Com. v. King, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 26, 2026
• Docket: 2935 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Dubow

Opinion

J-S37011-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : ANGELA KING : No. 2935 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered October 2, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005509-2023

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JANUARY 26, 2026

The Commonwealth appeals from the order dismissing charges filed

against Appellee Angela King pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. 1 The

Commonwealth asserts that the trial court violated the mandates of

Commonwealth v. Lear, 325 A.3d 552, 560 (Pa. 2024), by failing to consider

the cause of delays resulting from defense requests for continuances before

concluding the Commonwealth had failed to act with due diligence throughout

the life of the case. Following our careful review, we reverse the order

granting the motion, vacate the dismissal of the charges, and remand for

further proceedings.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Commonwealth also appealed the dismissal of Appellee’s co-defendant’s

cases following the grant of the Rule 600 motion. See Commonwealth v. Lawal, No. 2921 EDA 24; Commonwealth v. Torres, No. 2919 EDA 2024. J-S37011-25

On May 5, 2023, the Commonwealth charged Appellee and two others,

all co-workers at Home Depot, with Theft by Unlawful Taking-Movable

Property and six related crimes following an investigation into the

disappearance of building materials from store inventory. On June 6, 2023,

the parties jointly requested a continuance. On August 4, 2023, Appellee

waived her preliminary hearing and two charges were withdrawn by

agreement. On August 10, 2023, the Commonwealth joined Appellee’s case

with her co-defendants. The docket indicates that discovery was complete on

August 18, 2023.

Of most importance to our analysis is the period from September 14,

2023 until January 25, 2024, a period of 133 days. The docket reveals that

the court scheduled hearings three times and at each hearing, the defense

requested a continuance, which the trial court granted. At the pre-trial

conference held on January 25, 2024, Appellee rejected the Commonwealth’s

plea offer and the defense requested a waiver trial. On February 6, 2024, the

court scheduled a waiver trial for May 31, 2024. On May 31, 2024, the

Commonwealth requested a continuance because one of its witnesses failed

to appear. The court then rescheduled the waiver trial to October 2, 2024.

On September 30, 2024, co-defendant Torres filed a motion to dismiss,

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, which Appellee joined on October 2, 2024. On

October 2, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the motion at which defense

counsel argued that the period of delay occurring between September 14,

2023, and January 25, 2024, when it requested continuances for further

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investigation, should be included in the Rule 600 calculation against the

Commonwealth because the Commonwealth’s delay in providing mandatory

discovery demonstrated that it had not acted with due diligence. Defense

counsel argued that because “after two dates[,] discovery still remained

outstanding” and they were “continuing to receive discovery as of yesterday,

. . . the Commonwealth has not been ready to proceed to trial, therefore all

of that time should count against the Commonwealth, except that excludable

time where there was a joint request for further investigation at the

preliminary hearing stage.” N.T. Mot. Hr’g, 10/2/24, at 8-9.

The Commonwealth responded that it had provided “all the evidence the

Commonwealth had in their possession” and it was ready to move forward as

of March 25, 2024. Id. at 10. The Commonwealth also noted that “[a]nything

else that would have been outstanding was something that we requested from

Home Depot that they never sent over.” Id. at 10-11. The Commonwealth

acknowledged that it had not passed certain “FBI extracts” 2 until the day prior

to the Rule 600 hearing. Id. at 12. There was no discussion of when those

FBI extracts became available to the Commonwealth.

Following argument, the court granted the Rule 600 motion and

dismissed the case. The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration,

which the court denied.

2 FBI extracts may include genetic profiles and DNA analysis.

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The Commonwealth appealed to this Court on November 1, 2024, and

filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement. The court filed a responsive opinion

pursuant to Rule 1925(a).

The Commonwealth presents the following statement of question

involved:

Did the lower court err by dismissing theft and related charges under rule 600, where fewer than 365 potentially includable days had passed before the charges were dismissed and where time resulting from three unilateral defense continuance request should have been rule excludable.

Commonwealth’s Br., at 4.

We review the trial court’s disposition of a Rule 600 motion for an abuse

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Burno, 154 A.3d 764, 793 (Pa. 2017).

“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching

a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will .

. . discretion is abused.” Id. (citation omitted). “Our scope of review is limited

to the record evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings of the

lower court, reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the

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administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 875 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation

omitted).

Rule 600 requires that trial “shall commence within 365 days from the

date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). The 365 th

day following the filing of the complaint is known as the mechanical run date,

which may be extended under certain circumstances. Commonwealth v.

Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 956–57 (Pa. Super. 2017).3 When a defendant seeks

dismissal based on a violation of Rule 600, the court first establishes the

mechanical run date, then determines whether any periods of delay are

excludable and, if so, it extends the mechanical run date to account for the

periods of excludable delay to, thus, arrive at the adjusted run date.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). The Commonwealth must bring a defendant to trial by

the adjusted run date. Commonwealth v. Roles, 116 A.3d 122, 125 (Pa.

Super. 2015). “For purposes of [Rule 600(A)], periods of delay at any stage

of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth

has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of

time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be

excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

3 See generally Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1972); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

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Our Supreme Court recently explained that the first sentence of Rule

600(C)(1) provides “the general rule” and establishes “two requirements that

must be met for delay to count toward the 365-day deadline: (1) the delay

must be caused by the Commonwealth, and (2) the Commonwealth must have

failed to exercise due diligence.” Lear, 325 A.3d at 560 (citation omitted).

The Lear Court clarified that “the causation analysis precedes the due

diligence inquiry, and it is only when the Commonwealth both caused the delay

and lacked due diligence that the delay is properly included in the Rule 600

calculation.” Id. at 560 n.7. “This means that the trial court must first

consider the cause of the delay before analyzing the Commonwealth's

diligence in meeting discovery obligations over the life of the case.”

Commonwealth v. Walker, 331 A.3d 43, 48 (Pa. Super. 2025), appeal

denied, 343 A.3d 727 (Pa. 2025). In other words, the trial court only considers

whether the Commonwealth acted with due diligence in those situations in

which the trial court first determines that it was the Commonwealth who

caused the delay. When some other factor, such as a factor out of the control

of the Commonwealth, caused the delay, the court does not consider the

Commonwealth’s due diligence, but rather adds the period of delay to the

mechanical run date.

It is well established that when a court grants a continuance at the

request of the defense, the resulting period of delay is not included in the Rule

600 calculation. Thus, that delay will extend the date by which trial must

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occur. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 180 A.3d 368, 376 (Pa. Super. 2018);

see also Walker, 331 A.3d at 48 (holding that a defense request for a

continuance for further investigation “must be excluded.”).

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 governs pre-trial discovery

in criminal cases. The rule lists certain evidence that is subject to mandatory

disclosure by the Commonwealth when it is: (1) requested by the defendant,

(2) material to the case, and (3) within the possession or control of the

prosecutor. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a)-(g).4 This Court has recognized

that a delay caused by a defense request for non-mandatory discovery is not

includable against the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 213

A.3d 1004, 1013-14 (Pa. Super. 2019). In addition, where evidence is equally

4 Rule 573(B) provides that “mandatory discovery” includes “(a) Any evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment, and is within the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth; (b) any written confession or inculpatory statement, or the substance of any oral confession or inculpatory statement, and the identity of the person to whom the confession or inculpatory statement was made that is in the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth; (c) the defendant's prior criminal record; (d) the circumstances and results of any identification of the defendant by voice, photograph, or in-person identification; (e) any results or reports of scientific tests, expert opinions, and written or recorded reports of polygraph examinations or other physical or mental examinations of the defendant that are within the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth; (f) any tangible objects, including documents, photographs, fingerprints, or other tangible evidence; and (g) the transcripts and recordings of any electronic surveillance, and the authority by which the said transcripts and recordings were obtained.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a-g).

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accessible to both parties, the Commonwealth should not be penalized for the

defendant's failure to avail herself of the evidence. See Commonwealth v.

Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 883 (Pa. Super. 2017); see also Commonwealth v.

Corbin, 2025 WL 945815 at *7 (Pa. Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum

decision) (reversing grant of Rule 600 motion where, inter alia, the lower court

had not made a finding that the discovery at issue was equally accessible to

both parties).

Here, the Commonwealth filed the criminal complaint on May 5, 2023,

and thus, Appellee’s mechanical run date for purposes of Rule 600 was May

5, 2024. Following the parties’ joint continuance, the adjusted run date

became June 10, 2024. When Appellee joined the Rule 600 Motion that had

been filed on September 30, 2024, 512 calendar days had passed since the

Commonwealth filed the criminal complaint.

In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the court acknowledged that the 133-day

period of delay between September 2023 and January 2024 “could be

considered excludable due to Appellee’s actions” in requesting continuances.

Tr. Ct. Op., 12/30/24, at 5 (unpaginated). The trial court, nonetheless,

concluded that because the Commonwealth conceded it had not turned over

a 483 statement5 until October 1, 2024, the delay caused by the defense’s

continuance requests should be counted against the Commonwealth.

5 A 483 statement refers to a witness statement provided to law enforcement.

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The Commonwealth argues that 169 days of delay “were attributable to

defense and joint continuance requests and were therefore excludable as a

matter of law.” Commonwealth’s Br. at 10. The Commonwealth notes that

the docket labeled the defense requests as “defense requests for ‘further

investigation,’ and defendants did not object to those designations.” Id. The

Commonwealth further notes that Appellee’s counsel acknowledged that her

co-defendant’s counsel requested those continuances for further investigation

in the Rule 600 motion to dismiss and argues that “[a]s a matter of law,

because those continuances were unilateral defense requests, they were

excludable.” Id. at 10-11. The Commonwealth argues that the “lower court

incorrectly attributed those defense continuance requests to the

Commonwealth on the grounds that the Commonwealth was not duly diligent

in passing discovery before [Appellee] even began requesting those

continuances. However, lack of due diligence in this regard did not cause the

delay.” Id. at 11. The Commonwealth emphasizes that the Lear court

“cautioned against ‘reading the language of Rule 600 out of order’ and clarified

that ‘the causation analysis precedes the due diligence inquiry.’” Id., at 11

(quoting Lear, supra).

In reaching its determination, the trial court did not consider the cause

of the delay first, as required by the mandates of Lear, supra, and Walker,

supra. Rather, the trial court immediately determined that the

Commonwealth failed to act with due diligence beginning from just one month

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after the criminal complaint was filed, and counted all delay from June 9, 2023,

just one month after the criminal complaint was filed, against the

Commonwealth. We conclude the court abused its discretion by failing to

apply precedential law.

In this case, the period of time at issue is from September 14, 2023, to

January 25, 2024. The docket indicates that the defense requested and

received three continuances “for further investigation:” on September 14,

2023, which resulted in a 28-day delay; on October 12, 2023, which resulted

in 62-day delay; and on December 13, 2023, which resulted in a 43-day delay.

Because the defense requested each of these continuances, the cause of the

aggregate 133 days of delay between September 14, 2023, and January 25,

2024, is attributable to the defense. As such, pursuant to Lear and Walker,

supra, the Commonwealth’s diligence at the time the defense requested each

continuance is not relevant when calculating the adjusted run date of the trial.

The 133-day delay attributable to the defense extended the adjusted

run date from June 10, 2024, to October 21, 2024. Accordingly, the Rule 600

motion filed on September 30, 2024, was premature and the court abused its

discretion in granting the motion and dismissing the case.

Order reversed. Dismissal of charges vacated. Case remanded for

further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Date: 1/26/2026

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