Com. v. Madonado, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 12, 2024
• Docket: 878 EDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A28025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : CHRISTIAN MALDONADO : No. 878 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered February 28, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0006573-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 12, 2024

The Commonwealth seeks interlocutory review of an order entered by

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (suppression court), which

excluded a firearm abandoned by Christian Maldonado (Appellee) during his

flight from police.1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the suppression court

ruled that the weapon was inadmissible at trial because police recovered it

only after attempting to unlawfully seize Appellee. The Commonwealth now

argues that the ruling was erroneous because police had the requisite degree

of suspicion of criminal activity to detain Appellee prior to the firearm’s

abandonment. Finding no merit in the Commonwealth’s claim, we affirm. ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Commonwealth has certified in its notice of appeal that the suppression

court’s order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution of this case. Accordingly, under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), the order is immediately appealable. J-A28025-23

The pertinent case facts have been summarized by the suppression

court as follows:

Officer McGrody was on routine patrol in an unmarked vehicle when he encountered Appellee and had received no information specific to an individual or crime. The Officer first noticed Appellee simply walking on the sidewalk of the west side of Glendale Street wearing a black satchel across his shoulder/chest area. Officer McGrody observed: "to me that satchel looked like it had weight to it" but conceded he could not see any shape or form and did not know how much stuff Appellee could be carrying. Further, there was no indication in the testimony that Appellee touched or manipulated the satchel. The Officer admitted Appellee was not engaged in any criminal activity.

Appellee looks in the direction of the unmarked vehicle and walks away after which the unmarked car follow[ed] him. Appellee continue[d] to walk and look back several times at the unmarked car following him. Appellee encounter[ed] an unidentified male from whom, he obtain[ed] a bicycle. Appellee beg[an] riding the bicycle, and the unmarked car continue[d] to pursue him on to a one-way street then activating the police lights halfway down the block.

****

Essentially, Appellee was being followed, then subsequently chased by an unmarked, unidentified car, at nighttime, in a high crime neighborhood - 30 to 40 feet away. . . . Only towards the latter end of the pursuit did the officers suddenly reveal their identity by activating the police vehicle's red and blue lights located in the patrol car's windshield. Thus, Appellee's continued period of flight was compelled down the one-way street before the actual disclosure that the car was a police vehicle. Further, Officer McGrody's testimony failed to provide specific and articulable facts to support a belief that Appellee was involved in any criminal activity. Appellee was merely walking down the street wearing a satchel when he was suddenly followed by an unknown vehicle at night. Additionally, there is no evidence the bicycle was obtained by force or without permission to indicate it was stolen by Appellee.

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Suppression Court 1925(a) Opinion, 6/6/2023, at 5-7 (record citations

omitted, emphasis in original).

The above-described chase ended when Appellee crashed the bicycle he

was riding. Police apprehended him and recovered the satchel Appellee had

discarded. The satchel contained a firearm, and Appellee was subsequently

charged with three gun-related offenses. Appellee moved to suppress the

firearm on the ground that police recovered it during an illegal detention.

A suppression hearing was held on February 28, 2023, and the sole

witness was Officer McGrody. In addition to the officer’s testimony, the

Commonwealth introduced his body-camera footage of the incident. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the suppression court ruled that the firearm would

be excluded from trial because the police lacked reasonable suspicion that

they had observed Appellee committing a crime. See Suppression Hearing

Transcript, 2/28/2023, at 55-56. The Commonwealth timely appealed that

ruling, and the suppression court filed a 1925(a) opinion giving the reasons

why its order should be affirmed. See Suppression Court 1925(a) Opinion,

6/6/2023, at 5-7.

In it’s brief, the Commonwealth maintains that the firearm was

erroneously suppressed because police lawfully detained Appellee after they

saw him steal a bicycle and take flight in a high-crime area. The

Commonwealth points out further that the police had legal grounds to detain

Appellee once he committed a traffic infraction by riding the bicycle the wrong

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way down a one-way street. Appellee did not file an appellate brief in

response.

Review of a suppression court’s order is “limited to determining whether

the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v.

Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017). The suppression court’s factual

findings are binding on this Court if they are supported by the record. Id.

Conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Id.

In Pennsylvania, there are three recognized categories of police-citizen

interaction. See generally Commonwealth v. Young, 162 A.3d 524, 528

(Pa. Super. 2017). The first category is an informal encounter in which an

officer requires no suspicion of criminal activity to approach a citizen, who in

turn is free at any time to terminate the encounter. See id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Thran, 185 A.3d 1041, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(describing such interactions alternatively as a "mere encounter," an

"investigative detention," or a "custodial detention.").

The second category is an "investigative detention," in which a citizen is

compelled under the circumstances to stop and respond to an officer. See

Commonwealth v. Fuller, 940 A.2d 476, 479 (Pa. Super. 2007). Such

circumstances include those where a reasonable person would not feel free to

leave due to an officer’s “physical force or show of authority,” or a restriction

on the person’s movement. Commonwealth v. Newsome, 170 A.3d 1151,

1155 (Pa. Super. 2017).

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To justify an investigative detention, law enforcement must have

"reasonable suspicion" of unlawful activity at the outset. See

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 927 (Pa. 2019). Reasonable

suspicion may be drawn from the totality of the circumstances, and it exists

where detaining officers have a “particularized and objective basis for

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” In re D.M., 781

A.2d 1161, 11663 (Pa. 2001) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.

411, 417 (1981)).

The third type of encounter is a custodial detention. See

Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014). Such an encounter

amounts to an arrest which must be supported by probable cause that a crime

has been committed. See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 940 A.2d 476, 479

(Pa. Super. 2017).

Where police lack either reasonable suspicion for an investigative

detention or probable cause for an arrest, contraband discarded by an

individual taking flight from police must be suppressed. See Commonwealth

v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996). “Prior to the acquisition of any evidence

arising from an investigative detention, the seizure of a person must be

‘justified at its inception.’” Hicks, 208 A.3d at 932 (quoting Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).

The crux of the Commonwealth’s argument on appeal is that the

suppression court arrived at incorrect legal conclusions by making factual

determinations that are not supported by the record. According to the

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Commonwealth, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing established

that Appellee did not discard the weapon until after police had already seen

him commit a crime that would justify a detention. The Commonwealth

argues that, while in a “high-crime area,” police observed Appellee steal a

bicycle and then take flight going the wrong way down a one-way street,

giving them reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot and rendering the

discarded firearm legally obtained thereafter.

On these points, the suppression court’s interpretation of the evidence

differs from that of the Commonwealth in several key respects. First, the

suppression court determined that police initially failed to observe Appellee

engaged in any illegality, and “there is no evidence the bicycle was obtained

by force or without permission[].” Suppression Court 1925(a) Opinion,

6/6/2023, at 6.

Second, the suppression court found that police began following

Appellee without having observed a crime, and without making themselves

known as police. A person’s unprovoked flight from police in a high-crime

area may only give police reasonable suspicion that a crime was committed if

the person “knew he was running from the police." Commonwealth v.

Washington, 51 A.3d 895, 898-899 (Pa. Super. 2012) (reasonable suspicion

arises from unprovoked flight in a high crime area in "prior cases in which the

facts clearly show the defendant fled from individuals who were recognizable

as police.").

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Third, the suppression court reasoned that the pursuit of Appellee was

already underway when the police car’s red and blue lights were activated, at

which time Appellee was fleeing from an unlawful detention. See Matos, 672

A.2d at 771. (explaining that where officers’ pursuit of an individual is an

unlawful seizure, the property abandoned by the individual taking flight is

“coerced” and cannot retroactively justify a detention).

We have reviewed the record and find that the record supports the

suppression court’s findings of fact, as well as the resulting legal conclusions.

The officer who testified at the suppression hearing admitted that he did not

see Appellee committing a crime when he was initially observed in an alley.

Police nonetheless followed Appellee in an unmarked police car, prompting

Appellee to take flight in the opposite direction.

Although Appellee rode his bike the wrong way down a one-way alley,

it is important to note that this was the only route available to him once the

unmarked police car blocked the other side of the alley. To the extent that

Appellee committed a traffic offense in the presence of police, it would not

justify a detention because the arresting officers themselves provoked that

conduct. Once police activated their vehicle’s emergency lights, Appellee

would have necessarily understood that police were trying to detain him at a

time when there was no articulable basis for them to believe that a crime had

occurred. See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 621 (Pa.

2019) (“[A] reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would not interpret the

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activation of emergency lights on a police vehicle as a signal that he or she is

not free to leave.").

The evidence also supports the factual finding that Appellee did not steal

a bicycle in the presence of police. Neither the body-camera footage, nor the

testimony at the suppression hearing, establish that Appellee lacked

permission to take the bicycle from the person who had been riding it. The

evidence showed, rather, that Appellee took the bicycle from an unidentified

individual without incident. The record therefore supports the suppression

court’s finding in that regard.

As all of the suppression court’s findings of fact are supported by the

record, they are now binding on this Court. It must therefore be inferred

from those findings that both Appellee’s flight and his abandonment of a

weapon were coerced by an unlawful detention. See Matos, 672 A.2d at 774-

75. Thus, the order granting the suppression of the subject firearm must be

upheld.

Order affirmed.

Date: 3/12/2024

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