J-A01031-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAVON HYMAN : : Appellant : No. 2671 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 20, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004227-2014, CP-51-CR-0004228-2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 13, 2018
Javon Hyman appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed July 20,
2016, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. On March 2, 2016,
a jury convicted Hyman of two counts each of robbery (threatens serious
bodily injury), possession of firearm by a person prohibited, and possession
of an instrument of crime with intent (“PIC”).1 After a thorough review of the
submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm
on the basis of the trial court opinion.
The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history as follows:
On January 8, 2014, [Hyman] was arrested and charged, under two separate Bills of Information,1 with identical charges of ____________________________________________
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 6105(a)(1), and 907(a), respectively. J-A01031-18
[robbery, firearms possession, and PIC]. On [March 2, 2016], at the conclusion of his bifurcated jury trial, [Hyman] was found guilty of these charges. _______________________
1 CP-51-CR-0004227-2014 and CP-51-CR-0004228-2014. The charges against [Hyman] arose out of his gun point robberies of the same store on two separate occasions within a week of each other. _______________________
On May 13, 2016, [Hyman] was sentenced to consecutive periods of confinement in a state correctional facility of 5 to 10 years on the two Robbery charges followed by concurrent periods of ten years[’]probation. On the remaining charges he was sentenced to concurrent periods of probation, for an aggregate period of confinement 10 to 20 years followed by 10 years[’] probation. On May 16, 2016, [Hyman] filed a post sentence motion seeking a modification of his sentence to conform to Pennsylvania’s three strike laws. At the conclusion of the hearing, held on July 20, 2016, to consider [Hyman]’s motion, the Court vacated his original sentence and, on the two robbery charges, imposed concurrent periods of incarceration of 10 to 20 years followed [by] two concurrent periods of ten years[’] probation. Additionally, the court imposed concurrent periods of probation on the remaining charges for an aggregate period of confinement of 10 to 20 years followed by 10 years[’] probation.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/2017, at 1-2.
Hyman raises the following issues on appeal:
A. Did not the [trial] court err in denying Javon Hyman’s petition to dismiss pursuant to [P.R.Crim.P.] 600 where the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence by not bringing Mr. Hyman to trial within 365 days?
B. Did not the lower court violate state law and due process while instructing the jury on reasonable doubt when it diminished the Commonwealth’s burden of proof by telling the jurors they must be able to explain a doubt in order for it to amount to reasonable doubt, and infringed upon the exclusive purview of the jury by commenting on evidence in a biased and prejudicial manner?
-2- J-A01031-18
Hyman’s Brief at 4.
After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the
relevant case law, we find the trial court’s April 12, 2017, opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented
in this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/2017, at 3-12 (concluding: (1)
Hyman’s Rule 600 motion was properly denied because the Commonwealth
demonstrated due diligence in bringing the matter to trial, including, inter alia,
(a) there was no substantial delay on the part of the Commonwealth with
respect to completing discovery, and not disclosing certain inculpatory
evidence where (i) the Commonwealth “disclosed” the existence of the video
recording of the robbery, Hyman had downloaded a copy of it long before trial
commenced, and his insistence that he be provided a copy of the original video
was frivolous; (ii) Hyman’s request for copies of statements of unnamed
witnesses, which were in the exclusive possession of the FBI, was misplaced
since these items were not in the possession of the Commonwealth; (b) there
were court scheduling conflicts; and (c) Hyman was a fugitive for a two-month
period;2 and (2) the court’s instructions to the jury were proper where (a)
Hyman’s argument was highly subjective and distorted the record; (b) Hyman
waited until after the jury had retired to raise his objection and therefore, it
____________________________________________
2 We acknowledge there is a scrivener’s error on page 6 of the trial court’s opinion, and that the first period of time at issue should have been between 2/18/2014 and 2/28/2014.
-3- J-A01031-18
was untimely and waived; and (c) “in commenting on the evidence at trial in
its charge, [the court] did not at any time attempt to ‘usurp the power of the
jury to be the sole judge of the evidence’ but simply put it in context,” 3 and is
not required to present balanced views of evidence as long as it states the law
clearly and accurately, and therefore, “it was appropriate and proper for the
Court to comment on the evidence at trial, notably the video of the robbery,
the still photos, the unusual gun and the testimony of the complaining witness
and the police officers.”4). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial
court’s opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 8/13/18
3 Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/2017, at 10.
4 Id. at 11.
-4- ·1 Circulated 07/31/2018 02:53 PM
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 2671 EDA 2016 v. CP-51-CR-0004227-2014 JAVONHYMAN CP-51-CR-0004228-2014
FILED OPINION APR 12 2017 Ap�alsJPost Trial Office of Jud!clal Records STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant is appealing his convictions on the charges of Robbery and related
Weapons Offenses. Defendant is seeking relief, averring the Court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Pa.R.C.P.) and that the Court erred in its instructions to the jury. Defendant's
complaints are without merit.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 8, 2014, Defendant was arrested and charged, under two separate
Bills of Information, 1 with identical charges of Robbery - Threatens Serious Bodily
Injury pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3701(a)(l)(ii), Possession of Firearm by a Person
Prohibited pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.A. §6105(a)(l) and Possession of an Instrument of a
Crime With Intent pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. 907(a). 'on June 12, 2013, at the conclusion
of his bifurcated jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of these charges.
I CP-5l-CR-0004227-2014 and CP-51-CR-0004228-2014. The charges against Defendant arose out of his gun point robberies of the same store on two separate occasions within a week of each other. On · May 13, 2016, Defendant was sentenced to consecutive periods of
confinement in a state correctional facility of 5 to 10 years on the two Robbery charges
followed by concurrent periods of ten years probation. On the remaining charges he was
sentenced to concurrent periods of probation, for an aggregate period of confinement 10
to 20 years foJlowed by 10 years probation. On May 16, 2016, Defendant filed a post
sentence motion seeking a modification or' his sentence to conform to Pennsylvania's
three strike laws. At the conclusion of the hearing, held on July 20, 2016, to consider \
Defendant's motion, the Court vacated his original sentence and, on the two robbery
charges, imposed concurrent periods of incarceration of 10 to 20 years followed two
concurrent periods of ten years probation. Additionally, the court imposed concurrent
periods of probation on the remaining charges for an aggregate period of confinement of
10 to 20 years followed by 10 years probation.
On August 17, 2016, Defendant timely filed the instant appeal to the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania. On September 8, 2016, this Court filed and served on· Defendant
an Order pursuant to Rule l 925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,
directing Defendant to file and serve a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal,
within 21 days of the Court's Order. On September 28, 2016, Defendant timely filed his
"Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal.?" In his statement. of errors, Defendant
raises two issues, namely:
1.) "The court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Cr.P. 600, as appellant was tried beyond the time period allotted under the rule, and the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that it had exercised due diligence.
2 Defendant, after filing a request for an extension of time to file a supplemental statement of errors, filed a supplemental statement raising the same issues
2 2.) In its jury instruction on reasonable doubt, the court violated state law and due process by: summarizing the trial evidence in a biased, prejudicial manner; vouching for Commonwealth witnesses; insinuating that a verdict of not guilty would be unreasonable; stating that, in light of the Commonwealth's evidence, if a juror does not explain to fellow jurors the reason s/he may have a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt, then the juror likely manufactured such doubt to avoid carrying out an unpleasant duty .. "
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE RAISED
I. DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO
RULE 600 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE WAS PROPER.
In his first statement of errors, Defendant complains that the Court "erred in
denying appellant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Cr.P. 600, as appellant was tried
beyond the time period allotted under the rule ... u Defendant's complaint is without
merit.
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure (Pa. R. Crim. P.), amended effective
July 13 2012, at Rule 600 (A) provide in part that; "(2) Trial shall commence within the
following time periods. (a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed
against the defendant, when the defendant is at liberty on bail, shall commence no later
than 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed." Rule 600 further provides
at "(C) Computation of Time. ( 1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any
stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has
failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within
which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the.
3 computation." Simply stated, the only periods of time to be included in the Rule 600
calculation, are for those periods of delay caused by the Commonwealth's failure to
exercise due diligence. (N.T., 7/9/15 pg. 14, 15, 18)
The Court is mindful of the Commonwealth's obligation to exercise due diligence
in bringing a matter to trial within the Rule 600 time limit. "To protect the defendant's
speedy trial rights, Rule 600 ultimately provides for the dismissal of charges if the
Commonwealth . fails to bring the . defendant to trial within 365 days of the filing of the
complaint (the (mechanical run date'), subject to certain exclusions for delays attributable
to the defendant. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(3), (G). Conversely, to protect society's right to
effective prosecution prior to dismissal of charges, 'rule 600 requires the court to
consider whether the commonwealth exercised due diligence, and whether the
circumstances occasioning the delay of trial were beyond the Commonwealth's control.?'
Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A. 3d 693, 701 (Pa. 2012) (Internal citations omitted)
"A Rule 600 motion requires a showing of due diligence by a preponderance of the
evidence for the Commonwealth to avail itself of an exclusion. Due diligence is fact-
specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not require perfect vigilance and
punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable
effort." Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010) (Internal citations
omitted)
In considering a Rule 600 Motion, "the Court must distinguish between
'excludable time' and 'excusable delay>. Excludable time is that time delay occasioned
by the defendant's own actions as characterized under Rule 600(C). Excusable delay is
not expressly defined in Rule 600, but the legal construct takes into account delays which
4 occur as a result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth's control and despite its
due diligence." Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Pa. Super. 2004)
A review of the record reveals that the warrant for Defendant's arrest was issued
on December 19, 20133, resulting in a mechanical run date of 12/19/2014. (N.T., 7/9/15
pg. 24) At the hearing held on July 9, 2015, to consider his motion, Defendant took the
arbitrary position that the Commonwealth has a strict duty to bring a defendant to trial
within 356 days and that any delay, not occasioned by a defense request, is counted
against the Commonwealth, unless it could show it acted with due diligence to prevent
the delay. (N.T., 7/9/15 pg. 14, 15; 17)
At the heart of Defendant's motion is his contention that the substantial delay in
bringing him to trial was caused by the Commonwealth's failure to complete discovery
by failing to disclose inculpatory evidence in a timely' manner. It has long been
recognized that "the purpose of our discovery rules is to permit parties in criminal matters
to be prepared for trial; trial by ambush is contrary to the spirit and letter of those rules
and ,-vrn not be condoned." Commonwealth v. Appel, 547 Pa. 171, 204, 689 A.2d 891,
907 (1997) (Internal citations omitted) Pa. R. Crim. P. 573(1) provides in pertinent part
that; "In all court cases, on request by the defendant ... the Commonwealth shall disclose
to the defendant's attorney all of the foJlowing requested items or information, provided
they are material to the instant case ... (f) any tangible objects, including documents,
photographs, fingerprints, or other tangible evidence ... "· "The Commonwealth does not
violate the pretrial-discovery rule when it fails to disclose to the· defense evidence that it
does not possess ... » Commonwealtlt v. Collins, 957 A.2d 237_. 253 (Pa. 2008) (Internal
citations omitted)
.1 Defendant was subsequently arrested on January I, 2014.
5 The principal piece of evidence at issue is a security video recording of the
robbery the police posted on "Il-Tube" as part of its efforts to successfully identify and
arrest Defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes with which he was convicted. (N.T.,
719115 pgs. 20, 21) It is abundantly clear from the record that not only had the
Commonwealth "disclosed" the existence of the video to Defendant, but that he had in
fact downloaded a copy of it long before the commencement of trial. (N.T., 7/9/15 pgs.
21, 22, 27, 28) Defendant's insistence that he be provided copy of the original video,
which was in the possession of the Philadelphia Police Department, during the relevant
· periods at issue, is frivolous.
Defendant was also seeking copies of statements of unnamed witnesses in the
exclusive possession of the FBI. (N.T., 7/9/15 pgs:22, 23) Since the items at issue were
not in the possession of the Commonwealth, the Court found "that there was no lack of
due diligence" on the part of the Commonwealth. Therefore, contrary to Defendant's
argument, any delay that might be attributable to incomplete discovery was not
includable in the Rule 600 calculation. (N.T., 7/9/15 pg. 23)
The first period of time at issue is the 10 day period, preceding Defendant's
preliminary hearing, between 2/18/2014 - 2/18/2014. The Commonwealth concedes this
delay was includable in the Rule 600 calculation. (N.T., 7/9/15 pg. 9) The next period
at issue is the 14 day period, between 2/28/2014 - 3/14/2014. This delay was attributable .
to a defense request and, therefore, is excludable from the Rule 600 calculation. (N.T.,
7/9/15 pgs. 6, 7, 10) The 31 day delay, between 3/14/2014 - 4/10/2014, at which time
the matter was held for court, attributable to the unexplained failure of the complaining
witness to appear, is includable,
6 The next period of time to be considered is the 70 day period between 4/10/2014 ( - 6/19/2014, is attributable to the Court's scheduling matters, not to the lack of due
diligence on the part of the Commonwealth, and is, therefore, not includable in the Rule
600 calculation. (N.T.,. 7/9/15 pgs. 20, 23) Although the docket indicates that discovery
was not complete as of 5/28/14, as discussed above, this is not chargeable against the
Commonwealth. (N.T., 7/9/15 pg. 23)
The next period of time to be considered is the 355 day period between 6/19/2014
- 5/29/2015. On 6/10/2014, this matter was for a pre-trial conference on 5/29/1'5 and trial
scheduled for 6/9/2015. This period of time is attributable to the Court's scheduling and
is not includable in the Rule 600 calculation. Furthermore, Defendant concedes that the
trial date of 6/9/2015 was the earliest possible date available to the Court. (N.T., 7/9/15
pg. 23) Again, the docket indicates that discovery was not complete as of 6/19/14 and, as
discussed above, this is not chargeable against the Commonwealth. (N.T., 7/9/15 pg. 23)
The next period of time to be considered is the 11 day period between 5/29/15 -
6/9/15. On 5/29/15, the Court was not sitting due to illness, which certainly has not been
proven to be attributable to the lack of due diligence on the part of the Commonwealth,
and is not includable in the Rule 600 calculation. (N.T., 7/9/15 pg. 23) Defendant's trial
date remained the same.
The next period of time to be considered is the 409 day period between 6/9/15 -
2/29/16. On 6/8/15 and 6/9/15, both the Commonwealth and Defendant were ready to
proceed to trial. However, the Court was on trial on an older case and could not reach
this matter. After unsuccessfully attempting to move this matter to another court room
for trial, it was given the earliest possible date of 2/29/16 for trial. (N.T., 7/9/15 pgs. 25,
7 26) Again, this period of time is attributable to the Court's scheduling and is not
includable in the RuJe 600 calculations.
A further examination of Defendant's Rule 600 calculations reveals that the 57
days between the issuance of the arrest warrant on 12/19/13 and 2/18/14, the date of
Defendant's first preliminary hearing are not includable Rule 600 calculations. This
delay was attributable to Defendant being a fugitive and the Court's scheduling.
Therefore the only time includable in the Rule 600 calculation are the 41 days of delay
caused by the complaining witness' failure to appear at Defendant's preliminary hearings
scheduled for 2/18/ 14 and 3/14/14.
Defendant is not entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 600. Defendant's complaint
that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in meeting its discovery .I obligations is without merit. The Court finds that only 41 days of delay are attributable
to the Commonwealth's lack of due diligence.
II. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY WERE PROPER.
Defendant, in his second statement of errors, complains the Court's !nstructions
on reasonable· doubt were "biased" and "prejudicial." Not only is Defendant's complaint
without merit, it is highly subjective and distorts the record.
Pa. R. Cr. P. Rule 647(B) provides in pertinent part "No portions of the charge
nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are
made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate." In considering the application of Rule
647(B) The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, "that under Criminal Procedural Rules
603 and 647(B), the mere submission and subsequent denial of proposed points for
8 charge that are inconsistent with or omitted from the instructions actually given will not
suffice to preserve an issue, absent a specific objection or exception to the charge or the
trial court's ruling respecting the points.', Commonwealth v. Pressley, 584 Pa. 624, 887
A.2d 220, at 225 (2008). More recently, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the
defendant's failure to object to the trial court's refusal to include his request for
instructions on the law of "justification/self-defense" constituted a waiver of that issue.
Commonwealth v. Marquez, 209 PA Super 170. 980 A.2d 145 (2009)
During the course of its deliberations, the jury requested the Court to again define
"reasonable doubt." At the conclusion of its charge, the Court inquired of counsel if they
had "anything additional before the jury goes back out?" Defendant> s counsel answered
in the negative. (N.T., 3/2/16 pgs. 4, 13) After the jury had retired, Defendant proceeded
to object to the Court's instruction. Having raised his objection after the jury had retired,
Defendant's objection was untimely and is deemed waived. Marquez, Id
That said, it has long been recognized that a "trial court has wide discretion in
fashioning jury instructions." Commonwealth v. Scott, 73 A.3d 599, 602 (Pa. Super.
2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 911 A.2d 576, 583 (Pa. Super. 2006) �'When
reviewing the propriety of a jury charge, an appellate court examines the charge as a
whole. The trial court has broad discretion in formulating jury instructions, solong as the
law is presented to the jury in a clear, adequate, and accurate manner." (Internal citations
omitted.) Commonwealth v. Lukowlch, 875 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Pa. Super. 2005) We
review a jury instruction to determine "whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of
discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case." Id. (quoting
Brown, 911 A.2d at 582-83). The "key inquiry is whether the instruction on a particular
9 issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the jury, and is sufficient to
guide the jury in its deliberations." Id. (quoting Hamilton, 766 A.2d at 878)
Adopting the language of our Superior Court's decision in Commonwealtlt v.
Leonhard, 336 Pa. Super. 90, 95, 485 A.2d 444, (1984), our Supreme Court "explained
that it is not improper for an instructing court to refer to the facts and/or the evidence of
the case when giving a charge. The court. noted:
On one hand, the trial court must frame the legal issues for the jury and instruct the jury on the applicable law, while on the other hand, it must not usurp the power of the jury to be sole judge of the evidence. Plainly, these principles may conflict with each other, for in order to instruct the jury on the law the court may have to refer to the evidence. The proper balance to be struck will depend heavily on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, some general guidelines have been formulated. Thus, the court may not comment on, or give its opinion of, the guilt or innocence of the accused. Nor may it state an opinion as to the credibility of witnesses, nor remove from the jury its responsibility to decide the degree of culpability. However, the court may summarize the evidence and note possible inferences to be drawn from it. In doing so, the court may 1'. ... express [its] own opinion on the evidence, including the weight and effect to be accorded it and its points of strength and weakness, providing that the statements have a reasonable basis and it is clearly left to the jury to decide the facts, regardless of any opinion expressed by the judge."
Commonwealth v. Meadows, 567 Pa. 344, 354�55, 787 A.2d 312, 318 (2001) (Internal
citations and quotations omitted); In accord, Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d
1247 (Pa. Super. 2014)
The only objection raised to the Court's instructions was Defendant's objection to
its instruction on reasonable doubt delivered, in response to a question from the jury. The
Court, in commenting on the evidence at trial in its charge, did not at any time attempt to
"usurp the power of the jury to be sole judge of the evidence" but simply put it in context.
However, in commenting on the evidence, the Court is not required to present balancing ·
views of the evidence, "as long as the law is clearly and accurately presented to the jury."
10 ' .
Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 1259 Therefore, it was appropriate and proper for the Court to
comment on the evidence at trial, notably the video of the robbery, the still photos, the
unusual gun and the testimony of the complaining witness and the police officers. It is
understandable that Defendant would consider such evidence extremely detrimental to his
defense, but it was in no way presented in a "biased" or "prejudicial" manner,
Defendant's further complaint that the Court instructed the jury "that a verdict of
not guilty would be unreasonable; stating that, in light of the Commonwealth's evidence,
if a juror does not explain to felJow jurors the reason s/he may have a reasonable doubt as
to appellant's guilt, then the juror likely manufactured such doubt to avoid carrying out
an unpleasant duty," is, at best, a disingenuous distortion of the record.
On commencing its charge, the Court specifically instructed the jury:
"Likewise, if at any time during the trial or during this instruction I say anything or do 'anything implying my personal opinion about any of the evidence, any witnesses, or what your verdict should be, I want to tell you two things: First, I don't have an opinion; and second, if I did have an opinion, it would be the least well-informed opinion in this court because, as I told you at the outset, I can hardly see these · witnesses and· I get distracted by looking at legal issues up here on the bench anticipating things that will happen, talking to the courtroom staff about this case, other cases that are listed in here. So I have no opinion, and in any case, you should disregard it.
The only opinion that matters in this courtroom is yours. You're the jury. It's your opinion that matters with regard to the witnesses, the evidence and ultimately the verdict that counts." (N.T., 3/1/16 pgs. 94, 95)
In its supplemental charge, responding to the jury's question, the Court illustrated
the meaning of "reasonable doubt," by instructing the jury further:
"If somebody has reasonable doubt and it's a real doubt, a doubt based on the evidence or lack of evidence with respect to some element of offense, then probably that person should be able explain what that
11 doubt is. If somebody just says, I have a doubt, that's all, rm telling you l have a doubt, then there's a good chance that that doubt is simply a doubt that they've manufactured to avoid carrying out an unpleasant duty. And it is unpleasant to come into the courtroom 'and say somebody's guilty of an offense; but if the evidence demonstrates that beyond a reasonable doubt, your oath as a juror demands that you say that the defendant is guilty." (N.T., 3/2/16 pg. 9)
In concluding this supplemental charge, the Court gave the standard instruction:
"Also, we must recognize that sometimes simply out of fear of making important decisions, we image doubts that are based on virtually nothing. It's. important that we make sure that doubts that we allow to affect our decisions are only those that are based upon fact and reason.
So to summarize, you may not find 'the defendant guilty based on a mere suspicion of guilt. The Commonwealth has the burden· of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt If it meets that burden, then the defendant is no longer presumed innocent and you must find him guilty. On the other hand, if the Commonwealth does not meet its burden, you must find the defendant not guilty." (N.T., 3/2/16 pg. 12)
CONCLUSION
The Court finds- that the Commonwealth acted with due diligence 'in its
prosecution of Defendant and that its instructions to the jury were appropriate.
BY THE COURT:
April 12, 2017