Com. v. Li, X.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Com. v. Li, X.

DecidedAugust 14, 2025

Docket216 EDA 2025

StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Li, X. (Com. v. Li, X.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Com. v. Li, X., (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Pincite

Opinion

J-S21017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : XIAO HONG LI : : Appellant : No. 216 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-SA-0000668-2024

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2025

Appellant, Xiao Hong Li, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, following her summary

trial conviction for one count each of violating the maximum speed limit and

careless driving.1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

September 21, 2024, Pennsylvania State Trooper Deepak Gupta was in a

marked patrol car on Interstate 276 in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. He

observed, with a radar device, a vehicle driving past him at 95 miles per hour

(“mph”). The posted speed limit was 70 mph. During Trooper Gupta’s

attempts to catch up to the vehicle, he reached a speed in excess of 120 mph.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3362(a)(1.1) and 3714(a), respectively. J-S21017-25

Using the speedometer in his patrol vehicle, he calculated that the other

vehicle was travelling at 110 mph. Trooper Gupta activated his lights and

observed the vehicle exit from the left lane of traffic onto the right shoulder

of the roadway, without signaling a lane change. Subsequently, Trooper

Gupta cited Appellant for speeding and careless driving.

Initially, Appellant pled guilty to the aforementioned offenses in

magisterial district court. However, she subsequently filed a summary appeal

to the trial court, which held a de novo summary trial on December 19, 2024.

At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Trooper Gupta and

admitted as an exhibit a Bureau of Motor Vehicle Certificate of Speedometer

Accuracy for the vehicle he had been driving. The Commonwealth asked the

trial court to take judicial notice of the Pennsylvania Bulletin regarding testing

and accuracy of speedometers. The trial court overruled Appellant’s hearsay

objection and permitted the admission of the certificate, subject to any post-

trial submissions from the parties regarding its admissibility.

At the conclusion of trial, Appellant moved for dismissal of the charges,

arguing that the certificate was inadmissible hearsay, and the Commonwealth

had not proven the company that tested the speedometer in Trooper Gupta’s

vehicle was approved by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation

(“PennDOT”). In response, the Commonwealth cited 54 Pa.B. 216, “Approved

Speed-Timing Devices and Appointment of Maintenance and Calibration

Stations.” Appellant objected, arguing that the Commonwealth had already

rested its case. The court took the matter under advisement so the parties

-2- J-S21017-25

could provide post-hearing submissions. Following review, the court took

judicial notice of the Pennsylvania Bulletin and convicted Appellant of both

violations on December 23, 2024. That same day, the court imposed fines of

$112.50 for the speeding offense and $25.00 for the careless driving offense.

On January 17, 2025, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On

January 23, 2025, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely complied on

January 27, 2025.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for review:

1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT] OF VIOLATING SECTION 3362(a) OF THE PENNSYLVANIA VEHICLE CODE WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO SEEK PROPER JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE APPROVAL OF THE TIMING DEVICE AND THE TESTING STATION AND WHERE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE SUA SPONTE OF THE APPROVAL OF THE TIMING DEVICE?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).2

In her sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth

did not request that the court take judicial notice that the testing station and

speed timing device were approved by PennDOT. Appellant argues that the

court attempted to cure the defect by taking judicial notice of the facts sua

sponte. Appellant complains that the court did not take adequate notice of

the approval of the device itself but opined that the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code

provided for the use of speed timing devices in general. Appellant concedes ____________________________________________

2 Appellant presents no argument regarding her conviction for careless driving.

-3- J-S21017-25

that the Motor Vehicle Code allows for the use of a speedometer to determine

the speed of a vehicle, and that stations may test those speedometers, and

that courts may take judicial notice of a fact at any stage of the proceeding.

Nevertheless, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth did not request the

court to take judicial notice of the portion of the Pennsylvania Bulletin

pertaining to the approval of the specific speed timing device used. According

to Appellant, to prove that a particular speed timing device has been

approved by PennDOT, judicial notice may only be taken as long as the

approval is published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. Appellant concludes the

evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction for violating the maximum

speed limit, and she is entitled to relief on these grounds. We disagree.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where

-4- J-S21017-25

the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super.

2013)).

This Court has recently explained:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI