NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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AHMADD HOLTON :
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Appellant : No. 1290 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 2, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004893-2023
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: AUGUST 17, 2026 Ahmadd Holton appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions for persons not to possess firearm, firearms not to be carried without a license, and two counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”).1 He challenges the denial of his motion to suppress and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress but did err in imposing an aggravated range sentence without stating its reasons. We therefore vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
In September 2023, Holton was arrested and charged. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing in part that the evidence found in a bag should be
suppressed as the fruit of an improper search. The court held a hearing on the
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1) and 6106(a)(1) and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
motion. The court summarized the evidence from the suppression hearing as follows:
On September 5-6, 2023, Officer Austin Snyder (“Officer Snyder”) of the Harrisburg Police Department was dispatched to 1550 Vernon Street at the Political Club for reports of a male with a firearm. The caller described the individual as a black male, wearing all black, with a satchel around his shoulder. As Officer Snyder arrived in the area, he saw [Holton], who matched the caller’s description, on Vernon Street. [Holton] ran from Officer Snyder immediately upon seeing him and jumped over a fence.
Officer Snyder pointed his firearm at [Holton] and proceeded to detain him. The satchel was located near [Holton]. [Officer Snyder testified that the “satchel was directly located underneath where he was laying.”2]
[Holton] told Officer Snyder that the satchel did not belong to him. At the time of his detainment, [Holton] was not wearing the satchel. A bag of marijuana, three bags of suspected crack cocaine, and thirty-four various pills were located inside the satchel.
Trial Ct. Op., filed Dec. 19, 2025, at 2-3 (citations to record omitted).
A jury convicted Holton of the above-referenced offenses. In July 2025, the trial court sentenced Holton to 10 to 20 years’ incarceration on the persons not to possess firearm conviction, a consecutive term of two to four years’ incarceration for the firearms not to be carried without a license conviction, and concurrent terms of two to four years’ incarceration on the PWID convictions. Holton filed a post-sentence motion challenging, among other things, the sentence imposed for the possession of firearm prohibited conviction. The court denied the motion and Holton appealed.
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2 N.T., Feb. 26, 2025, at 12.
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Holton raises the following issues:
A. Did the Suppression Court err in determining that the search of Mr. Holton’s bag was permissive because it was “abandoned” when Mr. Holton was observed with the bag and his denials were clearly colloquial denials after being arrested?
B. Did the Court err in sentencing Mr. Holton to an aggravated range sentence when it failed to provide reasons on the record and the sentence was disproportionate to his rehabilitative needs?
Holton’s Br. at 3.
Holton first argues the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the bag. He maintains the court erred in finding he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag. Holton argues that such a finding “was . . . unsupported by the context of the record, and a misapplication of the law.” Id. at 14.
Holton argues his case is distinguishable from cases finding the defendant abandoned the property. He argues the officers had observed him with the bag and apprehended him on top of the bag, claiming “[s]ubjectively he attempted to cover the bag with his person to prevent further searching.” Id. at 20. He argues his denial of ownership differs from the defendant’s denials in Commonwealth v. Dowds, 761 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Pa. 2000), because it occurred after he was detained. He claims “[h]is subjective intent was ownership of the bag by both keeping it on his person and being observed atop it.” Holton’s Br. at 22. He further maintains that “[h]is denial of the bag is a colloquialism, to avoid admitting ownership which could be used against
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him.” Id. He claims the evidence does not support a finding the bag was not in his possession because it allegedly was found “immediately underneath him.” Id. at 22-23. Holton also argues that society would expect that someone would have an interest in the property if, while being arrested, he told police it was not his property. He argues “[t]here is a difference between denial or distancing and full-blown abandonment.” Id. at 23.
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we determine “whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1071 (Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017)). We “consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted.” Id. (citation omitted). “Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Pa.Const. Art. 1, § 8. This protection requires police to obtain a warrant before conducting a search unless an exception applies. Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 625 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted) (stating “a search without a warrant may be proper where an exception applies and the police have probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed”). “[A]n
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exception to the warrant requirement exists when the property seized has been abandoned.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 210 A.3d 324, 330 (Pa.Super. 2019).
“[T]o prevail on a suppression motion, a defendant must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or effects seized, and such expectation cannot be established where a defendant has meaningfully abdicated his control, ownership or possessory interest.” Id. (quoting Dowds, 761 A.2d at 1131) (alteration in Kane). No one can “complain of a search or seizure of property that he has voluntarily abandoned.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Shoatz, 366 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Pa. 1976)). “[A]bandonment of a privacy interest is primarily a question of intent and may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.” Dowds, 761 A.2d at 1131. A court should consider “[a]ll relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment.” Shoatz, 366 A.2d at 1220 (citation omitted). “The issue is not abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.” Id. (citation omitted).
In Dowds, the defendant denied ownership of a suitcase in an airport baggage carousel and, when subsequently asked whether the officers could look through the suitcase, she stated, “It’s not my bag. You can look through it if you want.” 761 A.2d at 1127. There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
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concluded that a search of the bag did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights because the defendant’s “abandonment was not the product of an illegal seizure and her repeated denial of ownership sufficiently manifested her intention to relinquish any privacy expectation held in the suitcase.” Id. at 1132.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Wilson, 606 A.2d 1211, 1212-13 (Pa.Super. 1992), this Court found the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a jacket where a police officer saw him place it on a banister, but he later denied owning it and failed to respond to a question regarding ownership. The Court reasoned the defendant “voluntarily discarded the jacket and relinquished any interest in the jacket and could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 1213.
Holton relies on Commonwealth v. Williamson, No. 500 MDA 2021, 2022 WL 167485, *5 (Pa.Super. filed Jan. 19, 2022) (unpublished mem.). There, this Court found the trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court had found that legal ownership of a vehicle, where registration is filed of record with the Commonwealth, is distinguishable from ownership of a piece of luggage. It reasoned “[v]ehicle ownership through the legal process of registration carries legal obligations and responsibilities. Such ownership also provides a private property interest that cannot be severed easily.” Id. (citation omitted). The trial court also found that the defendant’s statement that he denied being in the car and denied that a woman had approached it, in context, was a “‘colloquial way of denying an
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accusation being made against him’ rather than as a literal statement evidencing an intent to abandon his privacy interest in the vehicle,” and stated the defendant never expressly denied owning the vehicle. Id.
Here, the trial court concluded the police officers did not need a warrant to search the bag:
Officer Snyder testified at the suppression hearing that [Holton] fled from him immediately on sight. When detained while hiding on private property, [Holton] was not in possession of a bag or satchel. However, [Holton] told Officer Snyder that the bag did not belong to him. Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specified that a defendant “cannot prevail upon a suppression motion unless he demonstrates that the challenged police conduct violated his own, person privacy interests.” Commonwealth v.
Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 692 (Pa. 2005). Here, [Holton] was not wearing the bag when he was detained, it was later found on private property, and [Holton] specifically told officers that the bag did not belong to him.
Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7 (citations to record omitted).
The record supports the court’s findings and it did not err. Holton expressly denied owning the bag, which was not on his person at the time of his arrest. The evidence supports a finding of abandonment such that the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirements do not apply. See Dowds, 761 A.2d at 1127. This case is distinguishable from Williamson, as the item abandoned was not a vehicle, but a bag, and Holton expressly denied ownership.
Holton next argues the aggravated range sentence on count one was unreasonable because the court did not provide aggravating reasons for the
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sentence. He points out that the guideline range for count persons not to possess firearm was 84 to 102 months, but the court imposed a minimum sentence of 120 months. He argues the court failed to properly give its reasons for imposing an aggravated-range sentence. He maintains the court was aware of the guidelines, and had the benefit of a presentence investigation report, but that the court’s “imposition of an aggravated range sentence is at odds with this information.” Holton’s Br. at 27. He claims the court did not acknowledge it was imposing an aggravated range sentence or provide justification for it. He argues “[t]he [c]ourt’s reasoning does not demonstrate why Mr. Holton should receive an aggravated range sentence, particularly with the [c]ourt’s extended colloquy with Mr. Holton regarding his absence from his children’s lives.” Id. at 28. Holton argues that the court’s reliance on its consideration of the Sentencing Code factors “misses the mark,” as “[i]t is not whether the Court’s sentence could have been appropriate[,]” but rather it is “whether the Court’s aggravated range sentence was supported by adequate reasoning and what factors the court relied upon to aggravate the sentence.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
“The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018). Before we review the claim, we must determine whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved his issue; (3) his brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an appeal with respect
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to the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (stating that an appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence “shall set forth in a separate section of the brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence”).
Here, Holton preserved his issue in a timely post-sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, included in his brief a concise statement for reasons relied on for appeal, and raised a substantial question, that is, whether the court abused its discretion in imposing an aggravated range sentence without stating its reasons. See Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1278 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“[A]n allegation that the court failed to state adequate reasons on the record for imposing an aggravated-range sentence . . . raises a substantial question for our review”). We will therefore review the claim.
Sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Rominger, 199 A.3d 964, 970 (Pa.Super. 2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
When the court fashions its sentence, it must consider “the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life
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of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Additionally, where the court had the benefit of a Pre-Sentence Investigation (“PSI”) report, we may “assume the sentencing court was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
If a court “imposes an aggravated or mitigated sentence, it shall state the reasons on the record and on the Guideline Sentence Form . . . .” Commonwealth v. Mrozik, 213 A.3d 273, 278 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citing 204 Pa.Code § 303.13(c)). In Mrozik, we vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing where “the trial court did not state its reasons for imposing an aggravated-range sentence on the record or on the Guidelines Sentence Form.” Id. Here, the trial court imposed a sentence that included an aggravated range sentence of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration for possession of
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firearm prohibited.3,4 When imposing the sentence, the court reasoned:
THE COURT: . . . Based on the jury’s conviction as well as the information contained in the [PSI], which was very extensive - you have a long criminal history. There’s also issues of substance abuse, mental health, trauma – I hate to look at the Pre-Sentence and tell you that there’s a high risk of recidivism, but that’s what’s been happening throughout your life. I don’t know, maybe at this juncture, you’re realizing that you’re a grown man. You’re now 36?
THE DEFENDANT: 37.
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3 The Commonwealth stated:
The guidelines on this case start at 84 for the persons not to possess, and then the PWI[D] for the cocaine, which was 18.72 grams, start[s] at 46 months, and for the methamphetamine, which was 19 and a half grams roughly, also starts at 46 months. His criminal history, he is an RFEL.
He had some prior juvenile things in 2005. I’ll pass forward the guidelines for Your Honor as well. He had a PWI[D] in 2005 and 2006, making this his third lifetime PWI[D].
In 2007, he had two escapes; 2010 was a firearms charge, firearms not to be carried without a license. Most significantly on his criminal history was a 2011 robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and persons not to possess.
His sentence on that was essentially an 11- to 22-year sentence. So he would have been released very shortly prior to this September 6th of 2023 incident.
Based on his guidelines, his past criminal history, he is not RRRI eligible. We would be requesting at the very least a 10-to-20, if not a 12-to-24 for this case.
N.T., July 2, 2025, at 2-3. We point out that based on the guidelines stated here, Holton received mitigated range sentences for the PWID convictions.
4 The court also imposed a 24 to 48 month sentence for the firearms not to
be carried without a license conviction. The record does not disclose whether this was a mitigated, standard, or aggravated range sentence.
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THE COURT: 37 years old, and you missed out completely on your daughter’s life, and now you’re trying to make the possibility of being in your son’s life. I’m just hoping that you take whatever the state prison gives you and try to come out and be rehabilitated and not come back here again. Because this is not - this is not - this is not a life.
N.T., July 2, 2025, at 6.
The court did not acknowledge that it was imposing an aggravated range sentence or state its reasons for doing so. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.5 Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 8/17/2026
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5 To the extent Holton also claimed the court sentence was disproportionate
to his rehabilitative needs, we do not address this claim as we are remanding for resentencing.