J-S07037-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TILE HASEEN JAMES : : Appellant : No. 1837 MDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 18, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005330-2016
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2019
Tile Haseen James (James) appeals from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Lancaster County (PCRA court) denying his first petition filed
pursuant the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546.
James alleges the ineffective assistance of counsel for convincing him to enter
a negotiated guilty plea. After careful review, we affirm.
A.
James pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. §
780-113(a)(30), and criminal use of a communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. §
7512(a), for his delivery of crack cocaine to a confidential informant after
arranging the transaction with him on his cell phone. Pursuant to the terms
of the negotiated plea agreement, James was sentenced to an aggregate term
____________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S07037-19
of not less than one year less one day nor more than two years less one day
of incarceration.
Before imposing sentence, the trial court engaged in a colloquy with
James. (See N.T. Sentencing, 5/19/17, at 2-8). James testified that it was
his decision to plead guilty, that he was not “forced, threatened[,] or coerced
in any way” to do so, and, importantly, that he was pleading guilty because
he committed the offenses. (Id. at 4). He confirmed that he understood he
had “an absolute right” to a jury trial, the elements of the charges to which
he was pleading, and that it would be the Commonwealth’s burden to prove
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 4; see id. at 5). The
Commonwealth read the facts of the crimes to which James was pleading
guilty, and he admitted that he received a text message on his cell phone from
the confidential informant, he set up the buy location, and he delivered “one
clear plastic corner tied bag containing crack cocaine to him.” (Id. at 5; see
id. at 6). The court explained the maximum sentences James could receive
for his crimes and his post-sentence rights before confirming that he
understood them. (See id. at 7-8). Additionally, James completed a written
guilty plea colloquy that reflected the same questions and answers. (See
Guilty Plea Colloquy, 5/19/17, at 1-2) (pagination provided). James did not
timely file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal.
-2- J-S07037-19
B.
James filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, later amended by Appointed
Counsel raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel because, among
other things, he would not have plead guilty if his trial counsel pursued an
entrapment defense.
At his PCRA hearing, in contradiction with his guilty plea testimony,
James testified that he set up the drug transaction with the confidential
informant only after the confidential informant texted him more than once
begging that he do so. (See PCRA Hearing, 7/13/18, at 4). He stated that,
although he took the confidential informant to the buy location, a third party
actually delivered the drugs. (See id.). He testified that if trial counsel had
discovered the identity of the confidential informant and had suggested an
entrapment defense, he would not have pleaded guilty. (See id. at 7).
However, James’ trial counsel, David Blank, Esquire, testified at the PCRA
hearing that he did not pursue the identity of the confidential informant
because James already knew him. (See id. at 27). He also stated that he
did not consider an entrapment defense because James had not told him of
the alleged begging by the confidential informant, and that even if he had, it
would not have been enough for such a defense. (See id.).
Finding that James lacked credibility and that he was the one who
orchestrated the drug transaction, the PCRA court denied the petition. James
then filed this appeal.
-3- J-S07037-19
C.
The sole issue that James raises on appeal is that the PCRA court abused
its discretion1 in denying his petition where trial counsel convinced him to
enter a guilty plea instead of seeking the identity of the confidential informant
which would have made entrapment a viable defense. (See James’ Brief, at
8-10). We disagree.
“[T]o succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, a petitioner must
demonstrate that: the underlying claim is of arguable merit; counsel had no
reasonable basis for the act or omission in question; and he suffered prejudice
as a result[.]” Commonwealth v. Laird, 119 A.3d 972, 978 (Pa. 2015)
(citations omitted). “[F]ailure to prove any of these prongs is sufficient to
warrant dismissal of the claim without discussion of the other two.”
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 877 A.2d 433, 439 (Pa. 2005) (citation
omitted).
[C]laims of counsel’s ineffectiveness in connection with a guilty plea will provide a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused an involuntary or unknowing plea. . . . The law does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.
____________________________________________
1 “This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record[.]” Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
-4- J-S07037-19
Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. Therefore, where the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during which it became evident that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, the voluntariness of the plea is established. A defendant is bound by the statements he makes during his plea colloquy, and may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled.
Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(citations omitted).
James has failed to make out an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
First, in addition to the written form signed by James, the trial court conducted
a full on-the-record colloquy when James pled guilty. James is bound by those
statements and “may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that
contradict statements made when he pled.” McCauley, supra at 922
(citation omitted). When he admitted to the crimes, the version of the facts
introduced by the Commonwealth and his understanding of the ramifications
of pleading guilty, his claim fails. See Rigg, supra at 1084.
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J-S07037-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TILE HASEEN JAMES : : Appellant : No. 1837 MDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 18, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005330-2016
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2019
Tile Haseen James (James) appeals from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Lancaster County (PCRA court) denying his first petition filed
pursuant the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546.
James alleges the ineffective assistance of counsel for convincing him to enter
a negotiated guilty plea. After careful review, we affirm.
A.
James pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. §
780-113(a)(30), and criminal use of a communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. §
7512(a), for his delivery of crack cocaine to a confidential informant after
arranging the transaction with him on his cell phone. Pursuant to the terms
of the negotiated plea agreement, James was sentenced to an aggregate term
____________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S07037-19
of not less than one year less one day nor more than two years less one day
of incarceration.
Before imposing sentence, the trial court engaged in a colloquy with
James. (See N.T. Sentencing, 5/19/17, at 2-8). James testified that it was
his decision to plead guilty, that he was not “forced, threatened[,] or coerced
in any way” to do so, and, importantly, that he was pleading guilty because
he committed the offenses. (Id. at 4). He confirmed that he understood he
had “an absolute right” to a jury trial, the elements of the charges to which
he was pleading, and that it would be the Commonwealth’s burden to prove
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 4; see id. at 5). The
Commonwealth read the facts of the crimes to which James was pleading
guilty, and he admitted that he received a text message on his cell phone from
the confidential informant, he set up the buy location, and he delivered “one
clear plastic corner tied bag containing crack cocaine to him.” (Id. at 5; see
id. at 6). The court explained the maximum sentences James could receive
for his crimes and his post-sentence rights before confirming that he
understood them. (See id. at 7-8). Additionally, James completed a written
guilty plea colloquy that reflected the same questions and answers. (See
Guilty Plea Colloquy, 5/19/17, at 1-2) (pagination provided). James did not
timely file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal.
-2- J-S07037-19
B.
James filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, later amended by Appointed
Counsel raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel because, among
other things, he would not have plead guilty if his trial counsel pursued an
entrapment defense.
At his PCRA hearing, in contradiction with his guilty plea testimony,
James testified that he set up the drug transaction with the confidential
informant only after the confidential informant texted him more than once
begging that he do so. (See PCRA Hearing, 7/13/18, at 4). He stated that,
although he took the confidential informant to the buy location, a third party
actually delivered the drugs. (See id.). He testified that if trial counsel had
discovered the identity of the confidential informant and had suggested an
entrapment defense, he would not have pleaded guilty. (See id. at 7).
However, James’ trial counsel, David Blank, Esquire, testified at the PCRA
hearing that he did not pursue the identity of the confidential informant
because James already knew him. (See id. at 27). He also stated that he
did not consider an entrapment defense because James had not told him of
the alleged begging by the confidential informant, and that even if he had, it
would not have been enough for such a defense. (See id.).
Finding that James lacked credibility and that he was the one who
orchestrated the drug transaction, the PCRA court denied the petition. James
then filed this appeal.
-3- J-S07037-19
C.
The sole issue that James raises on appeal is that the PCRA court abused
its discretion1 in denying his petition where trial counsel convinced him to
enter a guilty plea instead of seeking the identity of the confidential informant
which would have made entrapment a viable defense. (See James’ Brief, at
8-10). We disagree.
“[T]o succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, a petitioner must
demonstrate that: the underlying claim is of arguable merit; counsel had no
reasonable basis for the act or omission in question; and he suffered prejudice
as a result[.]” Commonwealth v. Laird, 119 A.3d 972, 978 (Pa. 2015)
(citations omitted). “[F]ailure to prove any of these prongs is sufficient to
warrant dismissal of the claim without discussion of the other two.”
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 877 A.2d 433, 439 (Pa. 2005) (citation
omitted).
[C]laims of counsel’s ineffectiveness in connection with a guilty plea will provide a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused an involuntary or unknowing plea. . . . The law does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.
____________________________________________
1 “This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record[.]” Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
-4- J-S07037-19
Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. Therefore, where the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during which it became evident that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, the voluntariness of the plea is established. A defendant is bound by the statements he makes during his plea colloquy, and may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled.
Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(citations omitted).
James has failed to make out an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
First, in addition to the written form signed by James, the trial court conducted
a full on-the-record colloquy when James pled guilty. James is bound by those
statements and “may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that
contradict statements made when he pled.” McCauley, supra at 922
(citation omitted). When he admitted to the crimes, the version of the facts
introduced by the Commonwealth and his understanding of the ramifications
of pleading guilty, his claim fails. See Rigg, supra at 1084.
In denying the PCRA claim, the PCRA court stated:
Defendant’s . . . claim, that he had a potential entrapment defense, likewise lacks any merit. To establish an entrapment defense under the facts of the instant case, Defendant would have had the burden to demonstrate that the Commonwealth or the confidential informant employed methods of persuasion of inducement which created a substantial risk that such an offense would be committed by innocently disposed persons. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §313; Com. v. Mance, 619 A.2d 1378, 1380 (Pa. Super. 1993), aff’d 652 A.2d 299 (Pa. 1995). As noted above, Defendant’s version of the facts lacks any credibility and directly contradicts the record. Defendant’s trial counsel testified credibly
-5- J-S07037-19
that Defendant never told him that the confidential informant had to beg for the drugs or that there were any additional, undisclosed communications and, furthermore, there was no evidence of such communications.2 Defendant openly admits that in response to the confidential informant’s request he arranged the drug transaction and took the confidential informant to the drug transactions.3 Therefore, unlike the cases cited by Defendant, he was the one who orchestrated and directed the crime and not the confidential informant or the Commonwealth. Therefore, the record fails to demonstrate any credible defense of entrapment.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court properly found
that James failed to establish counsel’s ineffective assistance.4 We affirm the
PCRA court’s order denying James’ PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 02/27/2019
2 N.T. PCRA Hearings, 07/13/18, pp. 27, 34-35.
3 N.T. PCRA Hearing, 07/13/18, pp. 4, 11; Letter Brief-Amended PCRA, 02/28/18, p. 3.
4 Additionally, trial counsel’s testimony that he did not seek information about the confidential informant because James already knew him, and that he did not pursue an entrapment defense because it would have lacked merit, is reasonable. Therefore, James’ issue fails on that basis as well. See Laird, supra at 978; Robinson, supra at 439.
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