J-A28027-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant
v.
CHARLES T. MABINE
Appellee No. 1643 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered May 5, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0004285-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and SHOGAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED DECEMBER 29, 2015
The Commonwealth appeals from the pretrial order entered on May 5,
2014, by the Honorable Joan A. Brown, Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, which denied the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ of
certiorari from the order entered in municipal court granting Appellee,
Charles T. Mabine’s motion to suppress physical evidence.1 After review, we
reverse the order denying the Commonwealth’s petition for writ of certiorari
and remand for further proceedings.
____________________________________________
1 This appeal properly invokes the jurisdiction of this Court as an interlocutory appeal from an order that terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution. The Commonwealth has certified in good faith that the Order substantially handicaps the instant prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). J-A28027-15
The relevant facts and procedural history can be summarized as
follows. On January 30, 2013, at approximately 3:50 a.m., a police officer
on routine patrol observed Mabine asleep behind the wheel of a running car
parked on the side of a street in a business district. When the officer
approached the car, he discovered that Mabine was sound asleep and had
vomit or food on his shirt. After attempting to wake Mabine up for several
minutes to no avail, the officer called a wagon to come for DUI
transportation. Once Mabine woke up, the officer asked him to step out of
the car and began questioning him. Through their interaction, the officer
noticed that Mabine’s eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and the
smell of alcohol was on his breath. Mabine was subsequently arrested and
charged with DUI.2
At the municipal court hearing, Mabine moved to suppress physical
evidence3 on the grounds that the officer had “no reasonable suspicion to
question [him] about driving under the influence or probable cause to arrest
him.” N.T., Municipal Court Hearing, 12/20/13, at 3. Following the hearing,
the municipal court granted Mabine’s suppression motion, apparently on the
basis that the Commonwealth failed to establish reasonable suspicion for the
investigative detention. See id., at 13-14. ____________________________________________
2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802. 3 It is not clear from the record what physical evidence Mabine sought to have suppressed.
-2- J-A28027-15
Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a petition for writ of certiorari to
the court of common pleas. Following a brief hearing, the trial court denied
the Commonwealth’s writ of certiorari and affirmed the suppression order.4
This timely interlocutory appeal followed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in
affirming the municipal court’s suppression order and maintains that the
officer possessed reasonable suspicion to approach Mabine and investigate
for possibility of DUI.
Our standard of review for this issue is as follows.
The issue of what quantum of cause a police officer must possess in order to conduct a vehicle stop based upon a possible violation of the Motor Vehicle Code is a question of law, over which our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. However, in determining whether the suppression court properly denied [or affirmed] a suppression motion, we consider whether the record supports the court’s factual findings. If so, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 94 (Pa. 2011) (citations
omitted).
The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record. The legal
conclusion drawn from those facts, however, is just plain wrong. The Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of our
state Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and ____________________________________________
4 The trial court fails to explicitly state its reasoning for affirming the suppression order. See Trial Court Opinion, at 3-4.
-3- J-A28027-15
seizures. See In the Interest of D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001).
“To secure the right of citizens to be free from...[unreasonable searches and
seizures], courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to
demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with
citizens as those interactions become more intrusive.” Commonwealth v.
Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000). Our Supreme Court has
defined three levels of interaction between citizens and police officers: (1)
mere encounter, (2) investigative detention, and (3) custodial detention.
See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 940 A.2d 476, 478 (Pa. Super. 2007).
A mere encounter between a police officer and a citizen does not need
to be supported by any level of suspicion and “carr[ies] no official
compulsion on the part of the citizen to stop or respond.” Id., at 479
(citation omitted). There is no constitutional provision that prohibits police
officers from approaching a citizen in public to make inquiries of them. See
Beasley, 761 A.2d at 624. However, a mere encounter may escalate into
an investigatory detention or seizure if police action becomes too intrusive.
See id.
To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an
investigatory detention, we must determine whether, as a matter of law, the
police have conducted a seizure of the person involved. See id. To decide
whether a seizure has occurred, we must “examine all the circumstances
and determine whether police action would have made a reasonable person
-4- J-A28027-15
believe he was not free to go and was subject to the officer’s orders.”
Fuller, 940 A.2d at 479.
Here, although the interaction between the officer and Mabine may
have begun as a mere encounter, it escalated into an investigatory
detention, and hence a seizure, once the officer woke Mabine up, asked him
to step out his car, and started questioning him. See Commonwealth v.
Ayala, 791 A.2d 1202, 1208 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding mere encounter
escalated into an investigatory detention when officer ordered defendant to
step out of his car). Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we find
that a reasonable person in Mabine’s position would not have believed that
he was free to leave. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that Mabine was subject to an investigative detention and was
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section
8.
“Our courts have mandated that law enforcement officers, prior to
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J-A28027-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant
v.
CHARLES T. MABINE
Appellee No. 1643 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered May 5, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0004285-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and SHOGAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED DECEMBER 29, 2015
The Commonwealth appeals from the pretrial order entered on May 5,
2014, by the Honorable Joan A. Brown, Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, which denied the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ of
certiorari from the order entered in municipal court granting Appellee,
Charles T. Mabine’s motion to suppress physical evidence.1 After review, we
reverse the order denying the Commonwealth’s petition for writ of certiorari
and remand for further proceedings.
____________________________________________
1 This appeal properly invokes the jurisdiction of this Court as an interlocutory appeal from an order that terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution. The Commonwealth has certified in good faith that the Order substantially handicaps the instant prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). J-A28027-15
The relevant facts and procedural history can be summarized as
follows. On January 30, 2013, at approximately 3:50 a.m., a police officer
on routine patrol observed Mabine asleep behind the wheel of a running car
parked on the side of a street in a business district. When the officer
approached the car, he discovered that Mabine was sound asleep and had
vomit or food on his shirt. After attempting to wake Mabine up for several
minutes to no avail, the officer called a wagon to come for DUI
transportation. Once Mabine woke up, the officer asked him to step out of
the car and began questioning him. Through their interaction, the officer
noticed that Mabine’s eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and the
smell of alcohol was on his breath. Mabine was subsequently arrested and
charged with DUI.2
At the municipal court hearing, Mabine moved to suppress physical
evidence3 on the grounds that the officer had “no reasonable suspicion to
question [him] about driving under the influence or probable cause to arrest
him.” N.T., Municipal Court Hearing, 12/20/13, at 3. Following the hearing,
the municipal court granted Mabine’s suppression motion, apparently on the
basis that the Commonwealth failed to establish reasonable suspicion for the
investigative detention. See id., at 13-14. ____________________________________________
2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802. 3 It is not clear from the record what physical evidence Mabine sought to have suppressed.
-2- J-A28027-15
Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a petition for writ of certiorari to
the court of common pleas. Following a brief hearing, the trial court denied
the Commonwealth’s writ of certiorari and affirmed the suppression order.4
This timely interlocutory appeal followed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in
affirming the municipal court’s suppression order and maintains that the
officer possessed reasonable suspicion to approach Mabine and investigate
for possibility of DUI.
Our standard of review for this issue is as follows.
The issue of what quantum of cause a police officer must possess in order to conduct a vehicle stop based upon a possible violation of the Motor Vehicle Code is a question of law, over which our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. However, in determining whether the suppression court properly denied [or affirmed] a suppression motion, we consider whether the record supports the court’s factual findings. If so, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 94 (Pa. 2011) (citations
omitted).
The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record. The legal
conclusion drawn from those facts, however, is just plain wrong. The Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of our
state Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and ____________________________________________
4 The trial court fails to explicitly state its reasoning for affirming the suppression order. See Trial Court Opinion, at 3-4.
-3- J-A28027-15
seizures. See In the Interest of D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001).
“To secure the right of citizens to be free from...[unreasonable searches and
seizures], courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to
demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with
citizens as those interactions become more intrusive.” Commonwealth v.
Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000). Our Supreme Court has
defined three levels of interaction between citizens and police officers: (1)
mere encounter, (2) investigative detention, and (3) custodial detention.
See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 940 A.2d 476, 478 (Pa. Super. 2007).
A mere encounter between a police officer and a citizen does not need
to be supported by any level of suspicion and “carr[ies] no official
compulsion on the part of the citizen to stop or respond.” Id., at 479
(citation omitted). There is no constitutional provision that prohibits police
officers from approaching a citizen in public to make inquiries of them. See
Beasley, 761 A.2d at 624. However, a mere encounter may escalate into
an investigatory detention or seizure if police action becomes too intrusive.
See id.
To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an
investigatory detention, we must determine whether, as a matter of law, the
police have conducted a seizure of the person involved. See id. To decide
whether a seizure has occurred, we must “examine all the circumstances
and determine whether police action would have made a reasonable person
-4- J-A28027-15
believe he was not free to go and was subject to the officer’s orders.”
Fuller, 940 A.2d at 479.
Here, although the interaction between the officer and Mabine may
have begun as a mere encounter, it escalated into an investigatory
detention, and hence a seizure, once the officer woke Mabine up, asked him
to step out his car, and started questioning him. See Commonwealth v.
Ayala, 791 A.2d 1202, 1208 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding mere encounter
escalated into an investigatory detention when officer ordered defendant to
step out of his car). Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we find
that a reasonable person in Mabine’s position would not have believed that
he was free to leave. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that Mabine was subject to an investigative detention and was
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section
8.
“Our courts have mandated that law enforcement officers, prior to
subjecting a citizen to investigatory detention, must harbor at least a
reasonable suspicion that the person seized is then engaged in unlawful
activity.” Beasley, 761 A.2d at 625 (citations omitted). To establish
grounds for reasonable suspicion, the police officer must “articulate specific
facts which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from those
facts, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
activity was afoot.” Id., at 626 (citation omitted).
-5- J-A28027-15
In the instant case, the trial court affirmed the suppression order of
the municipal court, which held that the investigatory detention was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We disagree. The
evidence established that in the early hours of the morning, an officer found
Mabine asleep in the driver’s side of a running car parked on the side of the
road with food or vomit on his shirt. See N.T., Municipal Court Hearing,
12/20/13, at 4-6. Certainly, this evidence furnished the officer with the
requisite reasonable suspicion to approach Mabine’s car and investigate for
the possibility of DUI. Cf. Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242,
1246-1247 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding evidence sufficient to establish DUI
where defendant was found asleep in driver’s seat of a car parked on a
public street with the engine running and headlights illuminated); see also
Commonwealth v. Woodruff, 668 A.2d 1158, 1161-1162 (Pa. Super.
1995) (holding evidence sufficient to establish DUI where defendant found
sleeping while slumped over steering wheel of parked running car with
headlights illuminated). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred
in denying the Commonwealth’s petition for writ of certiorari and affirming
the suppression order of the municipal court.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
-6- J-A28027-15
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 12/29/2015
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