Com. v. Joyner, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 19, 2025
• Docket: 644 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A08006-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : TERRANCE JOYNER : No. 644 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Dated February 5, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001958-2023

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2025

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting Terrence Joyner’s

motion to suppress.1 After review, we reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

On January 10, 2023, the Commonwealth charged Joyner with

prohibited possession of a firearm,2 carrying a firearm without a license,3

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1 The Commonwealth took this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), and certified that the trial court’s ruling terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution. See Commonwealth's Brief, at 1.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.

3 Id. at § 6106. J-A08006-25

carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, 4 and possession of a controlled

substance.5 On April 19, 2023, Joyner filed a pre-trial omnibus motion in

which he argued, inter alia, that the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion

to seize him, and, therefore, any physical evidence recovered through the

subsequent unconstitutional search was inadmissible. 6 See Appellee’s Pre-

Trial Omnibus Motion, 4/19/23, at ¶¶ 7-12. The court held a suppression

hearing on December 12, 2023. After the hearing, the trial court made the

following findings of fact:

On January 9, 2023, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Police Officer Paul Moore[, who had been] assigned to the 22nd District for his entire six-year career, was on routine patrol in the area of 3200 West Cumberland Street. He was in uniform in a marked police vehicle and he was working with two [other uniformed police officers,] Officers Grant and Whatley.[7]

[Officer Moore] described this particular area as notorious for violent crime, including shootings, robberies, gun[ arrests,] and drug[ arrests]. He [had previously] made at least five firearm arrests in this area.

While driving eastbound on Cumberland Street, [Officer Moore] observe[d Joyner] walking in the same direction. [Joyner’s] right arm was allegedly pinned to his side as he walked with only his left arm swinging. As Officer Moore passed [Joyner], he allegedly saw what he described as a heavily weighted square object which ____________________________________________

4 Id. at § 6108.

5 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).

6 Joyner also argued his Miranda rights were violated.See Appellee’s Pre- Trial Omnibus Motion, 4/19/23, at ¶¶ 13-14; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

7 The certified record does not include the full names of Officers Grant and Whatley.

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he associated with being a gun. More specifically, Officer Moore testified repeatedly during direct and cross-examination that he knew [Joyner] was concealing a firearm.

Upon seeing the officers, [Joyner] turn[ed] around and [began] to walk westbound on Cumberland Street. [Joyner] then walk[ed] onto Natrona Street[.] Officer Moore [reversed down Cumberland Street and] pulled up to [Joyner at Natrona Steet. Officer Moore then] asked [Joyner] if he was carrying a gun. [Joyner] respond[ed] no. Officer Moore ask[ed] if [Joyner was] sure and he [said no again and began walking away]. As Officer Moore opened his door, [Joyner ran]. No lights or sirens had been activated.

The body-worn camera video [did] not begin until after the chase started. Officer Moore pursue[d Joyner in his vehicle and then] on foot[,] and hear[d] the sound of metal hitting the ground. [Joyner was] subdued and arrested after a brief chase. [A] firearm [was] recovered by Officer Whatley. Also confiscated from [Joyner’s] person [were] two prescription bottles of oxycodone.

N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2), 2/5/24, at 4-5. 8

On February 5, 2024, the trial court granted Joyner’s motion to suppress

and found that the officers’ interaction with Joyner constituted an

investigatory detention without reasonable suspicion. See Trial Court

Opinion, 4/1/24, at 12-13. Specifically, the court determined that the officers

lacked reasonable suspicion because the stop was based solely on Officer

Moore’s suspicion that Joyner possessed a concealed firearm, which alone,

under Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), is insufficient to

support reasonable suspicion. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/1/24, at 10-11. The

trial court concluded that,

[t]his is a classic case of forced abandonment. The [c]ourt rejects Officer Moore’s testimony that he knew [Joyner] had a gun in his ____________________________________________

8 Only Officer Moore testified at the suppression hearing.

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right pocket. . . . Officer Moore had no lawful basis to exit his vehicle to pursue [Joyner]. That action forced [Joyner] to flee and abandon the weapon.

N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2), 2/5/24, at 5-6.

The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal. Both the

Commonwealth and the trial court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.

1925. The Commonwealth raises the following issue on appeal: Did the [trial] court err by ordering suppression where [Joyner] voluntarily discarded an illegal firearm while running unprovoked from police because [Joyner] had not been seized before he took flight, and even if he had been, ample reasonable suspicion of illegal gun possession would have nonetheless justified a stop by that time?

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4.

The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting Joyner’s

motion to suppress because the interaction between the police and Joyner

constituted a mere encounter and did not rise to the level of an investigatory

detention. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 13. The Commonwealth avers

there is no evidence of coercion by the police that caused Joyner to run during

the interaction. Id. at 14-15. The Commonwealth asserts that because it

was a mere encounter, Joyner chose to run from the police, his voluntary

discarding of the gun was not unlawfully forced and, therefore, the evidence

should not have been suppressed. Id. at 19.

Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that “even if a seizure had

been initiated when Joyner took flight, the seizure was supported by

reasonable suspicion.” Id. Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts Hicks is

not implicated here because “the officers had a factual basis for reasonable

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suspicion not merely that [Joyner] was carrying a gun, but that he was

carrying it unlawfully.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 21. The Commonwealth

lists various factors to support Officer Moore’s reasonable suspicion, including

that Officer Moore was on patrol in a neighborhood notorious for violent crime

and observed Joyner walking strangely with a “squared-off” heavy item in his

pocket, and that Joyner turned around and walked in the opposite direction

upon seeing the police vehicle. Id. We agree.

Our standard of review in addressing a trial court’s order granting

suppression is as follows:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Coles, 317 A.3d 659, 663 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from

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unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 166

A.3d 357, 363-64 (Pa. Super. 2017).

We recognize three categories of warrantless interactions between

citizens and police officers. The first [type of interaction] is a mere encounter, sometimes referred to as a consensual encounter, which does not require the officer to have any suspicion that the citizen is or has been engaged in criminal activity. . . . The second type of interaction, an investigative detention, is a temporary detention of a citizen. This interaction constitutes a seizure of a person, and to be constitutionally valid[,] police must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The third, a custodial detention, is the functional equivalent of an arrest and must be supported by probable cause.

No bright lines separate these types of encounters, but the United States Supreme Court has established an objective test by which courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to elevate the interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often referred to as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to determine whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 276 A.3d 282, 293-95 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en

banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa.

2019) (internal citations omitted). In applying this “free to leave” test, the

focus is “whether the suspect has in some way been restrained by physical

force or show of coercive authority.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 161 A.3d

357, 363 (Pa. Super. 2017).

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In considering whether a seizure occurred, or whether a reasonable

person would feel free to leave, courts may examine the following non-

exclusive list of factors: “[T]he number of officers present during the

interaction; whether the officer informs the citizen [he is] suspected of

criminal activity; the officer’s demeanor and tone of voice; the location and

timing of the interaction; the visible presence of weapons on the officer; and

the questions asked.” Id. at 362-63 (internal citations omitted). “Although

no single factor controls our analysis, ‘[b]oth the United States and

Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have held that the approach of a police officer

followed by questioning does not constitute a seizure.’” Commonwealth v.

Young, 162 A.3d 524, 529 (Pa. Super. 2017), quoting Commonwealth v.

Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2011). The circumstances must

present some level of coercion, beyond the officer’s mere employment, that

conveys a demand for compliance or threat of tangible consequences from

refusal. Young, supra.

Further, an investigatory detention “must be supported by a reasonable

and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal

activity.” Hicks, 208 A.3d at 927. “[T]he question of whether reasonable

suspicion existed at the time of an investigatory detention must be answered

by examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there

was a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual stopped

of criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 273 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

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In making this determination, we must give due weight . . . to the specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. The totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 957 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, it is well-settled that unprovoked

flight by a defendant in a high-crime area is sufficient to create a reasonable

suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. See Commonwealth v. McCoy,

154 A.3d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Additionally, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, when an officer’s

initial seizure is not justified by reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and

a citizen subsequently flees and discards contraband, the “abandonment” of

that contraband is deemed to be forced or coerced and the item in question

must be suppressed. See Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 774

(Pa. 1996). Conversely, where the police possess reasonable suspicion to stop

a suspect, the officers may lawfully recover contraband abandoned by the

suspect during flight. See Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 675 (Pa.

1999).

Upon our review of the record, and based on the totality of the

circumstances, we conclude that the initial interaction between the police

officers and Joyner was a mere encounter. The interaction happened in broad

daylight on a public street. See N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2), 2/5/24,

at 4. When the officers first approached Joyner, they did not engage their

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vehicle’s sirens or lights, leave their vehicle, or brandish their weapons. Id.;

see also Parker, supra. Further, under the circumstances here, Officer

Moore’s questions of “do you have a gun” and “are you sure” did not escalate

the interaction from a mere encounter into an investigatory detention. See

N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2), 2/5/24, at 4; see also Commonwealth

v. Taylor, 2025 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1813 (Pa. Super. filed July 15, 2025)

(unpublished memorandum decision)9 (mere encounter where officers

suspected defendant of possession of concealed firearm, pulled up in police

vehicle, asked “if he had permit to carry,” officer opened door of patrol car

after defendant answered, at which point defendant fled); Commonwealth

v. Lindsay, 328 A.3d 531 (Pa. Super. 2024) (Table) (mere encounter where

police observed defendant with partially concealed weapon and asked multiple

times if he had a permit); Coleman, supra (holding interaction mere

encounter when officer approached defendant and asked him if he had gun). 10

Here, there is no evidence that Officer Moore’s tone of voice or demeanor

communicated to Joyner that that he was not free to leave, nor was there any

evidence presented that Officer Moore positioned himself in a manner that

9See Pa.R.A.P. 126(a)-(b) (unpublished, non-precedential opinions of this Court, filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).

10 As the trial court noted, in Hicks, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that possession of a concealed firearm “alone is an insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 945. However, the Hicks Court explicitly limited its holding to seizures based upon possession of a concealed firearm. Id. at 934, 936, 945. Here, the interaction is a mere encounter and, thus, Hicks does not control.

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obstructed Joyner’s ability to continue walking down the street. In fact, Joyner

continued walking after Officer Moore’s question. See N.T. Suppression

Hearing (Day 1), 12/12/23, at 13-14, 33.

Likewise, Officer Moore opening the vehicle door after the second

question did not escalate the interaction beyond a mere encounter. See

Young, 162 A.3d at 529 (approaching defendant and asking questions does

not automatically constitute an investigatory detention). Officer Moore’s

actions, without more, were not a coercive show of authority to restrain

Joyner. See Taylor, supra. Therefore, the suppression court erred in

concluding that the officers’ interaction with Joyner constituted an

investigative detention. See Thomas, supra. As such, the officers did not

need reasonable suspicion to justify their initial interaction with Joyner.

Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Officer Moore only began

chasing Joyner after Joyner ran, and the record supports a determination that

Officer Moore had reasonable suspicion to pursue Joyner at that point. Prior

to the chase, Officer Moore observed Joyner walking “strangely” in a high-

crime area with a “square-shaped” object that Officer Moore believed, based

on his experience, was a firearm. See N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 2),

2/5/24, at 4-5.11 Officer Moore further observed Joyner turning around after ____________________________________________

11 While the trial court rejected Officer Moore’s testimony that he “knew [Joyner] had a gun in his right pocket,” id. at 6 (emphasis added), the record supports Officer Moore’s observation that he saw a “heavily weighted square object which he associated with being a gun.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added); see also N.T. Suppression Hearing (Day 1), 12/12/23, at 14 (Officer Moore testifying that he “believed [the item] was a barrel [of a gun] outline[.]”).

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seeing the marked patrol car, and, upon interacting with the police officers,

Joyner ran. Id.

We agree with the trial court that mere observation of a concealed

weapon, alone, is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion. See Hicks,

supra. However, as we have set forth above, by the time Officer Moore gave

chase, the police had observed more than mere suspected possession of a

concealed weapon. See Commonwealth v. Rice, 304 A.3d 1255, 1262 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (concluding officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct

investigative detention where officers observed appellee in high crime area

with “L” shaped bulge in his waistband, and appellee turned and walked away

from police when asked to “come here”). Therefore, Joyner’s flight, in

combination with other factors, gave rise to reasonable suspicion. See

McCoy, supra.

In summary, we conclude that Officer Moore and Joyner were engaged

in a mere encounter until Joyner fled, unprovoked, and Officer Moore gave

chase. Once Officers Moore, Whatley, and Grant gave chase, the encounter

escalated to an investigatory detention, which was supported by reasonable

suspicion. Thus, the recovery of the firearm abandoned during the flight was

lawful. See Cook, supra. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of

suppression and remand for further proceedings. 12

12 The trial court did not rule on the portion of Joyner’s pre-trial motion that

argued his Miranda rights were violated. Therefore, it is not before us on (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 8/19/2025

appeal. See Appellee’s Pre-Trial Omnibus Motion, 4/19/23, at ¶¶ 13-14. Accordingly, our decision does not preclude the parties and trial court from addressing this issue in further proceedings.

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