Com. v. Locchetto, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 23, 2026
• Docket: 1204 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Ford Elliott

Opinion

J-S41034-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ANTHONY S. LOCCHETTO : : Appellant : No. 1204 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003007-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., BECK, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 23, 2026

Appellant, Anthony S. Locchetto, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County after the trial court

found him guilty of driving under the influence (DUI), disorderly conduct, and

public drunkenness.1 Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence

regarding his DUI conviction. Upon review, we affirm.

On March 21, 2024, at approximately 1:46 a.m., Elleny Metz was driving

her car, pulling out of a parking lot in Doylestown, Pennsylvania. She noticed

Appellant to her left, riding a bicycle in an unsteady manner and teetering.

Then, Metz saw Appellant collide with a pole and fall from the bicycle.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S. § § 5502(a)(4), and 5505 respectively. J-S41034-25

Thereafter, Appellant walked across the street into another parking lot, where

he remained with his bicycle. Concerned about Appellant’s safety, Metz

contacted law enforcement and pulled around the corner to await their arrival.

Once the police arrived, Metz drove away. See N.T. Trial, 2/12/25, at 8-11.

Responding to the call, Corporal Timothy Conboy arrived at the scene

and saw Appellant wobbling. After approaching Appellant, Corporal Conboy

detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Appellant. Corporal Conboy

saw fresh cuts on Appellant’s legs. Appellant told Corporal Conboy that he was

attempting to return home. While speaking with the officer, Appellant spoke

in rambling, incoherent sentences. Then, without prompting from Corporal

Conboy, Appellant attempted to demonstrate that he could complete a

sobriety test and nearly fell into the middle of the street. Corporal Conboy

tried to ascertain whether Appellant could contact someone to provide

transportation away from the scene; however, Appellant was unable to

provide any telephone numbers. Consequently, Corporal Conboy arrested

Appellant for public intoxication. See N.T. Trial, 2/12/25, at 13-15.

Appellant was brought to the Bucks County police headquarters and

placed in a holding cell. See N.T. Trial, 2/12/25, at 23. While under video

surveillance in the cell, Appellant shouted obscenities, kicked the cell walls

and doors, hit the security camera, and stuffed his shirt into the toilet to clog

-2- J-S41034-25

it. See id. at 27.2 As a result, Appellant was handcuffed and fitted with a spit

hood to prevent self-harm or further damage to the cell. See id. at 23. When

Appellant was transported to his preliminary arraignment, he engaged in more

unruly behavior, including throwing himself against the car doors. See id. The

Commonwealth charged Appellant with driving under the influence – general

impairment, institutional vandalism, disorderly conduct, and public

drunkenness. See Bill of Information, 8/1/24, at 1.

On February 12, 2025, Appellant proceeded to a non-jury trial. See N.T.

Trial, 2/12/25, at 6 (Appellant waiving his right to jury trial). Metz and

Corporal Conboy testified. See id. at 8-9, 12-24. The Commonwealth also

introduced Corporal Conboy’s body-worn camera footage of his encounter with

Appellant. See id. at 16; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-1 (Body-Worn

Camera Footage).

The trial court found Appellant guilty of all charges except institutional

vandalism, and sentencing was deferred. See id. at 38. On April 3, 2025, the

court imposed a sentence of six months’ probation and a three-hundred-dollar

fine for the DUI offense, with no further penalties for disorderly conduct or

public drunkenness. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 4/3/25, at 4; Order

(sentence), 4/3/25. Subsequently, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

See Notice of Appeal, 5/2/25. He and the trial court complied with

2 Appellant did not cause any significant damage to the cell. See N.T. Trial,

2/12/25, at 24, 27.

-3- J-S41034-25

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. See Rule 1925(b) Order,

5/5/25; Concise Statement of Errors Complained on Appeal, 5/23/25, at 1-2;

Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/25.

Appellant raises the following question for our review:

Was the evidence sufficient to prove Appellant’s guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt for driving under the influence where the police officers failed to conduct an investigation as to Appellant’s ability to safely drive?

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the trial

court’s finding that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving under

the influence. See id. at 10. Specifically, Appellant contends that the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his DUI conviction because the

Commonwealth failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

incapable of safely operating his bicycle. See Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant

points to Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 979 (Pa. 2009), in which

our Supreme Court addresses that evidence of intoxication permits a wide

range of circumstantial evidence and argues that there was “very little

evidence” presented at trial regarding Appellant’s impairment. Id. at 10-11.

Appellant avers that Corporal Conboy never observed him riding his bicycle.

See id. at 11. Although the Commonwealth presented testimony from Metz,

who stated that she saw a man riding a bicycle and subsequently crashing,

Appellant notes that Metz did not testify that the crash was caused by his

-4- J-S41034-25

intoxication or impairment. See id. (“[] Metz never even got out of her vehicle

and spoke with [Appellant].”).

Appellant further argues that Corporal Conboy’s conclusion that

Appellant was unfit to operate a vehicle rested only on two factors: the odor

of alcohol and the unsteadiness of Appellant on his feet. See id. at 11-12

(alleging Corporal Conboy never testified to other usual signs of impairment,

such as glassy eyes, confusion of questions, or being uncooperative). He avers

that Corporal Conboy admitted on cross-examination that Appellant’s

unsteadiness could be because of other factors besides impairment. See id.

at 11 (citing N.T. Trial, 2/12/25, at 26). Additionally, Appellant cooperated

with Corporal Conboy and was never given a field sobriety test or asked to

give a blood draw. See id. at 11.3

In addition, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence fell

short of that which this Court has deemed sufficient in prior cases. See id. at

12-15. Appellant contends that, unlike cases such as Commonwealth v.

Teems, 74 A.3d 142 (Pa. Super. 2013), and Commonwealth v. Blystone,

335 A.3d 328 (Pa. Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum), where multiple

indicators of intoxication supported appellants’ DUI convictions, the instant

case involved only the odor of alcohol and some unsteadiness. See id.

3 Appellant cites no authority that Section 3802(a) requires standardized field

sobriety tests to sustain a DUI conviction. See Appellant’s Brief at 13. Field sobriety tests are just one factor that the court considers. See Luberto, 344 A.3d at 47. Accordingly, this argument is waived.

-5- J-S41034-25

Accordingly, Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth’s evidence is

insufficient and therefore his judgment of sentence must be vacated. See id.

at 15. We disagree.

The standard of review in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence is well-

settled:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Banks, 253 A.3d 768, 774 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing

Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019)). Our

sufficiency standard of review applies equally where the Commonwealth’s

evidence is circumstantial. See Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099,

1105 (Pa. Super. 2022).

To sustain a conviction for DUI-general impairment, the Commonwealth

must establish that the defendant was: (1) operating a vehicle; and (2) did

-6- J-S41034-25

so after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that he was rendered

incapable of safely operating a vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Clemens,

242 A.3d 659, 665 (Pa. Super. 2020); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). 4 Our Court

has stated that, to sustain a conviction under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), the

Commonwealth may rely on the totality of the circumstances, including “[the

defendant’s] actions and behavior, including manner of driving and ability to

pass field sobriety tests; demeanor, including toward the investigating officer;

physical appearance, particularly bloodshot eyes and other physical signs of

intoxication; odor of alcohol, and slurred speech.” Commonwealth v.

Luberto, 344 A.3d 41, 47 (Pa. Super. 2025) (quoting Segida, 985 at 879

(Pa. 2009)).

Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the

Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction

under Section 3802(a)(1). See Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/25, at 5; Luberto,

supra. We find that Appellant misrepresents the record and omits significant

evidence that the Commonwealth presented at trial, contrary to our standard

of review. See Banks, supra. First, Appellant omits that Metz also testified

Appellant was teetering and watched him ride his bicycle into a pole. See N.T.

Trial, 2/12/25, at 8. Second, Corporal Conboy testified that Appellant had an ____________________________________________

4 The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code defines “Vehicle” as “[e]very device in, upon,

or by which any person…may be transported or drawn upon a highway[.]” Our Court has found a bicycle is a “vehicle” for purposes of prosecution of DUI of alcohol or controlled substances. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 620 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Pa. Super. 1993).

-7- J-S41034-25

odor of alcohol coming from his person and that he was unsteady. See id. at

14-15. In addition, Corporal Conboy testified that Appellant had fresh cuts on

his legs, rambled when speaking and uttered nonsense and became disruptive

after Appellant’s arrest. See id. at 12, 27; see also Banks, 253 A.3d at 775

(stating testifying police officer who observed defendant’s appearance and

behavior is competent to express opinion that defendant is impaired by

alcohol). Additionally, the trial court considered the body-worn camera

footage depicting Appellant’s actions with Corporal Conboy. See Trial Court

Opinion, 6/4/25, at 4; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-1.

Furthermore, Appellant’s reliance on Teems and Blystone is

unpersuasive; he merely recites the facts of each case, noting the different

circumstances presented in those cases without demonstrating how each

might preclude a conviction in this case. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-14.

Overall, Appellant essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence, which

this Court will not do. See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 307 A.3d 759, 765

(Pa. Super. 2023) (“Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.”) (citation

omitted). Accordingly, viewed in the most favorable light to the

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence here supported the trial

court’s conclusion that Appellant was impaired by alcohol and incapable of

safe driving, as it demonstrated that he operated the bicycle, struggled with

controlling it, and rode it into a pole, smelled of alcohol, spoke incoherently,

and could not maintain his balance even when not riding the bicycle. See

-8- J-S41034-25

Clemens, 242 A.3d at 665. Following our review of the record and the law,

we conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 1/23/2026

-9-