J-S07043-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHARLES JORDAN : : Appellant : No. 1228 MDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 11, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0001163-2016
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: MARCH 21, 2025
Appellant, Charles Jordan, appeals pro se from the order entered in the
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which denied as untimely his
serial petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
December 13, 2016, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of tampering
with evidence, and one count each of persons not to possess firearms, carrying
a firearm without a license, and receiving stolen property. Appellant received
an aggregate sentence of 11 to 22 years of incarceration. Appellant did not
file a direct appeal. Subsequently, Appellant unsuccessfully litigated several
PCRA petitions.
On April 5, 2024, Appellant filed the instant, pro se PCRA petition,
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S07043-25
arguing that his firearms convictions were unconstitutional in light of New
York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct.
2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022) (rejecting use of means-end scrutiny in Second
Amendment context and instead holding that, when Second Amendment’s
plain text covers individual’s conduct, Constitution presumptively protects that
conduct, and government must then justify regulation by demonstrating that
it is consistent with Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation). On May
9, 2024, the PCRA court sent Appellant notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
that his petition would be dismissed without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro
se response on June 4, 2024, and the PCRA court formally dismissed the
petition on July 11, 2024.
On August 1, 2024, Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal.2 On
August 20, 2024, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal. On October 10, 2024, the court
issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion noting that Appellant had not yet filed his
statement, and that the reasons for its denial of Appellant’s petition could be
found in its Rule 907 notice. On November 6, 2024, Appellant untimely filed
his Rule 1925(b) statement.
2 The trial court docket reflects that Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed August 15, 2024. However, as Appellant was incarcerated when he submitted this filing, we use the date listed on the certificate of service for his notice of appeal rather than the filing date. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279 (Pa.Super. 2011) (explaining that under “prisoner mailbox rule,” we deem pro se document filed on date it is placed in hands of prison authorities for mailing).
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Appellant raises the following issue for review:
Are the criminal statutes 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106 unconstitutional as applied to this [A]ppellant in light of [Bruen, supra] … and therefore should Appellant’s conviction and sentence pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 6106 be vacated and set aside.
(Appellant’s Brief at 3) (unpaginated).
Preliminarily, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional
requisite. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 598 Pa. 350, 956 A.2d 978 (2008),
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1285, 129 S.Ct. 2772, 174 L.Ed.2d 277 (2009).
Pennsylvania law makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an
untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837
A.2d 1157 (2003). The PCRA requires a petition, including a second or
subsequent petition, to be filed within one year of the date the underlying
judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes
final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3). To obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than one
year after the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner must allege
and prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, a PCRA petitioner must file his
petition within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). When the claim is predicated on a judicial decision,
the period begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision.
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 12,
2017, upon expiration of his time to file a direct appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 903.
See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Appellant had until January
12, 2018 to timely file a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant filed the instant petition on April 5, 2024, which is patently untimely.
Appellant attempts to assert the newly-recognized constitutional right
exception to the PCRA time bar. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
explained this exception has two requirements:
First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] after the time provided in [S]ection [9545]. Second, it provides that the right “has been held” by “that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must prove that there is a “new” constitutional right and that the right “has been held” by that court to apply retroactively. The language “has been
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held” is in the past tense. These words mean that the action has already occurred, i.e., “that court” has already held the new constitutional right to be retroactive to cases on collateral review. By employing the past tense in writing this provision, the legislature clearly intended that the right was already recognized at the time the petition was filed.
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 642 Pa. 717, 724, 171 A.3d 675, 679 (2017)
(emphasis added and citation omitted).
Here, Appellant failed to file his PCRA petition within one year of the
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J-S07043-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHARLES JORDAN : : Appellant : No. 1228 MDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 11, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0001163-2016
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: MARCH 21, 2025
Appellant, Charles Jordan, appeals pro se from the order entered in the
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which denied as untimely his
serial petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
December 13, 2016, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of tampering
with evidence, and one count each of persons not to possess firearms, carrying
a firearm without a license, and receiving stolen property. Appellant received
an aggregate sentence of 11 to 22 years of incarceration. Appellant did not
file a direct appeal. Subsequently, Appellant unsuccessfully litigated several
PCRA petitions.
On April 5, 2024, Appellant filed the instant, pro se PCRA petition,
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S07043-25
arguing that his firearms convictions were unconstitutional in light of New
York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct.
2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022) (rejecting use of means-end scrutiny in Second
Amendment context and instead holding that, when Second Amendment’s
plain text covers individual’s conduct, Constitution presumptively protects that
conduct, and government must then justify regulation by demonstrating that
it is consistent with Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation). On May
9, 2024, the PCRA court sent Appellant notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
that his petition would be dismissed without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro
se response on June 4, 2024, and the PCRA court formally dismissed the
petition on July 11, 2024.
On August 1, 2024, Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal.2 On
August 20, 2024, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal. On October 10, 2024, the court
issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion noting that Appellant had not yet filed his
statement, and that the reasons for its denial of Appellant’s petition could be
found in its Rule 907 notice. On November 6, 2024, Appellant untimely filed
his Rule 1925(b) statement.
2 The trial court docket reflects that Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed August 15, 2024. However, as Appellant was incarcerated when he submitted this filing, we use the date listed on the certificate of service for his notice of appeal rather than the filing date. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279 (Pa.Super. 2011) (explaining that under “prisoner mailbox rule,” we deem pro se document filed on date it is placed in hands of prison authorities for mailing).
-2- J-S07043-25
Appellant raises the following issue for review:
Are the criminal statutes 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106 unconstitutional as applied to this [A]ppellant in light of [Bruen, supra] … and therefore should Appellant’s conviction and sentence pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 6106 be vacated and set aside.
(Appellant’s Brief at 3) (unpaginated).
Preliminarily, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional
requisite. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 598 Pa. 350, 956 A.2d 978 (2008),
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1285, 129 S.Ct. 2772, 174 L.Ed.2d 277 (2009).
Pennsylvania law makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an
untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837
A.2d 1157 (2003). The PCRA requires a petition, including a second or
subsequent petition, to be filed within one year of the date the underlying
judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes
final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3). To obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than one
year after the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner must allege
and prove:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
-3- J-S07043-25
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, a PCRA petitioner must file his
petition within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). When the claim is predicated on a judicial decision,
the period begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision.
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 12,
2017, upon expiration of his time to file a direct appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 903.
See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Appellant had until January
12, 2018 to timely file a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant filed the instant petition on April 5, 2024, which is patently untimely.
Appellant attempts to assert the newly-recognized constitutional right
exception to the PCRA time bar. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
explained this exception has two requirements:
First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] after the time provided in [S]ection [9545]. Second, it provides that the right “has been held” by “that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must prove that there is a “new” constitutional right and that the right “has been held” by that court to apply retroactively. The language “has been
-4- J-S07043-25
held” is in the past tense. These words mean that the action has already occurred, i.e., “that court” has already held the new constitutional right to be retroactive to cases on collateral review. By employing the past tense in writing this provision, the legislature clearly intended that the right was already recognized at the time the petition was filed.
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 642 Pa. 717, 724, 171 A.3d 675, 679 (2017)
(emphasis added and citation omitted).
Here, Appellant failed to file his PCRA petition within one year of the
date that it could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Bruen was decided on June 23, 2022; Appellant did not file his current PCRA
petition until April 5, 2024, more than one year later. See Bruen, supra;
Boyd, supra. Additionally, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court have held that Bruen applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Reed, Nos. 12 EDA 2024,
1709 EDA 2024, 1710 EDA 2024 (Pa.Super. flied Dec. 5, 2024) (unpublished
memorandum) (concluding Bruen has not been held to apply retroactively).
See also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of
this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value). Consequently,
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Appellant’s PCRA petition remains time-barred.3 Accordingly, we affirm.4
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 3/21/2025
3 Additionally, Appellant argues that Commonwealth v. Alford, 352 MAL 2023 (Pa. filed December 20, 2023) (per curiam order) established the retroactivity of Bruen and should be considered the “underlying judicial decision” leading to his claim. We disagree. First, the PCRA’s retroactivity requirement is for cases on collateral review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). By contrast, Alford’s case was on direct review from a decision of this Court. See Commonwealth v. Alford, 2416 EDA 2021 (Pa.Super. filed Dec. 15, 2022), appeal granted, 352 MAL 2023 (Pa. filed December 20, 2023); see also Spotz, supra. Further, the order Appellant relies on merely ordered this Court to apply Bruen standards to Alford’s appeal from his judgment of sentence on remand. Accordingly, Alford does not entitle Appellant to relief.
4 Based on our decision that Appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over his
PCRA petition, we decline to analyze the untimeliness of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement.
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