Com. v. Laws, D.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Com. v. Laws, D.

DecidedFebruary 9, 2021

Docket254 MDA 2020

StatusUnpublished

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Com. v. Laws, D., (Pa. Ct. App. 2021).

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Opinion

J-S47013-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

DAMETRIUS CEFUS LAWS

Appellant No. 254 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 9, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No.: CP-40-CR-0004062-2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2021

Appellant Dametrius Cefus Laws appeals from the January 9, 2020

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne

County (“trial court”), following his guilty plea to robbery of a motor vehicle

and theft by unlawful taking.1 His counsel has filed a brief and an application

to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1969), and

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we

affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s application to withdraw.

The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. In

connection with an incident occurring on March 1, 2016, Appellant pleaded

guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery at docket number 3466-2016 (the

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3702(a) and 3921(a), respectively. J-S47013-20

“First Case”). On March 17, 2017, the trial court sentenced him five to 10

years’ imprisonment in the First Case.

While incarcerated, on June 22, 2018, Appellant was charged in the

instant case—docket number 4062-2018 (the “Second Case”)—with, inter

alia, robbery of a motor vehicle and theft by unlawful taking arising out of an

incident that occurred on April 3, 2016. Appellant pleaded guilty to robbery

of a motor vehicle and theft by unlawful taking in the Second Case. On

January 9, 2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 36 to 72 months’

imprisonment followed by 2 years’ probation. The presentence investigation

report indicated that Appellant was not entitled to any time credit. On

February 6, 2020, Appellant pro se filed a “Petition for Credit for Imprisonment

While in Custody Prior to Sentence,” alleging that he was entitled to 455 days’

credit for time served.2 On the same day, Appellant timely appealed his

judgment of sentence. The trial court appointed counsel. Eventually, the trial

court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors

complained of on appeal. Appellant complied, raising a single assertion of

error, challenging the trial court’s failure to credit him for time served in the

Second Case. In response, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,

concluding that Appellant’s sentencing issue lacked merit. The court

determined that Appellant was not entitled to any credit for time served in the ____________________________________________

2 Appellant pro se later amended the time credit from 455 to 474 days. He calculated the days from August 6, 2018 (the date of his preliminary arraignment in the Second Case) to January 9, 2020 (the date of sentencing sub judice).

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Second Case because he was serving the sentence in the First Case, which

arose out of a distinct and separate criminal incident.

On July 13, 2020, Appellant’s counsel filed in this Court an application

to withdraw as counsel and filed an Anders brief, wherein counsel raised the

following issue. “Is [] Appellant entitled to a credit of 474 days for time served

against the sentence imposed in the present case and did [the trial court] err

in failing to award that credit at the time of sentencing?” Anders Brief at 2.

When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the

merits of the underlying issues without first examining counsel’s petition to

withdraw. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super.

2007) (en banc). It is well-established that, in requesting a withdrawal,

counsel must satisfy the following procedural requirements: 1) petition the

court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious

examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be

frivolous; 2) provide a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the

defendant that he or she has the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro

se or raise additional arguments that the defendant considers worthy of the

court’s addition. Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super.

2009).

Instantly, counsel’s application to withdraw from representation

provides that counsel reviewed the record and concluded that the appeal is

frivolous. Furthermore, counsel notified Appellant that he was seeking

permission to withdraw and provided Appellant with copies of the petition to

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withdraw and his Anders brief. Counsel also advised Appellant of his right to

retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems

worthy of this Court’s attention. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel has

satisfied the procedural requirements of Anders.

We next must determine whether counsel’s Anders brief complies with

the substantive requirements of Santiago, wherein our Supreme Court held:

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Here, our review of counsel’s brief indicates that

he has complied with the briefing requirements of Santiago. We, therefore,

conclude that counsel has satisfied the minimum requirements of

Anders/Santiago.

Once counsel has met his obligations, “it then becomes the responsibility

of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the proceedings and make

an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly

frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5. Thus, we now turn to the merits

of Appellant’s appeal.

Appellant’s sole issue before us implicates the legality of sentence. See

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 595 (Pa. Super. 2007) (noting

that “[a] challenge to the trial court’s failure to award credit for time spent in

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custody prior to sentencing involves the legality of sentence”), appeal

denied, 944 A.2d 756 (Pa. 2008). Issues relating to the legality of a sentence

are questions of law. Commonwealth v. Aikens, 139 A.3d 244, 245 (Pa.

Super. 2016), aff’d 168 A.3d 137 (Pa. 2017). Our standard of review over

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