Com. v. Howard, R.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 583 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Dubow

Opinion

J-S10012-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RASHEED YUSEF HOWARD : : Appellant : No. 583 MDA 2025 :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0001360-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MARCH 30, 2026

Appellant Rasheed Yusef Howard appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered after the Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas convicted

him of two counts of Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) and one count each

of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Driving Without a License, Driving While

Operating Privileges are Suspended or Revoked, and Operation a Vehicle with

Improper Sun Screening.1 He challenges the denial of his suppression motion,

asserting that neither the traffic stop nor his arrest were supported by

probable cause. After careful review, we affirm.2

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1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(ii) and (d)(2); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32); 75 Pa.C.S.

§§ 1501, 1543, and 4524(e)(1).

2 The Commonwealth did not file an appellee’s brief. J-S10012-26

We glean the relevant facts from the suppression hearing record.3 On

May 7, 2021, at approximately 10:00 A.M., while on stationary patrol in a

middle berm on Route 80, Pennsylvania State Trooper Tyler Arbogast

observed a vehicle drive past him with window tinting that was so dark he

could not see into the vehicle. Trooper Arbogast followed the vehicle for a

mile and, after confirming that he was unable to see into the vehicle through

its rear windshield, he effectuated a traffic stop for illegal sunscreening. He

approached the vehicle from the passenger side and when Appellant, the sole

occupant of the vehicle, rolled down the window, Trooper Arbogast

immediately smelled burnt marijuana and noticed Appellant had glassy and

bloodshot eyes.

Appellant said that he did not have a valid driver’s license as it had been

suspended and instead provided Trooper Arbogast with a Pennsylvania State

ID card. Appellant admitted that he had a small amount of marijuana inside

the vehicle. Trooper Arbogast asked Appellant to step out of the car and he

continued questioning him on the side of the highway. Appellant then told the

trooper that he had a medical marijuana card and that he last smoked

marijuana the previous night. He admitted that he had a rolled marijuana

cigarette in the vehicle’s visor and a small amount of marijuana in a medical

3 Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial. Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).

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marijuana container in the center console. Appellant further admitted that

the window tinting on his vehicle was too dark. He voluntarily consented to

Trooper Arbogast’s search of his vehicle. Troop Arbogast seized the marijuana

cigarette found in the visor.4

Based on his observations of the smell of burnt marijuana both in the

car and on Appellant’s clothing, Appellant’s glassy, blood shot eyes, and the

marijuana cigarette found in the vehicle, Trooper Arbogast administered

Standardized Field Sobriety Tests to Appellant. Based on Appellant’s poor

performance on four out of five tests, Trooper Arbogast concluded Appellant

was unable to drive safely and arrested him. Trooper Arbogast drove him to

a hospital where Appellant consented to a blood draw.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the above offenses. On

March 16, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to suppress challenging the legality

of the traffic stop and the ensuing investigation.

On September 18, 2023, the court held a hearing on the motion at which

Trooper Arbogast testified that, while on patrol, he could not see inside

Appellant’s vehicle so he could not determine the occupants’ genders or how

many people were in the car until he made contact with Appellant. He also

testified that he smelled burnt marijuana in the car and observed Appellant’s

4 Trooper Arbogast did not seize the medical marijuana from the center console as it was in a proper medical container with a prescription label with Appellant’s name on it.

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glassy, red eyes which provided him with reasonable suspicion to continue his

investigation and conduct the field sobriety tests. The Commonwealth then

played the video recording captured by the trooper’s vehicle camera (“MVR”).

During Trooper Arbogast’s cross-examination, Appellant’s counsel

proffered two close-up photographs of Appellant’s vehicle that were not taken

at the time of the incident. Trooper Arbogast acknowledged that he could see

inside the vehicle in the photographs but stated he could not see inside at the

time of the stop. He also acknowledged that he did not test the depth of the

tinting at the time of the stop because he did not have a working testing device

on hand.

Appellant testified regarding the photographs his counsel submitted,

stating that he could not remember the date the photographs were taken but

acknowledged they were not taken at the time of the incident. Appellant also

testified that the vehicle’s windows had the same tint at the time of the traffic

stop as they did in the photographs and stated that when he “sold the vehicle

it was still in the same tint – the same tint is on the vehicle.” N.T. Supp. Hr’g,

9/18/23, at 25. During the Commonwealth’s re-cross examination, Appellant

agreed that in speaking with Trooper Arbogast, he had “said something to the

[e]ffect” of “the window tinting was too dark.” Id. at 30.

Following argument, the suppression court took the matter under

advisement. That same day, the court issued an order summarily denying the

motion to suppress.

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On January 16, 2024, the court held a bench trial, after which it found

Appellant guilty of each charged offense. On March 31, 2025, the court

imposed a sentence of incarceration of 72 hours to 6 months, plus fines.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The trial court filed an “order as statement in lieu of [a

Rule 1925(a)] opinion” addressing the issues raised by Appellant. Tr. Ct.

Order filed 10/15/25 (“Rule 1925(a) Statement”).

In his brief to this Court, Appellant raises the following issue for our

review:

Whether the suppression court erred in denying Appellant’s suppression motion because police lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion and probable cause for the traffic stop, investigation, and arrest in violation of Appellant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Appellant’s Br. at 4.

Appellant first argues that the court erred in denying his suppression

motion because his photos and the MVR shows that “the window screening,

being the sole purpose for the traffic stop as testified to by the trooper, did

not rise to a level violative of the motion vehicle code and [t]his Court should

find that the trooper therefore lacked probable cause for the traffic stop.” Id.

at 17-18.

We review the suppression court’s denial of a motion to suppress to

determine whether the record supports the court’s factual findings and

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.

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Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007). In

conducting this review, we consider “only the evidence of the prosecution and

so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read

in the context of the record as a whole.” Id. We are bound by the facts as

found by the suppression court, so long as they are supported by the record.

Id. We “may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in

error.” Id.

“It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass

on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.

The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence

presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823

A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

As Appellant notes, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the right to be

free of unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; PA. CONST.

ART. I SEC. 8. “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the development

of three categories of interactions between citizens and the police” that do not

violate this constitutional right. Commonwealth v. Raglin, 178 A.3d 868,

871 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043,

1047–48 (Pa. 1995)).

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond.

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See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 [] (1983); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 [] (1991).

The second, an “investigative detention[,]” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 [] (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [] (1968).

Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 [] (1979); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, [] 614 A.2d 1378 ([Pa.] 1992).

Raglin, 178 A.3d at 871–72 (paragraph breaks added; citation omitted).

Where a traffic stop is based on an offense that does not require further

investigation, our Supreme Court has held that an “officer must have probable

cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop for such offenses.”

Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008); see also

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1290-91 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en

banc) (applying Chase while discussing Section 6308(b)).

75 Pa.C.S. § 4524 provides the following pertaining to window tinting

on motor vehicles:

(e) Sun screening and other materials prohibited.-- (1) No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e)(1).

An officer has probable cause to believe that a driver is in violation of

the Vehicle Code's prohibition on window tint, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 4524(e)(1) and

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4107(b)(2), and a traffic stop for that violation is constitutionally permissible

where the officer observes that the vehicle's windows are so darkly tinted that

he cannot see inside it. Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263, 268-70

(Pa. Super. 2021).

In its Rule 1925(a) Statement, the court found that based on Trooper

Arbogast’s testimony that he could not see inside the vehicle, the traffic stop

was supported by probable cause. Rule 1925 Statement at ¶1(A).

In his argument to this Court, Appellant asks us to conclude that the

suppression court improperly weighed the evidence by not considering his

photos and the recording from the MVR which, he contends, contradict the

trooper’s testimony that he could not see into the car.5 Because it is within

the suppression court’s “sole province” to render credibility determinations

and weigh the evidence, we reject Appellant’s argument. Elmobdy, 823 A.2d

at 183.

Moreover, the statute at issue provides that window tinting that does

not allow someone to see into the vehicle violates the motor vehicle code.

See 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e)(1). Trooper Arbogast testified that he could not

see into the vehicle, and the court found his testimony credible. Since our

standard of review requires us to consider “only the evidence of the

5 The record does not contain the MVR or any indication that it was admitted

into evidence at the suppression hearing.

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prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole,” and Section

4525(e)(1) explicitly provides the statute is violated if a person cannot see

inside the vehicle due to the window tinting, we reject Appellant’s argument

that the traffic stop was not supported by probable cause. See, e.g., Prizzia,

260 A.3d at 268-70.

•

Appellant next challenges Trooper Arbogast’s investigation that followed

the traffic stop. He argues that the smell of burnt marijuana alone was not

sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See

Appellant’s Br. at 19, 21-22. He emphasizes that Trooper Arbogast “did not

witness any erratic driving or any other alleged violation of the motor vehicle

code beyond the window tint” and, thus, the administration of field sobriety

tests was not supported by reasonable suspicion that Appellant was driving

under the influence. Id. at 20, 22. He further contends that “having glassy

and/or bloodshot eyes does not rise to a level of probable cause for driving

under the influence” and “the evidence of record does not support that any

reasonably prudent person would conclude that there was probable cause that

Appellant was driving under the influence.” Id. at 22. Distilling Appellant’s

argument to its essence, he contends Trooper Arbogast did not have

reasonable suspicion to support his investigative detention, which included the

administration of field sobriety tests, and his arrest following the

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administration of those tests was not supported by probable cause. This

argument warrants no relief.

The following legal precepts inform our review. “The tolerable duration

of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s

‘mission’ – to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend

to related safety concerns.” Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 163

(Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-

55 (2015)). However, “a police officer may use information gathered during

an initial traffic stop to justify a second investigatory detention[.]” Sloan,

303 A.3d at 164 (citation omitted); see also 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (allowing

police officers to gather information from drivers stopped for traffic violations).

An investigative detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion.

Raglin, 178 A.3d at 871.

To meet the standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer must point to specific and articulable facts which, together with the rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion. In addition, we must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. An investigative detention may last as long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion. Because the level of intrusion may change during the course of the encounter, the record must be carefully scrutinized for any evidence of such changes.

Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 326 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 327 (concluding the

smell of alcohol and the appellant’s bloodshot and glassy eyes provided the

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police officer with reasonable suspicion to support an investigative detention,

which included the administration of field sobriety tests).

Pennsylvania allows possession of marijuana for medical purposes.

Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”), 35 P.S. § 10231.303(a). The MMA does not

allow medical marijuana to be smoked. See id. at (b)(2)(iv). Although the

smell of fresh marijuana “cannot objectively suggest anything more than

possession of a substance that many Pennsylvanians can legally possess,” the

smell of burnt marijuana is one fact that may be considered when analyzing

the existence of reasonable suspicion. Sloan, 303 A.3d at 165 (citing

Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021), and discussing its progeny

holding that the smell of burnt marijuana provided reasonable suspicion that

marijuana was being illegally smoked).

Here, following the traffic stop, Appellant indicated he was driving with

a suspended license, that he had marijuana in the vehicle, and that he had a

prescription for medical marijuana. Although Appellant denied having smoked

marijuana that morning, Trooper Arbogast smelled burnt marijuana

emanating from the vehicle and observed Appellant’s glassy and bloodshot

eyes. He also recovered a marijuana cigarette from the visor of Appellant’s

car. Under the totality of the circumstances, these facts—combined with the

trooper’s extensive training and experience in DUI enforcement regarding

alcohol and controlled substances—provided the trooper with reasonable

suspicion supporting his investigative detention, including the administration

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of field sobriety tests to ascertain whether Appellant was capable of driving

safely.

Finally, to the extent Appellant avers his arrest was not supported by

probable cause, we disagree.

Probable cause is established when “the facts and circumstances which

are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which

he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of

reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is

committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931

(Pa. 2009) (citation omitted). “The question we ask is not whether the

officer's belief was ‘correct or more likely true than false.’” Id. (citation

omitted). “Rather, we require only a “probability, and not a prima facie

showing, of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

235 (1983)) (emphasis in original). “In determining whether probable cause

exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances test.” Thompson, 985 A.2d

at 931 (citation omitted).

Because of his performance on the field sobriety tests, Trooper Arbogast

had probable cause to arrest Appellant for, inter alia, driving under the

influence of a controlled substance. At the suppression hearing, Trooper

Arbogast testified as to each of the five field sobriety tests he administered

and the results of each test which led him to conclude Appellant was impaired

to the extent that he was not capable of driving safely. N.T. Supp. Hr’g at 10-

15. In addition, during the hearing, the suppression court reviewed the

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portion of the MVR relevant to Appellant’s performance of those tests.6 Id. at

14-15. To the extent Appellant implies his arrest was not supported by

probable cause, he relies on Trooper Arbogast’s testimony regarding the two

of the five administered field sobriety tests that did not reveal indications of

impairment and minimizes the significance of the evidence indicating

impairment that supported to his arrest. Appellant’s Br. at 22. Appellant is

again asking this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we decline to do.

Accordingly, having concluded that the traffic stop was supported by

probable cause and the ensuing investigation was supported by reasonable

suspicion, we find the court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.

We, thus, affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 03/30/2026

6 The record contains no indication that the portion of the video viewed by

the court was admitted into evidence.

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