Com. v. Hontz, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 1, 2024
• Docket: 930 MDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S19037-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JARED LAURELL HONTZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : COURTNEY MARIE HONTZ : : Appellant : No. 930 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 25, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): 202210795

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 1, 2024

Appellant, Courtney Marie Hontz, appeals from a judgment of sentence

imposed for indirect criminal contempt for violation of a Protection from Abuse

(PFA) order. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse Appellant’s indirect

criminal contempt conviction and vacate the judgment of sentence.

Appellant and her husband Jared Laurell Hontz (Husband), who were in

the process of divorcing, filed petitions seeking PFA orders against each other

following a confrontation between them on November 29, 2022, at their

residence in Shickshinny, Pennsylvania (the Residence). The trial court

granted an ex parte temporary PFA in favor of Husband on November 30,

2022, denied Appellant’s request for a temporary PFA, and held a hearing on

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S19037-24

both PFA petitions on December 6, 2022. At this hearing, Husband testified

that the Residence is jointly owned by him and his brother and that on

November 29, 2022, Appellant turned off the security cameras in the

Residence, chased him around, slammed his hand in a carport door, grabbed

him, knocked him down, and injured his arm and knee. N.T., 12/6/22, at 8-

13, 23-27. Appellant denied assaulting Husband and testified that Husband

hit her during the altercation. Id. at 34-45, 51, 53.

On December 6, 2022, following this hearing, the trial court found

Husband’s testimony credible, denied Appellant’s PFA petition, and granted

Husband a final one-year PFA order (the PFA Order). N.T., 12/6/22, at 66-

67. The PFA Order provided that Appellant “shall not abuse, harass, stalk,

threaten, or attempt or threaten to use physical force against” Husband. PFA

Order, 12/6/22, at 1-2; N.T., 12/6/22, at 70-71. The PFA Order, however,

did not prohibit Appellant from all contact with Husband or order Appellant to

vacate the Residence. PFA Order, 12/6/22, at 1-2; N.T., 12/6/22, at 66-67,

70-71. On December 17, 2022, Appellant was charged with indirect criminal

contempt for violating the PFA Order by striking Husband with a door when

Husband tried to enter the Residence at 10:30 at night on December 9, 2022.

Criminal Complaint.

A hearing on the criminal contempt charge was held on January 24,

2023. At this hearing, Husband testified that on December 9, 2022, he

discovered that Appellant had changed the locks at the Residence, that he

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contacted the state police, and that the state police called him back saying

that they had contacted Appellant and that she agreed to give him a key.

N.T., 1/24/23, at 23-24. He testified that after he learned this from the state

police, he went back to the Residence with his brother and knocked on the

door and that Appellant told them to go away. Id. at 24. Husband testified

that he then went around to the back porch and found an unlocked door and

that when he put his hand on the knob of door and began to go into the

Residence, Appellant pushed the door closed and locked it, pushing him out

of the Residence. Id. at 24-25. In response to leading questions from the

Commonwealth and the trial court, Husband agreed the door was slammed

and that the door hit him but testified that the door did not injure him. Id. at

26-28, 35-36. Husband admitted that he was not living at the Residence at

the time and testified that he did not understand that what Appellant did

violated the PFA Order and did not report a violation of the PFA Order until

December 17, 2022, after his supervisor looked at the PFA Order and advised

him that the incident violated the PFA Order. Id. at 24, 32. He testified that

the incident occurred earlier than 10:30 p.m., but that it was dark out. Id. at

30-31.

Appellant testified that she was living in the Residence on December 9,

2022, that she only changed the lock on the front door, and that Husband had

a key to the back door. N.T., 1/24/23, at 37, 42-43. Appellant denied that

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she slammed the door and testified that she put her hand over the door and

did not let Husband enter because it was late at night. Id. at 44-45.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court found Appellant in contempt

of the PFA Order. N.T., 1/24/23, at 46; Indirect Criminal Contempt Order,

1/24/23. At the Commonwealth’s request, the trial court held imposition of

any sentence in abeyance with instruction to Appellant to vacate the Residence

within 45 days and advised Appellant that if she moved out, it would order the

indirect criminal contempt dropped. N.T., 1/24/23, at 41, 46-47; Indirect

Criminal Contempt Order, 1/24/23. At the sentencing hearing on April 25,

2023, it was represented that Appellant had vacated the Residence and that

there were no further violations of the PFA Order, and the trial court sentenced

Appellant to pay a fine of $300. N.T., 4/25/23, at 4, 13-16; Indirect Criminal

Contempt Order, 4/25/23. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion,

which the trial court denied on May 30, 2023. This timely appeal followed.

Appellant presents the following two issues for our review:

1. Did the Commonwealth fail to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Appellant had notice of the terms of the final PFA order because the terms were neither clear nor unequivocal?

2. Did the Commonwealth fail to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, based on the terms of the final PFA order or the circumstances alleged to substantiate a violation of that order, the Appellant acted with wrongful intent and violated the final PFA order?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. In reviewing these issues, we must determine whether

the evidence admitted at the contempt hearing, and all reasonable inferences

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drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as prevailing party, was sufficient to enable the trial court to

conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of indirect

criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Shaner v. Harriman, 189

A.3d 1088, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2018).

To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove

the following four elements: (1) that the court’s order was definite, clear,

specific, and left no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to whom

it was addressed of the conduct prohibited; (2) that the defendant had notice

of the order; (3) that the act constituting the violation was volitional; and (4)

that the defendant acted with wrongful intent. Commonwealth v. Baker,

766 A.2d 328, 331 (Pa. 2001); Shaner, 189 A.3d at 1090; Commonwealth

v. Felder, 176 A.3d 331, 334 (Pa. Super. 2017). We agree that the

Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant acted with wrongful intent.

Evidence is sufficient to prove wrongful intent where the Commonwealth

shows that the defendant would know that her action was substantially certain

to violate the court’s order. Shaner, 189 A.3d at 1092; Commonwealth v.

Wilson, 227 A.3d 928, 939 (Pa. Super. 2020); Commonwealth v.

Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 111 (Pa. Super. 2007). Where, however, the

defendant’s volitional act does not clearly violate the language in the court’s

order, wrongful intent cannot be inferred. Shaner, 189 A.3d at 1092. Thus,

wrongful intent has been found where a PFA order specifically prohibited the

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defendant from posting any remarks regarding the plaintiff on social media

and the defendant made social media posts that clearly referred to the

plaintiff, Commonwealth v. Lambert, 147 A.3d 1221, 1223-24, 1227 (Pa.

Super. 2016), and where a PFA order prohibited the defendant from contacting

the plaintiff or from having any contact with the plaintiff and the defendant

telephoned the plaintiff or got into a car with the plaintiff. Wilson, 227 A.3d

at 932, 939; Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d at 110-11. In contrast, where the terms

of the order did not clearly prohibit the intentional act that the defendant

committed or clearly advise the defendant of what he was required to do, this

Court has held that wrongful intent was not proved and has reversed the

contempt conviction. Shaner, 189 A.3d at 1089-92 (wrongful intent not

shown where defendant’s conduct consisted of his use of a shed owned by

another person in which a rifle was found, there was no evidence that the rifle

was defendant’s or that defendant ever handled it, and conduct that protective

order prohibited was possession of firearms, not access to any place where a

firearm was present); Diamond v. Diamond, 715 A.2d 1190, 1198 (Pa.

Super. 1998) (wrongful intent not shown with respect to defendant’s failure

to produce documents where the order “provided no clear guidance as to the

type and manner of documents to be produced”).

Here, the PFA Order only provided that Appellant “shall not abuse,

harass, stalk, threaten, or attempt or threaten to use physical force against”

Husband. PFA Order, 12/6/22, at 1-2. No other conduct was prohibited, and

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the trial court described the PFA Order to Appellant as a “no hit” PFA order.

N.T., 12/6/22, at 66-67, 70. In addition, the trial court made clear to both

Husband and Appellant that the PFA Order did not address use and occupancy

of the Residence and specifically rejected husband’s request that the order

prohibit Appellant from living there. Id. at 67-70.

The volitional conduct of Appellant that the Commonwealth proved at

the contempt hearing consisted of Appellant forcefully closing a door to

prevent Husband, who was not living at the Residence at the time, from

entering at night. N.T., 1/24/23, at 24-31. This evidence showed only that

Appellant’s intent was to close the door and prevent Husband from entering

the Residence, not to strike him with the door or with anything else or to

abuse or assault him, and no other evidence was introduced showing that

Appellant intended to hurt Husband. Although the mere fact that her intent

was to close the door would not negate wrongful intent if Appellant had done

so in a way designed to hurt Husband, Felder, 176 A.3d at 333-34 (rejecting

claim that wrongful intent was not shown because defendant’s intent was to

lock a door where defendant did so by grabbing the plaintiff’s hand and

twisting her fingers until they were painful and swollen), the record does not

support a conclusion that Appellant closed the door in a way that was likely to

hurt Husband. Husband’s testimony that the door hit him was that he was

pushed out of the Residence while his hand was on the door, not that the door

was flung into him or closed on a part of his body, and he testified that he was

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not injured at all. N.T., 1/24/23, at 24-25, 35-36. Indeed, it is clear from

Husband’s testimony that his complaint concerning Appellant’s conduct was

that she was denying him access to the Residence, not that she was abusing,

threatening, or using force against him. Id. at 15-19, 23-29.

Moreover, the PFA Order was sufficiently unclear as to whether it

prohibited forcefully closing a door to keep Husband out of the Residence that

Husband himself admitted that he did not believe at the time that Appellant’s

actions violated the PFA Order. N.T., 1/24/23, at 32. Because the

Commonwealth showed only that Appellant acted to exclude Husband from

the Residence and not to hurt him and Husband, who had the same knowledge

of the PFA Order as Appellant, did not understand that Appellant’s conduct

violated its terms, it could not be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that

Appellant acted with wrongful intent.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Commonwealth failed

to prove all the elements of indirect criminal contempt. We therefore reverse

Appellant’s conviction of indirect criminal contempt and vacate the fine

imposed by the trial court.

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Order of contempt reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/01/2024

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