Com. v. Jones, Q.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 25, 2025
• Docket: 1168 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A08031-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : QUADERE JONES : : Appellant : No. 1168 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 11, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000465-2023

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED APRIL 25, 2025

Quadere Jones (“Jones”) appeals from the denial of his pretrial

suppression motion. We affirm.

Philadelphia police observed Jones driving an unregistered car. After

Jones unsuccessfully attempted to evade the officers, he stopped and fled

from the car, discarding the keys in flight. The police found a gun inside the

car. Jones filed a motion to suppress the gun.

Officer Brendan McCauley (“Officer McCauley”), the only witness at the

hearing on Jones’s motion to suppress, testified that, at approximately 7:00

p.m. on January 2, 2023, he and his partner, Officer Chris Rycek (“Officer

Rycek”) (collectively, “the officers”), were in the area of 3200 North American

Street, a high crime area where Officer McCauley had made a gun arrest two

days earlier. See N.T., 1/5/24, at 10-11. Jones was driving a Nissan Altima.

The officers ran a computer check and determined the car was unregistered. J-A08031-25

See id. at 12. Officer McCauley put on his lights and siren and pulled behind

Jones, who had pulled over to the side of the road. As the officers attempted

to get out of their police cruiser, Jones drove away at high speed, almost

striking a SEPTA bus. See id. at 12-13. The officers pursued with their lights

and siren activated. See id. at 16.

After a pursuit, Jones parked the car on the 3300 block of North 3 rd

Street. Officer Rycek got out of the police cruiser. See id. at 13-15. Jones

then fled the car and ran until he reached a high fence behind a school where

the officers were able to detain him. See id. at 15-17. Officer McCauley

returned to Jones’s unlocked car, opened the door, and saw a firearm under

the driver’s seat. See id. at 17-18. After searching the path of Jones’s flight,

Officer Rycek found the car keys and returned to Officer McCauley. See id.

at 18-19. After conferring with a supervisor, Officer McCauley recovered the

gun from the car. See id. at 19. A computer check established the car was

not registered to Jones and its registration had been suspended several

months before. See id. at 20.

Jones later told the officer he fled because he had an outstanding

warrant, but the police found no warrant on their computer system. See id.

at 21. A computer check disclosed Kassir Brown owned the car and lived at

the same address as Jones. See id. at 23, 26.1

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1 The incident was captured on Officer McCauley’s body-worn camera; part of

the video was played at the suppression hearing. See N.T., 1/5/24, at 22.

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At the conclusion of Officer McCauley’s testimony, Jones argued the

Commonwealth failed to prove he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the car because he parked it legally, and there was no indication he stole

it. Counsel also asserted Jones had personal items in the car, and his failure

to lock the car did not negate his reasonable expectation of privacy under

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020). See N.T., 1/5/24,

at 30-34.

The Commonwealth asserted Jones had no reasonable expectation of

privacy because there was no evidence he had permission to drive the car,

the Commonwealth proved the car belonged to someone else, and Jones failed

to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. See id. at 35-

36. It argued, in the alternative, even had Jones met his burden of proof, he

abandoned the vehicle, relinquishing any expectation of privacy in the car, by

fleeing after the chase and discarding the keys. See id. at 37-40.

The court found Officer McCauley had made arrests for serious crimes

in the area, the officers determined Jones’s car was unregistered and activated

the patrol car’s lights and siren and pursued Jones as he drove away. See id.

at 41. Then, after a chase, Jones got out of the car and fled on foot. See id.

at 41. Jones was apprehended after a fence prevented his escape. See id.

at 42. As the video Officer McCauley’s body-worn camera shows, Officer

McCauley examined the car and saw a gun under the driver’s seat. See id.

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The court found the police had a legal basis to stop the unregistered car

Jones drove, Jones’s flight provided reasonable suspicion to stop him, and

Jones abandoned the car when he got out and fled and discarded the car keys

in flight. See id. at 42-43. The court also found Jones lacked a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the abandoned car and the officers were free to

search it. The court accordingly denied suppression. See id. at 43-44.

Following the denial of suppression, Jones proceeded to a bench trial

and was convicted of one count of persons not to possess firearms, 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 6105; he later received a sentence of ten to twenty years of

imprisonment. Jones timely appealed and he and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

On appeal, Jones raises one issue for our review:

Did the [suppression] court err when it found [Jones] had abandoned the vehicle and therefore had no expectation of privacy?

See Jones’s Brief at 1.

Jones claims the court erred by denying suppression because he had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, he did not abandon the car, and

the police searched it without a warrant. See Jones’s Brief at 4-7.

This Court’s standard of review regarding a challenge to a suppression

ruling is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s findings of

fact are supported by the record and the legal conclusions drawn from those

facts are correct. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 273 A.3d 1190, 1195

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(Pa. Super. 2022). Where the Commonwealth has prevailed below, this Court

may only consider the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the defense

evidence as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record.

See id. It is the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the

credibility of witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. See id. When

the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings, we are bound by

those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal

conclusions from those facts. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d

14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

This Court’s scope of review is limited to the evidentiary record at the

suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 302 A.3d 123, 126 (Pa.

Super. 2023). When an appellant asserts legal error in a suppression court’s

ruling, it is the Court’s duty to determine if the suppression court properly

applied the law to the facts. See Commonwealth v. Byrd, 235 A.3d 311,

319 (Pa. 2020) (stating that a suppression court’s conclusions and legal

rulings are subject to de novo review).

To defeat a motion to suppress, the Commonwealth must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence the challenged evidence “was not obtained in

violation of the defendant’s rights.” See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42

A.3d 1040, 1047-48 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc); see also Pa.R.Crim.P.

581(H). The Commonwealth bears the initial burden of production to present

sufficient evidence the defendant’s constitutional rights were not infringed

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because, inter alia, he lacked a privacy interest in the searched property;

when it does so, “it need do no more, absent proof to the contrary from the

accused himself.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 310 A.3d 802, 807 (Pa. Super.

2024), quoting Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 701 (Pa. 2004).

When the burden of proof shifts to a defendant, he must show he had a

protected privacy interest society is prepared to recognize as reasonable; if

he cannot, police action did not implicate the Federal or State constitutions,

and his suppression motion must be denied. See Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 698-

99; Moore, 310 A.3d at 807. A reasonable expectation of privacy is only

present when an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and that

expectation “is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”

Moore, 310 A.3d at 807, quoting Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d

1115, 1118 (Pa. 1993).

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people against

unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Constit., amend. IV. The

ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. See Riley

v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). Reasonableness generally requires

law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant before conducting a

search. See id. Searches without warrants must fall within a specific

exception to the warrant requirement. Id. (citation omitted).

Abandonment is a specific exception to the warrant requirement; a party

may not contest the search and seizure of items he voluntarily abandoned.

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See Commonwealth v. Byrd, 987 A.2d 786, 790-93 (Pa. Super. 2009);

Commonwealth v. Clark, 746 A.2d 1128, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2000).

“[A]bandonment of a privacy interest is primarily a question of intent and may

be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.”

Commonwealth v. Dowds, 761 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Pa. 2000) (internal

citations and footnote omitted). A person who abandons an item surrenders

his reasonable expectation of privacy in it. See id. at 1131 n.7.2

There can be nothing unlawful in the government’s appropriation of

abandoned property. See Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960);

Commonwealth v. Hall, 305 A.3d 1026, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2023), citing

Byrd, 987 A.2d at 790-93 (stating a suspect does not retain a reasonable

expectation of privacy in items he has voluntarily abandoned);

Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 825 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding

when a person abandons property voluntarily the police may recover it and

use it as evidence against him).

Jones asserts he did not voluntarily abandon the car when he parked,

locked the doors, took the keys, walked away from the car, and then ran. He

2 See also Commonwealth v. Shoatz, 366 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Pa. 1976) (emphasis added) (explaining that the definition of abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes differs from the strict property-right sense; the abandonment analysis turns not on a property interest in the item but an appellant’s possession of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property in question at the time of the search).

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asserts he later gave the officers the keys and they used them to conduct a

warrantless search of the car in violation of Alexander, supra. He asserts

the facts of the case differ from Hall, supra, and Commonwealth v. Lyn,

316 A.3d 1055 (Pa. 2024), because those cases involve a defendant’s flight

after a car crash. See Jones’s Brief at 4-7.

The suppression court found the Commonwealth made an initial showing

that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched

items and the proof burden shifted to the defendant. The court noted a

defendant cannot contest the search of property to which he has no

reasonable expectation of privacy, and a defendant cannot contest the search

of property he has abandoned. See Suppression Court Opinion, 7/8/24, at 3.

The court concluded Jones abandoned the car, failed to demonstrate a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, and thus cannot challenge its

search. See id. at 4-5.

The suppression court properly denied Jones’s claim. The

Commonwealth showed he has no legitimate privacy interest in the car. The

Commonwealth’s evidence showed the car was not registered, defendant did

not own the car, and defendant did not lock the car before fleeing from it. 3

The Commonwealth therefore met its burden to show Jones had no reasonable

3 A review of Officer McCauley’s testimony and body-worn camera videos contradicts Jones’s assertions both that he locked the car and that he later gave the police the keys. See N.T. 1/5/24, at 29-30, Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 at 2:00-4:20.

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expectation of privacy in the car, and the burden then properly shifted to

Jones. See Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 701; Moore, 310 A.3d at 807.

Jones presented no evidence and failed to establish a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the car. His claim fails without the need for further

analysis. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435-36 (Pa. Super.

2009) (en banc) (finding where the defendant, subjected to a routine traffic

stop, could not establish his connection to the car or the named lessee, his

suppression claim failed because “he failed to demonstrate that he had a

reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he did not own,

that was not registered to him, and for which he has not shown authority to

operate”); see also Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 701; Moore, 310 A.3d at 807.4

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

4 Consideration of the doctrine of abandonment further supports the denial of

suppression. Jones was driving another person’s car he did not show he had permission to use and which he abandoned by fleeing from the officers in the car, getting out of the car, running away, and discarding the keys. See Lyn, 316 A.3d at 1058 (finding the defendant abandoned a vehicle his girlfriend had given him permission to use when he failed to submit to a traffic stop, crashed, and fled and abandoned the car); Hall, 306 A.3d at 1033-34 (finding the defendant abandoned a car by fleeing from police after pulling over and fleeing on foot after an accident).

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Date: 4/25/2025

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