J-A15007-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
TANISHA HINES,
Appellant No. 3257 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 6, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003083-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, MUNDY, AND FITZGERALD* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2015
Tanisha Hines appeals from the judgment of sentence of three years
probation. We reverse Appellant’s convictions of robbery and theft and
remand for resentencing.
On December 12, 2012, Appellant was charged in connection with
events that occurred the previous day on Price Street, Philadelphia.
Appellant and her co-defendant, her cousin Tericka Hines, proceeded to a
nonjury trial on May 23, 2013, when the Commonwealth adduced the
following proof by its sole witness, Margaret Akano.
At approximately 7:40 p.m. on December 11, 2012, Ms. Akano went to
visit the co-defendants, whom she considered friends, at 5838 Wakefield
Street, Philadelphia, so that Tericka could style Ms. Akano’s hair. When she * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A15007-15
arrived, Ms. Akano was told by Cashmere, the co-defendants’ cousin, that
Tericka was upstairs. Ms. Akano and Cashmere attended school together.
Before Ms. Akano arrived at the co-defendants’ residence, Appellant had
warned her, in a text message, that Cashmere was there and not to come.
Ms. Akano thought that the message was a joke.
Ms. Akano went upstairs and sat on the bed with Tericka. Cashmere,1
a female, entered the bedroom about two minutes later, asked what had
happened, and, before Ms. Akano could respond, punched Ms. Akano in the
mouth with a closed fist. Ms. Akano and Cashmere went downstairs and
began to argue. Appellant and Tericka were also present, and Appellant told
Cashmere to “let [Ms. Akano] leave” and tried to break up the fight. N.T.
Waiver Trial, 5/23/13, at 17, 26. Cashmere responded that Ms. Akano could
leave but said to the victim, “[W]hen you leave out the door I’m going to hit
you again.” Id. As Ms. Akano left the house, Cashmere struck her again,
but Ms. Akano walked away.
Cashmere, Appellant, and Tericka began to follow Ms. Akano down the
street. Once Ms. Akano reached Price Street, Appellant told Ms. Akano to
fight Cashmere, but Ms. Akano responded that she did not want to.
Appellant then said, “[P]ass me your bag, you all can have a one-on-one
____________________________________________
1 Cashmere was a juvenile at the time of the incident, and was charged in the juvenile system. N.T. Waiver Trial, 5/23/13, at 18.
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fight[.] Id. at 19. When Ms. Akano again refused, Appellant “snatched the
bag” and “threw it down” on Price Street. Id. at 19, 21. The bag was
thrown across the street, to the other side of Price Street. Id. at 20. Ms.
Akano was asked specifically why Appellant removed the purse from Ms.
Akano’s arm. The cross-examination by Appellant’s attorney was as follows:
Q. And the whole time you were out on the street my client [Appellant], you testified, did you not, my client said to you, ‘just fight her, just fight Cashmere.’
A. Yes.
Q. And at that time my client took your bag and put it down on the street so you could have your hands free to fight Cashmere; right?
A. She snatched my bag out of my hand.
Q. Right. And she did that at the time she was encouraging you to put your dukes up and fight Cashmere; right?
A. Right. Id. at 31.
Ms. Akano testified on direct examination that, after Appellant
removed her purse from her arm and threw it across the street, Appellant,
Cashmere, and Tericka began to assault Ms. Akano. Ms. Akano blocked their
blows and ten to fifteen minutes later, “[s]ome guy from the neighborhood
came over and said ‘all right, all right, you got her’ and then they
[Cashmere, Appellant, and Tericka] just walked off.” Id. at 20. Ms. Akano
retrieved her purse, which was still located on Price Street. Id. at 21.
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The only item missing from the bag was Ms. Akano’s cell phone.
Although Ms. Akano did not want to call police, she started to search for the
phone. Police arrived on the scene due to a call from an anonymous
woman. Ms. Akano saw a young boy hand police her cell phone, which had
a cracked face. The Commonwealth agreed that an unknown person had
returned the cracked cell phone to police at the scene of the assault. The
record fails to indicate where the cell phone was located when it was
discovered by the boy. Ms. Akano admitted that she did not see who took
the phone from her purse. Id. at 28-29.
Appellant was charged with robbery (purse and cell phone),
conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking (purse and cell phone), receiving stolen
property (purse and cell phone), simple assault, and reckless endangerment.
The trial court found her guilty of felony robbery by physically removing
property by force, however slight. Appellant was also adjudged guilty of
theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, conspiracy to commit
simple assault, and simple assault. On November 3, 2013, after denying
Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the robbery and theft
counts, the court sentenced her to three years probation. In this appeal,
Appellant raises one contention: “Was the evidence insufficient to support
Appellant’s robbery and theft conviction because the Commonwealth failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant acted with the intent to
deprive the complaint of her [property].” Appellant’s brief at 3.
-4- J-A15007-15
Initially, we observe: “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, together with all
reasonable inferences therefrom, the trier of fact could have found that each
and every element of the crimes charged was established beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79
(Pa.Super. 2015).
Appellant was convicted of robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v),
which provides that a person is “guilty of robbery if, in the course of
committing a theft, he . . . . physically takes or removes property from the
person of another by force however slight[.]” Appellant likewise challenges
her theft conviction. The crime of theft by unlawful taking occurs when, in
pertinent part, a person “unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control
over, movable property of another with intent to deprive him thereof.” The
Crimes Code defines deprive, as:
(1) To withhold property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value, or with intent to restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation, or
(2) to dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3901 (emphasis added).
For a person to be guilty of theft, “the actor's intention or conscious
object must be to take unlawfully the property of another for the purpose of
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J-A15007-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
TANISHA HINES,
Appellant No. 3257 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 6, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003083-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, MUNDY, AND FITZGERALD* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2015
Tanisha Hines appeals from the judgment of sentence of three years
probation. We reverse Appellant’s convictions of robbery and theft and
remand for resentencing.
On December 12, 2012, Appellant was charged in connection with
events that occurred the previous day on Price Street, Philadelphia.
Appellant and her co-defendant, her cousin Tericka Hines, proceeded to a
nonjury trial on May 23, 2013, when the Commonwealth adduced the
following proof by its sole witness, Margaret Akano.
At approximately 7:40 p.m. on December 11, 2012, Ms. Akano went to
visit the co-defendants, whom she considered friends, at 5838 Wakefield
Street, Philadelphia, so that Tericka could style Ms. Akano’s hair. When she * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A15007-15
arrived, Ms. Akano was told by Cashmere, the co-defendants’ cousin, that
Tericka was upstairs. Ms. Akano and Cashmere attended school together.
Before Ms. Akano arrived at the co-defendants’ residence, Appellant had
warned her, in a text message, that Cashmere was there and not to come.
Ms. Akano thought that the message was a joke.
Ms. Akano went upstairs and sat on the bed with Tericka. Cashmere,1
a female, entered the bedroom about two minutes later, asked what had
happened, and, before Ms. Akano could respond, punched Ms. Akano in the
mouth with a closed fist. Ms. Akano and Cashmere went downstairs and
began to argue. Appellant and Tericka were also present, and Appellant told
Cashmere to “let [Ms. Akano] leave” and tried to break up the fight. N.T.
Waiver Trial, 5/23/13, at 17, 26. Cashmere responded that Ms. Akano could
leave but said to the victim, “[W]hen you leave out the door I’m going to hit
you again.” Id. As Ms. Akano left the house, Cashmere struck her again,
but Ms. Akano walked away.
Cashmere, Appellant, and Tericka began to follow Ms. Akano down the
street. Once Ms. Akano reached Price Street, Appellant told Ms. Akano to
fight Cashmere, but Ms. Akano responded that she did not want to.
Appellant then said, “[P]ass me your bag, you all can have a one-on-one
____________________________________________
1 Cashmere was a juvenile at the time of the incident, and was charged in the juvenile system. N.T. Waiver Trial, 5/23/13, at 18.
-2- J-A15007-15
fight[.] Id. at 19. When Ms. Akano again refused, Appellant “snatched the
bag” and “threw it down” on Price Street. Id. at 19, 21. The bag was
thrown across the street, to the other side of Price Street. Id. at 20. Ms.
Akano was asked specifically why Appellant removed the purse from Ms.
Akano’s arm. The cross-examination by Appellant’s attorney was as follows:
Q. And the whole time you were out on the street my client [Appellant], you testified, did you not, my client said to you, ‘just fight her, just fight Cashmere.’
A. Yes.
Q. And at that time my client took your bag and put it down on the street so you could have your hands free to fight Cashmere; right?
A. She snatched my bag out of my hand.
Q. Right. And she did that at the time she was encouraging you to put your dukes up and fight Cashmere; right?
A. Right. Id. at 31.
Ms. Akano testified on direct examination that, after Appellant
removed her purse from her arm and threw it across the street, Appellant,
Cashmere, and Tericka began to assault Ms. Akano. Ms. Akano blocked their
blows and ten to fifteen minutes later, “[s]ome guy from the neighborhood
came over and said ‘all right, all right, you got her’ and then they
[Cashmere, Appellant, and Tericka] just walked off.” Id. at 20. Ms. Akano
retrieved her purse, which was still located on Price Street. Id. at 21.
-3- J-A15007-15
The only item missing from the bag was Ms. Akano’s cell phone.
Although Ms. Akano did not want to call police, she started to search for the
phone. Police arrived on the scene due to a call from an anonymous
woman. Ms. Akano saw a young boy hand police her cell phone, which had
a cracked face. The Commonwealth agreed that an unknown person had
returned the cracked cell phone to police at the scene of the assault. The
record fails to indicate where the cell phone was located when it was
discovered by the boy. Ms. Akano admitted that she did not see who took
the phone from her purse. Id. at 28-29.
Appellant was charged with robbery (purse and cell phone),
conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking (purse and cell phone), receiving stolen
property (purse and cell phone), simple assault, and reckless endangerment.
The trial court found her guilty of felony robbery by physically removing
property by force, however slight. Appellant was also adjudged guilty of
theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, conspiracy to commit
simple assault, and simple assault. On November 3, 2013, after denying
Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the robbery and theft
counts, the court sentenced her to three years probation. In this appeal,
Appellant raises one contention: “Was the evidence insufficient to support
Appellant’s robbery and theft conviction because the Commonwealth failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant acted with the intent to
deprive the complaint of her [property].” Appellant’s brief at 3.
-4- J-A15007-15
Initially, we observe: “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, together with all
reasonable inferences therefrom, the trier of fact could have found that each
and every element of the crimes charged was established beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79
(Pa.Super. 2015).
Appellant was convicted of robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v),
which provides that a person is “guilty of robbery if, in the course of
committing a theft, he . . . . physically takes or removes property from the
person of another by force however slight[.]” Appellant likewise challenges
her theft conviction. The crime of theft by unlawful taking occurs when, in
pertinent part, a person “unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control
over, movable property of another with intent to deprive him thereof.” The
Crimes Code defines deprive, as:
(1) To withhold property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value, or with intent to restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation, or
(2) to dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3901 (emphasis added).
For a person to be guilty of theft, “the actor's intention or conscious
object must be to take unlawfully the property of another for the purpose of
-5- J-A15007-15
depriving the other of his or her property.” Commonwealth v.
Dombrauskas, 418 A.2d 493, 496-97 (Pa.Super. 1980). Theft is a
predicate offense for robbery and an element of the crime.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 936 A.2d 107 (Pa.Super. 2007). Thus, the
specific intent to deprive another of his or her property is likewise needed to
support a robbery conviction. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 A.2d 1189,
1191 (Pa.Super. 1988) (“The specific intent to deprive is required for a
robbery conviction.”).
Appellant’s position is straightforward. The Commonwealth’s proof
failed to establish that she intended to deprive Ms. Akano of either her purse
or the cell phone permanently or for an extended period. She points out
that Ms. Akano admitted that her purse was removed from her arm solely
for the purpose of freeing that arm to fight Cashmere. The purse was then
thrown across the street. There was no proof at all that Appellant looked
into the purse or removed any of its contents. To the contrary, Ms. Akano
plainly stated that, immediately after throwing the purse across the street,
Appellant began to participate in the assault. Ms. Akano admitted that she
did not know who removed her cell phone from her purse. The assault
lasted ten to fifteen minutes before a man verbally stopped the altercation.
Thereafter, Appellant, who could have taken the purse with her, simply
walked away with her two cohorts.
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The victim then picked up her purse, which had been left behind on
Price Street. She could not immediately find the phone, but saw a boy hand
it to police when they arrived on the scene. The Commonwealth never
established that there was any connection between Appellant and the boy
who returned the damaged cell phone to the police. They also failed to
provide any indication of where the phone was located when it was
discovered.
We agree with Appellant’s position. Theft of the purse did not occur
when the purse was flung out of the way and promptly ignored by Appellant.
The victim recovered her purse within fifteen minutes of that activity. Thus,
the victim was not deprived, as the term is defined in the Crimes Code, of
her purse. The trial court premised its theft and robbery convictions on the
cell phone. It leapt to an unsupported conclusion that Appellant “broke the
cell phone and disposed of [it] in a direction that Ms. Akano was unable to
observe. The damage to the cell phone demonstrates Defendant did not
intend to return the phone to Ms. Akano after they finished fighting.” Trial
Court Opinion, 1/22/15, at 4. Simply put, there was not a scintilla of proof,
circumstantial or otherwise, to support a finding that Appellant touched,
much less threw away, the cell phone.
The victim plainly stated that Appellant removed her purse and threw
it across the street and then started to fight her. She never said that
Appellant either looked or reached into the purse. She never testified that
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Appellant reached into the purse and threw an object from it. Instead, Ms.
Akano admitted that Appellant demanded to take the purse solely for the
purpose of freeing Ms. Akano’s arm so that she could fight Cashmere. Ms.
Akano reported that Appellant began to participate in the assault
immediately after throwing the bag across Price Street. When the man
stopped the fight, Appellant walked away. Ms. Akano did not report that
Appellant touched her purse after the assault and instead admitted that she
was unaware of who might have removed the cell phone from the purse.
The Commonwealth provided no evidence as to where the cell phone was
found or who recovered it or whether that stranger was connected to
Appellant.
While we are aware that the Commonwealth may prove its case based
upon circumstantial evidence, in this case, there was none to support a
finding that Appellant touched the cell phone. Indeed, the only inference
from the evidence presented is that the cell phone fell from the purse when
Appellant threw it across the street.
It is established that a conviction cannot be based upon speculation
and conjecture and that the Commonwealth’s evidence must establish the
elements of the offense. Thus, while all reasonable inferences from the
evidence must be made in favor of the Commonwealth, those “inferences
must flow from facts and circumstances proven in the record, and must be
of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence.”
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Commonwealth v. Robinson, 817 A.2d 1153, 1158 (Pa.Super. 2003) (it
was pure speculation that assailant intended to cause victim serious bodily
injury by striking her once on the back with a gun, rendering aggravated
assault conviction infirm); Commonwealth v. Scott, 597 A.2d 1220, 1221
(Pa.Super. 1991) (overturning arson and risking catastrophe convictions
where there was no proof that defendant wanted to cause a fire when the
evidence was that she squirted lighter fluid at her boyfriend during a fight
and left the room); see also Commonwealth v. Swerdlow, 636 A.2d
1173 (Pa.Super. 1994) (defendant’s conviction of conspiracy could not be
upheld where only evidence presented against him was that actual
perpetrator of burglary used a crawlspace in defendant’s residence to access
victim’s home).
Given the lack of proof that Appellant touched any content of
Appellant’s purse and the victim’s admission that Appellant threw it across
the street solely to allow the victim to fight, and since purse and cell phone
were left at the scene and quickly recovered by Ms. Akano, we cannot permit
Appellant’s robbery and theft convictions to stand.
Convictions for robbery and theft reversed. Judgment of sentence
vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2015
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