NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RONALD JACOBS :
:
Appellant : No. 269 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 28, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004768-2021
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RONALD JACOBS :
:
Appellant : No. 270 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 28, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003426-2021
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RONALD JACOBS :
:
Appellant : No. 271 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 28, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001883-2021
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2026 Appellant Ronald Jacobs appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his jury trial for multiple offenses at three separate docket numbers. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in consolidating the cases for trial and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the cases as follows:
These three matters stem from five shootings wherein [the Commonwealth charged that Appellant] and co-conspirators shot at multiple individuals and/or into occupied structures on June 22, 2020, August 16, 2020, August 26, 2020, and September 24, 2020 in Collingdale, Darby Township, and Folcroft, Delaware County, Pennsylvania.
Trial Ct. Op., 4/8/25, at 7 (some formatting altered).
On March 20, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a pretrial motion to consolidate three separate dockets for trial. Appellant objected to the proposed consolidation at the June 23, 2023 hearing. See N.T. 6/23/2023, at 14-16. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s consolidation motion.
A jury trial was held from October 23 to October 26, 2023. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that these shootings resulted from gang activity in the southeastern Delaware County area, including Collingdale, Folcroft, Sharon Hill, and Darby Borough. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 71-75. Specifically, the shootings were tied to a feud between “The Money Making Legend” gang (“MML”), based out of the 100 block of Wayne Avenue, and the
3
Sharon Hill wing of the Philadelphia gang “02DA4,” based on Foster Avenue in Sharon Hill. See id. at 71-75, 266-276. The feud escalated to shooting incidents, with over twenty violent attacks between the two gangs occurring just prior to the offenses charged at these three dockets. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 112-114. The feud continued to escalate, including an unrelated incident in which a resident of Wayne Avenue, on his way home from work, was shot and paralyzed. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 112-114; N.T., 10/24/23, at 282-283. After this incident, officer James Thomas Macintosh and Damir Davis testified that the feud between the two gangs appeared to die down, but Appellant and co-conspirator Malear Metts, sought to continue the violent feud, which led to the five shooting incidents charged in this case. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 67- 80, 234-284; N.T., 10/25/23, at 112-114.
Three of the shootings occurred on the 100 block of Wayne Avenue in Collingdale, Pennsylvania on June 22, 2020, August 16, 2020, and August 29, 2020 (collectively, the Wayne Avenue shootings).1 See N.T., 10/25/23, at 75. At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony that the intended target of the June 22, 2020 Wayne Avenue shooting was Jasmine Gatling, a known MML affiliate. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 88, 163, 177-179. The June 22, 2020 shooting resulted in no injuries, but projectiles were later found to have struck Gatling’s home and car. See N.T., 10/23/23, at 60-72. The August 16, 2020
Wayne Avenue shooting also resulted in no injuries, but video capturing the
____________________________________________
1 All three of these shootings were charged at Docket No. 3426-2021.
4
incident depicted two masked men, armed with handguns, shooting at MML affiliates, including Shadeem Hargrove and Samir Alford, while bystanders ran for cover. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 78-79, 86, 168. During the August 29, 2020 Wayne Avenue shooting, MML affiliate Michael DiMauro was shot five times in the arms and upper torso area. See N.T., 10/23/23, at 152-154; 164, 169-173; See N.T., 10/24/23, at 162-163. Eight fired cartridge casings (FCCs) recovered at each of the Wayne Avenue shootings matched the Hi- Point 9mm handgun found in Appellant’s possession at the time of his arrest. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 42-43, 47-51, 78. Additionally, one of the FCCs recovered at the scene of the August 29, 2020 Wayne Avenue shooting matched with a .380 caliber handgun, also found in Appellant’s possession upon his arrest. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 42-43.
The next shooting occurred on the 1500 block of Lincoln Avenue in Folcroft, Pennsylvania on September 24, 2020 at 1:00 a.m. (the Lincoln Avenue shooting).2 N.T., 10/24/23, at 100-104. Specifically, this shooting occurred at 1513 Lincoln Avenue, the address of Jaqui Bowman, a known MML affiliate. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 134-135, 164-165, 169. The residence, which was occupied at the time of the shooting, had several bullet holes, one of which indicated that a live projectile had traveled inside of the residence. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 57-61, 103. Police recovered twenty-seven FCCs from
the Lincoln Avenue shooting, twenty-three of which were determined to have
____________________________________________
2 This shooting was charged at Docket No. 4768-2021.
5
been fired by a Glock 9mm handgun, later identified as co-conspirator Metts’ firearm. See 10/24/23, at 40-60, 109-121, 134, 190-91, 237-38; N.T., 10/25/23, at 37-51. The other four FCCs were determined to have been fired by a 40 caliber handgun. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 144-45.
The final charged shooting occurred at 10:00 p.m. on September 24, 2020, less than twenty-four hours after the Lincoln Avenue shooting, on the 1100 block of Taylor Drive in Folcroft, Pennsylvania (the Taylor Avenue shooting).3 See N.T., 10/24/23, at 42. Responding to reports of numerous shots fired in the area, police mobilized in search of two vehicles, one white and the other black, which were reportedly involved in the shooting. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 42-49. Officers arrived on location and came across multiple shell casings in the area of Taylor Drive and Munroe Ave and discovered that three uninvolved vehicles were struck by projectiles. See id. Shortly thereafter, police located Appellant and his coconspirators in a black sedan and pursued them until they successfully stopped the vehicle. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 141-145, 171, 188-199, 200-233. Subsequently, police located a Hi-Point 9mm handgun in Appellant’s car next to where he was seated. See id. at 199-203. Police recovered seven FCCs matching the Hi- Point 9mm handgun at the scene of the Taylor Avenue shooting. See id. at 30.
____________________________________________
3 This shooting was charged at Docket No. 1883-2021.
6
Moreover, DNA analysis was conducted on a .380 caliber handgun recovered from near where Appellant was sitting in the vehicle. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 67-87, 188, 192, 297-300. Appellant’s DNA was found on the .380 caliber handgun and the same firearm was connected to the August 29, 2020 Wayne Avenue shooting. See id. at 41, 79-80.
In addition to the ballistics and DNA evidence connecting Appellant to the shooting incidents, the Commonwealth also presented the testimony of co-conspirator Damir Davis, who testified that, while in the car on the way to the Taylor Avenue shooting, Appellant told him that he shot Michael DiMauro on Wayne Avenue on August 29, 2020, and that Appellant had also shot up Wayne Avenue earlier in August of 2020. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 274-281, 294. Damir Davis also testified that, while still in the car with Appellant, Appellant stated that he had been in a shootout “the day before” in Folcroft. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 247-251.
Further, Davis testified to driving Appellant’s car while Appellant sat next to him leading up to, and during, the Taylor Avenue shooting and that they followed a female driving a white car. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 234-262. Davis also testified that he had known Appellant to “have [the] Hi-Point [9mm handgun for] a long time” and indicated that he had seen Appellant with it for “more than a year.” N.T., 10/24/23, at 254-56 (formatting altered).
Following trial, the jury found Appellant guilty at Docket No. 1883-2021 of two counts of firearms not to be carried without a license, aggravated
7
assault, and criminal conspiracy.4 At Docket No. 3426-2021, the jury found Appellant guilty of criminal conspiracy to discharge a firearm into an occupied structure and recklessly endangering another person for the incident on June 22, 2020;5 criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, possession of instruments of crime (PIC), and three counts of recklessly endangering another person for the incident occurring on August 16, 2020;6 and criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, and PIC for the August 29, 2020 incident.7 At Docket No. 4768-2021, the jury found Appellant guilty of three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of criminal conspiracy, discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure, firearms not to be carried without a license, PIC, recklessly endangering another person, and four counts of criminal mischief.8 On December 28, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 17 to 34 years of incarceration for his convictions at Docket No. 1883-2021; 14.5 to 29 years’ incarceration for his convictions at Docket No. 3426-2021; and 16.5 to 33 years’ incarceration for his convictions at Docket No. 4768-2021. The trial court imposed Appellant’s sentences consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 47 years and eight months to 95 years and four months of incarceration.
____________________________________________
4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106, 2702(a)(1), and 903, respectively. 5 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2707.1 and 2705, respectively. 6 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 907(a), and 2705, respectively. 7 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903 and 907(b), respectively. 8 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 903, 2701.1, 6106, 907(a), 2705, and 3304,
respectively.
8
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and both the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which we have reordered as follows:
1. Whether the . . . trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in consolidating [all three cases for trial]. The evidence introduced in each matter would not have been admissible in the trial of the others. [Appellant]
was prejudiced in that the jury was free to conclude that the [Appellant] had a propensity to commit a certain class of crimes. Evidence of [Appellant’s] possession of a firearm utilized during earlier shooting incidents alone was insufficient to justify joinder.
2. Whether the verdicts of guilty of conspiracy to discharge of firearm into occupied structure and recklessly endangering another person, based on a shooting incident said to have occurred on June 22, 2020, on Wayne Avenue in Collingdale, Delaware County, are based on insufficient evidence. There was no physical, video or identification evidence admitted showing [Appellant’s] involvement. The testimony of Damir Davis is not sufficient to demonstrate [Appellant’s]
involvement and expert testimony relating to gang activities failed to show that [Appellant] was affiliated with any group involved in the offenses committed on June 22, 2020.
Circumstantial evidence relating to possession of a handgun some months later failed to prove [Appellant’s] involvement beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Whether the verdict of guilty of the crimes of criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, attempt to cause serious bodily injury, [PIC] with intent to employ criminally and three counts of [REAP], based on a shooting incident said to have occurred on August 16, 2020 on Wayne Avenue in Collingdale, Delaware County, are based on insufficient evidence. There was no physical, video or identification evidence admitted showing [Appellant’s] involvement. The testimony of Damir Davis is not sufficient to demonstrate [Appellant’s] involvement and expert testimony relating to gang activities failed to show that [Appellant] was affiliated
9
with any group involved in the offenses committed on August 16, 2020. Circumstantial evidence relating to possession of a handgun one month later failed to prove [Appellant’s] involvement beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Whether the verdicts of guilty of conspiracy to [commit]
aggravated assault, attempt to cause serious bodily injury and [PIC] with intent to employ criminally, based on the shooting of Michael DiMauro on August 29, 2020, on Wayne Avenue in Collingdale, Delaware County, are based on insufficient evidence. There was no physical, video or identification evidence admitted showing [Appellant’s]
involvement. The testimony of Damir Davis is non-specific regarding this incident and therefore not sufficient to demonstrate [Appellant’s] involvement. Expert testimony relating to gang related confrontations failed to show that [Appellant] was affiliated with any group involved in the offenses committed on August 29, 2020. Circumstantial evidence relating to possession of a handgun utilized in the shooting on September 24, 2020, failed to prove [Appellant’s] involvement beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s Brief at 6-8 (ordering altered).
Consolidation
Appellant, in his first issue, argues that the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating all three cases at trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 46- 58. Specifically, Appellant contends that the three cases do not have the required similarities justifying joinder and that the evidence of each crime was not admissible in the trial of the others to prove identity, nor were the separate shooting incidents sufficiently unique to constitute “signature crimes.” Id. at 30, 46, 52-53, 55-56. Appellant adds that the evidence of his possession of a firearm utilized during earlier shooting incidents alone was insufficient to justify joinder. See id. at 50-51. Further, Appellant argues that, because the final shooting incident on September 24, 2020 did not involve groups targeting
10
MML, whereas the prior shootings did, the prior shootings were not admissible in the trial of the final shooting incident. See id. at 55-56. Appellant argues that a consolidated trial of the charges under all three dockets improperly enabled the jury to conclude that he had a propensity to commit a certain class of crimes, resulting in undue prejudice. See id. at 57-58. Therefore, Appellant concludes the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating the separate cases for a joint trial. See id. at 57.
This Court has previously discussed the law on consolidation and severance as follows:
Whether to join or sever offenses for trial is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse thereof, or prejudice and clear injustice to the defendant.
It is the appellant’s burden to establish prejudice.
The general policy of the laws is to encourage joinder of offenses and consolidation of indictments when judicial economy can thereby be effected, especially when the result will be to avoid the expensive and time-consuming duplication of evidence.
Our Supreme Court has stated that while evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant is generally not admissible to show his criminal propensity, such evidence is relevant and admissible to establish the perpetrator’s identity, or the existence of a common scheme or plan.
. . . Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582(A)(1) provides that distinct offenses which do not arise out of the same act or transaction may be tried together if the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion, or the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction. If the trial court finds that the evidence is admissible and the jury can separate the charges, the court must also consider whether consolidation would unduly prejudice the defendant.
11
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 583 provides a court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants, or provide other appropriate relief, if it appears that any party may be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together.
We explained, the “prejudice” of which Rule 583 speaks is that which would occur if the evidence tended to convict the appellant only by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid cumulating the evidence. Additionally, the admission of relevant evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for severance by itself.
Finally[, r]eading [R]ules 582 and 583 together, our Supreme Court established the following test for severance matters:
Where the defendant moves to sever offenses not based on the same act or transaction that have been consolidated in a single indictment or information, or opposes joinder of separate indictments or informations, the court must therefore determine: 1. whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other; 2. whether such evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these inquiries are in the affirmative, 3. whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses.
Commonwealth v. Gray, 296 A.3d 41, 47-48 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations omitted and some formatting altered).
Additionally, regarding the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, this Court has stated:
Bad acts evidence is inadmissible to prove a defendant acted in conformity with those acts or to demonstrate a criminal propensity. However, evidence of bad acts is admissible pursuant to our rules of evidence to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident. This list is non-exclusive. Indeed, prior to the codification of our rules of evidence, our Supreme Court set forth
12
the following list of exceptions to the general prohibition against bad acts evidence:
(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident;
(4) a common scheme, plan or design embracing commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one naturally tends to prove the others; (5) to establish the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial where there is such a logical connection between the crimes that proof of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the person who committed the other; (6) to impeach the credibility of a defendant who testifies in his trial; (7) situations where defendant’s prior criminal history had been used by him to threaten or intimidate the victim; (8) situations where the distinct crimes were part of a chain or sequence of events which formed the history of the case and were part of its natural development (sometimes called “res gestae”
exception).
Commonwealth v. Billa, 555 A.2d 835, 840 (Pa. 1989) (citing Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 497 (Pa. 1988)).
Our Supreme Court has consistently recognized that admission of distinct crimes may be proper where it is part of the history or natural development of the case, i.e., the res gestae exception . .
..
In Lark, . . . our Supreme Court explained,
the “res gestae” exception to the general proscription against evidence of other crimes, is also known as the “complete story” rationale, i.e., evidence of other criminal acts is admissible “to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 320, 325-26 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted and some formatting altered).9
____________________________________________
9 We note that our Supreme Court recently decided a case regarding consolidation and bad acts evidence. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 350 (Footnote Continued Next Page)
13
Here, the trial court addressed the consolidation of Appellant’s cases as follows:
[The trial] court heard evidence regarding the close geographic area, the limited three-month span of the incidents, among other factors, illustrating that the evidence was so similar and encompassed from one case to the next, that consolidation was appropriate. Specifically, the shootings targeted members of opposing groups, cooperating witnesses and co-defendants corroborating the scheme, as well as overlapping evidence. . . .
* * *
This court considered all relevant factors and did not err in determining that these matters should be consolidated.
Trial Ct. Op., 4/8/25, at 8-9 (some formatting altered).
After careful review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in consolidating the three cases presented here.10 See Gray, 296 A.3d at 47.
The record supports that evidence from each matter would be admissible in a separate trial for the other to show the history and natural development of the facts from each set of offenses charged under the three dockets. See Gray, 296 A.3d at 48; see also Brown, 52 A.3d at 325-326.
____________________________________________
A.3d 54 (Pa. 2026). Since that case dealt with the common plan, scheme or design exception to the bar on admission of bad acts evidence, which we conclude is not at issue in this case, we do not believe the Walker decision is implicated here. See id. at 62 (stating “[t]he matter before us concerns another judicially recognized exception to [the bar on the admission of bad acts evidence, which occurs] when the other bad acts evidence demonstrates a defendant’s common plan, scheme or design”).
10 “To the extent our legal reasoning differs from the trial court’s, we note that[,] as an appellate court, we may affirm on any legal basis supported by the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 176 A.3d 292, 296 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2017)
14
As the trial court points out, the five shooting incidents are both temporally and geographically linked. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/8/25, at 8-9; see also N.T., 10/25/23, at 75; N.T., 10/24/23, at 42, 100-104. Further, the evidence related to the Hi-Point 9mm handgun and its discovery in Appellant’s car upon his arrest was admissible to show the history and natural development of the facts of the cases. See Brown, 52 A.3d at 326. Specifically, the fact that numerous FCCs recovered from the Wayne and Taylor Avenue shootings match with the Hi-Point 9mm found with Appellant following the Taylor Avenue shooting is essential to the Commonwealth’s case proving Appellant’s involvement in at least four of the five shooting incidents. See N.T., 10/25/23, at 42-43, 47-51, 78. Moreover, Damir Davis’s testimony about what Appellant told him leading up to the Taylor Avenue shooting was admissible to show the history and natural development of the Lincoln Avenue Shooting and the Wayne Avenue Shootings. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 247-251, 274-281, 294; see also Brown, 52 A.3d at 326. Damir Davis’s testimony was also essential to show that Appellant was in possession of the Hi-Point 9mm handgun for a significant period prior to the events of this case. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 254- 56. Accordingly, the evidence of each shooting was admissible in the cases of the other shootings to show the history and natural development of the case. See Brown, 52 A.3d at 326.
Additionally, the evidence was readily capable of separation by the jury.
Gray, 296 A.3d 41, 47-48. As Appellant points out, each individual shooting was carried out differently. See Appellant’s Brief at 29-30. Namely, each
15
shooting incident had different victims or targets; occurred on different dates, or times, or on different streets; had a different number of FCCs recovered; occurred with or without a vehicle; and one of the shooting incidents resulted in severe injuries. See N.T., 10/23/23, at 152-154, 170-174; N.T., 10/24/23, at 42, 100-104, 134-35, 181, 249; N.T., 10/25/23, at 37-51, 75, 84, 177- 179. Further, the five shootings were investigated by different investigating officers who testified about each individual shooting at trial. See N.T., 10/24/23, at 34, 96, 165-66. Since each of the five shootings were distinct and were investigated by different investigating officers who testified at trial, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that the jury was capable of separating the evidence of each crime. See Gray, 296 A.3d at 47-48.
Finally, as to prejudice, Appellant argues that consolidation enabled the jury to conclude that he had a propensity to commit a certain class of crimes, resulting in undue prejudice. See Appellant’s Brief at 46-58. We find Appellant’s prejudice argument unavailing. While the evidence presented to the jury in the consolidated trial would tend to prejudice Appellant, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that it was not unduly prejudicial to Appellant given that he “created the sequence of events” of which he now complains. Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 534 (Pa. Super. 2023) (stating that “prejudice [for consolidation purposes] is not simply prejudice in the sense that the appellant will be linked to the crimes for which he is being prosecuted, for that sort of prejudice is ostensibly the purpose of all Commonwealth evidence” and that where the appellant “created
16
the sequence of events [he] cannot fairly now demand that the . . . matters be severed and tried in separate trials” (citations omitted and some formatting altered)); see also Lark, 543 A.2d at 501 (stating that a trial court is not “required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form a part of the history and natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged”).
Since consolidation of these cases satisfied the test for severance matters, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the cases for trial. See Gray, 296 A.3d at 47-48. Accordingly, no relief is due on Appellant’s consolidation claim.
Sufficiency of the Evidence Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions at Docket No. 3426-2021. See Appellant’s Brief at 31. Specifically, Appellant argues that there was no physical, video or identification evidence that showed his involvement with the shootings, and claims that the testimony from Damir Davis was insufficient to establish that
he was one of the perpetrators.11 See id. at 33, 44-46. Additionally,
____________________________________________
11 We note that Appellant raised an issue regarding the verdicts being against
the weight of the evidence in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement. However, Appellant does not raise this argument in his brief. Accordingly, Appellant has abandoned this issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (stating that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved [in the appellate brief] or is fairly (Footnote Continued Next Page)
17
Appellant claims that expert testimony relating to gang activities failed to show that he was affiliated with any group targeting MML members. Id. at 38-40. Further, Appellant contends that the circumstantial evidence relating to possession of a handgun located near him some months later failed to prove his involvement in the Wayne Avenue Shootings beyond a reasonable doubt. See Id. at 35-36. Therefore, Appellant concludes that the evidence supporting his convictions at Docket No. 3426-2021 is insufficient.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are governed by the following standard:
Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
finder.
____________________________________________
suggested thereby”); see also Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “an issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant's brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived” (citation omitted)).
18
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted and formatting altered).
However, as we have previously explained:
An argument that goes purely to weight, even if styled as sufficiency, necessarily fails. See Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666, 672 (Pa. 1999) (stating, “[a]lthough [the] appellant phrases this as a sufficiency argument, the challenge goes to the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, [the] appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must fail.” (citation omitted))
Commonwealth v. Martin, 323 A.3d 807, 816 (Pa. Super. 2024).
Following our review, we find that while Appellant’s claim is styled as a sufficiency claim, both the facts and law cited in support of Appellant’s claim attack the weight of the evidence. See Martin, 323 A.3d at 816; Small, 741 A.2d at 672; see also Appellant’s Brief at 31-46.
Appellant claims that since Damir Davis’s testimony was not specific as to the dates of the shootings of which he claims Appellant admitted involvement, and that Davis’s testimony contained what he suggests is “second hand information,” this Court should find the evidence insufficient to convict appellant. Id. at 44-45. Appellant also claims this Court should find the FCC evidence linked to his firearm insufficient to establish his involvement since, in his view, he was discovered with the Hi-Point “too remote in time” from the Wayne Avenue Shootings. See id. at 35-42. Although Appellant presents these claims as sufficiency arguments, his challenges go to the weight of the evidence. See Martin, 323 A.3d at 816; Small, 741 A.2d at 672; Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 20 WDA 2017, 2019 WL 2775611, at
19
*8 (Pa. Super. filed July 2, 2019) (concluding that a sufficiency claim that asks this Court to reweigh the evidence is a challenge to the weight of the evidence);12 Commonwealth v. Lewis, 45 A.3d 405, 409 (Pa. Super. 2012) (concluding that a sufficiency claim that asks this Court to reassess witness credibility is a challenge to the weight of the evidence). Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must fail. See Martin, 323 A.3d at 816; Small, 741 A.2d at 672.
Based upon the above, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 8/19/2026
____________________________________________
12 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating this Court may rely on unpublished decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value)