Com. v. Kressler, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 1, 2023
• Docket: 590 MDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A09004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CARL RAY KRESSLER : : Appellant : No. 590 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 31, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-19-CR-0000170-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: JUNE 1, 2023

Carl Ray Kressler appeals the judgment of sentence imposed by the

Columbia County Court of Common Pleas after Kressler pled guilty to two

counts of third-degree murder for shooting and killing his mother and father.

Specifically, Kressler argues the trial court erred by using the first of these

two convictions as a basis for imposing a mandatory life sentence for the

second third-degree murder conviction pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9715,

which provides that “any person convicted of murder of the third degree in

this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any time of murder

or voluntary manslaughter … shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.” He

argues, in essence, that Section 9715 is not applicable to his second third-

degree murder conviction because the murder underlying that conviction, for

his father, occurred as part of the same criminal episode as the murder J-A09004-23

underlying the first third-degree murder conviction, for his mother. He also

argues the mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional as he was 18 years

old at the time of the murders. As we conclude neither of these claims have

merit, we affirm.

Sharon Kressler and Flint Kressler were found dead in their home on

January 23, 2020. Their son, Kressler, admitted to shooting each of them.

Kressler was charged with two counts of murder and eventually entered into

a plea agreement with the Commonwealth. In the agreement, Kressler agreed

to plead guilty to third-degree murder for both the killing of his mother (count

1) as well as for the killing of his father (count 2). The agreement specifically

noted that the Commonwealth was seeking a term of life imprisonment on the

second third-degree murder conviction pursuant to Section 9715. However,

the agreement also provided that “[s]hould the sentencing provisions of

[Section 9715] become invalid through judicial or legislative action, it is

understood [Kressler] would have grounds to seek relief regarding his

sentence.” Plea Agreement, 3/31/2022, at 2 (unpaginated).

Following a written and oral colloquy, the trial court accepted Kressler’s

guilty plea to two counts of third-degree murder. The court, which had the

benefit of a presentence investigation report that had already been prepared,

immediately proceeded to sentencing. At the outset, Kressler noted his

objection to the application of Section 9715 to the sentence for his second

third-degree murder conviction, both on the basis that it was not applicable

-2- J-A09004-23

to his situation because the two murder convictions stemmed from a single

criminal episode and because sentencing him to a mandatory term of life

imprisonment for a crime he committed when he was 18 was, according to

Kressler, unconstitutional. See N.T., 3/31/2022, at 20, 22. The court noted

that Commonwealth v. Coleman, 249 A.3d 1143 (Pa. Super. filed February

9, 2021) (unpublished memorandum), appeal granted in part by 260 A.3d 923

(Pa. August 1, 2021), was pending before our Supreme Court at that time and

involved Section 9715 and the single criminal episode issue raised by Kressler.

See N.T., 3/31/2022, at 13.

The sentencing hearing proceeded and Kressler presented the testimony

of Louise Luck from Court Consultation Services, who offered mitigation

evidence on behalf of Kessler. See id. at 24-31. Ultimately, the court

sentenced Kressler to 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment for the third-degree

murder conviction for count 1, and to a consecutive sentence of life without

parole for the third-degree murder conviction for count 2 pursuant to Section

9715.

Kressler filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court

complied with Pa. R.A.P. 1925. Kressler raises these two issues for our

consideration:

A. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in applying the mandatory sentencing provision of 42 Pa. C.S. § 9715(a) to this case where the offenses and the deaths occurred during the same factual incident.

-3- J-A09004-23

B. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in giving [Kressler] life without the possibility of parole where [he] was age 18 at the time of the commission of the crime and thus a youthful offender and whether life without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional.

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Kressler first asserts the trial court erred by applying the mandatory

sentencing enhancement of Section 9715 to him. Section 9715, referenced in

part above, more fully provides:

(a) Mandatory life imprisonment.–-Notwithstanding [certain provisions of the Sentencing Code not applicable here], any person convicted of murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any time of murder or voluntary manslaughter in this Commonwealth or of the same or substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction shall be sentenced to life imprisonment…

(b) Proof at sentencing.--Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime and notice thereof to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth’s intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9715 (italicized emphasis added).

Kressler’s claim requires us to engage in statutory interpretation, and it

therefore presents a question of law. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285

A.3d 599, 605 (Pa. 2022). Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo and

our scope of review is plenary. See id. (citation omitted).

Kressler specifically argues Section 9715 is not applicable to him

because both of his third-degree murder convictions stemmed from a single

-4- J-A09004-23

criminal episode and under Section 9715, Kressler maintains, “the conviction

and sentencing on the primary conviction must antedate the commission of

the second offense.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. He complains that applying the

sentencing enhancement provision to situations such as his, where the “crimes

occurred in the same incident and are ple[d] and sentenced … at the same

time” fails to “give a person an opportunity for rehabilitation.” See id. at 22.

Kressler’s claim fails under our Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Coleman, referenced by the trial court during sentencing and filed by our

Supreme Court after the parties submitted their appellate briefs to this Court.

There, the High Court held that the sentencing enhancement prescribed by

Section 9715 applied to defendants, such as Kressler, who kill multiple people

contemporaneously and are thereafter convicted of third-degree murder for

each of those killings. See Coleman, 285 A.3d at 601. In so holding, the

Court specifically rejected Coleman’s claim, effectively identical to that raised

by Kressler here, that Section 9715 should not apply where a single course of

conduct caused multiple simultaneous deaths on the basis that such an

argument was refuted by the plain text of the statute. See id. at 609. To that

end, the Court explained that Section 9715 plainly states that

any person convicted of third-degree murder who has previously been convicted of murder “at any time” is to receive an enhanced sentence. Indeed, through use of the term “at any time,” the General Assembly made clear that there is no limitation relative to a person’s previous conviction that would preclude application of the sentencing enhancement insofar as it concerns Section 9715(a). Thus, pursuant to Section 9715(a), so long as a person convicted of third-degree murder has previously been convicted

-5- J-A09004-23

of murder at any point in time, the sentencing enhancement applies to that person.

…

While [Coleman] argues that Section 9715 should not apply where a single course of conduct caused multiple instantaneous, simultaneous deaths, we emphasize that the General Assembly spoke only in terms of convictions and, more specifically, whether the defendant “convicted” of third-degree murder “has previously been convicted at any time of murder.” [Coleman’s] attempts to shift the focus of the analysis to his particular conduct or circumstances are not supported by the text of Section 9715.

Id.

The Court also noted that the plain text of Section 9715(b) states that

the applicability of the mandatory sentencing enhancement of life

imprisonment “shall be determined at sentencing.” Id. at 611. In these

circumstances, i.e. “when a mandatory sentencing statute is unambiguously

predicated on a prior conviction at sentencing,” such as Section 9715, the

Court reiterated that “it is legally irrelevant whether this previous conviction

arose from the same or different criminal conduct.” Id. at 611.

The Coleman Court also addressed Coleman’s claim, again effectively

identical to that raised by Kressler here, that Section 9715 should be

interpreted to be inapplicable to defendants whose multiple third-degree

murder convictions arise from single-episode murders under the “recidivist

philosophy.” After defining this philosophy as one “represent[ing] the view

that the point of sentence enhancement is to punish more severely offenders

who have persevered in criminal activity despite the theoretically beneficial

-6- J-A09004-23

effects of penal discipline,” id. at 612 n.10 (citation omitted), the Supreme

Court stated in no uncertain terms that the “recidivist philosophy” cannot be

used to override clearly contrary statutory language. See id. at 613. And,

because Section 9715 is unambiguous, it “leaves no room for application of …

the ‘recidivist philosophy’ to the benefit of [defendants like Coleman who have

multiple third-degree murder convictions stemming from a single criminal

episode].” Id.

Applying the holding and reasoning of Coleman to our case here, it is

abundantly clear that Kressler’s contention that Section 9715 is not applicable

to his situation because his third-degree murder convictions stemmed from a

single criminal episode is without merit. No relief is due on this claim.

In his second issue, Kressler argues that mandatory life sentences

without parole should be deemed unconstitutional for anyone under the age

of 25. Although Kressler does not cite Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132

S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding that mandatory life without

parole sentences are unconstitutional for those under the age of 18 at the

time of their offenses), Kressler does acknowledge he was 18 at the time of

the murders but effectively argues Miller should be extended to those

defendants, like him, who were under 25 at the time of their crime because

“young adolescent brain development does not fully [mature] until the age of

25.” Appellant’s Brief at 26. This claim also fails.

-7- J-A09004-23

This Court has repeatedly held that Miller does not apply to defendants

who were 18 or older when they committed murder. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted) (stating Miller applies only to those defendants who were “under the

age of 18 at the time of their crimes''). We have also specifically declined to

extend Miller to those 18 or older on the basis that their brains were not fully

developed at the time of the offense. See Commonwealth v. Rodriquez,

174 A.3d 1130, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2017) (rejecting the argument that the trial

court erred by imposing a life sentence without parole on the basis that Miller

should be extended to those 18 or older whose brains are not fully developed);

Furgess, 149 A.3d at 94 (rejecting the argument that Miller should be

extended to persons convicted of murder who were older at the time of their

crimes than the under-18 class of defendants subject to Miller’s holding but

who are “technical juveniles'' because their brains were not fully developed at

the relevant time). Given this case law, Kressler has failed to demonstrate

that his second and final claim provides him with any relief.

In the end, Kressler’s claims that the court improperly or

unconstitutionally sentenced him to life in prison without parole pursuant to

Section 9715 are without merit, and no relief is due.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

-8- J-A09004-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 6/01/2023

-9-