Com. v. Jenkins, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 1, 2025
• Docket: 1349 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A14007-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ALFONSO JENKINS : : Appellant : No. 1349 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 17, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005115-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2025

Alfonso Jenkins appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for his conviction of person not

to possess a firearm, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), graded as a felony of the

first degree. Jenkins claims that the Commonwealth presented insufficient

evidence that he was previously convicted of a specific enumerated felony

offense to support his conviction being graded as a felony of the first degree.

Specifically, Jenkins argues that although he stipulated that he was a person

not to possess based on a conviction from 2012, the stipulation did not specify

what his specific prior offense was and the Commonwealth presented no other

evidence that he was previously convicted of a specific enumerated felony

offense to support the first-degree felony grading. We affirm.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A14007-25

On July 2, 2023, at approximately 10:30 a.m. Officer Anthony Pratt and

his partner Sergeant Harry Newell were in a marked police van in front of 1200

North Front Street in Philadelphia. They heard some arguing and observed

Jenkins pointing a brown pistol at another male. Jenkins was holding the pistol

with a blue article of clothing. Jenkins spotted the marked police van and

began walking away. While walking, Jenkins concealed the handgun in the

blue article of clothing and put it in a bookbag.

The officers detained Jenkins. They asked about the firearm, and Jenkins

denied being in possession of one. Officer Pratt then searched the bookbag

and recovered a brown Smith and Wesson M&P 40 caliber handgun. Jenkins

was placed under arrest.

Jenkins was charged with, inter alia, person not to possess a firearm,

graded as a felony of the first degree.1 Jenkins filed a motion to suppress. A

suppression hearing was held on February 16, 2024. The court heard

testimony from Officer Pratt and observed body camera footage. After the

hearing, the court denied Jenkins’s motion to suppress.

That same day, the matter proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. As

aforesaid, the Commonwealth only proceeded on the charge of person not to

possess a firearm. All relevant evidence from Officer Pratt’s testimony and

body camera footage from the suppression hearing was admitted. See N.T.,

2/16/24, at 46. A property receipt for the firearm was also admitted. See id. ____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth later withdrew every charge other than person not to

possess a firearm.

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Additionally, the Commonwealth stated, and defense counsel agreed, to the

following stipulation: “there’s a stipulation by and between counsel that the

defendant, Alfonso Jenkins, is prohibited from possessing a firearm due to a

prior conviction in 2012.” Id. at 47. The trial court found Jenkins guilty of

person not to possess a firearm graded as a first-degree felony. Id. While

discussing sentencing, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that “the

2012 [convictions were] for two counts of attempted burglary, F1’s.” Id. at

49. Furthermore, Jenkins’s prior record also included a 2011 conviction for

possession with the intent to deliver.2 See id. at 49.

On April 17, 2024, Jenkins was sentenced to three and a half to seven

years’ incarceration. He timely appealed and filed a court ordered concise

statement of matters complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

On appeal, Jenkins challenges whether the Commonwealth presented

sufficient evidence that Jenkins was previously convicted of a specific

enumerated felony offense to support his conviction being graded as a first-

2 A review of the publicly available docket sheets indicates that in 2012, Jenkins pleaded guilty to attempted burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary, both first-degree felonies. See Docket Sheet, CP-51-CR-0008447- 2012, at 3; Solomon v. U.S. Healthcare System of PA, Inc., 797 A.2d 346, 352 (Pa. Super. 2002) (acknowledging a court may take judicial notice of public docket sheets); Pa.R.E. 201(b)(2) (permitting courts to take judicial notice of facts deriving from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned). Additionally, in 2011 Jenkins pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver (PWID) and conspiracy to commit PWID, both ungraded felonies. See Docket Sheet, CP-51-CR-0005143-2011, at 4.

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degree felony.3 See Appellant’s Brief, at 1, 6-7. Consequently, Jenkins asserts

that he received an illegal sentence because the evidence was only sufficient

to convict him of violating Section 6105 as a first-degree misdemeanor. See

id. at 2, 6-7. Jenkins requests that this Court grant his request to change the

grading of his first-degree felony person not to possess conviction to a first-

degree misdemeanor and remand for him to be resentenced. See id. at 7, 19-

20.

Jenkins’s sufficiency and legality of sentence claims are interrelated.

When reviewing a sufficiency claim, we face a question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the Commonwealth’s favor. Through this lens, we must ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of the elements of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Castaneira, 322 A.3d 223, 227 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(citation and brackets omitted).

3 In his concise statement, Jenkins also claimed that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify stopping him. See Concise Statement, at ¶ 3A. However, Jenkins makes no mention of this issue in his appellate brief. Thus, the issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

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Similarly, in reviewing a challenge to the legality of a sentence “our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Seladones, 305 A.3d 83, 85 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

A person commits the crime of person not to possess if they were

previously convicted of an enumerated offense and possess a firearm. See 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). “[A] Section 6105 violation, by default, is graded as

a misdemeanor of the first degree[.]” Commonwealth v. Hale, 128 A.3d

781, 782 (Pa. 2015) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6119); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

6119 (“[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, an offense under this

subchapter constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree.”). For the charge

to be graded as a first-degree felony the Commonwealth must prove that the

person was previously convicted of an enumerated felony, a felony under the

Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or any equivalent

federal statute or equivalent statute of another state; and either that (A) the

defendant was previously convicted of person not to possess, or (B) was in

physical possession or control of a firearm. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

6105(a.1)(1.1)(i).

Jenkins argues that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden that

he was previously convicted of a disqualifying enumerated felony offense

because the stipulation contained no information about what specific offense

he was previously convicted of or even whether his previous offense was either

a felony or misdemeanor. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9-11. According to Jenkins,

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stipulations encompass only the “facts supporting” the stipulation which he

interprets as only those facts necessary for the stipulation to be true and thus,

need not be proven separately. See id. at 13-15. Essentially, Jenkins argues

that it was the Commonwealth’s burden to prove the specific disqualifying

offense and the stipulation failed to do that.

The Commonwealth argues that the stipulation was sufficient. See

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4, 7. It argues that by agreeing that he was a person

not to possess because of a 2012 conviction he “acknowledge[ed] the nature

of that conviction[,]” i.e., the specific offense for which he was convicted. See

id. at 8. Thus, “by stipulating that he was a person not to possess firearms

due to a prior conviction from 2012, he effectively agreed that he had been

convicted of a qualifying felony, thereby relieving the Commonwealth of its

burden to prove this element[.]” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 234

A.3d 576, 585 n.10 (Pa. 2020)).

Jenkins’s argument is premised on a novel understanding of our

Supreme Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Jemison, 98 A.3d 1254 (Pa.

2014), or more specifically, the Jemison court’s statement that “one element

of persons not to possess firearms is a prior conviction of a specific,

enumerated offense[.]” Id. at 1261. In Jemison, the defendant was willing

to stipulate that he was a person not to possess without indicating what

specific offense for which he was previously convicted. Id. at 1256. The

Commonwealth rejected the stipulation, and the trial court permitted the

Commonwealth to introduce into evidence the defendant’s previous certified

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robbery conviction. Id. Our Supreme Court affirmed and determined that the

Commonwealth’s rejection of the stipulation and presentation of evidence did

not violate Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403. Id. at 1262-63.

Importantly, Jemison is not a sufficiency case. Jenkins cites to no case,

nor are we aware of any, that has interpreted Jemison to mean that it is

necessary for the Commonwealth to present evidence of a specific

disqualifying offense, when the stipulation refers to a specific prior record; the

stipulation in this case was not a general stipulation without reference to the

underlying prior record. Rather, Jemison merely permits the Commonwealth,

when appropriate under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403, to reject a

defendant’s stipulation that he was a person not to possess, without

identifying information as to the specific prior conviction, and instead present

evidence of the specific disqualifying offense. When read closely, Jemison

does not compel the result argued by Jenkins and he offers no additional

support.4

In this case, the stipulation itself was sufficient to establish the prior

disqualifying conviction. “A stipulation is a declaration that the fact agreed

upon is proven, and a valid stipulation must be enforced according to its ____________________________________________

4 Our Supreme Court recently granted allocatur in Commonwealth v. Myers,

No. 523 MAL 2024, 2025 WL 1023168 (Pa. filed Apr. 7, 2025), to consider whether the en banc Superior Court’s Opinion in Support of affirmance was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Jemison “by defining one of Petitioner’s prior disqualifying convictions as a pre-condition rather than an element of the offense for purposes of sentencing[.]” While this is a distinct issue from the present case, we merely note that our Supreme Court will have an opportunity to further explain its holding in Jemison.

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terms.” Commonwealth v. Perrin, 291 A.3d 337, 345 (Pa. 2023) (citation

and brackets omitted). “[P]arties may stipulate, and be bound by their acts

as the law of the case, in all matters affecting them without affecting the

jurisdiction and prerogatives of the court.” Id. “A stipulation of facts is binding

and conclusive on a trial court, although the court may nonetheless draw its

own legal conclusions from those facts.” Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., 241

A.3d 600, 615 (Pa. 2020). Additionally, when a defendant enters a stipulation,

they “assent[] to the facts supporting it, and obviate[] the Commonwealth’s

burden to demonstrate that underlying fact.” Smith, 234 A.3d at 585 n.10

(citations omitted).

Here, Jenkins was charged with person not to possess graded as a first-

degree felony. At a stipulated bench trial, where no new evidence was

presented, he stipulated that he was a person not to possess because of a

2012 conviction. His only 2012 convictions were attempted burglary and

conspiracy to commit burglary, both felonies. As stated above, these

convictions were specifically listed in publicly available docket sheets.

Thus, after being charged with the person not to possess count as a

felony, and by agreeing that he was a person not to possess because of his

2012 convictions, both of which were disqualifying felonies, Jenkins stipulated

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to committing a disqualifying felony. The trial court was warranted in its

reliance on that stipulation.5

Therefore, the judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 8/1/2025

5 In fact, under the circumstances of this case, where Jenkins was charged with only the felony level of person not to possess, it is nonsensical to suggest the Commonwealth would have accepted a stipulation to anything other than a disqualifying felony conviction. Jenkins, the Commonwealth, and the court were all aware of what Jenkins was stipulating to. For him to suggest now that the Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the felony persons not to possess charge is disingenuous at best.

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