Com. v. Manley, L.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 3234 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S21019-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LEVON MANLEY : : Appellant : No. 3234 EDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 24, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0501841-2006

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2025

Appellant, Levon Manley, appeals pro se from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed as untimely his

serial petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

August 2, 2007, a jury convicted Appellant of aggravated assault, attempted

murder, and related offenses. On October 26, 2007, the court sentenced

Appellant to eighteen to thirty-six years of incarceration. This Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on November 30, 2009, and our Supreme

Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on May 28, 2010.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S21019-25

See Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal

denied, 606 Pa. 671, 996 A.2d 491 (2010).

Appellant filed a timely first PCRA petition on April 4, 2011. The PCRA

court appointed counsel, who later filed a Turner/Finley2 no-merit letter

asserting that Appellant’s PCRA claims lacked merit and there existed no other

issues of arguable merit that could be raised. The PCRA court dismissed

Appellant’s petition on October 21, 2013, and this Court affirmed on February

9, 2015. See Commonwealth v. Manley, 120 A.3d 373 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(unpublished memorandum). Appellant subsequently filed a second PCRA

petition, which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely on June 2, 2017. This

Court affirmed the dismissal of the second petition on November 28, 2018.

See Commonwealth v. Manley, 201 A.3d 886 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(unpublished memorandum).

Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition on August 16, 2023.3

On December 7, 2023, the Commonwealth filed an answer asserting that

Appellant’s claims should be dismissed as time barred. On February 9, 2024,

Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition. The Commonwealth filed its answer

to the amended petition on February 21, 2024, arguing that the supplemental

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1998); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

3 On December 6, 2023, Appellant also filed a “judicial notice petition,” requesting that the court take notice of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions as well as certain caselaw Appellant deemed relevant.

-2- J-S21019-25

amended petition is untimely and none of the claims raised overcome the

PCRA’s jurisdictional time bar. On June 21, 2024, the PCRA court issued notice

of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907,

indicating that it served the notice on Appellant via certified mail. On July 10,

2024, Appellant filed a writ of mandamus asserting that he did not receive the

certified copy of the PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss. On August 13,

2024, the court filed an additional notice of intent to dismiss the petition as

untimely. On September 3, 2024, Appellant filed a pro se response to the

court’s notice of intent to dismiss. Ultimately, the court denied PCRA relief on

October 24, 2024. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on November 22,

2024. Pursuant to the court’s order, Appellant filed a concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on December 23, 2024.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Did trial/PCRA court erred when it heard Commonwealth’s evidence about [Appellant’s] religious beliefs at 07/31/07 N.T. pages 13, 14 ?

II. Did trial/PCRA court err when it failed to dismiss complaint pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 600 in violation of PA Constitution art. I § 9?

III. Did Commonwealth’s Napue[ v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959)] evidence hinder trial/PCRA court from properly applying 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) pursuant to 1 Pa.C.S. 1921 and 1 Pa.C.S. 1922 for [Appellant’s] illegal sentence?

IV. Did trial/PCRA court’s [pretrial] prosecution violate PA Constitution art. § 9?

V. Did [initial] PCRA [counsel’s] … inadequate

-3- J-S21019-25

representation force [Appellant’s] hybrid [representation] in first PCRA appeal?

VI. Did trial/PCRA [court] charge jury with improper jury [instruction] that denied [Appellant] jury trial provided by PA Constitution art. I § 9?

VII. Did trial/PCRA court err in its breakdown in the judicial process when it allowed clerk of court not to serve [Appellant] any orders?

(Appellant’s Brief at 11-12) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

As a preliminary matter, we note that the timeliness of a PCRA petition

is a jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 853

(Pa.Super. 2016). A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition,

shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence

becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final

“at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(3). The statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow very limited

circumstances to excuse the late filing of a petition; a petitioner must also

assert the exception within the time allowed under the statute. 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(1) and (b)(2).

To obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than one year after

the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner must allege and prove

at least one of the three timeliness exceptions:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of

-4- J-S21019-25

interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, a PCRA petitioner must raise

his proffered time-bar exception within one year of its discovery. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

This Court has explained:

The [newly-discovered] facts exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.... Additionally, the focus of this exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.

Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296 A.3d 1228, 1232 (Pa.Super. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 2015)).

Furthermore, newspaper articles are generally insufficient to establish a newly

discovered fact exception. See id. (holding that newspaper articles

referencing misconduct by detectives in matters unrelated to appellant do not

constitute newly-discovered facts).

Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on August 26,

-5- J-S21019-25

2010, ninety days after our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal

following Appellant’s direct appeal, upon expiration of the time to file a petition

for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13

(allowing 90 days to file petition for writ of certiorari). Appellant filed the

current PCRA petition on August 16, 2023, which is patently untimely. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

In an attempt to escape the time-bar, Appellant vaguely asserts the

“newly discovered fact” exception. Specifically, Appellant argues that on

August 18, 2022, he learned that the Assistant District Attorney who

prosecuted him at trial had a propensity to submit false evidence to the court.

Appellant discovered this fact after a fellow inmate showed Appellant a

Philadelphia Daily News article from 2004 discussing the attorney’s

reassignment. Appellant also claims that he saw a news program on CNN

discussing his first PCRA counsel having been found ineffective in a different

case, and he argues that first PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

his case by failing to raise the issue of the Assistant District Attorney’s alleged

misconduct.

The PCRA court rejected Appellant’s assertion that any exception to the

PCRA time-bar applied, explaining that “Appellant’s [Rule] 1925(b)

[statement] raises seven claims of error. Included in those claims are

challenges related to ineffective assistance of counsel, sentencing, and jury

instructions; all aspects of which have been previously litigated. There is

-6- J-S21019-25

nothing new, or that would [meet] the time restraints of the PCRA, or its

exceptions.” (PCRA Court Opinion, dated 1/30/25, at 5-6). The PCRA court

explained that Appellant’s claims pertaining to sentencing and jury

instructions were patently untimely, and no exception applied. Additionally,

Appellant’s claims related to his religious beliefs, speedy trial rights, and

partiality were raised for the first time, were untimely, and did not meet an

exception to the PCRA time bar. Furthermore, Appellant’s claims of ineffective

assistance of trial and direct appeal counsel were raised in Appellant’s first

PCRA and were rejected by both the PCRA court and this Court. The PCRA

court also noted that Appellant’s second PCRA petition raised issues of

ineffective assistance of counsel, which were similarly meritless and untimely.

(See id. at 6-7).

Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s claims are

time barred, and that Appellant has not satisfied any of the exceptions to

establish jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). With respect to the

specific assertion Appellant raises on appeal, the news article pertaining to the

Assistant District Attorney’s alleged misconduct in another case is unrelated

to Appellant’s case and does not constitute newly discovered facts to

overcome the jurisdictional hurdle. See Reeves, supra. Furthermore, in his

second PCRA petition, which Appellant filed in 2015, he raised allegations that

the Assistant District Attorney knowingly presented false testimony.

Therefore, Appellant cannot demonstrate that this claim is “newly-discovered”

-7- J-S21019-25

or that it was raised within one year of its discovery. See id.; 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(2).

Appellant’s allegations that his initial PCRA counsel was ineffective for

not raising claims related to the Assistant District Attorney’s misconduct

similarly do not satisfy any PCRA time-bar exception. Although Appellant

alleges that he filed his petition within one year of seeing the CNN story and

learning about first PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in another case, Appellant

draws no connection between the case discussed in the news story and his

own case. To the extent that Appellant claims counsel was ineffective for

failing to litigate claims concerning the Assistant District Attorney’s

misconduct, Appellant could have challenged first PCRA counsel’s

effectiveness in his second PCRA petition, as Appellant was aware of prior

PCRA counsel’s representation and any related deficiencies at that time. See

Reeves, supra. Accordingly, Appellant’s petition remains time-barred, and

we affirm the order dismissing his petition as untimely. 4

Order affirmed.

4 To the extent that Appellant insists that he did not receive the court’s Rule

907 notice of intent to dismiss, we note that the certificate of service attached to the June 21, 2024 notice indicates that Appellant was served via certified mail. Even if he did not receive the initial notice of intent to dismiss, the court issued a second notice of intent to dismiss on August 13, 2024, which Appellant received and to which he filed a response. Moreover, the failure to issue a proper notice of intent to dismiss is not reversible error where a PCRA petition is untimely. See Commonwealth v. Pridgen, 305 A.3d 97 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 318 A.3d 97 (2024). Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief based on any deficient notice.

-8- J-S21019-25

Date: 10/28/2025

-9-