J-S57042-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : JASON JONES, : : Appellant : No. 308 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 5, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012677-1998 CP-02-CR-0013289-1998
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2016
Jason Jones (Appellant) pro se appeals from the February 5, 2016
order which dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum
as an untimely-filed petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
In 1999, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of, inter alia,
third-degree murder for which he received an aggregate sentence of 25 to
50 years’ incarceration. No direct appeal was filed.
On May 15, 2000, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition. On behalf of
Appellant, appointed counsel sought and received reinstatement of
Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed a notice of
appeal, but this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal in November 2001 for
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S57042-16
failure to file a brief. On March 10, 2005, Appellant filed an application
seeking to restore his direct appeal rights. This Court denied Appellant’s
request on March 21, 2005. A subsequent petition for reargument en banc
was also denied. Since then, Appellant has filed two post-conviction
petitions, both of which resulted in no relief.
On August 21, 2015, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum in the civil division, which was later transferred to
the criminal division. The trial court treated Appellant’s filing as a PCRA
petition and determined that it was untimely filed. The trial court thus
dismissed the petition without a hearing, and Appellant timely filed a notice
of appeal.
We begin our review by noting the relevant legal principles. “[T]he
PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief, including habeas corpus, to the
extent a remedy is available under such enactment.” Commonwealth v.
West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). Any PCRA petition, including
second and subsequent petitions, must either (1) be filed within one year of
the judgment of sentence becoming final, or (2) plead and prove a
timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). “[A] defendant cannot escape
the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas
corpus.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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However, “claims that fall outside the eligibility parameters of the
PCRA may be raised through a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v.
Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 850 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc). Our Supreme
Court has explained that “the boundaries of cognizable claims under the
PCRA can only be extended so far as is consistent with the purposes of the
statute.” Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007)
(holding habeas corpus, not the PCRA, “was available to adjudicate whether
defendant Judge’s deportation from Canada to face the death penalty in
Pennsylvania… violated his rights under the International Covenant for Civil
and Political Rights”).
In his petition, Appellant alleges that (1) the legislative definition of
third-degree murder is too vague and (2) the trial court lacked statutory
authorization to impose Appellant’s sentence. Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, 8/5/2015, at 7-10. In his brief Appellant argues
that because “none of the cases for relief [sic] under the PCRA address the
unique situation presented in this case” he properly petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus. Appellant’s Brief at 11.
The trial court determined that Appellant had attempted to “remove
himself from the time limitation provisions of the PCRA” by labelling his
petition as a writ of habeas corpus and that the court properly treated the
petition as a PCRA petition. Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/2016, at 3. In
-3- J-S57042-16
proceeding to consider Appellant’s filing under the PCRA, the trial court
found that his petition was untimely filed. Id. Because Appellant failed to
plead a timeliness exception, the trial court dismissed the PCRA petition.
It is not clear whether the relief Appellant seeks is cognizable under
the PCRA. Compare Judge, 916 A.2d at 520 (applying habeas corpus law
instead of the PCRA where Judge’s claim had “no connection to the truth-
determining process and [did] not render the underlying adjudication of guilt
or innocence… unreliable”); West, 938 A.2d at 1044 (determining that
habeas corpus, rather than the PCRA, is the appropriate vehicle for a claim
that “does not implicate the truth determining process underlying his
conviction and sentence, nor does it implicate the legality of the sentence
imposed”) with Commonwealth v. Stout, 978 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Super
2009) (“[A]ppellant’s allegations of constitutional defects in adoption of the
present version of the Pennsylvania Constitution and/or the Crimes Code,
equate to a contention that the Court of Common Pleas lacked authority to
prosecute him for the charge in question. As an attack upon the court's
authority, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction, it could have been addressed by the
PCRA court. To the extent appellant could have sought the same relief
under the PCRA, he was obligated to do so, and to do so in a timely
manner.”)
-4- J-S57042-16
What is clear is that Appellant cannot prevail under either the PCRA or
habeas corpus. If the PCRA applies, his petition is untimely filed with no
timeliness exception alleged. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63
A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chester,
895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (“[I]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this
Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without
jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the
substantive claims.”); Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.
2011) (“[T]he statute confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc
equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions
expressly delineated in the Act.”) (internal quotation omitted).
Appellant’s claims also are ineligible for habeas corpus relief. “It is
well settled that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, which can be
successfully invoked only in exceptional cases, is not a substitute for an
appeal or a motion for a new trial, nor is it available for the correction of trial
errors.” Com. ex rel. Williams v. Myers,
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J-S57042-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : JASON JONES, : : Appellant : No. 308 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 5, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012677-1998 CP-02-CR-0013289-1998
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2016
Jason Jones (Appellant) pro se appeals from the February 5, 2016
order which dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum
as an untimely-filed petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
In 1999, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of, inter alia,
third-degree murder for which he received an aggregate sentence of 25 to
50 years’ incarceration. No direct appeal was filed.
On May 15, 2000, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition. On behalf of
Appellant, appointed counsel sought and received reinstatement of
Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed a notice of
appeal, but this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal in November 2001 for
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S57042-16
failure to file a brief. On March 10, 2005, Appellant filed an application
seeking to restore his direct appeal rights. This Court denied Appellant’s
request on March 21, 2005. A subsequent petition for reargument en banc
was also denied. Since then, Appellant has filed two post-conviction
petitions, both of which resulted in no relief.
On August 21, 2015, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum in the civil division, which was later transferred to
the criminal division. The trial court treated Appellant’s filing as a PCRA
petition and determined that it was untimely filed. The trial court thus
dismissed the petition without a hearing, and Appellant timely filed a notice
of appeal.
We begin our review by noting the relevant legal principles. “[T]he
PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief, including habeas corpus, to the
extent a remedy is available under such enactment.” Commonwealth v.
West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). Any PCRA petition, including
second and subsequent petitions, must either (1) be filed within one year of
the judgment of sentence becoming final, or (2) plead and prove a
timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). “[A] defendant cannot escape
the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas
corpus.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013).
-2- J-S57042-16
However, “claims that fall outside the eligibility parameters of the
PCRA may be raised through a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v.
Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 850 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc). Our Supreme
Court has explained that “the boundaries of cognizable claims under the
PCRA can only be extended so far as is consistent with the purposes of the
statute.” Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007)
(holding habeas corpus, not the PCRA, “was available to adjudicate whether
defendant Judge’s deportation from Canada to face the death penalty in
Pennsylvania… violated his rights under the International Covenant for Civil
and Political Rights”).
In his petition, Appellant alleges that (1) the legislative definition of
third-degree murder is too vague and (2) the trial court lacked statutory
authorization to impose Appellant’s sentence. Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, 8/5/2015, at 7-10. In his brief Appellant argues
that because “none of the cases for relief [sic] under the PCRA address the
unique situation presented in this case” he properly petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus. Appellant’s Brief at 11.
The trial court determined that Appellant had attempted to “remove
himself from the time limitation provisions of the PCRA” by labelling his
petition as a writ of habeas corpus and that the court properly treated the
petition as a PCRA petition. Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/2016, at 3. In
-3- J-S57042-16
proceeding to consider Appellant’s filing under the PCRA, the trial court
found that his petition was untimely filed. Id. Because Appellant failed to
plead a timeliness exception, the trial court dismissed the PCRA petition.
It is not clear whether the relief Appellant seeks is cognizable under
the PCRA. Compare Judge, 916 A.2d at 520 (applying habeas corpus law
instead of the PCRA where Judge’s claim had “no connection to the truth-
determining process and [did] not render the underlying adjudication of guilt
or innocence… unreliable”); West, 938 A.2d at 1044 (determining that
habeas corpus, rather than the PCRA, is the appropriate vehicle for a claim
that “does not implicate the truth determining process underlying his
conviction and sentence, nor does it implicate the legality of the sentence
imposed”) with Commonwealth v. Stout, 978 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Super
2009) (“[A]ppellant’s allegations of constitutional defects in adoption of the
present version of the Pennsylvania Constitution and/or the Crimes Code,
equate to a contention that the Court of Common Pleas lacked authority to
prosecute him for the charge in question. As an attack upon the court's
authority, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction, it could have been addressed by the
PCRA court. To the extent appellant could have sought the same relief
under the PCRA, he was obligated to do so, and to do so in a timely
manner.”)
-4- J-S57042-16
What is clear is that Appellant cannot prevail under either the PCRA or
habeas corpus. If the PCRA applies, his petition is untimely filed with no
timeliness exception alleged. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63
A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chester,
895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (“[I]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this
Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without
jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the
substantive claims.”); Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.
2011) (“[T]he statute confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc
equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions
expressly delineated in the Act.”) (internal quotation omitted).
Appellant’s claims also are ineligible for habeas corpus relief. “It is
well settled that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, which can be
successfully invoked only in exceptional cases, is not a substitute for an
appeal or a motion for a new trial, nor is it available for the correction of trial
errors.” Com. ex rel. Williams v. Myers, 162 A.2d 419, 420 (Pa. Super.
1960). See also Com. ex rel. Ashmon v. Banmiller, 137 A.2d 236, 238
(Pa. 1958) (“[A] habeas corpus petition is not available for the correction of
trial errors which could have been reviewed and corrected on appeal; it is
not a substitute for an appeal or for a writ of error or for a motion for a new
trial.”); Com. ex rel. Bey v. Myers, 152 A.2d 921, 922 (Pa. Super. 1959)
-5- J-S57042-16
(“The sufficiency of the evidence, and any trial errors which could have been
considered and corrected on appeal are not remediable or the subject of
relief by habeas corpus.”). Appellant could have raised his claims related to
the trial court’s statutory authority to sentence Appellant and the vagueness
of the third-degree murder statute on direct appeal, but failed to do so.
Accordingly, Appellant’s claims are not subject to habeas corpus relief.
Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/7/2016
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