Com. v. Horne, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 22, 2025
• Docket: 585 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S42029-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : COREY RICHARD HORNE : : Appellant : No. 585 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000702-2011

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : COREY RICHARD HORNE : : Appellant : No. 586 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000703-2011

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : COREY RICHARD HORNE : : Appellant : No. 587 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000704-2011

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA J-S42029-25

: v. : : : COREY RICHARD HORNE : : Appellant : No. 588 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000706-2011

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 22, 2025

Appellant, Corey Richard Horne, appeals pro se from the order entered

in the York County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed as untimely his

petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

This Court has previously set forth the underlying facts and procedural

history of this matter as follows:

Charges were filed against [Appellant] arising from a string of bank robberies that occurred between April 17 and May 11, 2009 in York County. A warrant for [Appellant’s] arrest was issued on May 21, 2009.

* * *

Trial in case 702–2011 began on April 9, 2012. The jury returned a guilty verdict on two counts of robbery, one count of theft, and one count of receiving stolen property. Trial in case 703–2011 commenced on April 2, 2012. At its conclusion, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of robbery, theft by unlawful taking, and receiving stolen property. Trial in case 704–2011 began on May 14, 2012, and the jury returned with a verdict of guilty on two counts of robbery. Trial in case 706–2011 commenced on May 7, 2012, and the ____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

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jury found [Appellant] guilty on three counts of robbery. [On June 20, 2012, t]he court sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of 16 to 45 years’ incarceration.

Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 279-80 (Pa.Super. 2014) (record

citations and internal footnotes omitted), appeal denied, 628 Pa. 620, 102

A.3d 984 (2014). This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on

March 28, 2014, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on

October 15, 2014. See id.

Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his first, on October 21, 2024.

The PCRA court appointed counsel, who subsequently filed a motion to

withdraw and a Turner/Finley2 “no merit” letter. On February 7, 2025, the

PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition per Pa.R.Crim.P.

907 and granted PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw. Appellant filed his initial

objections to the court’s Rule 907 notice on February 27, 2025.3 The trial

court issued its final order and opinion dismissing the PCRA petition on April

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

3 Appellant’s initial objections were postmarked February 27, 2025, and were

therefore timely under the prisoner mailbox rule. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) (setting 20-day period to file response to notice of intent to dismiss); Commonwealth v. Little, 716 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa.Super. 1998) (applying prisoner mailbox rule to PCRA filings). Appellant later submitted an untimely amendment to the objections. The PCRA court later noted that “[e]ven if they had not been patently untimely, [it] did not believe that the [a]mended objections were available to [the c]ourt at the time of the drafting of the final order dismissing the PCRA petition.” (PCRA Court Opinion, dated 6/30/25, at 4). See also Commonwealth v. Pitts, 603 Pa. 1, 9, n.3, 981 A.2d 875, 879 n.3 (2009) (explaining that failure to object within this 20-day period can result in waiver).

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2, 2025. Appellant timely appealed.4 The PCRA court did not order Appellant

to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal,

and Appellant filed none. This Court ultimately consolidated Appellant’s

appeals sua sponte on July 1, 2025.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1) Did the PCRA court err by not allowing the Appellant to properly [develop] & plea[d] his claim with [specificity] prior to dismissal or to order Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement for clarification?

2) Should the Appellant be deemed incapable of [satisfying] the obligation, duty or requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)(ii); while outside the legal physical custody/jurisdiction of the Commonwealth serving a sentence in another states DOC?

3) Did PCRA court [err] in its reliance on PCRA counsel’s uninformed/uneducated analysis without more[?]

4) Was PCRA counsel’s complete disregard of inquiry/facts amount to abandonment/per se ineffectiveness?

(Appellant’s Brief at unnumbered page 6).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred by not

issuing a Rule 1925(b) order in this case. Under Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(b), the court has discretion to issue an order

directing the appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal if the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal desires

4 Appellant originally filed a single notice of appeal related to all four of the

underlying dockets. Thereafter, this Court directed Appellant to file individual notices of appeal at each underlying docket, and Appellant complied.

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clarification of the errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Here, the court explained that it did not require a statement from Appellant

clarifying the issues. Thus, the PCRA court acted within its discretion, and

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Appellant’s remaining claims challenge the PCRA court’s denial of his

PCRA petition. Preliminarily, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a

jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 598 Pa. 350, 956 A.2d

978 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1285, 129 S.Ct. 2772, 174 L.Ed.2d 277

(2009). Pennsylvania law makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear

an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837

A.2d 1157 (2003). The PCRA requires a petition, including a second or

subsequent petition, to be filed within one year of the date the underlying

judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes

final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(3). To obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than one

year after the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner must allege

and prove:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, a PCRA petitioner must file his

petition within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 13,

2014, when the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United

States Supreme Court expired. See U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13. Appellant had one

year from that date to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1). Thus, Appellant’s current petition filed on October 21, 2024, is

patently untimely.

On appeal, Appellant claims that despite the untimeliness of his PCRA

petition, fundamental fairness mandates that the PCRA court and this Court

should still review the merits of the issues raised on appeal because he was

incarcerated in Maryland until October 28, 2023, and was unable to conduct

the research on Pennsylvania law needed to file a petition while out of state.

Appellant insists that his petition, filed within one year of his return to

Pennsylvania, should benefit from the application of the governmental

interference exception to the PCRA time bar.

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“The proper question with respect to [the government interference]

timeliness exception is whether the government interfered with Appellant’s

ability to present his claim and whether Appellant was duly diligent in seeking

the facts on which his claims are based.” Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 218

A.3d 963, 975 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 658 Pa. 538, 229 A.3d 565

(2020) (internal citation omitted). Ignorance of the law does not excuse a

failure to file a PCRA petition within the required timeframe. See

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 789 A.2d 728, 731 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal

denied, 581 Pa. 669, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004).

In Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344 (Pa.Super. 2017), this Court

addressed a similar claim concerning a proffered interference by governmental

official exception. There, the appellant claimed that both the limited library

resources and his restricted housing status while incarcerated in a Virginia

correctional facility “frustrated his efforts to understand and invoke his

appellate rights under Pennsylvania law.” Rizvi, supra at 348. Significantly,

this Court noted that the appellant did not allege that the Virginia department

of corrections administered its library or housing policies in violation of the

appellant’s rights under constitutional or state law as required under a

governmental interference claim. Accordingly, this Court concluded that

because the appellant failed to show that any of the conditions of his

incarceration were illegal, he had failed to sufficiently develop his claim of

governmental interference. See id. (citing Commonwealth v. Albrecht,

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606 Pa. 64, 70, 994 A.2d 1091, 1095 (2010), which held that appellant’s claim

that restricted incarceration status of capital inmates which limit inmates’

ability to prepare PCRA petitions, does not constitute governmental

interference because appellant failed to show that any conditions of

incarceration were illegal). See also Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217

A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2019) (stating “without an assertion of illegality

on the part of government officers, restrictions on access to prison resources

does not qualify a petition for the governmental interference exception”).

Here, the PCRA court found that Appellant’s petition was untimely and

that Appellant did not prove any exception to the PCRA time bar. Initially, the

court noted that Appellant was not entitled to “nunc pro tunc reinstatement of

his PCRA rights premised upon his incorrect assumption that Pennsylvania

followed the same rules as Maryland,” which Appellant believed permits the

filing of PCRA petitions up to ten years after final disposition. (Notice of Intent

to Dismiss, dated 2/7/25, at 2-3). The PCRA court explained that although

Appellant claimed that he was unable to conduct internet research on

Pennsylvania law while he was incarcerated in Maryland, Appellant conceded

that in the last few years it had become possible to conduct internet research

for both Pennsylvania and Maryland law. Hence, the PCRA court found that

the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time bar did not apply.

(See PCRA Court Opinion, dated 6/30/25, at 4).

Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court’s determination that

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Appellant has failed to satisfy the proffered time-bar exception. Initially, we

agree that Appellant’s ignorance of the one-year timeframe in which to file a

timely PCRA petition does not satisfy any of the exceptions to the PCRA time

bar. See Baldwin, supra. As to Appellant’s proffered exception, Appellant

has not alleged that the Maryland Department of Corrections administered its

library policies in violation of Appellant’s constitutional rights as required to

prove governmental interference. See Bankhead, supra. Similar to the

defendants in Rizvi and Albrecht, Appellant’s complaint that the law library

limited his research to Maryland law does not establish that the conditions of

his incarceration and limited library resources were a violation of his rights

under constitutional or state law.5 See Albrecht, supra; Rizvi, supra. Thus,

Appellant has not established the applicability of the governmental

interference exception, or any other exception to the PCRA time bar.

Accordingly, Appellant’s PCRA petition remains-time barred, and we affirm.6

5 Indeed, had Appellant filed anything within one year of his judgment of sentence raising claims cognizable under the PCRA, the court would have appointed him counsel for his first PCRA petition to develop those claims.

6 Although Appellant’s questions presented appear to raise a claim that the

PCRA court erred in granting counsel’s petition to withdraw, he has not developed this claim in his brief. Consequently, Appellant has waived this issue on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 590 (Pa.Super. 2022) (explaining that failure to develop adequate argument in appellate brief may result in waiver of claim under Pa.R.A.P. 2119).

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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2025

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