J-S18009-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KEITH ALAN HOFFA : : Appellant : No. 989 MDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 30, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0001420-2018
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 08, 2026
Appellant, Keith Alan Hoffa, appeals from the June 30, 2025 order
entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-
46. After careful review, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. In 2018, the
Commonwealth charged Appellant in connection with sex-related crimes
perpetrated against seven underage victims between the ages of 8 and 16.
Appellant committed the crimes between 1996 and 2016 in Juniata and
Dauphin Counties. On May 30, 2019, Appellant filed a motion for severance
requesting that Appellant receive a separate trial for each victim. After a
hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion.
On November 18, 2019, Appellant filed a motion for disclosure of grand
jury testimony, requesting: any transcripts of testimony of witnesses that the J-S18009-26
Commonwealth intended to call at trial, any exculpatory transcripts of
testimony, and any exculpatory physical evidence presented to the grand jury.
The court granted Appellant’s motion.
On December 9, 2019, Appellant appeared for jury selection. After more
than 30 jurors were stricken for cause, Appellant raised concerns with trial
counsel because of the opinions expressed by the stricken jurors concerning
perpetrators of sexual abuse. During a recess in selection, trial counsel
alerted the court that Appellant wished to waive his right to a jury and proceed
with a bench trial instead. Later that day, the trial court conducted an on-
the-record waiver colloquy and Appellant indicated that he wished to proceed
without a jury.
On December 11, 2019, at the conclusion of the bench trial, the court
convicted Appellant of fifteen counts including, inter alia, Rape of a Child and
Indecent Assault – Person Less than 13 Years of Age. On March 4, 2020, the
court sentenced Appellant to 63 to 126 years of incarceration. On September
21, 2021, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v.
Hoffa, 2021 WL 4281302 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 21, 2021) (non-precedential
memorandum), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 273 A.3d 505 (Pa.
2022).
On March 28, 2022, Appellant pro se filed a “Petition to Correct Illegal
Sentence,” which the court treated as a PCRA petition and appointed
Christopher Wilson, Esquire, as PCRA counsel. On April 27, 2023, Appellant’s
PCRA counsel requested a discovery conference, which the court held on May
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15, 2023. Following the conference, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s
request for discovery.
On June 30, 2023, Appellant filed a counseled “First Supplemental PCRA
Petition” alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.1 The PCRA court held
two evidentiary hearings on March 25, 2024, and September 10, 2024, at
which Appellant and his trial attorneys, Mary Klatt, Esquire, and Deanna
Muller, Esquire, testified. Following the hearings, the court denied Appellant’s
PCRA petition as meritless.
This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the PCRA court complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2
In his counseled brief, Appellant raises the following issues for our
review:
1. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred and failed to [] follow the authority of Commonwealth v. Callen, 198 A.3d 1149 (Pa. Super. 2018) when it concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a venue/jurisdictional challenge and in determining that the matters in Juniata County and Dauphin County arose from the same criminal episode. Further, any reliance on the hearsay statement contained in the Commonwealth’s filing purporting to be coordination between the two counties, was not competent testimony, and would not cure the lack of the same criminal episode, or crime spree, failure[?]
2. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred when it concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge and seek to ____________________________________________
1 Appellant subsequently filed two additional supplemental PCRA petitions on
August 25, 2023, and February 19, 2024. 2 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court directs us to its June 30, 2025
opinion dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.
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quash the defective grand jury indictment when the Commonwealth failed to follow 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 4544 and Supreme Cour[t] authority found in Commonwealth v. Levinson, 389 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 1978)[?]
3. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred when it concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to explain all of 3 the rights given up, the matters that were waived, and the chances of prevailing at a jury trial versus a bench trial, along with only discussing his rights for only a 1–2-minute timeframe[?] Thus, the PCRA [c]ourt erred in failing to conclude that the advice given fell below the required standards to waive a bedrock constitutional right.
4. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred when it concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain discoverable materials before trial involving the computer hard drive, the cell phones taken, the full grand jury transcript, and the sealed file and plea deal (and potential Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) material) related to the disposition of [co-d]efendant Jamie Hoffa[?]
5. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred when it failed to conclude that trial counsel was ineffective for resting the defense case without calling a subpoenaed witness and without requested assistance from the Sheriff’s office or requesting that the case reconvene the next morning[?]
6. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred by failing to find that structural ineffectiveness or cumulative prejudice even if the discovery and witness issues, along with the limited preparation prior to the waiver of jury trial, standing alone did not rise to the level of prejudice and individually to warrant a new trial[?]
7. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred and abused discretion when it failed to find the instant case involved exceptional circumstances allowing and requiring discovery[?]
Appellant’s Br. at 3-5.
We review an order denying a petition for collateral relief to determine
whether the PCRA court's decision is supported by the evidence of record and
free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014).
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“This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the
record contains any support for those findings.” Commonwealth v.
Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010).
To prevail on a petition for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
resulted from one or more of the circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9543(a)(2). These circumstances include ineffective assistance of counsel,
which “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Id. at
9543(a)(2)(ii).
The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance.
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[T]he
burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Id. To
satisfy this burden, the appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no
reasonable basis existed for counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3) there
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding
would have been different absent counsel's error. Commonwealth v.
Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). Failure to satisfy any prong of the
test will result in rejection of the appellant's claim. Id.
To establish the prejudice prong, the petitioner must prove a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the relevant proceedings would have been
different but for counsel’s action or inaction. Commonwealth v. Busanet,
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54 A.3d 35, 46 (Pa. 2012). Importantly, “counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Fears, 86 A.3d at 804.
***
Appellant first asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
the issue that “venue was not proper for Dauphin County” for the offenses
that occurred in Juniata County. Appellant’s Br. at 31. Appellant argues that
“[t]his matter involves two separate non-contiguous counties where alleged
criminal acts of abuse were decades apart” and that, therefore, the charges
did not arise from the same criminal episode sufficient to be properly tried
together in Dauphin County. Id.
Generally, venue in a criminal action properly belongs in the place where
the crime occurred. Pa.R.Crim.P. 130(A). Nevertheless, “[w]hen charges
arising from the same criminal episode occur in more than one judicial
district,” criminal proceeding on all the charges may be brought in any of the
judicial districts in which the charges occurred. Id. at 130(A)(3).3 In other
words, “a condition precedent to the exercise by a single county to jurisdiction
in a case involving multiple offenses in various counties is[ ]the offense must
constitute a single criminal episode.” Commonwealth v. Witmayer, 144
A.3d 939, 946 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). ____________________________________________
3 In his reply brief, Appellant argues that “Rule 130 was never followed,” citing
to the rule regarding transfer of proceedings. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1-4 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 130(B)). Appellant also cites to Rule 582, which governs joinder of separate indictments or informations. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5-6 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 582). However, this case did not involve the transfer of proceedings or the joinder of indictments or informations.
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“If a number of charges are logically or temporally related and share
common issues of law and fact, a single criminal episode exists. When we
ascertain whether a number of statutory offenses are ‘logically related’ to one
another, the court should initially inquire as to whether there is a substantial
duplication of factual, and/or legal issues presented by the offenses.” Id.
(internal citation and some quotation marks omitted). In making this
determination, the temporal relationship between criminal acts will be a
factor; “[h]owever, the definition of a ‘single criminal episode’ should not be
limited to acts which are immediately connected in time.” Id. at 947.
The PCRA court reviewed Appellant’s claim and concluded that counsel
was not ineffective for failing to challenge venue because the underlying claim
lacked merit. PCRA Ct. Op., 6/30/25, at 16. The PCRA court highlighted that
the charges were properly joined and tried in Dauphin County because “all
charges involve[d] sexual offenses involving minors and [arose] out from
similar circumstances and schemes[.]” Id.
Appellant likens this case to Commonwealth v. Callen, 198 A.3d 1149
(Pa. Super. 2018), in which this Court held that the appellant’s crimes did not
arise out of a single criminal episode because the temporal relationship
between the crimes was attenuated and there “was no identity of factual
background and no series of transactions with either an immediate or remote
connection.” Id. at 1161. Appellant attempts to identify a “gap” in time
between his abuse of the victims in this case, argues that the counties are
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“not even contiguous,” and distinguishes the “brutal rape” of one victim from
the sexual assaults suffered by the other victims. Appellant’s Br. at 31-35.
These arguments are unavailing. Based on our review of the record, we
find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant engaged in the same
methods of identifying and luring each victim and the same escalating pattern
of inappropriate conduct over a continuous period from 1996 to 2016 sufficient
to comprise a single criminal episode. Therefore, Appellant’s underlying claim
of improper venue lacks merit and “counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for
failing to raise a meritless claim.” Fears, 86 A.3d at 804.
Additionally, while Appellant asserts that he should have been “afforded
trials in both Juniata County and Dauphin County,” Appellant fails to identify
how the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had counsel
raised a challenge to venue and obtained such a bifurcated trial. Appellant’s
Br. at 35. Appellant has also, therefore, failed to identify how he suffered
prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge venue.
Appellant next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge and to seek to quash the grand jury indictment because he claims
that the Dauphin County investigating grand jury impermissibly “operated as
a multi-county [g]rand [j]ury” and heard testimony pertaining to crimes
committed in both Dauphin and Juniata Counties. Id. at 40.
Generally, a county investigating grand jury has “the power to inquire
into offenses against the criminal laws of the Commonwealth alleged to have
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been committed within the county or counties in which it is summoned.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 4548. “However, the legitimate underlying purpose for which the
grand jury is convened does not hinder investigations into other matters which
may be brought before it. If, during an investigation of ongoing criminal
activity, a grand jury comes upon criminal activity which has been completed,
it is not required to close its eyes thereto.” Commonwealth v. McCauley,
588 A.2d 941, 945 (Pa. Super. 1991). “Once a grand jury is properly
impaneled, the purpose for which a grand jury is convened does not restrict
the grand jury from investigating actions which constitute either criminal
activity or probable violations of the criminal laws of the Commonwealth.”
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1091 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Rather, all that need be
alleged in an application for submission of an investigation to any grand jury,
county or multi-county, is that the matter in question requires the
investigative resources of the grand jury.” Id. at 1092 (citations omitted).
Here, the court properly impaneled an investigative grand jury in
Dauphin County. Once that grand jury began its investigation of ongoing
criminal activity in Dauphin County, it was not required to ignore evidence of
Appellant’s completed criminal activity in Juniata County, especially where
Appellant engaged in a single criminal episode spanning both counties. Trial
counsel, therefore lacked a meritorious basis for quashing the grand jury
indictment and Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance fails to merit relief.
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Additionally, while Appellant asserts that he should have had “at least
three separate trials,” Appellant fails to identify how the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different had counsel challenged the indictment,
beyond baldly stating that “there is no basis to conclude that [Appellant] was
not prejudiced here.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9. Appellant has also, therefore,
failed to identify how he suffered prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge
the indictment. Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance fails to merit relief.
Appellant next claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
with regard to Appellant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial. Appellant’s Br. at
41-53. Appellant complains that, immediately prior to Appellant’s waiver, trial
counsel had only a “general conversation of less than two minutes where
critical legal points were not discussed” Id. at 42. Appellant relies on Attorney
Klatt’s testimony at the PCRA hearing that:
[Appellant] was somewhat disappointed or dissatisfied with a lot of feedback that he heard from the jurors. I discussed it with him at that point in time if he was uncomfortable with a jury trial that we could ask the judge if we could proceed with a bench trial. That was a relatively quick discussion. I don’t know if he had time to reflect on that or not. At the time, it seemed in keeping with what the jury was saying. However, in hindsight, I would have explained to him that it was a positive thing that so many jurors were vocal and were struck.
Id. at 45-46 (citing N.T. Hr’g, 3/25/24, at 11). Appellant specifically asserts
that trial counsel failed to advise him “that it was positive that [counsel] was
able to excuse 25 jurors for cause” and that “he had virtually no chance of
being acquitted at a bench trial[.]” Id. at 51-52.
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“In all cases, the defendant and the attorney for the Commonwealth
may waive a jury trial with approval by a judge of the court in which the case
is pending, and elect to have the judge try the case without a jury. The judge
shall ascertain from the defendant whether this is a knowing and intelligent
waiver, and such colloquy shall appear on the record.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 620.
“When a presumptively-valid waiver is collaterally attacked under the
guise of ineffectiveness of counsel, it must be analyzed like any other
ineffectiveness claim.” Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 699 (Pa.
2008). The analysis must focus on the totality of the circumstances, including
the defendant’s experience, his explicit waiver, and the content of discussions
with counsel. Id. “[W]hen a defendant seeks to collaterally attack his waiver
of a jury trial, on grounds that it was caused by the ineffective assistance of
his trial counsel, to prove prejudice, he must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that but for counsel's constitutionally deficient service, the
outcome of the waiver proceeding would have been different, i.e., that he
would not have waived his right to a jury trial.” Id. at 704.
The PCRA court found that Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to a jury trial on the record and indicated to the trial court that he
did not have any questions for the court or his attorneys. PCRA Ct. Op. at 12.
The court found that Appellant “was very articulate while explaining his
specific reasons for requesting a bench trial instead of a jury trial [and]
explicitly explained that he wanted his case to be decided by facts and the law
and not decided by emotional or inflamed jurors.” Id. The court emphasized
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that Appellant “also stated that he discussed the decision to proceed with a
bench trial with his attorneys.” Id. at 12-13. The PCRA court, thus, concluded
that Appellant’s “decision to proceed with a bench trial was clearly knowing,
intelligent, and based on trial strategy.” Id. at 14.
Based on Appellant’s on-the-record colloquy, we agree with the trial
court that Appellant’s decision to proceed with a bench trial was knowing and
intelligent. While Appellant claims that counsel was ineffective because of the
brevity of their discussion prior to waiver, we note that Appellant had an
established relationship with counsel and had previously discussed trial
strategy in preparation for jury selection. Following his conversation with
counsel and his observation of the jury selection process, Appellant was able
to intelligently articulate his reasons for waiving a jury trial, stating: “I want
the facts in the case decided based on the facts and the law, not emotions or
inflammatory materials or theatrics [] and I feel I would get a fair shot at that
going with a bench trial.” N.T. Mot. And Waiver, 12/9/22, at 6.
Appellant has, therefore, failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability
that a longer consultation with counsel would have altered the outcome of the
waiver proceeding. While Appellant now believes that he had “virtually no
chance” of being acquitted at a bench trial and would have fared better at a
jury trial, “a claim of ineffectiveness ordinarily will not succeed through
comparing, by hindsight, the trial strategy employed with alternatives not
pursued.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 980 (Pa. 2023)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Appellant’s claim fails to merit relief.
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Appellant next asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by failing to obtain and review certain discovery material. Appellant’s Br. at
54-63. Appellant specifically identifies the downloads of his hard drive and
cellular phones and information related to the indictment and disposition of
charges against a defense witness. Id. Appellant speculates, for instance,
that it would have helped his case “had an expert [] concluded that the
materials found on the hard drive were placed by someone other than
Appellant[.]” Id. at 59-60.
Appellant’s claim amounts to mere speculation as to what discovery
could have contained. Attorney Mueller testified that she and Attorney Klatt
viewed the contents of Appellant’s hard drive. N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 9/10/24, at
10. Additionally, Appellant admits that, prior to trial, the trial court granted
Appellant’s motion for disclosure of grand jury testimony, meaning that trial
counsel obtained transcripts of testimony of witnesses that the
Commonwealth intended to call at trial, exculpatory transcripts of testimony,
and exculpatory physical evidence presented to the grand jury. See
Appellant’s Br. at 59. Appellant presents no reasonable basis for his belief
that there was additional exculpatory material that trial counsel could have
obtained. Appellant’s claim fails to merit relief.
Appellant next asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
when counsel failed to present testimony from defense witness Todday
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Pinkney. Id. at 63-64. Appellant argues that when Mr. Pinkney did not appear
to testify on the last day of trial, counsel should have “brought [him] in via
the enforcement mechanism of the Sheriff’s office” or asked “to reconvene the
next morning” instead of resting her case. Id.
“[T]rial counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to investigate or
call a witness unless there is some showing by the appellant that the witness's
testimony would have been helpful to the defense.” Commonwealth v.
Brown. 767 A.2d 576, 582 (Pa. Super. 2001). “A failure to call a witness is
not per se ineffective assistance of counsel for such decision usually involves
matters of trial strategy.” Id. (citation omitted).
While Appellant baldly states that he was prejudiced, Appellant develops
no argument and cites to no case law to support his assertion. See Appellant’s
Br. at 64. When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an
appellant's duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our
review. Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006).
This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of
an appellant. Id. Moreover, when briefing defects impede our ability to
conduct meaningful appellate review, we may find certain issues to be waived.
Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Appellant has failed to develop his claim on appeal and
it is, thus, waived.
Appellant next asserts that he is entitled to a new trial due to the
“structural lack of counsel” and cumulative prejudice resulting therefrom.
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Appellant’s Br. at 64-67. As we find, supra, that counsel provided effective
assistance, Appellant’s claim fails.
In his last issue, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred when it
denied Appellant’s request for discovery after finding that exceptional
circumstances did not exist sufficient to justify granting discovery. Id. at 68-
73.
In PCRA proceedings, discovery is only permitted upon leave of court
after a showing of exceptional circumstances. Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(1). “The
PCRA and the criminal rules do not define the term ‘exceptional
circumstances.’ Rather, it is for the trial court, in its discretion, to determine
whether a case is exceptional and discovery is therefore warranted.”
Commonwealth v. Frey, 41 A.3d 605, 611 (Pa. Super. 2012). “We will not
disturb a court's determination regarding the existence of exceptional
circumstances unless the court abused its discretion.” Id.
The PCRA court heard argument and received briefing on this issue and
determined that no such exceptional circumstances existed. Appellant’s
arguments to the PCRA court and on appeal amount to mere speculation that
discovery will uncover exculpatory evidence. See Appellant’s Br. at 70-73.
“[M]ere speculation that exculpatory evidence might exist does not constitute
an exceptional circumstance warranting discovery.” Frey, 41 A.3d at 612.
We conclude that the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant’s request for discovery.
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Having found each of Appellant’s issues either meritless or waived, we
affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 07/08/2026
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