Com. v. Madison, L.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Com. v. Madison, L.

DecidedDecember 12, 2019

Docket160 WDA 2019

StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Madison, L. (Com. v. Madison, L.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Com. v. Madison, L., (Pa. Ct. App. 2019).

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Opinion

J-S64011-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LAWRENCE J. MADISON : : Appellant : No. 160 WDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 2, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0000495-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 12, 2019

Lawrence Madison appeals from the January 2, 2019 order dismissing

his petition for relief pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”). We affirm.

The instant case began on January 27, 2016, in Peters Township,

Washington County, Pennsylvania. On that date, Appellant was pulled over

while driving by an officer of the Peters Township Police Department based

upon his failure to stop at a red light. As the traffic stop progressed, Appellant

consented to various searches and was ultimately found to be in possession

of a large number of items that were determined to be stolen property

appropriated from cars and homes in the surrounding area including jewelry,

clothing, credit cards, loose change, a wireless speaker, and a holstered

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S64011-19

handgun. See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 1/27/16, at 1; see also N.T. Guilty

Plea Colloquy and Sentencing, 12/16/16, at 2 (Appellant stipulating to the

contents of the aforecited affidavit).

On December 16, 2016, Appellant pled guilty to person not to possess

a firearm, receiving stolen property, and firearms not to be carried without a

license. See N.T. Guilty Plea Colloquy and Sentencing, 12/16/16, at 4-5. He

was immediately sentenced to an aggregate term of five to ten years of

imprisonment. Id. at 6-7. Although Appellant might have qualified for

acceptance into the Washington County Veterans’ Court, the Commonwealth

would not offer him a plea that would permit his participation therein. See

Memorandum and Order, 4/28/17, at 3. Rather, Appellant was accepted into

the Allegheny County Veterans’ Court and would be eligible to participate once

he was paroled from the aforementioned sentence. See N.T. Guilty Plea

Colloquy and Sentencing, 12/16/16, at 4.

No timely post-sentence motion or direct appeal was taken. The PCRA

court appointed counsel to represent Appellant, who ultimately filed a no-merit

brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213

(Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). In pertinent part, PCRA counsel averred that

Appellant’s petition was untimely and that no exceptions to the PCRA’s

timeliness requirements were applicable. On December 5, 2018, the PCRA

court granted counsel’s petition and provided Appellant with notice of its intent

to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition on jurisdictional grounds without a

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hearing. Appellant swiftly filed a pro se response styled “Petitioner’s

Memorandum and Proffer in Response to Rule 907,” wherein Appellant argued

that the PCRA timeliness provisions at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) are

unconstitutional and that his appellate rights under the PCRA should be

reinstated, nunc pro tunc. See Petitioner’s Memorandum and Proffer,

12/31/18, at 3-6. That same day, the PCRA court filed a memorandum and

order denying Appellant’s request for reinstatement.

On January 2, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition

without a hearing. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.1

Our standard and scope of review in this context is well-articulated

under existing Pennsylvania precedent: “On appeal from the denial of PCRA

relief, our standard and scope of review is limited to determining whether the

PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and without legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013). We must view

the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at

the PCRA court level. See Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 ____________________________________________

1 The PCRA court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and advised Appellant that “[a]ny issue not properly included in the statement timely filed and served, shall be deemed waived.” Order, 1/30/19, at unnumbered 1. Appellant failed to comply. Thus, no Rule 1925(a) opinion from the trial court was filed of record. Ordinarily, this oversight on Appellant’s part would result in waiver of all his claims. However, the PCRA court’s order was not docketed in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c). This renders the order unenforceable for the purposes of waiver. See Commonwealth v. Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 472 (Pa.Super. 2017) (holding order to file Rule 1925(b) statement was unenforceable where there was no indication on the docket of the date of service of the order requiring its filing).

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(Pa. 2012). However, we apply a de novo standard of review with specific

regard to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18

A.3d 244, 259 (Pa. 2011).

In light of the PCRA court’s holding, we must assess whether Appellant’s

petition is timely or subject to one of the exceptions to the timeliness

requirements under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d

589, 591-92 (Pa.Super. 2016) (“[T]he PCRA’s timeliness requirements are

jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not address

the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.”). In

pertinent part, the PCRA provides as following regarding timeliness:

(b) Time for filing petition.—

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United Sates;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

....

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(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). In reviewing these statutory provisions, it is also

important to note that “there is no generalized equitable exception to the

jurisdictional one-year time bar pertaining to post-conviction petitions.”

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