Com. v. Hoffman, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 7, 2025
• Docket: 1264 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S29021-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JEFFREY SCOTT HOFFMAN : : Appellant : No. 1264 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000254-1996

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JEFFREY SCOTT HOFFMAN : : Appellant : No. 1378 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000255-1996

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JEFFREY SCOTT HOFFMAN : : Appellant : No. 1379 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000256-1996 J-S29021-25

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JEFFREY SCOTT HOFFMAN : : Appellant : No. 1380 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000257-1996

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JEFFREY SCOTT HOFFMAN : : Appellant : No. 1381 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000258-1996

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: October 7, 2025

Jeffrey Scott Hoffman (“Hoffman”) takes these consolidated appeals

from the orders denying his petitions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and “[o]pen and [v]acate [j]udgment” (“Petitions”), which he filed in the

above-listed criminal cases.1 In the Petitions, Hoffman alleged that the denial

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1 Hoffman filed a single notice of appeal listing all five cases, but, in response

to this Court’s order, filed separate amended notices of appeal in each case. See Commonwealth v. Young, 280 A.3d 1049, 1057 (Pa. Super. 2022). This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte.

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of his pre-trial suppression motion was the product of fraud and collusion

among his counsel, the Commonwealth, and the trial court. Hoffman has also

filed in this Court applications for relief concerning the timeliness of his

appeals. We grant Hoffman’s applications for relief, conclude the trial court

should have dismissed the Petitions as untimely petitions seeking relief under

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),2 but otherwise affirm the trial court’s

orders denying relief.

The following procedural history is relevant to this appeal. After police

stopped and arrested Hoffman for prowling, Hoffman consented to searches

of his apartment and car. During those searches, police recovered evidence

connecting Hoffman to a series of rapes of elderly victims in the Johnstown

area. Hoffman, through his counsel (“trial counsel”), filed a motion to

suppress that evidence claiming, inter alia, an unlawful detention and/or

arrest that tainted all evidence connecting Hoffman to the rapes. Following a

suppression hearing, at which Hoffman did not testify, the trial court denied

the motion. Hoffman requested a rehearing on the suppression motion and

stated he intended to testify at the new hearing. See Mot. for Rehr’g,

10/17/96, unnumbered at 1 (stating that Hoffman “has since indicated to

counsel that he wishes to testify relative to the circumstances surrounding the

illegal stop and seizure”). The trial court denied that motion.

2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

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In 1996, a jury convicted Hoffman of numerous counts of rape and

related offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate maximum

term of imprisonment of almost two hundred years. After the PCRA court

granted Hoffman leave to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, this Court affirmed

judgment of sentence and adopted the trial court’s opinion that it had properly

denied Hoffman’s suppression motion. See Commonwealth v. Hoffman,

742 A.2d 1144, 1860 Pittsburgh 1998 (Pa. Super. 1999) (unpublished mem.

at 4). Our Supreme Court denied Hoffman’s petition for allowance of appeal

in 2000. Hoffman did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the High Court.

Hoffman did not file a timely PCRA petition following the conclusion of

his direct appeal. Instead, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

federal district court. The federal district court denied that petition, and

Hoffman pursued appeals through the federal courts, which ended in 2002

when the High Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari.

In 2003, Hoffman filed a facially untimely first PCRA petition, and the

court appointed new counsel. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as

untimely.3 This Court affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 855 A.2d 132, 1327 WDA 2003

(Pa. Super. 2004) (unpublished mem. at 2). In 2015, Hoffman filed a second

PCRA petition. The PCRA court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing,

3 In his 2003 PCRA petition, Hoffman raised issues concerning the allegedly

fraudulent litigation of his suppression motion similar to those raised in the present appeal.

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and this Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 159 A.3d 993,

1779 WDA 2015 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished mem. at 2).4

In 2024, Hoffman filed the instant Petitions, in which he asserted fraud

at the suppression hearing. The trial court denied the Petitions because

Hoffman did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Hoffman

timely appealed,5 and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court reasoned that Hoffman could

not seek equitable relief from his convictions because he had adequate

alternate remedies to address his claims, including the PCRA. See, e.g., Trial

Ct. Op., CP-11-CR-0000254-1996, at 3.

Hoffman raises the following issue for our review:

I. Whether the lower court erred and/or abused its discretion by denying [Hoffman’s] action in equity and petition to open and vacate judgment for failure to state a claim without allowing [him] to prove his set of facts in support of [his] claim, and does the court’s failure in this regard constitute a denial of due process.

Hoffman’s Br. at 2.

4 Hoffman’s 2015 PCRA petition asserted new facts that challenged the reliability of expert opinions concerning hair comparisons, which had been presented at his 1996 trial.

5 Although Hoffman’s initial notice of appeal was docketed on October 18, 2024, Hoffman has filed in this Court applications for relief requesting a correction to the docket entry of his notice of appeal. In those applications, Hoffman attached a certified mail receipt stamped September 9, 2024. We conclude Hoffman has supplied verifiable proof of the date on which he filed his initial notice of appeal from prison, and, accordingly, we grant his application for relief and decline to quash this appeal. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997).

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We must first consider the nature of the relief sought in Hoffman’s

Petitions. See Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super.

2019) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which can

be raised by a court, sua sponte, at any stage of the proceeding). This is a

legal question over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope is

plenary. See Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 496 (Pa. 2016).

The PCRA “shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and

encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same

purpose . . ..” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. The PCRA subsumes all manner of post-

conviction relief unless it could not have provided a potential remedy. See

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Section 9543(a)(2) enumerates seven grounds for PCRA relief, including

constitutional violations undermining the truth-determining process, see 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i), and the ineffective assistance of counsel, see 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). If a petition raises claims cognizable under section

9543(a)(2), a court cannot consider the petition unless the petitioner either

files a facially timely petition or pleads and proves one of three statutory

timeliness exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). The timeliness

requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional and not subject to equitable

exceptions. See Commonwealth v. Laird, 331 A.3d 579, 599 (Pa. 2025);

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 404 (Pa. Super. 2018). In short,

“[n]o court has jurisdiction to review an untimely PCRA petition.” Beatty,

207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal citation omitted).

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Here, Hoffman’s Petitions alleged fraud in the litigation and the denial

of his motion to suppress, and his arguments in these appeals do the same.

See, e.g., Petition, CP-11-CR-0000254-1996, 8/12/24, at 1 (asserting that

the “willful and corrupt conduct orchestrated and perpetrated by a Cambria

County [trial j]udge, a District Attorney of Cambria County, two Cambria

County Public Defenders, and a [c]ourt-appointed appella[te] attorney . . .

took part in a scheme to cover-up, conceal, and suppress the circumstances

surrounding an illegal arrest . . ..”); Hoffman’s Br. at 3-4, 8-9. Hoffman adds

that the summary dismissal of his claims violated his due process rights

because he has not had an opportunity to be heard on his allegations of fraud.

See Hoffman’s Br. at 8.

We conclude the PCRA provided a remedy for Hoffman’s claims of fraud

as constitutional violations which so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i). To the extent Hoffman alleged his

trial counsel colluded in the fraud at the suppression hearing, the PCRA

provided a remedy for the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Therefore, the trial court should have regarded

Hoffman’s instant Petitions as PCRA petitions. See Descardes, 136 A.3d at

503 (stating that “where a petitioner’s claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the

PCRA is the only method of obtaining collateral review”).

We next consider whether Hoffman invoked the court’s jurisdiction to

consider the merits of his PCRA claims. See Commonwealth v. Ballance,

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203 A.3d 1027, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2019). Here, Hoffman’s convictions became

final in 2000, after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of

appeal in his direct appeal and Hoffman did not seek further review. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), (3). Hoffman would have had until 2001 to file a

facially timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The instant

Petitions, filed more than twenty-three years later, are facially untimely.

Hoffman thus bore the burden of pleading and proving a statutory

timeliness exception under section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). However, a review of

the Petitions, as well as Hoffman’s arguments in these appeals, establish that

he has not, and cannot, demonstrate any of the three statutory exceptions for

the interference by governmental officials in the presentation of his claims,

the discovery of a new fact upon which his claims were based, or a newly

recognized constitutional right. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

Hoffman’s bald assertions of fraud during the litigation of his motion to

suppress, do not state a statutory time-bar exception. See Murphy, 180

A.3d at 404-05. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the

Petitions and should have dismissed them as untimely PCRA petitions. See

Ballance, 203 A.3d at 1032. 6

6 We acknowledge Hoffman’s apparent attempts to avoid the PCRA timeliness

requirements by referring to the court’s inherent authority to address fraud and by citation to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5504 and 5505. However, his arguments attempt to carve out equitable exceptions to the PCRA’s time requirements, which no court has authority to do. See Laird, 331 A.3d at 599.

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Even if Hoffman had attempted to plead a timeliness exception, no relief

would have been due under the PCRA. Contrary to Hoffman’s claim that he

did not have an opportunity to litigate his claims of fraud, Hoffman could have

raised his claims at the suppression hearing, in his direct appeal, or in a timely

filed PCRA petition. Cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b) (stating that “an issue is

waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at

trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction

proceeding”). Moreover, Hoffman raised nearly identical claims of fraud and

the ineffective assistance of counsel in a prior 2003 PCRA petition, and this

Court affirmed the dismissal of the 2003 PCRA petition on timeliness grounds.

Therefore, the issues raised in this appeal have been previously litigated, cf.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a), and the prior determinations that Hoffman’s claims

are time barred are binding in this appeal.

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Hoffman’s

Petitions, but we do so on different grounds than relied on by the trial court.

See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 151 A.3d 1117, 1127 n.14 (Pa. Super.

2016) (noting this Court may affirm a trial court’s ruling on any basis).7

Orders affirmed. Application for relief granted.

7 Because the trial court did not consider the Petitions under the PCRA, it did

not issue a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice before dismissing the Petitions. However, the failure to issue a Rule 907 notice is not reversible error where the record makes clear that the underlying PCRA petition was untimely. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 852 (Pa. Super. 2016).

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10/7/2025

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