Com. v. Lisowski, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: 385 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Panella

Opinion

J-A04014-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : THOMAS M. LISOWSKI : : Appellant : No. 385 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 17, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0000412-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 23, 2026

Thomas M. Lisowski appeals pro se1 from the order entered in the

Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas on January 17, 2025, dismissing

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

On January 4, 2024, Lisowski pled guilty to one count each of criminal

trespass and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).2 In exchange

for his plea, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining charges pending

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1 Lisowski has represented himself pro se throughout the entirety of these proceedings, after waiving his right to counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) at various points, including prior to the plea hearing and prior to the instant appeal. Standby counsel was present for the plea hearing.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, respectively. J-A04014-26

against him. Sentencing was deferred for preparation of a presentence

investigation report.

On January 18, 2024, the trial court sentenced Lisowski to 12 to 42

months’ incarceration for criminal trespass, plus a consecutive term of 9 to 18

months’ incarceration for REAP, for an aggregate sentence of 18 to 60 months’

incarceration. Lisowski filed a timely motion for sentence modification or

correction, in which he asked the court to clarify that his sentences under the

instant docket would be run concurrent with a sentence he was serving in

Wyoming County. The court denied the motion.

In February 2024, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”)

wrote a letter to the court, similarly seeking clarification as to whether the

sentences in this case were to run consecutively or concurrently to the

Wyoming County sentence of 1 to 2 years’ incarceration. The DOC requested

a new sentencing order with this clarification.

On February 22, 2024, the trial court issued a corrected sentencing

order, indicating that the sentences in this case were to run consecutively to

the Wyoming County sentence.

On August 23, 2024, Lisowski filed a pro se PCRA petition, in which he

argued the court abused its discretion by modifying his sentence after the 30

day time-limit for modification pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 and that the

Commonwealth failed to timely seek modification of the sentence.

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Following an answer from the Commonwealth, the PCRA court issued

notice of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to

Pa.R.C.P. 907. In response, Lisowski filed a motion for a PCRA hearing. On

January 17, 2025, the trial court dismissed the PCRA petition. Lisowski filed a

notice of appeal on March 4, 2025.

As a prefatory matter, we must address our jurisdiction to entertain this

appeal because an untimely appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction to

entertain the appeal. See Commonwealth v. Edrington, 780 A.2d 721, 725

(Pa. Super. 2001). We may address questions of our jurisdiction sua sponte.

See id.

Generally speaking, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(a)

directs that “an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a

government unit or trial court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). “An order … denying,

dismissing, or otherwise finally disposing of a petition for post-conviction

collateral relief shall constitute a final order for purposes of appeal.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 910. “[T]he notice of appeal … shall be filed within 30 days after

the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). As

such, “[t]ime limitations on the taking of appeals are strictly construed and

cannot be extended as a matter of grace.” Commonwealth v. Perez, 799

A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 105(b)

(“An appellate court ... may not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal,

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a petition for allowance of appeal, a petition for permission to appeal, a

petition for review, or a petition for specialized review.”).

“In a criminal case, the date of entry of an order [that triggers the appeal

period] is the date the clerk of courts enters the order on the docket, furnishes

a copy of the order to the parties, and records the time and manner of notice

on the docket.” Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. Super.

2000).

A review of the docket shows that the docket entry for the January 17,

2025 PCRA dismissal order does not indicate service to pro se Lisowski. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)(1) (“A copy of any order or court notice promptly shall

be served on each party’s attorney, or the party if unrepresented.); see also

Commonwealth v. Midgley, 289 A.3d 1111, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(“Where the trial court docket in a criminal case does not indicate service on

a party or the date of service, we will not quash the appeal or require further

proceedings. Rather, we will treat the time in which to take an appeal as never

having started to run and treat the appeal as timely.”).

Here, not only does the docket not indicate service on Lisowski, there is

ambiguity in the record as to what date the order actually was mailed to

Lisowski. The clerk entered the order on the docket on January 17, 2025.

However, the attached certified mail envelope reflects three different

postmarks−January 23, 2025, February 3, 2025, and February 11, 2025. The

envelopes bears a handwritten note that it was “[r]eceived on 02/18/25 from

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S.C.I. Dallas.” This note appears to have been written by Lisowski, as he

indicates in his appellate brief that he did not receive the court’s order until

February 18, 2025.

As noted previously, the appeal period began on the date the clerk of

courts furnished a copy of the order to Lisowski. Given the lack of indication

in the docket of a date of service to Lisowski as a pro se appellant, as well as

the ambiguity as to when Lisowski received the order, we construe the appeal

as timely filed.

On appeal, Lisowski argues the trial court erred by modifying his

judgment of sentence more than thirty days after the sentence was handed

down, in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. See Appellant’s Brief, at 20.

Our standard of review is well settled. We review the denial of a post-

conviction petition to determine whether the record supports the PCRA court’s

findings and whether its order is otherwise free of legal error. See

Commonwealth v. Faulk, 21 A.3d 1196, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Rule 705 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that

“[w]henever more than one sentence is imposed at the same time on a

defendant, or whenever a sentence is imposed on a defendant who is

sentenced for another offense, the judge shall state whether the sentences

shall run concurrently or consecutively.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 705 (emphasis added).

Under the instant docket, the court sentenced Lisowski to 12 to 42

months’ incarceration for criminal trespass, to be served consecutive with a

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term of 6 to 18 months’ incarceration for REAP. See Sentencing Order,

1/18/24. Significantly, nowhere in the orders does the court mention the

Wyoming County sentence, nor direct that the instant sentences be served

either concurrent or consecutive to any other sentence for another offense.

A sentencing court may modify a sentencing order only in limited

circumstances. “Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court

upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days

after its entry, notwithstanding prior termination of any term of court, if no

appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505.

Generally, once the thirty-day period has passed, the trial court lacks

jurisdiction to modify a sentencing order. Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639

A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. 1994).

Lisowski asks us to refer to Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466

(Pa. Super. 2011), in which this Court held that “for a trial court to exercise

its inherent authority and enter an order correcting a defendant’s written

sentence to conform with the terms of the sentencing hearing, the trial court’s

intention to impose a certain sentence must be obvious on the face of the

sentencing transcript.” Id. at 473. “Stated differently, only when a trial court’s

intentions are clearly and unambiguously declared during the sentencing

hearing can there be a ‘clear clerical error’ on the face of the record, and the

sentencing order subject to later correction.” Id; see also Commonwealth

v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1227 (Pa. 2013) (our Supreme Court noting a trial

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court retains jurisdiction to correct “errors in its records or orders so they

speak the truth, and thereby reflect what actually took place in judicial

proceedings.”).

We do not find Borrin is applicable to the case at hand. There has been

no assertion of a clerical error here. The court here was not attempting to

speak truth to or reflect what actually took place during the sentencing

proceedings. Instead, a review of the record shows that both the sentencing

proceedings and the original sentence order were entirely silent as to the

Wyoming County sentence. Accordingly, there was no ambiguity to correct

here, nor any intent to analyze.

While Lisowski disagrees, we find this case to be more analogous to the

issue presented in Commonwealth v. Moran, 823 A.2d 923 (Pa. Super.

2003). In Moran, the trial court sentenced the appellant to a lengthy term of

imprisonment. In its sentencing order, the trial court stated that counts 2, 5,

and 9 were consecutive to count 1, but it did not state whether the sentences

for counts 2, 5, and 9 were consecutive to each other. While a direct appeal

was pending, the trial court sua sponte amended its sentencing order to clarify

that “[c]ount 2 is to run consecutive to [c]ount 1, [c]ount 5 is to run

consecutive to [c]ount 2, and [c]ount 9 is to run consecutive to [c]ount 5.”

Moran, 823 A.2d at 925.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

modify sua sponte its original sentencing order, more than thirty days later

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while his appeal was pending. We disagreed. We acknowledged that under

Section 5505, a trial court may modify a final, appealable order within 30 days

after its entry if no appeal from the order has been taken. See id. We,

however, noted that in limited circumstances, a trial court may be excused

from the requirements of Section 5505 to “correct a patent or obvious mistake

or to supply defects or omissions in the record.” Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 65 (Pa. 2007) (noting Section

5505 “was never intended to eliminate the inherent power of a court to correct

obvious and patent mistakes in its orders, judgments, and decrees”). We

explained that under Rule 705, relating to imposition of sentence, the trial

court’s failure to specify in its original sentencing order whether sentences

were concurrent or consecutive was a patent error. Based on Rule 705, we

concluded that the trial court’s modification of the original sentencing order

was not improper. See Moran, 823 A.2d at 925.

Similarly, here, the trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 705 was a

patent error. Rule 705 does not contain a presumption that multiple sentences

run concurrently unless stated otherwise by the sentencing judge. See id.

Instead, under Rule 705, the trial court was required to specify whether the

sentence was concurrent with or consecutive to the Wyoming County

sentence. Accordingly, the trial court’s correction of the original sentencing

order did not violate the thirty-day limit under Section 5505, because courts

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have inherent jurisdictional power to correct patent errors in sentencing

orders.

In sum, the trial court had jurisdiction to correct the original sentencing

order more than thirty days later to indicate that the sentences set forth were

consecutive to the Wyoming County sentence. Accordingly, the PCRA court

did not err in dismissing Lisowski’s PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/23/2026

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