J-S01041-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CURTIS D MAHAFFEY : : Appellant : No. 960 WDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 14, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004685-2003
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CURTIS MAHAFFEY : : Appellant : No. 1340 WDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 14, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0017548-2002
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: February 18, 2026
Appellant, Curtis D. Mahaffey, appeals from the order entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissing as untimely his sixth
petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A
§§ 9541-46. We affirm.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S01041-26
We addressed the underlying factual and procedural history of this case
in our prior decision affirming the PCRA court’s order denying relief on
Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition:
Briefly, following a jury trial [commencing on November 13, 2003], Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy. On November 20, 2003, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. On direct appeal we affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Mahaffey, No. 2279 WDA 2003 (Pa. Super. filed July 20, 2005). Our Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for leave to file a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc on October 6, 2005. See Commonwealth v. Mahaffey, 68 WM 2005 (Pa. 2005).2
From 2006 through 2019, Appellant filed several PCRA petitions, none of which were successful. On September 21, 2021, Appellant filed [his fifth PCRA] petition (which, as noted above, Appellant identified as a “Petition for Subpoena of an Official's Misconduct Records/Reports”). In his petition, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the affidavit of probable cause for Appellant's arrest and the truthfulness of Detective Logan, the affiant. On October 7, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as an untimely PCRA petition.
Commonwealth v. Mahaffey, 304 A.3d 740 (Pa. Super. 2023) (bracketed
language added).
On January 8, 2025, Appellant filed the present PCRA petition, his sixth,
raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, newly-discovered facts,
and governmental interference, all stemming from his assertion that one
Stephen Montgomery, a fellow inmate, informed him that a former Allegheny
County assistant district attorney and now sitting court of common pleas judge
had been investigated and disciplined for knowingly suppressing the
investigative work and testimony of Allegheny County Detective Dennis
-2- J-S01041-26
Logan,1 who conducted the post-arrest interrogation of Appellant and testified
at Appellant’s criminal trial that Appellant confessed to committing the crimes
with which he was charged. By order dated July 14, 2025, the PCRA court
dismissed this sixth petition as untimely and presenting no recognized
exception to the statutory time bar, see infra. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the PCRA court err or abuse its discretion in denying post- conviction relief on this claim of whether Appellant is entitled to a new trial in this matter based on previously unavailable and exculpatory information material, namely an affidavit from Stephen Montgomery, which must be accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the PCRA court’s Order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA Petition without a hearing, whereas Montgomery informed Appellant that [a former Allegheny County ADA] had been investigated and disciplined by the Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board for the knowing use of malfeasance in connection with his office’s investigation of criminal cases handled by Police Detective Dennis Logan, who ____________________________________________
1 As this Court summarized in another appeal:
In March 2000, a lawsuit was filed against Detective Logan alleging that during an interrogation, he violated the constitutional rights of a homicide suspect. The plaintiff referenced a 1999 document from the Department of Public Safety, Office of Municipal Investigations which listed three complaints against Detective Logan, and alleged that Detective Logan engaged in coercive interrogation techniques against him. A federal jury awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in damages in June 2002. A new trial was subsequently granted, and after a settlement conference, the parties entered into a stipulation dismissing the case with prejudice in November 2002.
Commonwealth v. Boyer, 323 A.3d 182, 2024 WL 2815035, at *2 (Pa. Super. 2024) (non-precedential decision) (cleaned up).
-3- J-S01041-26
was an “arm of the prosecutor” or member of the “prosecution team,” and was the investigating officer on Appellant’s case, and failing to rule on whether Appellant established exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time bar for governmental interference and/or newly-discovered fact: PCRA court committed additional err [sic] by failing to determine whether [the Allegheny County ADA] had an affirmative duty to disclose impeachment evidence, coupled with a duty to disclose, which constituted a Brady violation?
2. Did the PCRA court err or abuse its discretion in denying post- conviction relief on the claim of whether Appellant is entitled to a new trial in this matter based on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to investigate the Commonwealth’s key witness against Petitioner, Police Detective Dennis Logan, who proffered evidence Petitioner verbally admitted in the crime alleged?
3. Did the PCRA court err or abuse its discretion in denying post- conviction relief on Appellant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of PCRA Petition and Petitioner’s Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of PCRA Petition and Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate its Notice of Intention to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, for this PCRA Court’s mistaken findings of fact in its June 17, 2025, Notice of Intention to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. that “Although these pleadings reference a January 8, 2025, PCRA Petition, the dockets do not contain such an entry.”?
Brief of Appellant at 4.
Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-
settled:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court's ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court's decision on any grounds if the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
-4- J-S01041-26
afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
Under the PCRA, any petition, including a second or subsequent petition,
must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes
final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final
at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking such
review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA's timeliness requirements
are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the
issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. See Commonwealth
v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
As addressed above, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on
or about August 19, 2005, after this Court affirmed judgment of sentence on
July 20, 2005, and the 30-day period to file a timely petition for allowance of
appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113
(stating: “Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, a petition for allowance
of appeal shall be filed with the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court within 30
days after the entry of the order of the Superior Court or the Commonwealth
Court sought to be reviewed”); Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50
(Pa. Super. 2000) (holding date that Supreme Court denies untimely petition
for allowance of appeal does not alter date judgment of sentence becomes
-5- J-S01041-26
final for purposes of time restrictions of PCRA). Therefore, Appellant had until
Monday, August 21, 2006, to file a facially timely PCRA petition. Appellant
filed his current serial PCRA petition on June 2, 2025, making it facially
untimely by nearly two decades.
Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition, however, if the
petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of the three exceptions set forth at
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Those three exceptions are as follows:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
Id. Any petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within one
year of the date the claim could have been presented. Id. at § 9545(b)(2).2
“The PCRA petitioner bears the burden of proving the applicability of one of
the exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). ____________________________________________
2 On October 24, 2018, the General Assembly amended Section 9545(b)(2)
and extended the time for filing a petition from sixty days to one year from the date the claim could have been presented. See 2018 Pa.Legis.Serv.Act 2018-146 (S.B. 915), effective December 24, 2018. The amendment applies only to claims arising one year before the effective date of this section, December 24, 2017, or thereafter.
-6- J-S01041-26
Appellant acknowledges the untimeliness of his present petition and,
therefore, invokes Subsection 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii) in claiming that he
qualifies under both the governmental interference and the newly discovered
fact exceptions of the PCRA as bases for obtaining this court’s jurisdiction over
his patently untimely serial petition. As noted in our 2023 decision affirming
the PCRA court’s order denying relief on Appellant’s fifth petition, Appellant
had sought reversal of his conviction by asserting both an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim and a Brady claim based on the underlying
assertion that the Philadelphia Police Department Detective Dennis Logan,
who testified at his criminal trial that he took Appellant’s confession to murder
and conspiracy to commit murder in connection with the shooting death of
Lanel Buckner, had a history of testifying untruthfully against criminal
defendants that remained undisclosed at his criminal trial. We deemed
Appellant’s fifth petition untimely and determined that his claims failed to
satisfy the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar.
Specifically, we reasoned:
Appellant apparently attempts to invoke the newly discovered fact exception,[fn] see Petition for Subpoena of an Official's Misconduct Records/Reports, 9/21/21, at 2. Indeed, he alleges that the discovery of Detective Logan's history of untruthfulness, constituted “newly discovered evidence,” which he intends to use to “impeach the credibility of Detective Logan's truthfulness.” Id. Appellant, however, does not explain when he first became aware of the allegations he makes in his current petition. Additionally, he does not explain why he could not have discovered those facts in a timely manner nor the efforts he put forward to discover those facts.[fn]
-7- J-S01041-26
Thus, given that the instant petition is facially untimely, and given that Appellant failed to prove the applicability of the “newly discovered facts” exception, we conclude we have no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. The record supports the PCRA court's determinations, and we agree with counsel that Appellant's claims lack merit. Moreover, having conducted an independent review of the record in light of the PCRA petition, as well as the contents of counsel's petition to withdraw and brief, we agree that the PCRA petition is meritless and that counsel is entitled to withdraw.
Commonwealth v. Mahaffey, 304 A.3d 740 (Pa. Super. 2023).3
Appellant’s present PCRA petition, his sixth, attempts to relitigate his
previously rejected “newly discovered fact” and “government
interference/Brady” claims premised on Detective Logan’s coercive ____________________________________________
3 In deeming meritless Appellant’s argument that Detective Logan lied in Appellant’s affidavit of probable cause supporting his arrest, this Court, in Appellant’s previous PCRA appeal, observed that the same underlying issue was raised and disposed of on the merits on direct appeal, where Appellant unsuccessfully argued that the affidavit of probable cause was premised on false information provided by a witness. Mahaffey, 304 A.3d 740 at fn.9. We continued:
In the instant petition, Appellant argues that the affidavit of probable cause was premised on Detective Logan's untruthfulness about Appellant's statements made to Detective Logan during the interview. We see two additional problems with the current petition. First, “[a] petitioner is not entitled to relitigate a claim every time he offers a new theory or argument which he had not previously advanced.” Commonwealth v. Tenner, 547 A.2d 1194, 1197 (Pa. Super. 1988), appeal denied, 562 A.2d 826 (Pa. 1989); see also Commonwealth v. Fuller, 509 A.2d 364, 366 (Pa. Super. 1986). Second, Detective Logan's alleged untruthfulness about what Appellant stated at the time of Appellant's interview was known to Appellant since before the trial; yet he, inexplicably, decided to raise it only now.
Mahaffey, 304 A.3d 740 at **3, fn. 9.
-8- J-S01041-26
interrogation techniques by couching them within a layered claim declaring
that the former Allegheny County assistant district attorney who prosecuted
his case was investigated and disciplined for knowingly suppressing the
detective’s malfeasance. Appellant seeks vacation of his judgment of
sentence by now asserting, first, that the prosecutor at his trial knew about
the 1999 Department of Public Safety, Office of Municipal Investigations
(“OMI”) report listing three complaints against Detective Logan and
corroborating the record of his misconduct but did not disclose it to the
defense, and, second, that his trial counsel was ineffective for not discovering
this report. 4
At the outset of our review, we observe Appellant fails to prove that
either time bar exception applies to his case. Specifically, he has not explained
why the exercise of due diligence in the wake of his own alleged experiences
with Detective Logan’s coercive interrogation methods would not have enabled
him to discover either before his trial or during the more than two decades
following his trial the publicized 1999 OMI report or the newspaper articles
and media accounts from the early 2000s covering the federal civil lawsuits
against Detective Logan emanating from other similar complaints against him. ____________________________________________
4 As this Court observed in its decision affirming the order denying relief in Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition, we apply the settled principle that “a PCRA petitioner cannot obtain review of claims that were previously litigated by presenting new theories of relief, including allegations of ineffectiveness, to relitigate previously litigated claims.” See Commonwealth v. Patterson, (non-precedential decision) 317 A.3d 568 (Pa. Super. filed March 5, 2024) quoting Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 39 (Pa. 2002).
-9- J-S01041-26
We are cognizant of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 346 A.3d 318 (Pa. filed November 5, 2025),
in which the Court addressed a PCRA petitioner’s issue asking whether the
PCRA court erroneously dismissed his patently untimely petition by “ignor[ing]
his uncontradicted allegations regarding his knowledge and diligence and
instead dismiss[ing] his PCRA petition as untimely on the basis of the now
repudiated public record presumption, see Commonwealth v. Small, [662
Pa. 309], 238 A.3d 1267, 1286 (Pa. 2020)?” Blakeney, at 322. The Court
observed that Appellant Blakeney’s petition advanced a newly-discovered fact
exception, pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(ii), which “requires only that
Blakeney plead and prove that facts relevant to his claim were unknown to
him and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due
diligence.” Id. at 323.
The due diligence requirement to the exception, however, does not
apply a presumption that petitioners will have known of the asserted facts
underlying the petition when those facts first appeared in the public record.
Instead, the requirement “calls for a circumstance-dependent analysis of the
petitioner's knowledge, not that of the public at large[,]” as described below:
The statute itself contains no exception, express or constructive, regarding information that is of public record.” [Small, 238 A.3d at 1281] (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). Thus, “the newly discovered fact exception does not call for any assessment of whether the asserted facts appear in the public record.” Id. at 1283 (emphasis added). Instead, it “calls for a circumstance-dependent analysis of the petitioner's knowledge, not that of the public at large.” Id. As such, “[i]n any
- 10 - J-S01041-26
circumstance in which a PCRA petitioner can establish the facial requirements of the newly discovered fact exception, but the court rejects the claim merely due to the earlier public availability of the information, the court is overriding the language of the PCRA.” Id. at 1284.
Blakeney, 346 A.3d 318, 323 (emphasis in original).
Guided by its review of both the relevant statute and Small, the
Blakeney Court reiterated that “the PCRA court cannot presume that
Blakeney knew of the pending charges [of attempted murder and related
offenses against Juror 7’s nephew at the time of voir dire]5 merely because
they were published in a newspaper [prior to trial].” Id. at 323. It continued,
Moreover, even if we assume that Blakeney was aware of the charges, there is nothing in the record at this point [i.e., the time of trial] to support a finding that Blakeney was aware that Juror #7 was related to the person identified in the newspaper article. As this is a necessary fact underpinning Blakeney’s claim that Juror #7 answered the voir dire question(s) untruthfully, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that Blakeney knew of the facts upon which his claim for relief relied. Id.
Nor did the Court accept the PCRA court’s conclusion that Petitioner
Blakeney had failed to establish requisite due diligence in discovering the facts
underpinning this claim. The Commonwealth argued that the appearance of
the juror’s questionnaire put Blakeney on notice that he should further
investigate this juror. The voir dire record showed, however, that the juror
5 Juror 7’s voir dire written questionnaire contained a “no” answer alongside a scribbled out “yes” answer to a question asking, “have you or a family member been charged with a crime.” Blakeney, at 322.
- 11 - J-S01041-26
orally affirmed before the trial court that he intended to answer “no.” Id. at
324. The Court thus concluded,
Blakeney was entitled to accept Juror #7's written response at face value when preparing for an imminent capital trial. Further, Blakeney was not required to research the extended family of Juror #7 to discover whether the juror answered the written question honestly. Holding Blakeney, or any counsel, to a higher standard would be expecting perfect vigilance, not reasonable effort. See [Commonwealth v.] Cox, 146 A.3d [221,] 230 [Pa. 2016)].
Id.
Viewing the record before us with the benefit of Blakeney, we discern
that a circumstance dependent analysis shows that the facts here are
distinguishable from those in Blakeney, as Appellant’s alleged personal
experience with Detective Logan’s coercive interrogation techniques, which he
maintains compelled him to make a false stationhouse confession and sign a
written statement to that effect, would have alerted him to the strong
possibility that the detective employed such methods in many instances and
would attract negative attention as a result.
Unlike in Blakeney, where the petitioner had no reason to suspect that
a juror serving at his trial had failed to reveal their nephew had been charged
with a crime similar to the charges against Blakeney, Appellant, assuming the
accuracy of his claimed experience with Detective Logan, would have had good
reason to investigate whether a record of Detective Logan’s improper
interrogation methods existed. Yet, he waited 20 years before undertaking
such an inquiry, despite his own alleged experience, and in so waiting allowed
- 12 - J-S01041-26
a discoverable record of Allegheny County civil actions and local news
publications from several years before his criminal trial to sit unreviewed. This
record supports the conclusion that Appellant has failed to carry his burden to
plead and prove that he exercised due diligence in discovering the alleged
facts that serve as the basis for the ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
governmental interference/Brady claim, and newly-discovered fact claim that
he raises in his current PCRA petition.
Our determination is consistent with a recent nonprecedential decision
of this Court that we find persuasive. In Commonwealth v. Frazier, (non-
precedential decision) No. 290 WDA 2025, 2026 WL 161665, (Pa. Super. filed
Jan. 21, 2026)6, a unanimous panel of this Court reviewed a collateral appeal
taken from the order denying relief on a patently untimely, serial PCRA petition
raising issues and arguments predicated on Detective Logan’s conduct, and it
declined to address the appeal on the merits because the petitioner failed to
qualify for an exception to the statutory time-bar. The Frazier panel
observed:
Here, Appellant [Frazier] acknowledges that his [PCRA] petition, filed approximately twenty years after his sentence became final, was facially untimely. He invoked both subsections (i) and (ii) of § 9545(b)(1) as bases for the court's jurisdiction over his Brady claim. As our Supreme Court has explained:
6 Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, we may cite
nonprecedential memorandum decisions of this Court that were filed after May 1, 2019, for their “persuasive value.” Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2).
- 13 - J-S01041-26
Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)’s exception requires the facts upon which the Brady claim is predicated were not previously known to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained through due diligence.... [T]he exception set forth in subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim. Rather, the exception merely requires that the facts upon which such a claim is predicated must not have been known to [the] appellant, nor could they have been ascertained by due diligence.
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008). Thus, neither exception could confer jurisdiction for the court to consider the merits of Appellant [Frazier’s] Brady claim unless he pled and offered to prove that he exercised due diligence in discovering the alleged Brady material.
The PCRA court noted that the lawsuit against the detectives upon which Appellant [Frazier] premises his Brady claim was filed in 2000, which predates his trial, and concluded in 2002, which was before his judgment of sentence became final. Further, “[t]here were articles in the local newspapers about the lawsuit which mentioned both detectives by name[,]” such as the one from June 2002 that Appellant [Frazier] attached to the instant PCRA petition after his family located through a simple internet search. See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/1/25, at 2. Therefore, the PCRA court concluded that, “[i]f [Appellant Frazier] had exercised due diligence, as required by the exception, he would have unearthed details of the lawsuit at some point over the past more than twenty years.” Id.
Applying the due diligence mandates discussed above, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the PCRA court's finding that Appellant [Frazier] did not meet his burden. Indeed, in the Pinson memorandum he happened upon in prison, Appellant [Frazier] would have read that in pursuing relief based upon Detective Logan's alleged misconduct, Pinson relied on: (1) a June 2002 newspaper article about it in a PCRA petition that was the
- 14 - J-S01041-26
subject of a 2009 appeal to this Court; and (2) later information he received about the civil rights case through an open records request upon which he premised a 2015 PCRA petition.
Plainly, the facts Appellant [Frazier] discovered were readily available through the exercise of due diligence many years before he filed his 2024 petition. Moreover, Appellant [Frazier] offered no explanation as to how the government interfered with his ability to bring the claim earlier. Cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, 168 A.3d 97, 106 (Pa. 2017) (holding the petitioner satisfied the governmental interference exception where due diligence would not have earlier uncovered Brady material included in the prosecution's files, but not provided to the defense before the 1986 trial, because the petitioner “had no access to the Commonwealth's files until [a witness] came forward in 2012 with his affidavits, which resulted in the discovery orders that finally revealed the Commonwealth's suppression of evidence”).
Thus, Appellant[] [Frazier’s] 2024 PCRA petition was untimely, and he failed to establish that a timeliness exception applied. Since the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits of his Brady claim, it properly dismissed his petition.
Frazier, No. 290 WDA 2025, 2026 WL 161665, at *3–5.
Because the present facts and circumstances entirely align with those
considered in Frazier, we find that decision persuasive and apply it to
conclude Appellant did not act with due diligence commensurate with his
alleged personal experience with and knowledge about Detective Logan’s
wrongful investigative and interrogation techniques. It was Appellant’s
burden to show that the facts consisting of public information of Detective
Logan’s coercive interrogation techniques underpinning the claims he now
presents in his sixth PCRA petition could not have been ascertained earlier by
the exercise of due diligence. Therefore, we affirm the order of the PCRA court
dismissing Appellant’s petition for reasons of untimeliness.
- 15 - J-S01041-26
Order affirmed.
DATE: 2/18/2026
- 16 -