NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ERNEST LORENZO LEONARD SR. :
:
Appellant : No. 50 MDA 2026
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 29, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001197-2020
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: AUGUST 27, 2026 Ernest Lorenzo Leonard, Sr. (“Leonard”) appeals from the order entered by the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Leonard argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly preserve his claims on direct appeal. As we conclude his claims have no merit, we affirm.
In August 2020, the Commonwealth charged Leonard with two counts each of rape of a mentally disabled person, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) of a mentally disabled person, sexual assault, and aggravated indecent assault of a mentally disabled person, arising out of reports that he had sexually assaulted thirty-six-year-old A.W., who has a
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
Down Syndrome diagnosis. On May 11, 2023, he filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. The trial court denied Leonard’s Rule 600 motion. The case proceeded to a jury trial. Following trial, the jury convicted Leonard on all counts. The trial court then sentenced Leonard to an aggregate sentence of eight years to sixteen years of incarceration.2 Leonard then filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court denied.
Leonard appealed, raising claims that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 600 motion, the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and the sentence was manifestly excessive. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Leonard, 331 A.3d 604 (Pa. Super. Nov. 4, 2024) (non-precedential decision).
On his Rule 600 claim, this Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Leonard’s motion. Id. at **2-4. We observed that Leonard failed to provide an accounting of the time delays at issue in the case. Id. at *3. Nevertheless, we found support for the trial court’s findings that the relevant periods of delay were attributable to the defense or court scheduling, and the Commonwealth was prepared to proceed with trial. Id. at *4. Thus, the Court concluded that the jury trial was scheduled within the
____________________________________________
2 The trial court imposed consecutive prison terms of four to eight years for
the rape convictions and concurrent prison terms of three to six years for the sexual assault convictions. The trial court found that the IDSI convictions merged for purposes of sentencing and imposed no further penalty on the aggravated indecent assault convictions.
3
adjusted run date. Id. Regarding his sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court found the argument section of the brief was woefully inadequate, as counsel failed to identify which elements of each offense were being challenged, thus waiving the claim. Id. at *5. As to his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim, this was also found to be waived because Leonard failed to include a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief, and the Commonwealth objected. Id.
On February 10, 2025, Leonard filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition asserting appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly preserve his sufficiency claim such that it deprived Leonard meaningful review of the evidence presented at trial. Leonard further contended that he had no claims reviewed on appeal as a result of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, and a reinstatement of his appellate rights was therefore warranted.
On December 2, 2025, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Leonard’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Subsequently, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Leonard filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of matters complained of on appeal.
He raises the following issues for our review:
1. [] Leonard is able to demonstrate that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in his case had merit sufficiently to warrant reinstatement of his right to file Post Sentence Motions and a direct appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to obtain appellate review of his challenge to the Commonwealth’s evidence against him.
4
2. [] Leonard was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel on appeal due to appellate counsel’s failure to put forth an appeal that offered any meaningful review of the issues and he is entitled to reinstatement of his right to file an effective Post Sentence Motion and direct appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Leonard’s Brief at 4 (issues reordered).
Standard of Review
“This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s denial of a PCRA petition is whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.” Id. “With respect to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 249 A.3d 93, 998 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted).
As each of Leonard’s claims relate to appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, we note that “[a] court’s review of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel begins with the strong presumption that counsel was effective.” Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 340 A.3d 1038, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2025). To overcome this presumption, a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that “(1) The underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or inaction.” Commonwealth v. Felix, 303 A.3d 816, 819 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “The failure to satisfy any one of the
5
ineffectiveness prongs precludes relief.” Commonwealth v. Drayton, 313 A.3d 954, 960 (Pa. 2024) (citation omitted).
Sufficiency of the Evidence Addressing Leonard’s second issue first, he claims his appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not preserve his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Leonard’s Brief at 19. Leonard argues that appellate counsel failed to adequately raise, preserve, and argue his sufficiency claim on appeal, and did so without any reasonable strategic basis. Id. at 19, 22. Noting that he was convicted of numerous offenses that require proof of sexual conduct with a person who suffers from a mental disability, and this element is material to the offenses charged, Leonard contends the Commonwealth failed to offer evidence that A.W.’s mental condition resulted in her being incapable of consenting to sexual contact. Id. at 20, 21. Leonard acknowledges that the Commonwealth offered evidence establishing that A.W. had a mental disability, but distinguishes that from the Commonwealth proving that her mental disability caused her to be incapable of consent. Id. at 22. Leonard points to the testimony of Commonwealth witness Dr. Richard Dowell and argues that he incorrectly assumed that because A.W. had a mental age that placed her below the age of consent under Pennsylvania law, she was per se unable to consent to sexual contact. Id. Finally, he argues his counsel’s failure to preserve this claim prejudiced him by preventing his constitutional right to appellate review to evaluate the sufficiency of the
6
Commonwealth’s proof. Id. at 22-23. Leonard seeks reinstatement of his post-sentence motion and direct appeal rights. Id. at 23.
Our Court’s standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well settled:
Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the province of the fact[]finder to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’[] testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact[]finder.
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 307 A.3d 759, 764-65 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).
Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Crimes Code a person is guilty of rape of a mentally disabled person, a first-degree felony, “when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant … who suffers from a mental disability which renders the complainant incapable of consent.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(5). IDSI of a mentally disabled occurs “when the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant … who suffers from a mental disability which renders him or her incapable of consent.” Id. § 3123(a)(5). Lastly,
7
[A] person who engages in penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of a complainant with a part of the person’s body for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures commits aggravated indecent assault if … the complainant suffers from a mental disability which renders him or her incapable of consent.
Id. § 3125(a)(6).
As the sole element challenged by Leonard is whether A.W. suffered from a mental disability rendering her incapable of consent, we limit our examination of the record to that issue.3 Dr. Dowell, a clinical neuropsychologist, testified as an expert witness in the field of neuropsychology. N.T., 5/18/2023, at 47. He testified about Down Syndrome and provided an overview of his evaluation of A.W. Id. at 48, 55-61. Dr. Dowell said that individuals with Down Syndrome “have difficulty connecting … information together to form the concept of something,” “understand[ing] an outcome for something,” and “when they get into novel settings.” Id. at
____________________________________________
3 We note that the jury also convicted Leonard of sexual assault. Contrary to his stated argument, this crime does not require a finding of A.W.’s mental disability. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1 (noting a person commits sexual assault “when that person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant without the complainant’s consent”). Nevertheless, based on A.W.’s testimony, wherein she denied that she consented to the sexual encounters with Leonard, the evidence is sufficient to support this conviction. See N.T., 5/18/2023, at 50-51, 57, 61-62; see also Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 721 (Pa. Super. 2015) (the uncorroborated testimony of a victim is sufficient to support a sexual assault conviction); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3106 (the testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated in sexual assault prosecutions).
8
57-58. Dr. Dowell testified that people with Down Syndrome are people pleasers and can be easily influenced by others. Id. at 68.
Dr. Dowell administered I.Q. tests for A.W. and determined her level of intellectual capacity is equivalent to that of a child. Id. at 54-61. He emphasized that she is unable to live on her own and cannot link actions with associated outcomes or consequences. Id. at 56-57. Dr. Dowell concluded that A.W. was incapable of consent because “the court system has almost universally indicated that individuals of similar age levels lack the capacity to consent.” Id. at 70. He specifically stated it was his opinion that A.W. “is incapable of consent. This opinion is supported by a combination of factors, including an intellectual disability.” Id. at 69.
Multiple other expert witnesses testified to A.W.’s mental impairment, rendering her incapable of consent. Agent Brittany Alexander, the investigating officer, testified that based on Dr. Dowell’s report and her conversation with him, she understood that A.W. was “not able to give consent.” N.T., 5/17/2023, at 168. Melanie Hashagen, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (“SANE”), testified that when she examined A.W., she sought her guardian’s consent to perform the exam “because [A.W.] was mentally challenged and didn’t have the capacity to … make that decision.” Id. at 100- 01. Deborah Bacon, another SANE, testified that A.W. was “child-like.” Id. at 143. Kathy Hepler, a caseworker for the Joinder Board in the Intellectual Disabilities office, testified that A.W. had been “deemed incompetent” and
9
therefore, with respect to consensual sex, A.W. “was not able to make that decision.” Id. at 128. Dawn Harer, another employee of the Joinder Board in the Intellectual Disabilities office, testified that Leonard lived with A.W. and her guardian, establishing that Leonard was aware of A.W.’s mental disability. Id. at 85.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to show that A.W. had a mental disability that rendered her incapable of consenting to sexual conduct. See Thomson, 673 A.2d at 359 (holding that expert’s credible testimony that victim had a mental deficiency which rendered her incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse was sufficient to support the finding that victim was incapable of consent); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding “[a]n appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the fact[]finder”).
Accordingly, appellate counsel’s actions did not prejudice Leonard in this respect, as the evidence against him was sufficient and the result of the appeal would not have been different. Thus, Leonard’s appellate counsel was not ineffective, and he is due no relief on this claim.
Reinstatement of Appellate Rights Leonard further argues that the claims raised on appeal did not receive proper review because of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. Leonard’s Brief at 11-18. He highlights that counsel waived his sufficiency and discretionary
10
aspects of sentencing claims on direct appeal, and that counsel failed to provide any evidence in support of his Rule 600 claim. Id. at 13-14, 17-18. Leonard asserts that the appellate brief was so defective, it should be viewed as the equivalent of a failure to file a brief. Id. at 16-17. In light of this, he contends he suffered a complete deprivation of counsel and was denied his constitutional right to a direct appeal. Id. at 15, 18 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)); see also id. at 15 (“Under narrow circumstances a petitioner may claim that counsel’s ineffectiveness was so manifest that he need not prove the elements of an ineffective assistance claim. He may do so by showing circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”). Leonard seeks the reinstatement of his post-sentence and direct appeal rights. Id. at 17, 18.
Where the action or inaction of a defendant’s appellate counsel denies him his right to appeal, prejudice will be presumed and a defendant’s right to a direct appeal should be reinstated. Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 801 (Pa. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Mikell, 968 A.2d 779, 781 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“In those extreme circumstances, where counsel has effectively abandoned his or her client and cannot possibly be acting in the client’s best interests, our Supreme Court has held that the risk should fall on counsel, and not his client.”) (citation omitted). To be entitled to this presumption, a defendant must have been entirely denied his right to appeal.
11
See Commonwealth v. Rosado, 150 A.3d 425, 433 (Pa. 2016) (holding errors that completely foreclose appellate review amount to a constructive denial of counsel and thus constitute ineffective assistance of counsel per se). However, “reinstatement of direct appeal rights is not the proper remedy when appellate counsel perfected a direct appeal but simply failed to raise certain claims.” Mikell, 968 A.2d at 781 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Halley, 870 A.2d at 801 (stating the significant difference between “failures that completely foreclose appellate review, and those which may result in narrowing its ambit”).
Although counsel’s appellate brief was underdeveloped, it did not entirely foreclose review for Leonard. To the contrary, this Court reviewed his Rule 600 claim on its merits. See Leonard, 331 A.3d at **2-4. As counsel’s actions simply narrowed the ambit of the appeal, Leonard’s appellate counsel was not per se ineffective. See Mikell, 968 A.2d at 782 (finding that appellant had not been denied his right to a direct appeal where despite finding waiver on direct on appeal on one issue, appellate counsel had taken the steps necessary to ensure that at least one issue presented on appeal would be reviewed); see also Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216, 1226 (Pa. 2009) (concluding “that the filing of an appellate brief, deficient in some aspect or another, does not constitute a complete failure to function as a client’s advocate so as to warrant a presumption of prejudice under Cronic”).
12
Thus, Leonard was obligated to prove appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness under the above three-prong test. See Felix, 303 A.3d at 819.
To that end, we note that although Leonard claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly preserve his sufficiency of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of sentencing claims,4 he does not present any further argument to establish counsel’s ineffectiveness. Nevertheless, as we already concluded, he was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to preserve his sufficiency claim.
Nor has Leonard established he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to properly preserve his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim. At sentencing, the judge had the benefit of a presentence investigation report. N.T., 8/29/2023, at 3-5. The trial judge considered Leonard’s rehabilitative needs, his age, his lack of a prior record, and the seriousness of the crime. Id. at 19-20. He indicated that the sentence would be at the bottom of the standard range for the rape convictions. Id. at 19. Thus, the trial court, both implicitly (through the presentence report) and explicitly (on the record), considered both the mitigating evidence and requisite sentencing factors. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2021) (noting “the Sentencing Code affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its
____________________________________________
4 On appeal, Leonard argued “the trial court abused its discretion by imposing
consecutive sentences, without adequate consideration of mitigating factors raised by [him].” Leonard, 331 A.3d 604, at *5.
13
sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time”) (cleaned up); see also Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (“Where pre[]sentence reports exist, we shall continue to presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors”). Accordingly, Leonard was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to preserve the discretionary sentencing challenge on appeal.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 08/27/2026