J-S13001-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ARNON HILL : : Appellant : No. 1590 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 7, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004633-2023
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 23, 2026
Arnon Hill appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas on May 7, 2025. Additionally, Hill’s
court-appointed counsel seeks to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967). We affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel
permission to withdraw.
On September 6, 2023, Hill was arrested following an incident where he
“pistol whipped” his girlfriend after dragging her around his apartment
complex at gunpoint, banging on other residents’ doors, and accusing her of
cheating on him with them.
On November 1, 2023, a criminal information was filed charging Hill with
Counts 1 and 2−aggravated assault, Count 3−possession of firearm
prohibited, Counts 4 and 5−simple assault, Count 6−possession of an J-S13001-26
instrument of crime (“PIC”), Counts 7 and 8−terroristic threats, Count
9−unlawful restraint, Counts 10 and 11−recklessly endangering another
person, and Count 12 and 13−harassement. 1 After consideration of Hill’s
motion to quash bills of information, the court granted the motion, thereby
quashing Counts 2, 5, 8, and 11, as to an unnamed victim.
At trial, the jury heard the grisly and disturbing details of the night of
the assault. The victim testified that, in September 2023, she had known Hill
for a few months, and assented that their relationship could be described as
“boyfriend and girlfriend.” N.T., 2/19/25, at 44. However, she had been
planning to end things with Hill. See id. at 47. On the night in question, she
was at her sister’s home in Philadelphia, and Hill was calling and texting the
victim. While she ignored him at first, she ended up leaving with him because
“he was saying he was going to kick my sister’s door in.” Id. at 48. They then
went to Hill’s apartment in Delaware County. See id. at 48-49. The victim
described Hill’s apartment as just one room, with a bed, a dresser and a little
kitchen area. See id. at 49.
When they got to Hill’s apartment, the victim wanted to take a shower.
See id. at 49. Hill did not have any soap in his room, so he went to his car to
look for some soap. See id. at 52. In the meantime, the victim already got
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1), respectively.
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undressed. See id. However, when Hill could not find any soap, the victim
decided to just go to bed since she had work in the morning. See id. The
victim then took her towel off, with her back turned towards Hill. See id. at
53. The victim testified that when she turned around, Hill was holding a gun
in her face. See id. At that time, Hill was also undressed. See id. at 99-100.
She described the gun as gray with a bunch of rubber bands on the handle.
See id. The victim had seen the gun a few times before, stating it “was
something he carried [].” Id. The victim identified the gun shown in court as
Hill’s gun, and indicated the rubber bands were familiar to her, and confirmed
she had seen the same gun in Hill’s possession “a lot of times.” Id. at 56.
When Hill put the gun in the victim’s face, he told the victim to “[g]o to
the apartment of the dude that [she was] fucking in the apartment.” Id. at
54. The victim was confused, as she had only been to the apartment complex
one other time, and did not know anyone else in the building. See id. at 51,
54. Because she did not know where Hill wanted her to go she felt stuck. See
id. at 56. She walked towards the door, at which point Hill was behind her
with the gun. See id. Hill nudged her in the back of the head to open the door.
See id. at 57. They then left the apartment and started walking down the
hallway, while the victim was still naked. See id. Hill kicked in the door to the
first apartment, but no one was there. See id. at 58. At the next apartment,
while the gun was still pointed at the victim’s face, Hill started knocking on
the door, and said that she better hope that the guy has the same answer
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(meaning that the neighbor better not know the victim) or “we’re both done.”
Id. The victim took that statement to mean that she was going to die at that
time. Id. at 59. Someone answered the door and immediately closed and
locked it. See id. at 61-62. The victim did not know that person. See id. at
62.
The victim then got away from Hill and started knocking on every door
down the hall, but no one came out to help. See id. at 64. The victim then
got stuck in the corner of the hallway, and sat down there as her “legs just
gave out under” her. Id. at 65. Hill came over with the gun and told her to
get up, but when she did not get up, Hill hit her hard on the side of her head
with the side of the gun. See id. at 65-67. Hill again asked her to get up, and
when she did not, he told her to open her mouth and he put the barrel of the
gun in her mouth. See id. at 67-68. While he had the gun in her mouth, Hill
said he would blow her brains out. See id. at 69. Hill then took the gun out of
her mouth and told her to get up again. See id. at 70. The victim did not get
up, explaining that she could not because her body was numb from being so
scared. See id. Hill then hit her in the forehead with the butt of his gun. See
id. The victim then got up because she did not want to be hit again or shot.
See id. at 72. Hill then started dragging her back towards his room. See id.
Hill told her to open the door to his apartment. See id. at 73. She did not
open the door, and then ran away when she heard the cops arrive. See id. at
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73-74. Hill still had the gun when they got back to his apartment door, but
the victim did not know what he did after she ran away. See id.
Charles Holmes, a resident in the same building, then testified. Holmes
did not want to testify and had called the Commonwealth multiple times asking
if he was necessary for the case and if he had to show up. See id. at 133-34.
He was told he could be locked up or held in contempt if he did not appear.
See id. at 134. Holmes rented a room in the same building as Hill and was
home alone on the night in question. See id. at 135-36. A knock on his door
woke him up from sleeping. See id. at 137. He got up to see who was at the
door, opened the door, and then shut the door when he “seen there was
someone that shouldn’t have been at my door.” Id. at 137-38. When asked
why he said the person “shouldn’t have been there,” Holmes just said “I didn’t
have a reason. I don’t know who the person was, so why would I stand at the
door if I didn’t know who the person was.” Id. at 138. Holmes said there was
only one person at the door and contended he did not remember what they
were wearing. See id. at 139-140. After getting back up and seeing that the
person was still outside his door, Holmes called 911. See id. at 140. When
asked why, if the person was not doing anything, he closed the door and did
not speak to him, Holmes said he was intoxicated. See id. at 141; see also
id. at 145.
When the Commonwealth showed Holmes a handwritten statement that
he gave to police on the night of the incident, Holmes stated he did not
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recognize it. See id. at 147. However, Holmes acknowledged that all the
personal information contained in the statement was his, including his name,
age, phone number, and social security number. See id. at 149. When asked
if it was his signature at the bottom, Holmes stated “I mean, it’s a scribble
scrap, but I guess.” Id.
When Holmes was asked to read the answers in the statement, he read
“Man came to my door to approach about a girl.” Id. at 150. Although he
confirmed the statement was in his handwriting, he claimed he could not read
the handwriting. Id.
The Commonwealth then requested to treat Holmes as a hostile witness.
See id. at 152. After Holmes continued to contend he could not read the
statement, and stated he lied in the statement about the person at his door
having a gun, see id. at 155-67, the court allowed the Commonwealth to treat
Holmes as a hostile witness. See id. at 168 (“It is clear he’s a hostile witness.
He can treat him as a hostile witness.”). The Commonwealth thereafter asked
Holmes leading questions about his statement to police and the ways in which
it differed from his trial testimony. See id. at 169-84.
Next, Officer Bryce McElhiney testified that he was on duty working as
a patrolman on the night in question. See id. at 197. Officer McElhiney was
dispatched via an emergency tone, “which usually means something, a priority
is coming out for a domestic with a weapon …”. Id. at 199. Officer McElhiney
also testified that they received a call about a naked male with a gun. See id.
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at 202. When Officer McElhiney got to the property, he went upstairs and
observed the victim and Hill, who were both naked, standing in the hallway
with other officers. See id. Officer McElhiney was told to detain Hill. See id.
at 204. Since Hill was naked, Officer McElhiney went with Hill into his room so
he could put clothes on. See id. Once they were in the room, Hill put his shorts
on, but then “wouldn't fully put the shirt on, was kind of maybe wasting time.”
Id. Officer McElhiney was asked by another officer to grab an article of clothing
for the victim. See id. at 204-05. Officer McElhiney picked up clothing off the
bed and observed a firearm underneath that piece of clothing on the bed. See
id. at 205. Officer McElhiney then put Hill in handcuffs. See id. When asked
how far the bed was from the door, Officer McElhiney testified that “[y]ou
could probably stick your foot out and touch it from the doorway.” Id. Officer
McElhiney described the gun as a small handgun that was black and gray with
rubber bands wrapped around. See id. at 206. The Commonwealth then
played video from Officer McElhiney’s body-worn camera, and after watching
the video, Officer McElhiney confirmed the video showed that neither he nor
Hill opened the door to Hill’s room, and that the door had already been open
when they entered. See id. at 213.
Finally, the Commonwealth called an employee from the correctional
facility, and played a phone call made by Hill while he was incarcerated pre-
trial. We acknowledge the contents of the call are not clear from the trial
transcript. See id. at 246-49. However, according to closing arguments, Hill
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acknowledged in the call that he pistol-whipped and beat up the victim
because she was disrespecting him by having sex with other men. See N.T.,
2/20/25, at 44, 46, 53.
On February 20, 2025, following a three-day trial, a jury found Hill guilty
of Count 4−simple assault, Count 6−PIC, Count 7−terroristic threats, and
Count 9−unlawful restraint. The jury found Hill not guilty of Count
1−aggravated assault. On the verdict sheet, the jury responded “yes” to an
interrogatory as to whether they found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hill
possessed a firearm on the date in question. Based on the jury’s affirmative
response to that question, the trial court entered a bench verdict of guilty to
Count 3−possession of firearm prohibited.
On May 7, 2025, the trial court sentenced Hill to an aggregate term of
136 to 272 months’ incarceration. Hill filed a post-sentence motion, which the
court denied. Trial counsel then filed the instant timely notice of appeal on
Hill’s behalf. Trial counsel was subsequently permitted to withdraw and current
appellate counsel thereafter entered his appearance. After receiving an
extension of time to file a concise statement, counsel filed a statement of
intent to file an Anders brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). Counsel has since
filed an Anders brief along with a motion to withdraw as counsel.
We turn first to counsel’s petition to withdraw. To withdraw pursuant to
Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
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determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citation omitted). With respect to the third requirement of Anders,
that counsel inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s
withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to
withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their
rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
An Anders brief must comply with the following requirements:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). “[I]f counsel’s
petition and brief satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our own review of
the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Wrecks,
931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007) (brackets added, citation omitted).
We find counsel has substantially complied with the preliminary
requirements set forth in Anders. Counsel filed a petition to withdraw,
certifying he has reviewed the case and determined that Hill’s appeal is
frivolous. Counsel also filed a brief, which includes a summary of the history
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and facts of the case, potential issues that could be raised by Hill, and
counsel’s assessment of why those issues are meritless, with citations to
relevant legal authority. Finally, counsel provided a copy of the Anders brief
to Hill and notified him that he has the right to retain new counsel in pursuit
of his appeal or proceed pro se and that he has the right to submit any
additional issues he believes are meritorious. Hill has not filed a response. As
counsel has substantially complied with the dictates of Anders and its
progeny, we will conduct an independent review of the record to determine if
the appeal is wholly frivolous.
The Anders brief first presents a potential challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence. “Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en
banc) (citation omitted).
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence presented at trial and all reasonable inferences derived from the evidence was sufficient to establish [each element] of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden entirely by circumstantial evidence. Moreover, the jury, which passes upon the weight and credibility of each witness’s testimony, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 333 A.3d 417, 432 (Pa. Super. 2025)
(citations omitted). “Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved
by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a
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matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Mead, 326 A.3d 1006, 1012 (Pa. Super.
2024) (citation omitted).
Counsel raises potential sufficiency challenges to the possession
charges; namely, whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
charges of possession of firearm prohibited and PIC, “where the
Commonwealth failed to prove [Hill] was in possession of the firearm in
question.” Anders Brief, at 10.
To sustain a conviction for possession of firearm prohibited under
Section 6105(a)(1), “the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant [(1)] possessed a firearm and [(2) was previously]
convicted of an enumerated offense that prohibits him from possessing … a
firearm.” Commonwealth v. Batty, 169 A.3d 70, 76 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation omitted).
Meanwhile, for PIC the Commonwealth must establish two elements:
“(1) possession of an object that is an instrument of crime and (2) intent to
use the object for a criminal purpose.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 263 A.3d
1193, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
The sole element Hill disputes in his sufficiency challenge to both
charges is possession of the firearm. The Commonwealth can establish the
element of possession by proving actual or constructive possession. See
McIntyre, 333 A.3d at 432. Because the firearm at issue was not recovered
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from Hill’s person, but rather from his bed, “the concept of constructive
possession applies.” Muhammad, 289 A.3d at 1091.
When there is no direct evidence [that] the person was in physical possession of the firearm, the Commonwealth must prove the element of possession through what has been described as the legal fiction of constructive possession. This Court has stated that a defendant has constructive possession of contraband if he has conscious dominion of it, that is, he has the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. Constructive possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that possession of the contraband was more likely than not, and may be established by the totality of the circumstances[.]
McIntyre, 333 A.3d at 432 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted). “[A]s with any other element of a crime, constructive possession
may be proven by circumstantial evidence.” Muhammad, 289 A.3d at 1091
A defendant’s mere presence at a place where contraband is found or secreted is insufficient, standing alone, to prove that he exercised dominion and control over those items. Thus, the location and proximity of an actor to the contraband alone is not conclusive of guilt. Rather, knowledge of the existence and location of the contraband is a necessary prerequisite to proving the defendant’s intent to control, and, thus, his constructive possession.
If the only inference that the fact finder can make from the facts is a suspicion of possession, the Commonwealth has failed to prove constructive possession. It is well settled that facts giving rise to mere association, suspicion[,] or conjecture[] will not make out a case of constructive possession.
Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 A.3d 542, 553 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
as verdict winner, we conclude that the Commonwealth adduced sufficient
evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer Hill had constructive
possession of a firearm. Witness testimony shows that Hill was seen with the
gun in his hands; the door to Hill’s room was already open when the police
arrived; and Hill was proximately located to the gun found on his bed, which
was close enough to the open door to reach a foot out and touch it. The totality
of these circumstances was sufficient to establish that Hill constructively
possessed the firearm. See McIntyre, 333 A.3d at 432. Therefore, the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Hill possessed the firearm for purposes of sustaining his
convictions under Sections 6105(a)(1) and 907(a). Accordingly, the
sufficiency challenge would fail.
Next, counsel raises a potential challenge to the court’s discretion in
allowing the Commonwealth to treat Holmes as a hostile witness under
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 611. At trial, trial counsel maintained that
Holmes was answering to the best of his ability, and was not refusing to
answer questions. See N.T., 2/19/25, at 152.
A trial court has “wide discretion in controlling the use of leading
questions,” and this Court will not reverse “on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion.” Commonwealth v. Bibbs, 970 A.2d 440, 453 (Pa. Super. 2009)
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(quoting Commonwealth v. Lambert, 765 A.2d 306, 360 (Pa. Super.
2000)).
Generally, under Rule 611, a party should not use leading questions on
direct examination unless the witness is a hostile witness, an adverse party,
or a witness identified with an adverse party:
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on direct or redirect examination except as necessary to develop the witness’s testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow leading questions:
(1) on cross-examination; and
(2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party. A witness so examined should usually be interrogated by all other parties as to whom the witness is not hostile or adverse as if under redirect examination.
Pa.R.E. 611(c).
A party may properly be allowed to treat a witness as hostile if the
witness “evidenced [an] overt unwillingness to testify and ... belligerence on
the stand.” Bibbs, 970 A.2d at 453. In other words, a “hostile” witness is one
“who shows himself or herself so adverse to answering questions, whatever
the source of the antagonism, that leading questions may be used to press
the questions home.” Lambert, 765 A.2d at 357 n.42 (citation omitted).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth
to treat Holmes as a hostile witness. Holmes made it very clear he did not
want to testify and was uncooperative on the stand, refusing to actually
answer questions and repeatedly claiming he could not read his own
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handwriting and that he did not remember events. The record shows that
Holmes was not open to reviewing his prior statements to the police. He
continuously made up excuses for not reviewing the original statement. He
first contended that he could not remember giving the statement, and
subsequently contended he could not read his own handwriting in the
statement. See N.T., 2/19/25, at 147-150. He claimed he was intoxicated
when he gave the statement, and insinuated that was why he could not read
the statement, and why the statement differed vastly from his in-court
testimony. See id. at 141; see also id. at 145. Finally, he stated he lied in
the written statement. See id. at 155-67.
As Holmes was unwilling to answer any of the Commonwealth’s
questions to the extent that he gave a statement to police on the date of the
incident in which he stated Hill had a gun, the trial court appropriately allowed
the Commonwealth to treat Holmes as a hostile witness. Accordingly, the
Commonwealth was permitted to ask leading questions based on Holmes’
signed statement during its direct examination.
Having reviewed the issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief, and after
conducting our own independent review of the record, we agree with counsel
that the within appeal is wholly frivolous. As such, we affirm the judgment of
sentence and grant counsel leave to withdraw.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition for leave to withdraw granted.
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Date: 6/23/2026
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