Com. v. Lovasz, S.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 7, 2023
• Docket: 1467 WDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S14012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : STEVE ROBERT LOVASZ : : Appellant : No. 1467 WDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000169-1987

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: AUGUST 7, 2023

Steve Robert Lovasz appeals pro se from the order dismissing his fifth

petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9545. We affirm.

On January 26, 1987, Lovasz, acting in concert with his brother, stabbed

and fatally wounded Phillip Morris. Lovasz then stole Morris’s wallet and placed

his body into the trunk of a vehicle. Eventually, the police arrested Lovasz and

the Commonwealth charged him with numerous crimes. Ultimately, a jury

convicted Lovasz of first-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. The trial

court imposed an aggregate sentence of life in prison. This Court affirmed the

judgment of sentence, and on March 27, 1990, our Supreme Court denied

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S14012-23

allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lovasz, 564 A.2d 260 (Pa.

Super. 1989) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 110 (Pa.

1990). Lovasz previously filed four PCRA petitions, all of which were denied or

dismissed.

On July 11, 2022, Lovasz filed the instant PCRA petition, raising claims

substantially similar to the claims raised in his fourth PCRA petition.

Specifically, Lovasz argued that the Commonwealth committed a Brady1

violation by failing to inform him that his prior counsel in this matter, Mark

Morrison, was imprisoned in 2011, which evidenced a “dirty deal.” Lovasz also

raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The PCRA court issued a

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed the petition

without a hearing. This timely appeal followed.

This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s dismissal of a

PCRA petition is whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the

evidence of record and is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Garcia,

23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Under the PCRA, any PCRA petition “shall be filed within one year of the

date the judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review,

including discretionary review in … the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not

address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely

filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Here, Lovasz’s judgment of sentence became final in 1990, after the

time to seek review with the United States Supreme Court expired. See

Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 995 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Accordingly, Lovasz’s PCRA petition, filed on July 11, 2022, was patently

untimely under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition

where the petitioner can explicitly plead and prove one of three exceptions:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

Id.

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Here, Lovasz did not plead or prove any of the above timeliness

exceptions.2 To the extent Lovasz raises a substantive ineffective assistance

of counsel claim, it does not implicate any of the exceptions to the PCRA time-

bar. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 186 (Pa. 2016)

(observing there is no statutory exception to PCRA time-bar applicable to

ineffective assistance of counsel claims). As we are without jurisdiction to

address the merits of Lovasz’s PCRA petition, the PCRA court properly

dismissed the petition as untimely.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2023

2 We note that Lovasz baldly pleaded the three exceptions to the time-bar in

his pro se PCRA petition. See PCRA Petition, 7/11/22, at 3. However, Lovasz’s appellate brief does not present any argument in favor of these exceptions on appeal; accordingly, they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 517 A.2d 1248, 1250 n.4 (Pa. 1986) (stating issues raised in PCRA petition and not presented on appeal are deemed abandoned).

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