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3101.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the verdict winner, we find there was ample evidence to sustain Appellee’s
- 15 - J-S35012-22
convictions for IDSI and indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years
of age. At trial, the Commonwealth called three witnesses: J.K.; J.K.’s
mother, E.A.; and Detective David Rush. The record reflects that J.K., who
was fifteen-years old at the time of trial, testified that Appellee would make
her perform oral sex on him, “[u]sually in the computer room.” Notes of
testimony, 8/31/21 at 72-75. J.K. testified that Appellee began sexually
abusing her “a couple days into it in the first week” after she and her family
moved into his home during the 2013 school year. Id. J.K. was between
seven and eight-years old when these incidents took place. Id. at 25, 91.
J.K. further testified that no one else was present in the room when these
incidents took place, but the other residents of the household would
“[s]ometimes … be upstairs and sometimes they would be in the outside of
the house in the back yard.” Id. at 73, 75. J.K. also stated that the incidents
“would usually be in the daytime.” Id. at 76.
On cross-examination, J.K. agreed that in a videotaped statement she
said that the abuse happened every day, but clarified that “[i]t happened
every other day because sometimes it would be like breaks.” Id. at 114. J.K.
testified that the abuse continued until she “said ‘no’ the one time and then
we moved out shortly after.” Id. at 74. J.K. further testified that she disclosed
the abuse to her two sisters a few years after leaving Appellee’s residence.
Id. at 123. J.K. and her sisters then told E.A., who subsequently contacted
the authorities and an investigation commenced. Id. at 81.
- 16 - J-S35012-22
This Court has long recognized that the testimony of the complainant
standing alone is sufficient to convict. “[A] solitary witness’s testimony may
establish every element of a crime, assuming that it speaks to each element,
directly and/or by rational inference.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180
A.3d 474, 479 (Pa.Super. 2018) (emphasis in original), appeal denied, 205
A.3d 315 (Pa. 2019). Here, the record reflects that J.K.’s testimony that
Appellee’s genitals made contact with her mouth is sufficient to meet the
elements of IDSI. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 714
(Pa.Super. 2003) (stating, “[b]ecause there was oral contact with the
[a]ppellant’s genitalia and the victim’s mouth, we find the evidence is
sufficient to establish penetration however slight.”). Likewise, the same
testimony meets the definition of indecent assault under Section 3126(a)(7),
as it was undisputed that J.K. was under 13 at the time of these crimes.
Accordingly, J.K.’s testimony that she and Appellee had oral sex on multiple
occasions, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to establish both crimes.
The trial court concluded that J.K.’s testimony presented a “conundrum”
because she stated, when confronted with a prior statement, that the abuse
occurred every day, that it occurred every other day. Trial court opinion,
5/13/22 at 23-26. The trial court determined that this was extremely unlikely
when measured against Appellee’s stipulated work records. Id. The core
problem with the trial court’s analysis is that it appeared to consider the jury’s
ability to weigh evidence as constituting an all-or-nothing proposition. The
- 17 - J-S35012-22
“conundrum” presented by J.K.’s testimony that the abuse occurred every
other day and the stipulation to Appellee’s work records is resolvable by
concluding that a rational fact-finder could reject parts of J.K.’s testimony
while accepting others. The jury could credit J.K.’s testimony that Appellee
serially abused her, but not at the frequency claimed. The jury was not
required to fully credit J.K.’s testimony in all respects for the conviction to be
valid. The jury could have, for example, rationally concluded that J.K. was so
traumatized by multiple incidents of abuse that she recalled it happening more
often than it did.
The jury was not required to fully credit that aspect of J.K.’s testimony
to uphold this conviction. A rational fact-finder could conclude that Appellee
repeatedly abused J.K. while simultaneously concluding that it did not occur
as often as J.K. stated.
The United States Supreme Court has held that “[s]ufficiency review
essentially addresses whether the government’s case was so lacking that it
should not have even been submitted to the jury.” Musacchio v. United
States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). If a jury “was convinced, … the only question under Jackson is
whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of
bare rationality.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012). We
conclude that it does not in the case sub judice, and therefore reverse the
- 18 - J-S35012-22
trial court’s order discharging Appellee on the basis there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict.
III.
In its final claim, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in granting Appellee’s post-sentence motion on the basis that
the jury’s verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence.
Commonwealth’s brief at 30. The Commonwealth contends that the trial
court’s analysis indicates that it improperly attempted to function as the
thirteenth juror in this case by disregarding the jury’s judgment and
substituting its own for that of the fact-finder. Id. at 32. For the following
reasons, we agree.
This Court has recognized that “[a]n allegation that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.”
Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1051 (2010).
[W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the
- 19 - J-S35012-22
findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
....
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and
emphasis omitted).
Upon review, we disagree with the trial court’s assessment that this
matter was one of the exceedingly rare cases in which a jury’s verdict should
be vacated on weight-of-the-evidence grounds. As discussed, our Supreme
Court has recognized that “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting
or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or
was not against the weight of the evidence….” Id. (citation omitted). “[A]
true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists
- 20 - J-S35012-22
to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed.”
Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 643 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 970 (Pa. 2018). The primary focus of
such a challenge is whether “the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in
favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of justice.”
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1048 (2014).
Here, the jury heard testimony from multiple Commonwealth witnesses
that Appellee sexually abused J.K. The jury clearly found the testimony and
evidence presented at trial credible and elected not to believe Appellee’s
version of the events. The trial court’s opinion vigorously discusses alternative
theories to explain J.K.’s inconsistent testimony, in an attempt to explain why
it believes the verdict in this matter was a “shock to the conscience.” See
trial court opinion, 5/13/22, at 35, 38-44. In doing so, we find that the trial
court plainly exceeded the limits of judicial discretion and invaded the
exclusive domain of the jury by substituting its own credibility determination
for that of the fact-finder. See Clay, supra.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s May 13, 2022 order
granting Appellee’s post-sentence motions and discharging him from custody,
and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order
reinstating the jury’s guilty verdict and re-committing Appellee to serve the
balance of his sentence.
- 21 - J-S35012-22
Order reversed. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge McLaughlin joins the Opinion.
P.J.E. Bender files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/12/2023
- 22 -