J-S10023-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
TIMOTHY JONES
Appellant No. 1581 EDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered May 3, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at Nos: CP-51-CR-0416501-1992; CP-51-CR-1021441-1992
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2019
Appellant, Timothy Jones, appeals from the May 3, 2018 order entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his fourth
petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
Appellant argues that his mandatory life-without-parole sentence for
homicide, which he committed when he was 18 years and 67 days old, is
unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).
Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. We disagree.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S10023-19
The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute. 1 This Court
summarized the same in its memorandum issued in connection with
Appellant’s direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Jones, No. 1307 EDA
1994, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed October 18, 1995). Thus,
we need not repeat them here. Procedurally, we note that Appellant filed the
instant PCRA petition (his fourth)2 on March 25, 2016, more than nineteen
years after his judgment became final.3
“[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews its
conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed
within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an exception ____________________________________________
1Relevant to this matter, it is also undisputed that Appellant was 18 years and 67 days old at the time he committed the underlying crime. See Appellant’s Brief at 6, 9.
2 See Commonwealth’s Brief at 3. Appellant confirmed that he “has filed numerous PCRA [p]etitions seeking relief.” Appellant’s Brief at 5.
3 On April 5, 1994, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison after a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder. We affirmed the judgment of sentence on October 18, 1995. Our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on April 16, 1996. There is no indication that Appellant sought further review. Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on July 15, 1996, ninety days after our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Supreme Court Rule 13. Thus, to be considered timely, the PCRA petition had to be filed within one year of the sentence becoming final, or by July 15, 1997.
-2- J-S10023-19
to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “The PCRA’s time
restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely,
neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition.
Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the
substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa.
2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As timeliness is
separate and distinct from the merits of Appellant’s underlying claims, we first
determine whether this PCRA petition is timely filed. See Commonwealth
v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008) (consideration of Brady4 claim
separate from consideration of its timeliness). The timeliness requirements
of the PCRA petition must be met, even if the underlying claim is a challenge
to the legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214,
223 (Pa. 1999) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review
within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of
the exceptions thereto”) (citation omitted).
We must first determine whether the instant petition is timely. As noted
above, Appellant filed the instant petition in 2016, more than nineteen years
after his judgment of sentence became final. As such, the instant petition is
facially untimely. To overcome the untimeliness of the petition, a petitioner
must allege and prove one of the exceptions to the one-year time bar, codified
at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). These exceptions include governmental ____________________________________________
4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-3- J-S10023-19
interference, newly-discovered facts, and after-recognized constitutional
rights. Here, Appellant argues he meets the requirements of the after-
recognized constitutional right exception, codified in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(iii). Specifically, Appellant argues that he is entitled to review
based on Miller.5 We disagree.
We have repeatedly held that Miller does not apply to defendants who
were eighteen or older when they committed murder. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Lee, 2019 WL 986978 (March 1, 2019) (en banc);
Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016). As noted
above, Appellant was 18 years old at the time of the underlying crimes.
Accordingly, Appellant has no claim under Miller.
Appellant also argues that he is due relief because equal protection
requires that adults are entitled to the same protection as juveniles. We
disagree.
Simply because Appellant alleges a constitutional violation, it does not
mean that the alleged constitutional violation can be raised at any time.
Indeed, even claims of constitutional dimension are subject to the same
5 Miller held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (emphasis added). In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), the United States Supreme Court held that Miller was a new substantive rule that, under the United States Constitution, must be retroactively applied in cases on state collateral review. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736.
-4- J-S10023-19
timeliness rules. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 767 (Pa.
2013) (“we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional
timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, the constitutional
nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on
collateral review”) (internal citation omitted).
Because Appellant failed to plead and prove that the instant PCRA
petition is timely, the PCRA court did not err in not holding a hearing on an
untimely petition. See Commonwealth v. Marshall,
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J-S10023-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
TIMOTHY JONES
Appellant No. 1581 EDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered May 3, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at Nos: CP-51-CR-0416501-1992; CP-51-CR-1021441-1992
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2019
Appellant, Timothy Jones, appeals from the May 3, 2018 order entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his fourth
petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
Appellant argues that his mandatory life-without-parole sentence for
homicide, which he committed when he was 18 years and 67 days old, is
unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).
Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. We disagree.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S10023-19
The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute. 1 This Court
summarized the same in its memorandum issued in connection with
Appellant’s direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Jones, No. 1307 EDA
1994, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed October 18, 1995). Thus,
we need not repeat them here. Procedurally, we note that Appellant filed the
instant PCRA petition (his fourth)2 on March 25, 2016, more than nineteen
years after his judgment became final.3
“[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews its
conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed
within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an exception ____________________________________________
1Relevant to this matter, it is also undisputed that Appellant was 18 years and 67 days old at the time he committed the underlying crime. See Appellant’s Brief at 6, 9.
2 See Commonwealth’s Brief at 3. Appellant confirmed that he “has filed numerous PCRA [p]etitions seeking relief.” Appellant’s Brief at 5.
3 On April 5, 1994, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison after a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder. We affirmed the judgment of sentence on October 18, 1995. Our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on April 16, 1996. There is no indication that Appellant sought further review. Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on July 15, 1996, ninety days after our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Supreme Court Rule 13. Thus, to be considered timely, the PCRA petition had to be filed within one year of the sentence becoming final, or by July 15, 1997.
-2- J-S10023-19
to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “The PCRA’s time
restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely,
neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition.
Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the
substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa.
2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As timeliness is
separate and distinct from the merits of Appellant’s underlying claims, we first
determine whether this PCRA petition is timely filed. See Commonwealth
v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008) (consideration of Brady4 claim
separate from consideration of its timeliness). The timeliness requirements
of the PCRA petition must be met, even if the underlying claim is a challenge
to the legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214,
223 (Pa. 1999) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review
within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of
the exceptions thereto”) (citation omitted).
We must first determine whether the instant petition is timely. As noted
above, Appellant filed the instant petition in 2016, more than nineteen years
after his judgment of sentence became final. As such, the instant petition is
facially untimely. To overcome the untimeliness of the petition, a petitioner
must allege and prove one of the exceptions to the one-year time bar, codified
at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). These exceptions include governmental ____________________________________________
4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-3- J-S10023-19
interference, newly-discovered facts, and after-recognized constitutional
rights. Here, Appellant argues he meets the requirements of the after-
recognized constitutional right exception, codified in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(iii). Specifically, Appellant argues that he is entitled to review
based on Miller.5 We disagree.
We have repeatedly held that Miller does not apply to defendants who
were eighteen or older when they committed murder. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Lee, 2019 WL 986978 (March 1, 2019) (en banc);
Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016). As noted
above, Appellant was 18 years old at the time of the underlying crimes.
Accordingly, Appellant has no claim under Miller.
Appellant also argues that he is due relief because equal protection
requires that adults are entitled to the same protection as juveniles. We
disagree.
Simply because Appellant alleges a constitutional violation, it does not
mean that the alleged constitutional violation can be raised at any time.
Indeed, even claims of constitutional dimension are subject to the same
5 Miller held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (emphasis added). In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), the United States Supreme Court held that Miller was a new substantive rule that, under the United States Constitution, must be retroactively applied in cases on state collateral review. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736.
-4- J-S10023-19
timeliness rules. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 767 (Pa.
2013) (“we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional
timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, the constitutional
nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on
collateral review”) (internal citation omitted).
Because Appellant failed to plead and prove that the instant PCRA
petition is timely, the PCRA court did not err in not holding a hearing on an
untimely petition. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 723 (Pa.
2008) (defendant was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on petition for post-
conviction relief that was untimely filed, and which did not adequately allege
any statutory exception to one-year limitations period for filing petition.).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court properly dismissed
the instant petition as untimely.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 5/16/19
-5-