Com. v. Jones, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: 807 WDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Bowes

Opinion

J-A13015-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYRIK LAMAR JONES : : Appellant : No. 807 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-04-CR-0000928-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: June 30, 2026

Tyrik Lamar Jones appeals from the judgment of sentence of life without

the possibility of parole for his conviction of first-degree murder. We affirm.

We glean the following history from the certified record. On January 7,

2024, Rebecca Miller was murdered. At the time, she lived in a home owned

by Cornerstone Recovery and Supports, an organization that serves people

with mental health diagnoses. The home had several security cameras and a

sign-in/sign-out sheet. On the morning of her murder, the victim attended a

service at Soma Church. Following the service, she ate the lasagna lunch

provided by the church and then returned to her residence. Shortly after 3:00

p.m., she shared a meal of meatloaf, corn, and mashed potatoes with some

housemates before meeting Appellant outside of the home. J-A13015-26

Security footage, which this court reviewed, captured Appellant

approaching the home, the victim and Appellant conversing, Appellant walking

in the direction of his own home on the next block, and the victim returning

inside. The victim then changed clothes, grabbed a yellow backpack purse,

and signed out, leaving a message that she was going for a walk. The video

next showed her leaving the residence and heading in Appellant’s direction

with a pink coffee cup and the yellow backpack. On her way out, she texted

a close friend, Aria Miller, that she was going for a walk with Appellant. At

3:53 p.m., she texted Appellant, “you coming out.”

The video recordings confirmed that Appellant and the victim walked

together towards a trail near Geneva College. The victim was dressed in black

athletic pants and a white shirt, wearing a yellow backpack and gloves, and

holding a pink coffee cup and pink umbrella. At 4:33 p.m., the two sat briefly

on a rock by the trail’s entrance before continuing onto it. For the next twenty-

four hours, security footage captured no one else entering or exiting the trail.

The victim never returned to her residence from her walk. On the

following day, the house manager tried but failed to contact her. He informed

Cornerstone’s director, who filed a missing person report with the Beaver Falls

Police Department on January 9, 2024. The next day, Appellant visited a

friend, Rochelle Burks, who was also close with the victim. When Ms. Burks

asked Appellant if he had seen the victim, he first responded that he had not.

He then revised his story, admitting that he and the victim had gone for a

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walk on the trail near Geneva College three days prior. When asked how the

two parted, Appellant claimed that he left her on the trail so that she could

meditate. This claim surprised Ms. Burks, who had never known the victim to

meditate.

That evening, Ms. Burks, Ms. Miller, and Soma’s pastor visited the

walking trail to search for the victim. The darkening evening quickly drove

the searchers home, but they resumed the following morning with some

additional friends of the victim. About three quarters of the way down the

trail, the group recognized the victim’s yellow backpack abandoned in an

adjacent culvert. At the end of the trail, the group found the victim’s body

lying prone behind a fence with her black athletic pants and underwear pulled

down to her ankles. Police officers who arrived afterwards observed several

stab wounds in the victim’s neck and found her backpack, coffee cup,

umbrella, inhaler, and wallet near her body. Two weeks later, police officers

discovered the victim’s cell phone about fifteen yards away from where her

body had been found. Data extracted from the phone revealed that it did not

move after about 4:45 p.m. on January 7, 2024.

A medical examiner confirmed that the victim had stab wounds on the

left, right, and posterior neck, incised wounds on the posterior and right neck,

and blunt force trauma to the head. He concluded that she died as a result of

sharp force injuries to her neck. During the internal autopsy, he discovered

meat, corn, and flat noodles in the victim’s stomach. He later testified that

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the stomach is usually empty after two to three hours of eating, indicating

that she died the evening of January 7, 2024. The subsequent investigation

revealed the presence of semen in the victim’s rectum, as well as other DNA

evidence under her fingernails.

Appellant was questioned by law enforcement on January 11, 2024. He

initially told the police that he and the victim were merely friends with no

sexual history, despite the victim’s desire for a more intimate relationship. He

claimed that he ran into the victim while walking his dogs on the day of her

murder. The police indicated that they did not believe his version of events

was correct, and he revised his story. He next stated that he went to the

victim’s home to see if she wanted to go for a walk. The victim told him that

she would come out once she finished eating, but they did not end up walking.

After further conversation with the police, Appellant once again changed his

story. He claimed that, once he left the victim’s residence, he went to his

house and took medication, causing him not to remember the rest of the day.

However, he indicated, if they had gone for a walk, they would not have gone

to the walking trail.

Before leaving, Appellant consented to a DNA sample via a buccal swab.

The DNA found in the victim’s rectum did not match Appellant’s exactly, but

it contained the same rare haplotype that is found in approximately one out

of every 6,157 individuals. See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. V, 03/28/25, at 120. The

DNA found underneath the victim’s fingernails belonged to Elaine Daley, who

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had died two months before the murder. At trial, Detective Michael Kryder of

the Beaver Falls Police Department suggested that this could have been the

result of wearing a hand-me-down pair of gloves on the day of her murder.

Id. at 125. Based on the DNA report and the evidence already gathered, law

enforcement arrested Appellant.

Appellant was charged with criminal homicide, rape by forcible

compulsion, and rape by threat of forcible compulsion. At the jury trial,

Appellant refrained from testifying, and his defense presented no other

witnesses. Appellant attempted to portray another man, James Botinovich,

as the victim’s killer through cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s

witnesses, but Detective Kryder testified that Botinovich lived in Vanport,

Pennsylvania, and none of his vehicles was in the area where the victim was

found on the day of the murder. See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. V, 03/28/25, at 126-

27. The jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and acquitted him of

the rape charges. He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole and did not file a post-sentence motion.

This timely appeal followed. The court entered an order directing

Appellant to file a concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

After being granted two extensions, Appellant timely submitted a statement.

The trial court responded with a Rule 1925(a) opinion. On appeal, Appellant

presents the following question for our consideration: “Whether the

circumstantial evidence presented at [Appellant’s] trial was constitutionally

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insufficient to overcome his presumption of innocence and establish his

identity as the perpetrator of [the victim’s] killing beyond a reasonable doubt,

in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution?” Appellant’s brief at 2.

We begin with a review of the governing legal principles. “The

sufficiency of the evidence poses a question of law, subject to a de novo

standard of review.” Commonwealth v. Griffin-Morgan, 347 A.3d 1133,

1136 (Pa.Super. 2025) (citation omitted). When the sufficiency of the

evidence is challenged, this Court considers:

Whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to enable the fact-finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Pledger, 332 A.3d 29, 34 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up).

The Commonwealth may prove every element of a crime “by utilizing only

circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Riley, 302 A.3d 112, 115

(Pa.Super. 2023) (citation omitted). Upon review, we may not substitute our

judgment for that of the jury or reweigh the evidence. See Commonwealth

v. Miyares, 320 A.3d 740, 743 (Pa.Super. 2024).

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2502(a), which provides that “a criminal homicide constitutes murder of the

first[-]degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.” Id. (cleaned

up). Appellant does not dispute that the Commonwealth established the

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elements of murder, but he asserts that it failed to identify him as the

perpetrator. See Appellant’s brief at 25.

It is well settled that, “in addition to proving the statutory elements of

the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth must also

establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes.”

Griffin-Morgan, 347 A.3d at 1136 (cleaned up). This Court has confirmed

that “evidence of identification need not be positive and certain to sustain a

conviction.” Id. (cleaned up). Further, “direct evidence of identity is, of

course, not necessary, and a defendant may be convicted solely on

circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Smyser, 195 A.3d 912, 915

(Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). In a first-degree murder case, “there is no

requirement that the Commonwealth exclude all possibility that a third party

may have committed the crime.” Commonwealth v. Akers, 572 A.2d 746,

751 (Pa.Super. 1990).

The trial court reasoned in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that there was ample

evidence presented at trial to establish Appellant’s identity as the perpetrator

of the murder. See Trial Court Opinion, 09/17/25, at 15-19. Specifically, it

found that the three surveillance videos, text messages, DNA evidence,

Appellant’s inconsistent statements, time of death, time and location where

the victim’s cell phone stopped moving, and disproving of any alternative

theories of guilt was sufficient to establish Appellant as the perpetrator of the

crime. Id.

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Appellant compares the facts of the instant case with those of two others

to advance his sufficiency challenge. See Appellant’s brief at 37-47. He first

argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence proving that he was the last person

seen with the victim does not prove that he committed the crime. Id. at 33.

For support, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Woong Knee New, 47 A.2d

450 (Pa. 1946), in which our High Court overturned a conviction for first-

degree murder. In that case, the Commonwealth relied on claims that Woong

Knee New was with the victim at 4:00 a.m. and the victim was killed between

2:30 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. Id. at 455. However, at trial, it was determined

that the time of death was mere conjecture, and that Woong Knee New’s

admission that he was with the victim was the result of a miscommunication

due to his limited understanding of English. Id. at 455, 463. Credible

evidence suggested that Woong Knee New was actually in a different city at

the time of the murder. Id. at 461. Other circumstantial evidence, such as a

lack of broken windows, cigarette stumps found at the scene, a hat in the

house that may or may not have belonged to the victim or Woong Knee New,

and a hammer handle without Woong Knee New’s fingerprints on it, suggested

that Woong Knee New was not the killer. Id. at 453, 458.

Appellant rests his comparison to Wong Knee New on the Court’s

contention that, even if it was assumed that Woong Knee New was at the

victim’s home at the time of death, this alone was insufficient to infer that

Woong Knee New was the killer because a different party could have

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committed the crime. See Appellant’s brief at 40. Appellant posits that here

“the Commonwealth’s evidence left substantial gaps” which amount “to

reasonable doubt” because the Commonwealth “failed to thoroughly

investigate and then rule out James Botinovich as a suspect,” the DNA

evidence was contaminated with Elaine Daley’s DNA, and evidence of motive

was absent. Id. at 54-55.

Appellant then attempts to distinguish the case sub judice from

Commonwealth v. Miller, 724 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1999). See Appellant’s brief

at 45-47. In Miller, the Court affirmed a first-degree murder conviction,

determining that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the

conclusion that Miller committed the crime. See Miller, 724 A.2d at 899.

Appellant contends that Miller’s DNA in the victim’s vagina is “a fact that is

distinguishable” from his case. See Appellant’s brief at 46. He maintains

that, unlike in Miller, no forensic evidence, inculpatory statements, “murder

weapon, bloody clothing, or other items of evidentiary value were ever

recovered” linking Appellant to the crime. Id. Finally, he asserts that his case

is distinct from Miller because “Miller fled the state after his wife’s killing

without explanation, reflecting his consciousness of guilt,” whereas Appellant

did not. Id.

Appellant’s comparisons to Woong Knee New and Miller are inapt.

Unlike in Wong Knee New, here the Commonwealth presented evidence to

rule out other potential perpetrators. For example, Detective Kryder testified

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that Botinovich was not in the area on the day of the murder. See N.T. Jury

Trial Vol. V, 03/28/25, at 126-27. Detective Kryder also addressed and

dispelled the supposed “contamination event” in his testimony. See N.T. Jury

Trial Vol. V, 03/28/25, at 125. Further, the circumstantial evidence, including

the text messages, the surveillance footage, the victim’s discarded items, the

place the victim’s body was found, and the time and location where the

victim’s cell phone stopped moving, confirmed that Appellant was the last

person to see the victim alive. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 348 A.3d

291, 298 (Pa.Super. 2025) (finding that cellular data placing the appellant’s

phone near the victim’s apartment at the time of death was sufficient evidence

to support the conclusions that the appellant was the last person to see the

victim and, when considered with other circumstantial evidence, was the

perpetrator).

Appellant’s inconsistent statements, which unlike in Woong Knee New

were not due to a language barrier, evinced his consciousness of guilt. See

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 134 A.3d 1034, 1040 (Pa. 2016) (establishing

that the appellant’s omissions and lies to police were evidence of

consciousness of guilt). Additionally, Appellant’s case is akin to Miller, where

DNA evidence reinforced the jury’s finding that the appellant killed the victim.

Appellant mistakenly attempts to distinguish the DNA evidence in his case

from that in Miller, but the DNA found in the victim’s rectum, although not a

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perfect match to Appellant, was sufficiently close to support the conclusion

that Appellant was the killer.

In sum, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant was the

perpetrator. Therefore, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

6/30/2026

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