J. S58015/17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : DENNIS JAY MACCOLL, : No. 278 MDA 2017 : Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, January 11, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No. CP-36-CR-0002834-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 13, 2017
Dennis Jay MacColl appeals, pro se, from the order of January 11,
2017, dismissing his PCRA1 petition without a hearing and allowing
appointed counsel to withdraw. We affirm.
The history of this case was set forth at length in the PCRA court’s
comprehensive March 17, 2017 opinion. (Docket #28.) To summarize,
appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea on July 10, 2013 to multiple
counts of simple assault and terroristic threats and received the agreed-upon
sentence of 6 to 23 months’ incarceration followed by 5 years of probation.
Appellant’s sentence was below the mitigated range of the guidelines.
Appellant did not take a direct appeal. On August 28, 2015, appellant
1 Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J. S58015/17
appeared for a parole/probation violation hearing. Following the hearing,
parole and probation were revoked, and appellant was resentenced on
November 10, 2015 to 2½ to 5 years’ incarceration. Post-sentence motions
were denied, and appellant filed a timely appeal. On September 9, 2016,
this court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. MacColl,
158 A.3d 173, 2016 WL 5886755 (Pa.Super. Sept. 9, 2016) (unpublished
memorandum).
A timely pro se PCRA petition was filed on November 7, 2016.
Counsel was appointed and filed a petition to withdraw and Turner/Finley2
“no-merit” letter addressing the issues raised in appellant’s petition. On
December 13, 2016, the PCRA court issued 20-day notice of intent to
dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(a).
Appellant filed a pro se response on January 5, 2017; and on January 11,
2017, the PCRA court dismissed appellant’s petition and granted PCRA
counsel leave to withdraw. This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the PCRA court has filed a Rule 1925(a)
opinion.3
2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
3The PCRA court ordered appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement within 21 days “of the date Defendant receives this Order.” (Docket #26.) The Rule 1925 order was filed on February 3, 2017, and mailed to appellant at SCI-Laurel Highlands via first-class mail and certified mail. (Id.) Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement is dated Sunday, February 26, 2017 and bears a postmark of Monday, February 27, 2017. (Docket #27.) Ordinarily,
-2- J. S58015/17
Although the PCRA court erroneously concluded in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion that appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely filed, it nevertheless
addressed the issues appellant raised on the merits. We determine that the
merits review of the Honorable Donald R. Totaro’s 22-page Rule 1925(a)
opinion ably and comprehensively disposes of the matter, discussing each of
the issues raised in appellant’s PCRA petition and on appeal with appropriate
citation to relevant authority and without legal error. Therein, Judge Totaro
thoroughly explains why all of appellant’s issues are either waived,
previously litigated, or wholly meritless and no purpose would be served by
further proceedings. In addition, appellant has cited no authority for the
proposition that appointed PCRA counsel was required to interview him prior
to filing a withdrawal petition and Turner/Finley letter. We will affirm the
order dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition on the basis of the merits review
contained in Judge Totaro’s March 17, 2017 opinion.
appellant’s concise statement would be considered untimely because it was not placed in the prison mail within 21 days of the PCRA court’s order. Nevertheless, we will not find waiver since the PCRA court explicitly provided that the Rule 1925(b) statement shall be filed within 21 days of the date appellant “receives” the order, and presumably, it took at least 1-2 days for the order to arrive at SCI-Highlands and be placed into appellant’s hands.
-3- J. S58015/17
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/13/2017
-4- Circulated 09/21/2017 03:41 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL r-J;> r-.> = •:;-) _.. :z: (J
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No.278MDA2017 g(J -1 n vs. 0 -0 3 0 c DENNIS JAY MACCOLL CP-36-CR-0002834-2013~ -1 -.. ;o _.... :< (.J1 CJ', (/)
PA R.A.P. 1925 OPINION
BY TOTARO, J.
Before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is an appeal from an order dismissing the pro
se Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief ("PCRA")filed by Dennis Jay MacColl
("Appellant"). On January 11, 2017, this court issued an order dismissing the PCRA motion
without a hearing and granting leave for Christopher P. Lyden, Esquire ("PCRA counsel") to
withdraw as counsel. On January 27, 2017, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. For the reasons
that follow, the appeal should be denied.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged with one count of simple assault and one count of terroristic
threats, at docket 2823-20i3, for an incident which allegedly occurredon May 18, 2013. See
Information.1 Appellant was additionally charged with one count of simple assault and two
counts of terroristic threats, at docket 2834-2013, for an incident which allegedly occurred on
May 25, 2013. See Information.
On July 10, 2013, Appellant tendered a negotiated guilty plea on both dockets.2 At 2823-
2013, Appellant admitted to striking Dorothy Coll ("Coll"), pulling her hair, throwing her to the
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(l) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706 (a)(l) respectively. 2 Appellant was represented by Michael E. McHale, Esquire ("trial counsel"). ground, threatening to kill her, and telling her that spending the rest of his life in jail would be
worth it if she died. (Notes of Testimony, Guilty Plea at 23-24) (hereinafter ''N. T.G.P. ").
Appellant was sentenced to serve 6 to 23 months in Lancaster County Prison ("LCP") on each
count, concurrent to one another. See Sentencing Order.
At 2834-2013, Appellant admitted pulling Coll from a chair and threatening to have her
and Victoria Burkhart ("Burkhart") killed if they called police. (N.T.G.P. at 24). Appellant was
placed on probation for two years on the charge of simple assault and five years of concurrent
probation on the two counts of terroristic threats.3 See Sentencing Order. This sentence was
made consecutive to the jail sentence imposed at 2823-2013. Id. Appellant did not appeal.
On August 28, 2015, Appellant appeared before the court with trial counsel for a parole
and probation violation (PV) hearing on the above-referenced dockets. Appellant stipulated to
some violations and a hearing was held on other alleged violations. (Notes of Testimony, PV
Hearing at 3-4) (hereinafter ''N.T.P.V."). Following the hearing Appellant was found in violation
of probation and parole on both informations, they were revoked, and sentencing was deferred
pending the completion of a Pre-Sentence Investigation ("PSI") Report. Id. at 59.
On November 10,2015, Appellant was sentenced to serve the unexpired balance of his
sentence at docket 2823-2013. (Notes of Testimony, PV Sentencing at 24) (hereinafter
"N.T.P.V.S."). At docket 2834-2013, Appellant received an aggregate sentence of 2'12 to 5 years
in jail on all counts. Id. at 24-25.
3 With a prior record score of "5," the recommended minimum sentence for each count on both dockets was between 6-16 months incarceration. See Sentencing Guidelines Worksheet. The mitigated range of the sentencing guidelines called for a minimum sentence of at least 3 months in jail on each count. Id. Appellant also admitted to violating a Protection From Abuse order by going to Coll's residence on a separate occasion, where he was found at the scene by police. (N.T.G.P. at 23).
2 On November 20, 2015, trial counsel filed a post-sentence motion which was denied on
November 23, 2015. On December 10, 2015, Chad W. Zimmerman, Esquire, ("appellate
counsel"), an assistant public defender, filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania at docket 2834-2013 only, claiming the aggregate jail sentence of 2Yi to 5 years
was an abuse of discretion which showed a bias of the sentencingjudge. See Statement of Errors
Complained of on Appeal. On September 9, 2016, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of
sentence. See Commonwealth v. MacColl, 2156 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. September 9, 2016).
On November 7, 2016, Appellant filed a prose PCRA Motion alleging that trial counsel.
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by: (1) failing to seek dismissal of all charges when the
Commonwealth conceded there was no victim or witness to prosecute the case; (2) failing to
object when the court sentenced him to 2Yi to 5 years incarceration for his first probation
violation on two misdemeanor charges; (3) failing to review his case or provide a meaningful and
vigorous defense; (4) representing him on July 10, 2013, because counsel was recently
terminated from his employer for ethical violations; and (5) failing to ask the trial court to recuse
himself from the case for bias towards Appellant. · See PCRA Motion.
On November 10, 2016, the court appointed Christopher P. Lyden, Esquire, as PCRA
counsel. On November 18, 2016, after investigating Appellant's claims, PCRA counsel
submitted a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988)
and Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), with a copy to Appellant, expressing the
opinion that there were no meritorious issues to pursue on behalf of Appellant. Counsel
simultaneously filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, complying with the requirements of
Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006) (overruled on other grounds).
3 In his Letter, PCRA counsel found the PCRA court did not have jurisdiction to review
Appellant's first claim because it was not timely filed and there were no timeliness exceptions.
See No-Merit Letter. Counsel noted the second and fifth issues were previously litigated on
direct appeal, while Appellant's fourth issue had no merit because trial counsel is duly licensed
to practice law in Pennsylvania. Id Finally, PCRA counsel dismissed the third issue by noting
that Appellant "simply made a conclusive accusation unsupported by any facts warranting relief."
Id PCRA counsel also conducted an independent review and found no meritorious claims. Id 4
Thereafter, this court conducted an independent review of the record, concluding on
December 13, 2016 that Appellant's PCRAmotion was patently frivolous, the allegations were
not supported by the record, and the court intended to dismiss the motion without a hearing. See
Rule 907 Notice. Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 907, Appellant was informed he had twenty days to file
a response and show good cause why his motion should not be dismissed. Id.
On December 29, 2016, Appellant submitted a written response opposing the dismissal of
his PCRA Motion. Because his response did not contain anything new for the court's
consideration that would result in a change to the findings as detailed in the Rule 907 Notice, the
court filed an order dismissing Appellant's PCRA motion. 5 See Order, 1 /11 /17.
4 . On November 28, 2016, in response to the no-merit letter and motion to withdraw as counsel, Appellant submitted a letter to the court objecting to the conclusion of PCRA counsel that the petition was untimely and requesting another attorney to file an amended petition on his behalf. See Letter. 5 Inhis response, Appellant alleged that PCRA counsel failed to comply with the requirements of Finley because counsel never contacted him to discuss the petition before seeking to withdraw as counsel. See Response. However, as the PCRA court noted in its order, Finley does not mandate that counsel speak with a defendant. See Order, 1/11/17. Appellant further stated he wished to explain to PCRA counsel the issues raised in his prose petition, specifically issues 1, 3, and 4. See Response. However; the PCRA Court conducted an independent review of all issues raised in Appellant's PCRA petition and found them to be untimely, previously litigated, or without merit. See Order, 1/11/17.
4 On January 27, 2017, Appellant filed a prose Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. A Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal ("Statement") was filed on
March 1, 2017, alleging the PCRA court erred by: (1) granting PCRA counsel's petition to
withdraw where counsel failed to discuss the PCRA petition with Appellant; (2) requiring
Appellant to respond prose to PCRA counsel's petition to withdraw; (3) "not exercising it's
inherent power to supervise the bar, where it failed to require appointed counsel to at a minimum
discuss the petition and underlying facts with petitioner;" and (4) allowing appointed counsel to
"abandon petitioner" by withdrawing without fully investigating the PCRA petition, thus
effectively denying petitioner his constitutional right to counsel. See Statement.
This opinion is written pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
DISCUSSION
Before addressing the specific issues raised by Appellant in his Statement, the court will
first address the allegations made by Appellant in his PCRA motion.
To obtain relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that: ( 1) he has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth
and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole for that crime; (2) the
conviction resulted from one or more of the statutorily enumerated errors; (3) the allegation of
error has not been previously litigated or waived; and (4) the failure to litigate the issue prior to
or during trial or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic or
tactical decision by counsel. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543. Ineffective assistance of counsel is a
statutorily enumerated error under the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
5 Appellant's first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves the failure by trial
counsel to timely motion the court for dismissal of all charges when the Commonwealth
allegedly conceded there was no victim or witness to prosecute the case. See PCRA Motion.
Appellant's claim in this regard is governed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b), which provides:
(b) Time for filing petition.-
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could · not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the · Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph(l) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented ....
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
A defendant must file a PCRA motion within one year of the date judgment of sentence
becomes final unless one of the exceptions listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(l)(i-iii) applies.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1294 (Pa. Super. 2002). The time limit requirements
are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not disregard them to reach the
merits. Id Thus, if a ''PCRA petition is untimely, neither [the Superior] Court nor the trial court
6 has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, [there is simply no] legal authority to
address the substantive claims." Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 241 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). There is no generalized equitable exception to the one-year jurisdictional time bar
pertaining to post-conviction petitions. Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 2008).
Appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced on July 10, 2013. Because he did not file an
appeal following his guilty plea and sentencing, judgment of sentence became final at the
expiration of the 30-day time limit for seeking direct review in the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
or on August 9, 2013. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant did not file his prose PCRA
motion until November 7, 2016, well beyond the one-year deadline of August 9, 2014.
Since Appellant did not file his petition within one year of the time judgment of sentence
became final, this issue is untimely unless one of the exceptions of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(l)
applies. Commonwealth v. Kretchmar, 971 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing
Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000)). Those exceptions are.interference by
government officials, after-discovered evidence, or recently-recognized constitutional rights to be
applied retroactively. Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 789 A.2d 728, 730 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Appellant has the burden to plead and prove that one of these exceptions to the one-year time
requirement applies. Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 752 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa. 2000).
In this case, Appellant has failed to establish that he was unable to meet the August 9,
2014 deadline for filing the PCRA motion due to any exception. In fact, Appellant wrote in his
original PCRA motion that there were no issues of after discovered evidence, "no issues dealing
with retroactivity," and no issues of governmental interference which precluded him from
7 making a timely claim. See PCRA Motion. Therefore, because Appellant failed to meet his
burden, PCRA counsel and the PCRA court properly concluded the issue was not timely raised,
there were no exceptions, and the court did not have jurisdiction to review this claim.
Assuming, arguendo, the motion is timely, Appellant is mistaken in asserting the
Commonwealth "readily conceded" there was no competent or credible witness/victim to legally
prosecute the case. At the time of the guilty plea, victim Coll was present in the courtroom.
(N.T.G.P. at 5, 7). Although she did not want to testify against Appellant, she did testify against
him at the preliminary hearing and there was no indication she would not do so at trial if
necessary. Id at 5-7, 10-11. Moreover, Burkhart was a victim/witness to the charges at this
docket, and she was very willing to testify. Id at 11-12. Thus, as will be discussed infra, there
was no arguable merit to this underlying claim to support ineffective assistance of counsel.
In his fourth PCRA claim, Appellant also alleges trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel at his guilty plea hearing on July 10, 2013, because counsel was recently
terminated from his ,employer for an alleged "plethora of ethical violations .... " See PCRA
motion. Once again, for the reasons previously stated, this claim is untimely.
To the extent Appellant is alleging an exception based on newly-discovered evidence, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that a motion for a new trial based on after-discovered
evidence must at the very least describe the evidence that will be presented. Commonwealth v.
Castro, 93 A.3d 818, 827 (Pa. 2014 ). Simply relying on conclusory accusations is insufficient to
warrant a hearing. Id. An evidentiary hearing is not meant to function as a fishing expedition for
any possible evidence that may support some speculative claim. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 137
A.3d 605, 610 (Pa. Super. 2016).
8 As such, Appellant had the burden of pleading the existence of recent ethical violations
against trial counsel, and how they would have effected counsel's representation of him during a
v guilty plea hearing held more than three years ago. In his motion, Appellant offers nothing more
than bald allegations. In response, PCRA counsel noted that trial counsel is currently licensed to
practice law in Pennsylvania. See No-Merit Letter. Thus, Appellant's claim must fail.
In his second and fifth PCRA claims, Appellant alleges trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to ask the trial court to recuse himself from the PV hearing for
alleged bias towards Appellant, and for failing to object when the court sentenced Appellant to
2Yi to 5 years incarceration. See PCRA Motion.
To be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that "the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived." 42 Pa.
C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). An issue has been previously litigated if "the highest appellate court in
which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the
issue[.]" 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2).
In the present case, Appellant's· claims in this regard were previously litigated on direct
appeal, and on September 9, 2016, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected those claims.
MacColl, supra, No. 2156 MDA 2015. Therefore, because these matters were previously
litigated, Appellant is not entitled to further relief.
In his third PCRA claim, Appellant alleges trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by failing to review his case or provide a meaningful and vigorous defense/representation. See
PCRA motion. If Appellant is referring to trial counsel's conduct prior to or during the guilty
plea of July 10, 2013, his claim is untimely for the reasons previously stated.
9 Assuming, arguendo, Appellant's claim is in reference to the guilty plea and it is deemed
timely, the court will address his allegation on the merits. To succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a petitioner must specifically plead and prove facts sufficient to support a
claim. See Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 894 (Pa. 2010). Abstract allegations will
not be considered. Id. at 895. Because Appellant has simply made a conclusory accusation
unsupported by any facts, relief is not warranted.
Moreover, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must
show that "(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct
pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and
- (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different." Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232, 243 (Pa.
2001); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Failure to address any prong will
.defeat an ineffectiveness claim. Commonwealth v. Walker, 36 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. 2011).
When determining whether counsel's conduct had a reasonable basis for effectuating their
interest, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel did not act in
their best interests. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532-33 (Pa. 2009). A
petitioner must also establish resulting prejudice or the claim will fail. Commonwealth v. Miller,
987 A.2d 638, 648-49 (Pa. 2009). A petitioner must demonstrate that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have occurred because ineffective assistance of counsel so undermined
the truth-determining process. Commonwealth v. Whitney, 708 A.2d 471, 476 (Pa. ·1998).
"Counsel is presumed effective, and [Appellant] bears the burden of proving otherwise."
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014) (quoting Steele, 961 A.2d at 796) (internal
10 quotation marks omitted). Counsel is given broad discretion in determining trial tactics and
strategy. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 703 A.2d 1027; 1029 (Pa. 1997). The applicable test is not
whether alternative strategies were more reasonable employing a hindsight evaluation of the
record, but whether counsel's decision had any reasonable basis to advance the interests of a
petitioner. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 618 (Pa. 2015).
The mere fact that a petitioner tenders a guilty plea does not preclude relief. Section
9543(a)(2)(ii) of the PCRA encompasses all constitutionally cognizable claims of relief.
Commonwealth ex rel. Dadario v. Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126, 131 (Pa. 2001) (claims relating to
the guilty plea process are cognizable under the PCRA). A claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in relation to a guilty plea provides a basis for relief if a defendant can prove that the
ineffective assistance caused an involuntary or unknowing plea. Commonwealth v.
D 'Collanfield, 805 A.2d 1244; 1246-4 7 (Pa. Super. 2002). In determining whether a plea has
been voluntarily entered, an examination of the totality of the circumstances is warranted:
Commonwealth v. Allen, 732 A.2d 582, 588-89 (Pa. 1999).
Where a defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea - depends on whether counsel's advice "was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases." Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted). To succeed in showing prejudice, the defendant must show it
is reasonably probable that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have gone to trial. Id In determining whether a plea has been voluntarily entered, the oral and
written plea colloquy and off-the-record communications between a defendant and trial counsel
are to be considered. Allen, 732 A.2d at 588-89.
11 During a guilty plea, the court"must conduct an inquiry with a defendant on the record
which addresses the following: (1) does the defendant understand the nature of the charges; (2) is
there a factual basis for the plea; (3) does the defendant understand his right to a jury trial; (4)
does the defendant understand he is presumed innocent until proven guilty; (5) is the defendant
aware of the permissible range of sentences; and (6) is the defendant aware the judge is not
bound by the terms of any plea agreement. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 3 83
(Pa. Super. 2002); Commonwealth v. Hallock, 722 A.2d 180, 182 (Pa. Super. 1998); Pa. R. Crim.
P. 590 Cmt. The express purpose for conducting this colloquy is to ensure the defendant
understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading and the rights he is-waiving.
Commonwealth v. Carter, 656 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. 1995).
The questioning of a defendant may be conducted by the judge, an attorney for either
party, or by written colloquy. Commonwealth v. Harris, 589 A.2d 264, 265 (Pa. Super. 1991). If
a written colloquy is used it must be completed and signed by the defendant and made part of the
record. Id The colloquy must also be supplemented by some oral explanation. Id.
A defendant has the duty to truthfully answer all questions at the time of the guilty plea.
Commonwealth v. Vesay, 464 A.2d 1363, 1368 (Pa. Super. 1983). Consistent with this principle,
defendants are bound by the statements they make during their plea colloquy and may not assert
grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when they pleaded guilty.
Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999).
After careful review of the record, there is no evidence to suggest that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel prior to or at the time of the guilty plea. During the
guilty plea hearing Appellant acknowledged he signed guilty plea slips and a plea agreement
12 form which listed the charges and agreed-upon sentence. (N.T.G.P. at 16-17). Appellant stated
he reviewed the forms with his attorney and understood the terms of the guilty plea. Id. The
court confirmed with Appellant that he reviewed with his attorney all of the rights listed on a
seven-page guilty plea colloquy, he understood those rights, and he signed the form. Id. at 13-
14.6 The court then reviewed some of those rights with Appellant, who stated he understood. Id
at 14-15. The court reviewed with Appellant the recommended minimum sentences contained in
the sentencing guidelines worksheet and the potential maximum sentences. Id at 17-18, 21.
The court reviewed with Appellant the elements of the crimes for which he was pleading
guilty, and Appellant stated he understood. (N.T.G.P. at 20-21). Following the prosecutor's
recitation of the facts Appellant admitted to committing these crimes. Id at 23-24. Appellant
stated it was his decision to plead guilty, he made this decision of his own free will, and he was
not forced or threatened to plead guilty. Id. at 14-15.
As noted, a defendant has the duty to truthfully answer all questions at the time of the
guilty plea, they are bound by the statements they make during the plea, and they may not assert
grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when they pleaded guilty. In
the present case, because Appellant acknowledged committing the crimes, he is bound by his
admissions and rnay not assert grounds for withdrawing a plea which contradict that admission.·
6 Appellant signed the Guilty Plea Colloquy and Post-Sentence Rights form acknowledging he understood he did not have to plead guilty, he had the right to a trial by jury, he understood that at trial the Commonwealth would be required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he reviewed the sentencing guidelines and maximum sentences he was facing with his attorney, he was giving up the right to a jury trial by pleading guilty, he was entering into a negotiated plea agreement with the District Attorney, he understood the terms of the plea agreement, it was his decision to plead guilty, he was not threatened or forced to plead guilty, he was making this decision of his own free will, he understood his guilty plea would have the same effect as a conviction by judge or jury, and he had sufficient time to review this information with his attorney before pleading guilty. See Colloquy.
13 Appellant must also show the course of conduct pursued by trial counsel did not have
some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests in order to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel. Presently, trial counsel negotiated a sentence where Appellant, with an
extensive prior criminal record, received a sentence below the mitigated range of sentencing
guidelines in a case where he physically assaulted and threatened to kill his victims. Rather than
face jail following an open guilty plea or conviction at trial, including the potential for state
prison within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines, Appellant was placed on probation
for all three counts at 2834-2013. The court was reluctant to accept the guilty plea because of the
lenient sentence, advising Appellant a state prison sentence was appropriate. (N.T.G.P. at 6).
The court only accepted the plea after warning Appellant that if he returned for a probation
violation he could receive a prison sentence of up to five years in jail. Id at 12, 19-20, 22, 27.
Thus, trial counsel's course of conduct had a reasonable basis designed to effectuate Appellant's
interest and was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
Additionally, Appellant must show there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different but for counsel's ineffectiveness. Appellant has failed in
this regard as well. While Appellant asserts there were no witnesses to legally prosecute the .
case, the record establishes that Coll testified against Appellant at the preliminary hearing, she
was present in court for the guilty plea, and there was no indication she would not do so at trial if
necessary. Moreover, an independent witness (Burkhart) was more than willing to testify against
Appellant. Based on the foregoing, there is no reasonable probability the outcome would have
been different if Appellant had proceeded to trial rather than plead guilty, and for these reasons
Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as it may relate. to his guilty plea must fail.
14 If Appellant's claim is in reference to the PV proceedings, it would be timely. However, . . Appellant is not entitled to relief because he has failed to specifically plead and prove facts
sufficientto support a claim. Colavita, 993 A.2d at 894. Assuming, arguendo, there is sufficient
specificity, the record discloses that trial counsel clearly provided a meaningful and vigorous
defense. While Appellant stipulated to certain clear violations, counsel requested a hearing to
contest other alleged violations. (N.T.P.V. at 3-4, 7-8). Counsel then questioned the probation
officer and Appellant in an attempt to refute the allegations, suggesting Appellant missed certain
appointments due to his work schedule or for health reasons. Id at 11-25, 30-40, 46-47, 53-55.
Counsel also provided argument as to why Appellant should not be found in violation of certain
allegations. Id at 55-57. From counsel's questions and argument it was clear he was very
prepared and did in fact present a vigorous defense to the allegations. Id. at 11-25, 30.
At the conclusion of the hearing the court found that Appellant was in violation of his
probation for failing to report for drug testing on several occasions, traveling more than 30 miles
from his place of residence without permission, using cocaine on at least three occasions, using a
chemical agent with the intent to adulterate a urine sample, and failing. to report to several
appointments with his probation officer. (N.T.P.V. at 37-38, 50-51, 57-59). This finding was
based on Appellant's own admissions and on his lack of credibility when claiming he used a
chemical agent for· a purpose other than to adulterate a drug test.' lei. While Appellant blames
counsel for the outcome, his own admissions were the basis for the violation.
7 According to the probation officer, Appellant signed a form admitting to the use of a chemical adulterant in an attempt to pass his drug test. (N.T .P.V. at 9-11). Appellant testified at the hearing and denied using a chemical for that purpose, stating he was only joking. Id. at 37-38. The court did not find Appellant to be credible. Id. at 58.
15 Counsel also provided meaningful and vigorous representation of Appellant at the PV
sentencing held on November 10, 2015, producing certificates Appellant received while in
prison, citing Appellant's background, and raising health concerns. (N.T.P.V.S. at 4). While
recognizing that Appellant was previously warned of the potential for a state prison sentence if
he violate_d probation or parole, counsel nevertheless argued for a lesser sentence because the
underlying violations were technical in nature, this was Appellant's first violation in the present
case," and Appellant should be given credit for staying out of trouble for 1 Y:z years. Id. at 6, 10.
Moreover, counsel identified applicable sentencing code provisions and presented them
in a light most favorable to Appellant, noting that Appellant had completed some conditions of
his original sentence including a domestic violence evaluation, drug and alcohol counseling,
payment of fines and costs, full-time employment, and completion of the Promoting Responsible
Fatherhood and Beginning in the Right Direction programs. (N.T.P.V.S. at 6-11). Counsel also
provided case law to support his argument that incarceration was not warranted, while presenting
testimony from the assault victim in this case who was requesting leniency. Id. at 12-14.
It is clear from the record that Appellant's underlying claim as it may relate to the PV
hearing is not of arguable merit, the course of conduct pursued by counsel did have a reasonable
basis designed to effectuate Appellant's interests, and there is no reasonable probability the
8 outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for the actions of counsel. As
8 At sentencing the court considered the numerous unsuccessful attempts at inpatient treatment, the gravity of the original offenses where Appellant physically assaulted and/or threatened to kill his victims, five prior violations while on court supervision, repeated present violations over an extended period of time while on non-custodial status, extensive prior record which included eight separate crimes of violence, the original negotiated sentence was below the mitigated range of the sentencing guidelines, Appellant was warned of a state prison sentence ifhe violated, and Appellant has not made any effort to change his lifestyle or show he is amenable to treatment or rehabilitation. (N.T.P.V.S. at 14-22).
16 Appellant himself stated following counsel's presentation, "I wasn't taking my probation
seriously." (N.T.P.V.S. at 15).
For the reasons stated herein, Appellant's PCRA claims were untimely, previously
litigated, or frivolous. Nevertheless, Appellant asserts in his Statement on appeal that the PCRA
court erred by failing to require appointed counsel to at a minimum discuss the petition and
underlying facts with petitioner, and by granting PCRA counsel's petition to withdraw where
counsel did not discuss the PCRA petition with Appellant See Statement.
· When PCRA counsel determines issues raised in a prose PCRA motionare meritless and
the court agrees, counsel will be permitted to withdraw and the petitioner may proceed on his
own or with private counsel. Commonwealthv. Finley, 550 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. Super. 1988).
The steps required of counsel before withdrawing are to provide a no-merit letter detailing the
nature and extent of his review, list eachissue the petitioner wished to have reviewed, and
explain why the issues are meritless. Id.; Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927, 928 (Pa.
1988). The PCRA court must then conduct its own independent review of the record andagree
with counsel that the petition is meritless. Finley, 550 A.2d at 215. The independent review
necessary to assure a withdrawal request by PCRA counsel requires proof to the PCRA court of
the above steps required of counsel. Id.
Meaningful participation of counsel is required. Commonwealthv. Karanicolas, 836
A.2d 940, 946 (Pa. Super. 2003). Where the record fails to demonstrate meaningful participation
by counsel appointed to represent an indigent petitioner filing his first PCRA petition, the
Superior Court will remand for appointment of new counsel. Commonwealthv. Perez, 799 A.2d
848, 852 (Pa. Super. 2002). However, neither Finley nor Turner state that counsel is required to
17 discuss the petition with a petitioner before withdrawing from a frivolous appeal, as suggested by
Appellant. Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Torres, 630 A.2d 1250 (Pa. Super. 1993), the
Superior Court found that an interview of the appellant by counsel is not required in a case
involving-a direct appeal. Id at 1255. Tue Superior Court stated as follows:
It is this determination of frivolousness which is essential under Anders, and not an interview which may aid in making it. An interview is unnecessary in most instances, and we find no justification in making one an additional Anders requirement. What is essential to making a determination of frivolousness and fulfilling the duty under Anders to advise the defendant adequately of counsel's actions and his rights is communication with defendant by providing a copy of the Anders brief, the motion to withdraw and a letter explaining counsel's actions and the defendant's alternative recourses. Prior communication may or may not be necessary for counsel to fulfill adequately his responsibility, depending on the circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 1252. As such, the Superior Court declined to propose a per se requirement that counsel
interview or communicate with appellant prior to issuing a no-merit letter. Id at 1253 .9
Torres involved a direct appeal, and the requirements for withdrawal by appellate counsel
in such cases are found in Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981 )°,
and its federal precursor, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).10 Nevertheless, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted that the Finley/Turner procedures for withdrawal of
9 In Commonwealth v. Fischetti, 669 A.2d 399 (Pa. Super 1995), where counsel provided no indication that he interviewed appellant with regard to the direct appeal and the appellant argued this constituted a deficiency in counsel's representation entitling him to new counsel, the Superior Court disagreed. Id. at 400 n.l. 10 In McClen_don, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it "apparent [based on Anders] that the right to withdraw is in the first instance tied to a finding, after a conscientious review of the record, that the appeal is 'wholly frivolous."' Torres, 630 A.2d at 1251 ( citing McClendon, 434 A.2d at 1187). McClendon imposed the Anders requirements that counsel notify appellant of his request to withdraw, furnish appellant with a copy of the brief prepared by counsel, and advise appellant of his right to retain new counsel or raise any points that he may deem worthy of consideration. Id. It then becomes the responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an· independentj udgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous. Id.
18 counsel in cases on collateral review are less cumbersome than those set forth in
Anders/Mctllendon. Turner, 544 A.2d at 927. In Turner, the Supreme Court stated "[i]nasmuch
as the United States Supreme Court decided in Pennsylvania v. Finley, supra, that the federal
constitutional considerations underlying the tortuous procedures of Anders do not apply under the
[PCRA ], we deem these less rigid requirements for withdrawal of counsel to satisfy Pennsylvania
law in collateral attacks on criminal convictions." Turner, 544 A.2d at 929.11
Consequently, if a lawyer is not required to speak with their client under the more
stringent Anders requirement, then it follows that a lawyer is not required to speak with their
client under Turner/Finley. As such, there was no per se requirement that PCRA counsel discuss
the petition with Appellant, the PCRA court was not required to mandate that appointed counsel
at a minimum discuss the petition with Appellant, and the PCRA court properly granted PCRA
counsel's petition to withdraw where the court conducted an extensive independent review of the
record before determining the petition was :frivolous.
Appellant further asserts in his Statement that the PCRA court erred by requiring him to
respond pro se to PCRA counsel's petition to withdraw. See Statement. However, Pa.R.Crim.P.
907(1) requires the judge to notify a defendant of the intent to dismiss their petition. Id. The
defendant then has twenty days to respond. Id. Ifno response is received or the substance of the
response has no bearing on the merits of the case the judge will dismiss the petition. Id. A
11 In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the constitutional right to appointed counsel in the Anders decision is not applicable to collateral attacks on convictions. Id at 552~55. Thus, where a state chooses to provide appointed counsel for the purpose of assisting an indigent criminal launch a collateral attack on his conviction, the United States Constitution does not dictate the form which such assistance must take. Id. at 559. Finley's right to appointed counsel rested upon Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which do not impose upon appointed counsel a duty to proceed in the manner directed by Anders. Id at 551.
19 PCRA court's notice under rules governing disposition of a PCRA petition without a hearing is
adequate when the court advises the petitioner that his issues lack merit, states the reasons for
dismissal, and informs the petitioner he has twenty days to file a response to the notice.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 121 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. Super. 2015).12
Presently, the PCRA court complied with all requirements for notice of intent to dismiss
and provided Appellant an opportunity to respond. Because Appellant's response did not result
in a change to the findings as detailed in the Rule 907 Notice, an order was subsequently entered
denying the PCRA motion. As such, Appellant's claim in this regard must fail.
Finally, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred by allowing appointed counsel to
withdraw as counsel without fully investigating the PCRA petition, thus effectively denying
petitioner his constitutional rights. See Statement.
PCRA counsel submitted a no-merit letter that detailed the nature and extent of his
review, listed each issue Appellant wished to have reviewed, and explained why and how those
issues were meritless. Counsel provided substantive reasons, cited four cases, referenced three
different sections of a statute, and confirmed that trial counsel was licensed to practice law
despite Appellant's baseless accusations of impropriety. Counsel also stated he conducted an
independent review of the record and found no additional claims of merit for Appellant to
pursue. Therefore, PCRA counsel satisfied all the necessary Turner/Finley steps to withdraw
12 To merit entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a defendant must set forth an offer to prove sufficient facts upon which a reviewing court can conclude that counsel may have in fact been ineffective. Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 715 A.2d 420, 422 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pettus, 424 A.2d 1332, 1335 (Pa. 1981)). Where the record reflects that the underlying claim is of no arguable merit or no prejudice resulted, no evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance claim is required. Commonwealth v. Pirela, 726 A.2d 1026,1037 (Pa. 1999). In the case sub Judice, the record reflected the underlying claims lacked merit and a hearing was not necessary.
20 from the case. The PCRA court then conducted a thorough independent review of the record as
detailed in the Rule 907 Notice and found the petition to be meritless. Consequently, Appellant's·
assertion in this regard must fail.
Assuming, arguendo, PCRA counsel failed to comply with all of the Turner/Finley
requirements, Appellant is still not entitled to relief. In Commonwealth v. Gaerttner, 649 A.2d
139 (Pa. Super. 1994), where the Superior Court found that counsel's no merit letter fell
"considerably short of the requirements" of Turner/Finley, the Court treated counsel's failure to
comply as harmless error because no claim had been presented that would entitle the defendant to
post conviction relief and he had not been prejudiced. Id. at 143. As stated in Gaerttner:
We could have thus vacated the lower court's order granting [PCRA counsel] permission to withdraw, and remanded this case with instructions to comply with Finley or file an advocate's brief. We need not make such a de facto finding of . ineffectiveness, though, because [PCRA counselj's failure clearly did not prejudice [ defendant]."
Id. In Commonwealth v. Granberry, 644 A.2d 204 (Pa. Super. 1994), where the Superior Court
found a petitioner's PCRA issues to be without merit, the PCRA court's order denying appellant's
petition and granting counsel's motion to withdraw was affirmed even though counsel technically
failed to comply with Finley. Granberry, 644 A.2d at 210.13
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record, this court properly denied Appellant's PCRA
Motion after concluding the issues were untimely, previously litigated, or not supported by the
13 See also Commonwealth v. Harris, 553 A.2d 428, 434 (Pa. Super. 1989), where the Superior Court had no reluctance affirming the order denying post-conviction relief on substantive grounds when counsel was in non-compliance with the minimum requisites of Turner/Finley but the Court's review of the record revealed "the evidence against appellant was irrefutable, the guilty plea colloquy was impeccable, and the sentence of imprisonment imposed was manifestly appropriate." Id.
21 I
record. For the reasons stated herein, this appeal should be denied and the PCRA court should be
affirmed.
BY THE COURT
March 17, 2017 Date V~n.ne:- DONALD R. TOT ARO, JUDGE
ATTEST:
copies: Lancaster County District Attorney Dennis Jay MacColl, Appellant, SCI~Laurel Highlands, 5706 Glades Pike, Somerset, PA 15501 (by certified mail, return receipt requested, and first class mail)