J-S59023-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
MICHAEL E. KEELING
Appellant No. 2889 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 18, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1111571-1994 CP-51-CR-1111581-1994 CP-51-CR-1111591-1994
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2016
Appellant, Michael Keeling, appeals pro se from the order entered on
August 18, 2015, dismissing his fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the relevant factual background and
procedural history of this case as follows:
On November 18, 1994, [p]olice [o]fficers Joseph Osborne and Herbert Nelson detained [Appellant] on 5th Street in Philadelphia after identifying him through composite sketches as a suspected carjacker. After gathering additional information, the officers decided to bring him into headquarters for further questioning. As they were preparing for transport, [Appellant] grabbed a hidden revolver from inside his pants and fired at the officers. The officers retreated behind their police car as he fired more shots. Satisfied that he was beyond the reach of the officers, [Appellant] ran away.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S59023-16
As he was running, [Appellant] spotted a station wagon at a stoplight, pointed the revolver at [the] driver [], and ordered him to exit the vehicle. [Appellant] then drove off, with the officers in pursuit. During the chase[, Appellant] lost control of the vehicle and hit a pole. He jumped out of the car and began to run but was apprehended several blocks away. His gun was found nearby.
Using this evidence, the jury convicted [Appellant] of two counts of aggravated assault,[1] robbery,[2] robbery of a motor vehicle,[3] theft,[4] and [carrying a firearm without a license.5 The trial c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 32½ to 65 years. [Appellant] appealed [and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Our] Supreme Court denied [allowance of appeal] on December 24, 1996.
PCRA Court Opinion, 10/13/15, at 1-2.
Thereafter, on September 12, 1997, [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA
petition. After counsel was appointed, the PCRA court dismissed the petition
and this Court affirmed. Appellant filed a second PCRA petition on July 8,
2005 which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely. Appellant also filed a
third PCRA petition which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely. This Court
affirmed the dismissal and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal.
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702. 2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701. 3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3702. 4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921. 5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106.
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On November 19, 2014, Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA
petition, his fourth. Thereafter, Appellant filed an amended petition. On
August 6, 2015, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the
petition without an evidentiary hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant
filed a response to the Rule 907 notice. On August 18, 2015, the PCRA court
dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. This timely appeal
followed.6
Appellant presents four issues for our review:
1. Did the [PCRA] court err by its failure to grant [Appellant’s] motion for leave to amend [his PCRA petition pursuant to] 42 Pa.[C.S.A.] § 9545(b)(1) into a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief [pursuant to] 42 Pa.[C.S.A.] § 6502(a)?
2. Did the [PCRA] court err by its failure to grant a writ of habeas corpus relief . . . ?
3. Did the [PCRA] court err [in] its denial [of] independent ballistic identification testing . . . ?
4. Did the [PCRA] court err by failing to grant [an] evidentiary hearing where[,] for reasons outside [Appellant’s] own personal control[,] he has never been afforded a probable cause hearing to determine whether police had sufficient probable cause to stop and arrest [him] on November 18, 1994?
Appellant’s Brief at ii.7
6 Appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”) contemporaneously with his notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 13, 2015. All issues raised on appeal were included in Appellant’s concise statement. 7 We have re-numbered the issues for ease of disposition.
-3- J-S59023-16
In his first and second issues, Appellant argues that the PCRA court
should have treated his filing as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant alleges a conflict of interest existed between his trial counsel and
direct appeal counsel because both were employed by the Defender
Association of Philadelphia. He further argues this constitutes a breakdown
of the judicial system and entitles him to habeas corpus relief because the
PCRA is an inadequate remedy. Appellant’s argument is misguided.
“The [PCRA is] the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same
purpose . . . including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9542. A petition for writ of habeas corpus is only appropriate where a
petitioner’s claim is not cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth
v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016). A claim that there was a
conflict of interest is cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v.
Townsend, 850 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. Super. 2004). Accordingly, the PCRA
court correctly treated Appellant’s filing as a PCRA petition and not a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
“Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of
the underlying petition. Thus, we must first determine whether the instant
PCRA petition was timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 35 A.3d 766,
768 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 53 A.3d 757 (Pa. 2012). The
timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions “is mandatory and jurisdictional in
-4- J-S59023-16
nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the
petition.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation omitted). “The question of whether a petition is timely raises
a question of law. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard
of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date the
judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A]
judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant’s judgment of sentence
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J-S59023-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
MICHAEL E. KEELING
Appellant No. 2889 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 18, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1111571-1994 CP-51-CR-1111581-1994 CP-51-CR-1111591-1994
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2016
Appellant, Michael Keeling, appeals pro se from the order entered on
August 18, 2015, dismissing his fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the relevant factual background and
procedural history of this case as follows:
On November 18, 1994, [p]olice [o]fficers Joseph Osborne and Herbert Nelson detained [Appellant] on 5th Street in Philadelphia after identifying him through composite sketches as a suspected carjacker. After gathering additional information, the officers decided to bring him into headquarters for further questioning. As they were preparing for transport, [Appellant] grabbed a hidden revolver from inside his pants and fired at the officers. The officers retreated behind their police car as he fired more shots. Satisfied that he was beyond the reach of the officers, [Appellant] ran away.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S59023-16
As he was running, [Appellant] spotted a station wagon at a stoplight, pointed the revolver at [the] driver [], and ordered him to exit the vehicle. [Appellant] then drove off, with the officers in pursuit. During the chase[, Appellant] lost control of the vehicle and hit a pole. He jumped out of the car and began to run but was apprehended several blocks away. His gun was found nearby.
Using this evidence, the jury convicted [Appellant] of two counts of aggravated assault,[1] robbery,[2] robbery of a motor vehicle,[3] theft,[4] and [carrying a firearm without a license.5 The trial c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 32½ to 65 years. [Appellant] appealed [and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Our] Supreme Court denied [allowance of appeal] on December 24, 1996.
PCRA Court Opinion, 10/13/15, at 1-2.
Thereafter, on September 12, 1997, [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA
petition. After counsel was appointed, the PCRA court dismissed the petition
and this Court affirmed. Appellant filed a second PCRA petition on July 8,
2005 which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely. Appellant also filed a
third PCRA petition which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely. This Court
affirmed the dismissal and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal.
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702. 2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701. 3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3702. 4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921. 5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106.
-2- J-S59023-16
On November 19, 2014, Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA
petition, his fourth. Thereafter, Appellant filed an amended petition. On
August 6, 2015, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the
petition without an evidentiary hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant
filed a response to the Rule 907 notice. On August 18, 2015, the PCRA court
dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. This timely appeal
followed.6
Appellant presents four issues for our review:
1. Did the [PCRA] court err by its failure to grant [Appellant’s] motion for leave to amend [his PCRA petition pursuant to] 42 Pa.[C.S.A.] § 9545(b)(1) into a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief [pursuant to] 42 Pa.[C.S.A.] § 6502(a)?
2. Did the [PCRA] court err by its failure to grant a writ of habeas corpus relief . . . ?
3. Did the [PCRA] court err [in] its denial [of] independent ballistic identification testing . . . ?
4. Did the [PCRA] court err by failing to grant [an] evidentiary hearing where[,] for reasons outside [Appellant’s] own personal control[,] he has never been afforded a probable cause hearing to determine whether police had sufficient probable cause to stop and arrest [him] on November 18, 1994?
Appellant’s Brief at ii.7
6 Appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”) contemporaneously with his notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 13, 2015. All issues raised on appeal were included in Appellant’s concise statement. 7 We have re-numbered the issues for ease of disposition.
-3- J-S59023-16
In his first and second issues, Appellant argues that the PCRA court
should have treated his filing as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant alleges a conflict of interest existed between his trial counsel and
direct appeal counsel because both were employed by the Defender
Association of Philadelphia. He further argues this constitutes a breakdown
of the judicial system and entitles him to habeas corpus relief because the
PCRA is an inadequate remedy. Appellant’s argument is misguided.
“The [PCRA is] the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same
purpose . . . including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9542. A petition for writ of habeas corpus is only appropriate where a
petitioner’s claim is not cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth
v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016). A claim that there was a
conflict of interest is cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v.
Townsend, 850 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. Super. 2004). Accordingly, the PCRA
court correctly treated Appellant’s filing as a PCRA petition and not a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
“Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of
the underlying petition. Thus, we must first determine whether the instant
PCRA petition was timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 35 A.3d 766,
768 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 53 A.3d 757 (Pa. 2012). The
timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions “is mandatory and jurisdictional in
-4- J-S59023-16
nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the
petition.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation omitted). “The question of whether a petition is timely raises
a question of law. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard
of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date the
judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A]
judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on March 24, 1997, 90 days after our Supreme Court denied
allowance of appeal. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13 (petition for a writ of certiorari
must be filed within 90 days). Appellant’s present petition, his fourth, was
filed on or about November 19, 2014. Thus, the petition was patently
untimely.
An untimely PCRA petition may be considered if one of the following
three exceptions applies:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
-5- J-S59023-16
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). If an exception applies, a PCRA petition
may be considered if it is filed “within 60 days of the date the claim could
have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
As noted above, a petitioner must plead and prove the existence of a
timeliness exception in order for the PCRA court to have jurisdiction over an
untimely petition. Failure to plead the applicability of a timeliness exception
in the PCRA petition renders the PCRA court without jurisdiction to consider
the merits of the petition. See Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d
466, 468-469 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 934 A.2d 72 (Pa. 2007). In
this case, Appellant’s PCRA petition did not allege that he satisfied one of the
PCRA’s timeliness exceptions. Accordingly, he failed to plead and prove the
applicability of a timeliness exception and the PCRA court properly held that
it lacked jurisdiction over his untimely petition.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 8/19/2016
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