Com. v. Kania, R., II

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 10, 2025
• Docket: 88 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S26036-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RAYMOND JOSEPH KANIA, II : : Appellant : No. 88 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 4, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000473-2024

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., OLSON, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 10, 2025

Raymond Joseph Kania II (“Kania”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed by the Bradford County Court of Common Pleas (“trial

court”) following his guilty plea to possession with intent to deliver marijuana.1

Kania’s counsel, Attorney Victoria E. Martin (“Counsel”), seeks to withdraw

from representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Upon

review, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Kania’s judgment

of sentence.

On November 4, 2024, Kania agreed to enter a guilty plea to possession

with intent to deliver marijuana, arising out of his possession and maintenance

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1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). J-S26036-25

of marijuana plants, in exchange for the dismissal of his other charges. That

same day, the trial court sentenced Kania to eighty-eight days to twenty-three

months and twenty-nine days of incarceration. The trial court further stated

that Kania would be subject to thirty days of electronic monitoring upon

release. Kania filed a post-sentence motion arguing the sentence was overly

harsh. The trial court denied the motion. Kania filed a timely appeal.

Counsel filed an Anders brief and petition to withdraw as counsel in this

Court. When faced with an Anders brief, we may not review the merits of

the underlying issues or allow counsel to withdraw without first evaluating

whether counsel has complied with all requirements set forth in Anders and

Santiago. Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1195 (Pa. Super.

2018). There are mandates that counsel seeking to withdraw pursuant to

Anders must follow, which arise because a criminal defendant has a

constitutional right to a direct appeal and to be represented by counsel for the

pendency of that appeal. Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898

(Pa. Super. 2007). We have summarized these requirements as follows:

Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation thereof.

Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.

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If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to withdraw and remand the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an advocate brief on [a]ppellant’s behalf).

Id. (citations omitted).

Additionally, Santiago sets forth precisely what an Anders brief must

contain:

[T]he Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw … must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Substantial compliance with the Anders and

Santiago requirements is sufficient. Commonwealth v. Redmond, 273

A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2022). If counsel has satisfied the above

requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the

record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues that the

appellant could raise on appeal. Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d

266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

We conclude that Counsel has complied with the requirements outlined

above. Counsel filed a petition to withdraw and an Anders brief with this

Court stating that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Petition to Withdraw,

5/21/2025. Counsel attached to her petition to withdraw the letter she sent

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to Kania informing him that she was filing an Anders brief and advising Kania

of his right to proceed pro se or to retain new counsel and raise any additional

issues that he deems worth of this Court’s consideration. Id., Attachment.

In her brief, Counsel provided a summary of the procedural history and facts.

Anders Brief at 8-10. Counsel also refers to material in the record that could

arguably support this appeal and cites to relevant authority to support her

conclusion that the claim Kania seeks to raise is wholly frivolous. Id. at 11-

16. Accordingly, we conclude that Counsel has substantially complied with

the procedural requirements for withdrawing from representation. See

Redmond, 273 A.3d at 1252.

We thus turn our attention to the issue Counsel raised in the Anders

brief: “Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence of 88

days followed by 30 days of electronic monitor, which [Kania] contends is

excessive under the circumstances?” Anders Brief at 4.

This issue challenges the discretionary aspects of Kania’s sentence.2

Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting a

claim that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence is a challenge to the

discretionary aspects of sentencing).

The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal. To invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to review ____________________________________________

2 Because Kania entered an open guilty plea he may challenge the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 A.3d 970, 972 (Pa. Super. 2020).

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a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant must satisfy a four-part test:

(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the time of sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (2) the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of his appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises a substantial question for our review.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 312 A.3d 366, 376-77 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(citations and question marks omitted).

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d

763, 768 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted). “A substantial

question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that

the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Id. (citations omitted).

Our review of the record indicates that Kania filed a timely notice of

appeal and post-sentence motion arguing that the sentence was too harsh.

Notice of Appeal, 01/17/2025; Post-Sentence Motion, 11/12/2024. Kania also

included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. Anders Brief at 10.

Therein, Kania acknowledges that his sentence was at the higher end of the

standard range but nevertheless argues “the sentence was unduly harsh or

excessive,” and “that the sentence was inconsistent with the Sentencing

Code.” Id.

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“Bald allegations of excessiveness … do not raise a substantial question

to warrant appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928,

935 (Pa. Super. 2020). Here, Kania fails to raise a substantial question for

our review as he fails to articulate “the manner in which the sentence violates

either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing

Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.”

Id. at 935-36 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting

that “this Court does not accept bald assertions of sentencing errors”).

Therefore, Kania fails to raise a substantial question for our review.

Even if we were to find a substantial question, Kania would not be

entitled to relief.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 311 A.3d 12, 19 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

omitted).

If the trial court was informed by a presentence investigation report, “it

is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and

considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion

should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 A.3d 530, 535 (Pa.

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Super. 2022) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8

A.3d at 912. 919 (Pa. Super. 2010) (noting that where “the sentencing court

had the benefit of a pre[]sentence investigation report, we can assume the

sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory

factors”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The trial court considered the presentence investigation report and

sentencing guidelines. N.T., 3/11/2025, at 1-2, 11-12. The trial court

reviewed a letter written by Kania and heard statements by Counsel about

Kania’s age, classes he takes, and his health concerns, all of which was also

detailed in the presentence investigation report. Id. at 7-10. The trial court

incorporated the presentence investigation report into its reasons for imposing

the sentence and stated it considered “all the factors that go into sentencing,

and the facts and circumstances surrounding [Kania.]” Id. at 12.

As such, there is no basis for this Court to conclude that the trial court

abused its discretion in sentencing Kania. Given that the trial court had the

benefit of a presentence investigation report, we presume that it was aware

of, and considered, all relevant sentencing factors. See Miller, 275 A.3d at

535. Therefore, for all of the reasons stated hereinabove, we agree with

Counsel that Kania’s sentencing claim is frivolous.

Our independent review of the record reveals no non-frivolous issues

that Kania could raise on appeal. See Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272. We

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therefore grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Kania’s judgment of

sentence.

Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/10/2025

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