NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MIGUEL LOPEZ, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 1191 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002457-2021
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: AUGUST 17, 2026 Miguel Lopez, Jr. (“Lopez”) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”) after a jury convicted him of indecent assault – complainant less than thirteen years of age, indecent exposure, and corruption of minors.1 On appeal, Lopez asserts that the trial court erred in denying his multiple requests for a mistrial based on what he contends were several instances of improperly admitted evidence. Because we conclude that Lopez’s claims lack merit, we affirm.
Lopez’s convictions resulted from the sexual assault of his ex-
paramour’s son, I.S., which occurred sometime in 2018. On December 24, 2020, I.S. told his mother, L.S., about the incident, but she did not report the
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(7), 3127(a), 6301(a)(1)(i).
sexual assault to police. In February or March 2021, I.S. told a friend, Z.J. about the sexual assault during a sleepover. The following day, Z.J. told his mother about what I.S. had told him and Z.J.’s mother contacted ChildLine, Pennsylvania’s child abuse reporting system. After police investigated the ChildLine report and interviewed I.S., the Commonwealth charged Lopez with the above-referenced crimes.
The trial court summarized the relevant testimony at Lopez’s trial and procedural history of this case as follows:
On Christmas Eve 2020, I.S. told his mother that [Lopez] had sexually assaulted him. I.S. told her that the assault occurred when [Lopez] had just been fired from FedEx, had been out all night[,] and came home drunk and high. [L.S.] testified that she recalled the time described and that the next morning, [Lopez]
offered to take I.S. to before-school care so that she could leave for work earlier. Although aware that [Lopez] had been under the influence the night before, she accepted [Lopez]’s offer. [L.S.]
learned, however, that [Lopez] overslept and did not take I.S. to school. I.S. called his mother sometime during the day and told her that he and [Lopez] had played a board game together, which surprised [L.S.] because [Lopez] never interacted with I.S., and the two did not have a good relationship. …
* * *
I.S. testified that on the day of the incident, as his mother prepared to leave for work, [Lopez] and she argued. I.S. testified that [Lopez] looked “off” as if he were drunk and high; he had red eyes and slurred his speech. [Lopez] told [L.S.] that he would take I.S. to before-school care. I.S. testified that when he was playing PlayStation in the living room, [Lopez] asked him if he wanted to watch a movie in I.S.’s mother’s bedroom. I.S. testified that [Lopez]’s request was very out of the ordinary, as I.S. spent most of his time by himself. I.S. agreed, as there was [a] scene of a particular shark movie he wanted to see.
3
I.S. testified that [Lopez] told him to get comfortable and take his pants off. I.S. followed [Lopez]’s further instructions to remove his underwear, as he was afraid [Lopez] would hurt him.
[Lopez] touched I.S.’s penis and grabbed I.S.’s hand to make I.S.
touch [Lopez]’s penis. I.S. told [Lopez] “No”, pulled his hand away, and left the room. Afterward, [Lopez] told I.S. that he needed to keep a very important secret. Because I.S. was afraid of [Lopez], he told him that he would keep the secret.
I.S. testified that he did not tell and counselors or teachers at Lawton Elementary School about the assault because he wanted to keep the peace in the household and avoid anything like it happening again. He testified that he told someone of the assault a long time afterward because he was tired of hiding the truth. On March 18, 2021, I.S. gave an interview regarding the incident to a forensic interviewer at the Children’s Resource Center (“CRC”).
During cross examination of I.S. in the Commonwealth’s case in chief, the defense played a portion of the video recording of the CRC interview. I.S. acknowledged that he told the interviewer that he did not like [Lopez] and had never liked him.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/2025, at 3-5 (record citations and typographical errors omitted).
Following trial, the jury found Lopez guilty of all charges. The trial court ordered the Sexual Offender’s Assessment Board to assess Lopez to determine if he was a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). Ultimately, the trial court found Lopez was not an SVP. On June 2, 2025, the trial court sentenced Lopez to an aggregate term of six to twenty-three months of incarceration followed by four years of probation.
Lopez filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court subsequently denied. He then timely appealed to this Court. Lopez presents the following issues for review:
4
1. The trial court erred in denying Lopez’s request for mistrial when [L.S.]’s testimony alleging illegal drug use and possession violated the pretrial order prohibiting the introduction of any uncharged criminal conduct during the Commonwealth’s case in chief.
2. The trial court erred in denying Lopez’s request for mistrial when allegations of domestic violence, namely hitting [L.S.] in the stomach, were introduced against Lopez and violated the pretrial order prohibiting the introduction of any uncharged criminal conduct during the Commonwealth’s case in chief, and when its probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial effect.
3. The trial court erred in denying Lopez’s request for mistrial when additional allegations of domestic violence, namely hitting [L.S.] in the stomach while pregnant, were introduced against Lopez and violated the pretrial order prohibiting the introduction of any uncharged criminal conduct, was not introduced during any portion of the trial and when its probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial effect.
Lopez’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Each of Lopez’s issues raises a claim that the trial court erred in denying his requests for a mistrial. An appellate court will not overturn a trial court’s denial of a mistrial absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Leap, 222 A.3d 386, 392 (Pa. Super. 2019). “A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is appropriate only where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, “[i]t is well[]settled that defendants are entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 340 A.3d 334, 341 (Pa. Super. 2025). “This Court has long held although a perfectly conducted trial is indeed the ideal objective of our judicial
5
process, the defendant is not necessarily entitled to relief simply because of some imperfections in the trial, so long as he has been accorded a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 135 (Pa. 2008) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
In his first issue, Lopez argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for a mistrial following L.S.’s trial testimony that he was “drunk and high on coke” after he had been fired from FedEx. Lopez’s Brief at 14. Lopez contends that this statement violated the trial court’s pretrial order precluding the Commonwealth from presenting evidence of uncharged criminal conduct, as L.S.’s testimony that Lopez had been using cocaine was evidence that he had engaged in illegal activity for which the Commonwealth had not charged him. Id. at 13-15.
The trial court explained its decision to deny Lopez’s request for a mistrial as follows:
No basis existed for grant of the defense request for a mistrial where [Lopez] did not seek a [pretrial] ruling on preclusion of testimony related to alleged illegal drug use.
Contrary to [Lopez]’s assertion, the defense did not seek a pretrial order seeking preclusion of testimony as to [his] alleged use of illegal drugs. Therefore, no violation of a [pretrial] ruling could have occurred.
We set forth on the record our reasons for overruling the objection to the testimony and denial of the motion for mistrial.
We reasoned that the jury was free to believe or disbelieve [L.S.’s]
recollection of the description of [Lopez]’s behavior, that the defense could cross-examine [L.S.] as to her statements, and that reference to drug use would not be shocking or unduly prejudicial to [Lopez].
6
Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/2025, at 8 (record citations omitted).
The record reflects that the day before trial, Lopez filed a motion in limine in which he sought to preclude the Commonwealth from introducing evidence that he engaged in criminal conduct for which he was never charged. Motion in Limine, 1/26/2025, ¶ 11. Lopez’s motion did not identify any specific prior bad acts or crimes that he sought to exclude, it was merely a general request that the Commonwealth not introduce any such evidence. See id. Immediately before trial, the trial court granted the motion stating that “as far as it coming in the case in chief, no uncharged prior misconduct would come in unless it becomes relevant based on how the defendant pursues the case.” N.T., 1/27-29/2025, at 16. At trial, when the prosecutor asked L.S. if she knew the day Lopez had sexually assaulted I.S., L.S. responded that it “was when [Lopez] had just got fired from FedEx and he had been out all night and he came home and he was drunk and he was high on coke … .” Id. at 74. Lopez objected and requested a mistrial, which the trial court denied, reasoning that it was unable to control the witness’ recollection of events and that Lopez was free to cross-examine L.S. regarding how she knew he was drunk and high after being fired from FedEx. Id. at 74-76. Lopez did not request a curative instruction from the court regarding L.S.’s testimony. See id.
As this Court has explained, “[a] trial court may grant a mistrial only where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that its
7
unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 274 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
[O]rdinarily, admission of testimony which describes, or from which the jury may infer, past criminal conduct by a defendant constitutes reversible error. However, not all such references warrant reversal. An isolated[,] passing reference to prior criminal activity will not warrant reversal unless the record indicates that prejudice resulted from the remark. There is no per se rule which requires a new trial for every passing reference to prior criminal conduct. Additionally, the possible prejudicial effect of a reference to prior criminal conduct may, under certain circumstances, be removed by a cautionary instruction. Where a defendant alleges the prosecutor elicited improper testimony, we must consider whether the improper remark was intentionally elicited by the Commonwealth, whether the answer was responsive to the question posed, whether the Commonwealth exploited the reference, and whether the curative instruction was appropriate.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 313 A.3d 1112, 1120 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citations, quotation marks, and paragraph breaks omitted).
In this case, the Commonwealth did not intentionally elicit the statement from L.S. regarding Lopez’s alleged drug use around the time he sexually assaulted I.S. See N.T., 1/27-29/2025, at 74. Rather, the prosecutor asked her if she knew which day the incident occurred. See id. Additionally, other than a bald, conclusory statement that L.S.’s testimony characterized him in a negative light to the jury, Lopez has utterly failed to establish that her statement resulted in prejudice. See Lopez’s Brief at 13-15. While the trial court did not provide a cautionary instruction regarding L.S.’s testimony, the record is clear that Lopez did not request one. See N.T., 1/27-29/2025, at
8
74-76. In light of the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny Lopez’s request for a mistrial; his first issue is without merit. See Baker, 313 A.3d at 1120.
In his second and third issues, Lopez argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial relating to a portion of I.S.’s CRC interview that the Commonwealth played for the jury. See Lopez’s Brief at 15-18. Specifically, Lopez contends that the trial court should have granted him a mistrial after the Commonwealth, on two occasions, played a portion of the interview during which I.S. stated that Lopez punched L.S. in the stomach while she was pregnant. See id. Lopez asserts that this part of the interview went beyond the scope of the parties’ agreement as to what would be played for the jury. Id. He further contends that it was unfairly prejudicial for the jury to hear that Lopez hit L.S. in the stomach while she was pregnant as any domestic violence that occurred between Lopez and L.S. was not relevant to the question of whether Lopez sexually assaulted I.S. Id.
The trial court declined to grant Lopez’s requests for a mistrial because the two occasions during trial when the Commonwealth played the portion of the CRC interview at issue occurred accidentally because of technological errors and was not the result of any action taken by the Commonwealth. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/26/2025, at 8-11 Additionally, on both occasions the trial court provided the jury with cautionary instructions. See id.
9
The record reflects that during trial, the Commonwealth sought to play a portion of I.S.’s CRC interview in response to Lopez’s use of the interview to attack I.S.’s credibility. N.T., 1/27-29/2025, at 221-22. Specifically, Lopez sought to establish that I.S. fabricated his allegations against Lopez merely because I.S. did not like Lopez. See id. The portion of the interview that the Commonwealth sought to play added context as to why I.S. disliked Lopez— because Lopez was abusive and punched I.S.’s mom in the stomach while she was pregnant. Id. The trial court stated that any reference to L.S. being pregnant when Lopez punched her in the stomach would be prejudicial and the Commonwealth agreed to stop the interview recording immediately after I.S. statement that “[Lopez] used to try to hit my mom.” Id. at 223. When the Commonwealth presented that portion of the interview for the jury, however, it inadvertently failed to stop the recording before I.S. also stated “in the stomach.” Id. at 239-40. The Commonwealth was able to stop the recording on this occasion before I.S. also stated “while she was pregnant.” See id. Lopez then requested a mistrial. Id.
The trial court denied Lopez’s motion for a mistrial. See id. at 241. The trial court did, however, later provide the jury with the following curative instruction:
In this case, there might have been some reference as to other things that were occurring in the household, whether there was domestic violence and things like that, that is not the charges in front of you. So there’s no adverse inference to be drawn and he’s not accused of those crimes and there’s nothing to be determined. However, in the context, you get to see the setting
10
so to speak. But in no case should any of that reflect adversely on him relative to these charges, which are not really related to those other actions.
Id. at 356. Lopez’s counsel expressly agreed that the instruction adequately addressed the issue. Id.
The record further reflects that after the jury began deliberations, it requested to hear the CRC interview again. Id. at 363-64. When the Commonwealth played the interview for the jury, despite trying to stop the recording, it could not get the recording to stop playing before I.S. stated in the interview that Lopez punched L.S. in the stomach while she was pregnant. Id. at 366. The trial court immediately gave the jury the following instruction: “So ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that would be the most that we can show you and you probably heard more than you heard during the trial. I’m going to ask that you disregard anything that you didn’t hear the first time.” Id.
We emphasize that the jury is presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions. Gilliam, 249 A.3d at 274. Additionally, while, as Lopez’s argues, the portion of I.S.’s CRC interview regarding Lopez punching L.S. in the stomach while she was pregnant was not directly relevant to question of whether Lopez sexually assaulted I.S., he opened the door to that testimony by using select portions of the interview to argue that I.S. fabricated the allegations against Lopez. See N.T., 1/27-29/2025, at 221-22. The additional portion of the interview the Commonwealth played for the jury provided
11
context as to exactly why I.S. disliked Lopez. See id. Although the portion of the video played by the Commonwealth went beyond the parties’ agreement, this occurred inadvertently. The trial court issued cautionary instructions on both occasions, and as in his first issue, Lopez offers nothing to establish prejudice other than conclusory statements that I.S.’s allegation of domestic abuse against Lopez was highly prejudicial and outweighed any probative value to the Commonwealth’s case. See Lopez’s Brief at 15-18.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny Lopez’s requests for a mistrial relating to I.S.’s allegations of domestic abuse in the CRC interview recording. Lopez’s second and third issues therefore do not entitle him to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 8/17/2026