J-S47026-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPRIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMIEL JOHNSON : : Appellant : No. 1062 EDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 15, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0801541-2004
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2024
Jamiel Johnson appeals pro se from the order denying his untimely-filed
petition for post-conviction relief. The lower court treated this as a serial
petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
46. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In August
2003, Johnson stabbed another man in a crack house in Philadelphia, causing
his death. On September 21, 2005, a jury convicted him of first-degree
murder and possession of an instrument of crime. On November 2, 2005, the
trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of life without parole. On
March 7, 2007, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, and, on October
24, 2007, our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S47026-23
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 919 A.2d 289 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 934 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 2007).
Johnson filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition on March 26, 2008, but later
withdrew it. On October 2, 2008, he filed another pro se petition, as well as
an amendment to that petition on March 18, 2009. On November 12, 2009,
the PCRA court appointed counsel. After receiving several continuance
requests, the PCRA court removed PCRA counsel and appointed new counsel.
Ultimately, Johnson requested the right to proceed pro se. After conducting
a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998),
the PCRA court permitted Johnson to proceed pro se. Thereafter, Johnson
supplemented his pro se PCRA petition.
On February 8, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss
Johnson’s PCRA petition. On March 27, 2013, the PCRA court issued a
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Johnson’s petition without a
hearing. After being granted a continuance, Johnson filed a response. By
order entered May 20, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Johnson
appealed. On September 16, 2014, this Court affirmed the denial of post-
conviction relief. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 107 A.3d 237 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (non-precedential decision). Johnson did not seek further
review.1 ____________________________________________
1 Instead, Johnson filed an unsuccessful petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the federal judicial system. See Johnson v. Wetzel, 2019 WL 2339966 (E.D.Pa. 2019).
-2- J-S47026-23
On September 22, 2020, Johnson filed a “Motion to Correct or Modify
Illegal sentence,” which he subsequently supplemented with multiple filings.
In these later documents, Johnson contended that his 2020 motion should be
treated as a petition for habeas corpus relief not subject to the time
restrictions of the PCRA. The PCRA court treated the 2020 motion as a second
PCRA petition. On January 23, 2023, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice
of its intent to dismiss Johnson’s second petition as untimely filed and
establishing no time-bar exception. Johnson filed a response. By opinion and
order entered March 15, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed Johnson’s petition.2
This appeal followed. The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925
compliance.
Johnson raises multiple substantive issues on appeal.3 Before we
consider their merits, however, we first note that the PCRA court properly
considered his latest filing for post-conviction relief as a serial PCRA petition.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means
of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and
statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . including habeas corpus”); ____________________________________________
2 On March 20, 2023, Johnson filed a motion in which he stated that he was
not properly served with the order denying his second PCRA petition. As a result, the PCRA court reentered its order and opinion on April 13, 2023.
3 Johnson has filed an application for leave to supplement his brief with a “subsidiary claim” that the trial court “lacked clear statutory authorization” to sentence him to life imprisonment without parole for his first-degree murder conviction. As explained supra, because we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim, we deny Johnson’s application as moot.
-3- J-S47026-23
Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (explaining
that “claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under
that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the . . . conviction
resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9543(a)(2)”).
Treating Johnson’s latest filing as a PCRA petition, we must next
determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that it was untimely
filed, and that Johnson failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness
of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for
relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed
within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the
petition is met.
The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as
follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the
claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional
right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s
time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.
2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the
lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
-4- J-S47026-23
Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date
the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and
proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction
over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.
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J-S47026-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPRIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMIEL JOHNSON : : Appellant : No. 1062 EDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 15, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0801541-2004
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2024
Jamiel Johnson appeals pro se from the order denying his untimely-filed
petition for post-conviction relief. The lower court treated this as a serial
petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
46. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In August
2003, Johnson stabbed another man in a crack house in Philadelphia, causing
his death. On September 21, 2005, a jury convicted him of first-degree
murder and possession of an instrument of crime. On November 2, 2005, the
trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of life without parole. On
March 7, 2007, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, and, on October
24, 2007, our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S47026-23
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 919 A.2d 289 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 934 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 2007).
Johnson filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition on March 26, 2008, but later
withdrew it. On October 2, 2008, he filed another pro se petition, as well as
an amendment to that petition on March 18, 2009. On November 12, 2009,
the PCRA court appointed counsel. After receiving several continuance
requests, the PCRA court removed PCRA counsel and appointed new counsel.
Ultimately, Johnson requested the right to proceed pro se. After conducting
a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998),
the PCRA court permitted Johnson to proceed pro se. Thereafter, Johnson
supplemented his pro se PCRA petition.
On February 8, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss
Johnson’s PCRA petition. On March 27, 2013, the PCRA court issued a
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Johnson’s petition without a
hearing. After being granted a continuance, Johnson filed a response. By
order entered May 20, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Johnson
appealed. On September 16, 2014, this Court affirmed the denial of post-
conviction relief. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 107 A.3d 237 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (non-precedential decision). Johnson did not seek further
review.1 ____________________________________________
1 Instead, Johnson filed an unsuccessful petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the federal judicial system. See Johnson v. Wetzel, 2019 WL 2339966 (E.D.Pa. 2019).
-2- J-S47026-23
On September 22, 2020, Johnson filed a “Motion to Correct or Modify
Illegal sentence,” which he subsequently supplemented with multiple filings.
In these later documents, Johnson contended that his 2020 motion should be
treated as a petition for habeas corpus relief not subject to the time
restrictions of the PCRA. The PCRA court treated the 2020 motion as a second
PCRA petition. On January 23, 2023, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice
of its intent to dismiss Johnson’s second petition as untimely filed and
establishing no time-bar exception. Johnson filed a response. By opinion and
order entered March 15, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed Johnson’s petition.2
This appeal followed. The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925
compliance.
Johnson raises multiple substantive issues on appeal.3 Before we
consider their merits, however, we first note that the PCRA court properly
considered his latest filing for post-conviction relief as a serial PCRA petition.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means
of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and
statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . including habeas corpus”); ____________________________________________
2 On March 20, 2023, Johnson filed a motion in which he stated that he was
not properly served with the order denying his second PCRA petition. As a result, the PCRA court reentered its order and opinion on April 13, 2023.
3 Johnson has filed an application for leave to supplement his brief with a “subsidiary claim” that the trial court “lacked clear statutory authorization” to sentence him to life imprisonment without parole for his first-degree murder conviction. As explained supra, because we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim, we deny Johnson’s application as moot.
-3- J-S47026-23
Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (explaining
that “claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under
that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the . . . conviction
resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9543(a)(2)”).
Treating Johnson’s latest filing as a PCRA petition, we must next
determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that it was untimely
filed, and that Johnson failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness
of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for
relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed
within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the
petition is met.
The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as
follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the
claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional
right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s
time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.
2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the
lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
-4- J-S47026-23
Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date
the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and
proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction
over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.
Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
Here, Johnson’s judgment of sentence became final on January 22,
2008, ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance
of appeal and the time for filing a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.
Therefore, Johnson had until January 21, 2009, to file a timely petition. As
Johnson filed the petition at issue in 2020, it is patently untimely unless he
has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated
exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.
Johnson has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time
bar. Instead, he maintains that his request for habeas corpus relief exists
outside the parameters of the PCRA. The PCRA court summarily rejected this
claim:
Instantly, [Johnson] makes no attempt to invoke an exception to the PCRA’s time bar, [] arguing instead that the PCRA does not apply to his claims. It does. [Johnson’s] erroneous denial of the PCRA’s applicability falls short of satisfying his burden of demonstrating that one of the three statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement applies to his petition.
-5- J-S47026-23
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/15/23, at unnumbered 3 (citations omitted).
Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion. Section
9543(a)(2)(vii) specifically affords relief under the PCRA when an illegality of
sentence claim is raised. “Although legality of sentence is always subject to
review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or
of the exceptions thereto. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa.
1999). A PCRA petitioner must present an illegal sentencing claim in a timely
PCRA petition over which we have jurisdiction. Id. See also
Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 146 A.3d 266 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Otherwise, the petitioner is too late to obtain relief, and the sentence will
stand.
In sum, Johnson’s 2020 petition is cognizable under the PCRA, but it is
untimely, and Johnson has failed to establish a time-bar exception. As such,
both the PCRA court and this Court lack jurisdiction to consider his substantive
claims. Derrickson, supra.
Application for leave to supplement brief denied. Order affirmed.
Date: 1/24/2024
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