J-S20024-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
KHALIL HENDERSON
Appellant No. 997 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 1, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0007858-2016
BEFORE: SHOGAN, STABILE, and McLAUGHLIN, JJ .
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2020
Appellant, Khalil Henderson, appeals from the March 1, 2019 order
dismissing his petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
The pertinent underlying facts are as follows:
On December 5, 2015, at approximately 7:30 p.m., in the area of C and Somerset Streets in Philadelphia … there was a fight between two females, one named Marguerita Gonzalez and another female. As the two women fought, a crowed surrounded them … [including the Petitioner] and [the decedent, Najee Rivera.] During the fight, [the Petitioner] struck Gonzalez in the face, knocking her to the ground. [The decedent] approached the [Petitioner] and said something to the effect of ‘why did you hit her.’ An altercation ensued and the [Petitioner] produced a 9- millimeter handgun from his jacket and shot [the decedent] once in the stomach. The crowd dispersed and the [Petitioner] fled the scene.
At the time that this happened, Police Officers William Nagey, Shannon Dill and Brian Smith were in patrol uniform but in an unmarked vehicle driving down “C” Street right at Somerset. J-S20024-20
When those officers got to the intersection, they heard the gunshot and saw the crowd dispersing. [The decedent] was carried over to the police officers. A patrol car … drove [the decedent] to Temple Hospital.
At Temple Hospital, [the decedent] fell into a coma. He was treated for a gunshot wound to the abdomen and ultimately succumbed to his injuries on December 20, 2015. The body was taken to the Medical Examiners’ Officer, and he was examined by Dr. Albert Chu, who determined the immediate cause of death to be complications of a gunshot wound to the abdomen, and the manner of death [was] homicide.
At that time, police officers began an investigation for a shooting that later turned into a homicide. [Detective Brian Peters] interviewed multiple witnesses … Amongst these witnesses, four identified the [Petitioner] as the shooter. They described the incident between the two females in the fight and the [Petitioner] striking Gonzalez in the face. They identified the [Petitioner] by either knowing him or through a series of photographs in the photo array.
Ultimately, an arrest warrant was issued for the [Petitioner] on March 25, 2016. At the crime scene, [police officers] recovered one 9-millimeter fired cartridge casing. Recovered from the body of [the decedent] was one bullet fragment consistent with a 9- millimeter handgun. No murder weapon was recovered.
After the arrest warrant was issued, the [Petitioner] left the area. The case was referred to the fugitive squad. … Eventually they located the [Petitioner] as he was riding in a car that belonged to a woman named Keneisha Wright-Carter. That vehicle was driving southbound on 76. The vehicle turned onto the Boulevard and was stopped at Fox Street. … The [Petitioner] was identified and arrested pursuant to the arrest warrant.
PCRA Court Opinion, 5/28/19, at 2-3.
Police arrested Appellant and charged him with murder and unlawful
possession of a firearm at docket number 7623 of 2016, and unlawful
-2- J-S20024-20
possession of a firearm1 in the instant matter, docket number 7858 of 2016.
On December 4, 2017, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to those
offenses, and the trial court imposed an aggregate 22½ to 50 years of
incarceration. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. He filed this timely first
PCRA petition on June 6, 2018. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition
on October 18, 2018, and the PCRA court held a hearing on March 1, 2019.
At the conclusion of that hearing, the PCRA court entered an order denying
relief. This timely appeal followed.
We observe that Appellant has filed this appeal at docket number 7858
of 2016, relating to a § 6105 charge. The PCRA court, citing Commonwealth
v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), recommends that we quash this appeal
because it filed separate orders to each of the two docket numbers denying
relief, yet only a single notice of appeal was filed to docket number 7858 of
2016. In other words, it is the trial court’s opinion that Appellant had to file
two notices of appeal. We disagree. Walker held, prospectively, that “where
a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate
notices of appeal must be filed for each case.” Id. at 971. It was the co-
mingling of multiple dockets under a single notice of appeal that our Supreme
Court felt impeded proper appellate review. Implicit in Walker’s bright-line
rule is the assumption that an appellant desires to appeal issues relating to
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
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more than one docket under a single notice of appeal. The Commonwealth in
Walker attempted to file a single notice of appeal relating to four separate
dockets. Walker, however, is not violated where an appellant choses to
appeal from less than all dockets resolved under separate orders and files
separate notices only to those dockets relevant to the judgments sought to be
reviewed. This does not impede appellate review and is consistent with our
earlier case law that holds that our appellate jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
a judgment of sentence only under the docket number identified by a notice
of appeal and to no others. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 99 A.3d 577 (Pa.
Super. 2014), citing cases.2 Instantly, the record contains an order denying
relief at number 7858 of 2016. The PCRA court also entered a separate order
denying relief at docket number 7623. Appellant filed a notice of appeal only
to the order disposing of the petition raising issues as to docket number 7858
of 2016. This appeal did not arise from a single order pertaining to multiple
docket numbers. Walker therefore, is not applicable. The Commonwealth
candidly acknowledges the inapplicability of Walker in its brief.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 5 n.1. Our jurisdiction accordingly, is limited to
2 Hardy was a pre-Walker decision issued at a time when we considered we had jurisdiction to review multiple dockets under a single notice of appeal. Walker no longer allows that practice, but instead requires separate appeal notices for each docket sought to be reviewed. The holding in Hardy that our appellate jurisdiction only pertains to the judgment under the docket identified in a notice of appeal remains valid, is consistent with Walker, and properly vests this Court with jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.
-4- J-S20024-20
review of Appellant’s petition respecting his guilty plea to the charge at docket
number 7858 of 2016. We now turn to the merits.
Appellant claims his guilty plea was not valid, given that plea counsel
was ineffective for failing to present evidence of Appellant’s mental health
problems to the trial court. The PCRA court found otherwise, noting that the
trial court discussed Appellant’s mental health history with him during the
guilty plea hearing and concluded that Appellant understood the proceeding.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/19, at 7-8. Moreover, Appellant testified that he
had not undergone any mental health treatment since he was sixteen years
old. N.T. Guilty Plea, 12/4/17, at 16-17. Appellant, born on August 14, 1993,
was 24 years old at the time of the guilty plea and sentencing hearing.
We conduct our review according to the following standard:
In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108 A.3d 692, 701 (Pa. 2014)(citations
omitted), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 221 (2015). Counsel is presumed effective,
and a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving otherwise.
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). To do so, the
petitioner must show that “(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)
counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) the
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petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result.” Id. Failure to prove any of
these three prongs is fatal to the claim. Id.
It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel extends to the plea process, as well as during trial. However, [a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
[T]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.
Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Instantly, the record reflects that plea counsel informed the trial court
of Appellant’s prior mental health issues. Appellant informed the trial court
that his treatment for mental health issues had ceased years prior to the plea,
and Appellant stated that he understood the proceeding. Moreover, Appellant
reviewed and signed a written plea colloquy, and the trial court conducted a
thorough oral colloquy before accepting Appellant’s plea. The trial court
therefore accepted the plea and proceeded to sentencing. We have reviewed
the PCRA court’s opinion, the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable
law. We conclude that the PCRA court accurately addresses and disposes of
the merits of Appellant’s argument. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s
order for the reasons explained in the PCRA court’s May 28, 2019 opinion.
Order affirmed.
-6- J-S20024-20
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/15/2020
-7- Circulated 09/29/2020 02: 11 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION .. .. � ; . -- . 2:} P; l ,. "') '. ,._"1.-
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-5l-CR-0007858-2016
OPINION
McDermott, J. May 28, 2019
Procedural History
On April 22, 2016, the Petitioner, Khalil Henderson, was arrested and charged with
Murder and related offenses in CP-51-CR-0007623-2016, and Possession ofa Firearm by a
Prohibited Person ("VUF A 6105") and related offenses in CP-5l-CR-0007858-2016. On
December 4, 2017, the Petitioner appeared before this Court and entered into a negotiated guilty
plea to Third-Degree Murder and VUFA 6105 in CP-51-CR-0007623-2016 and VUFA 6105 in
CP-51-CR-0007858-2016.1 On that same date, this Court imposed the negotiated sentence of
twenty to forty years of imprisonment for Third-Degree Murder, and consecutive sentences of
one and one-half to five years of imprisonment and one to five years of imprisonment on each
respective VUF A 6105 charge, for a total sentence of twenty-two and one-half to fifty years of
imprisonment. The Petitioner did not file a post-sentence motion or a Notice of Appeal.
On June 6, 2018, the Petitioner filed a timely Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCR.A,,)
petition, his first. On October 18, 2018, appointed PCRA counsel filed an Amended Petition.
I The remaining charges were nolle prossed.
1 On March 1, 2019, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, this Court dismissed the instant
petition. On March 29, 2019, the Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal.
Guilty Plea Hearing Facts
At the December 4, 2017 guilty plea hearing, the Conunonwealth summarized the
following agreed upon facts:
On December 5, 2015, at approximately 7:30 pm, in the area of C and Somerset Streets in Philadelphia ... there was a fight between two females, one named Marguerita Gonzalez and another female. As the two women fought, a crowd surrounded them ... [including the Petitioner] and [the decedent, Najee Rivera.] During the fight, [the Petitioner] struck Gonzalez in the face, knocking her to the ground. [The decedent] approached the [Petitioner] and said something to the effect of "why did you hit her." An altercation ensued and the [Petitioner] produced a 9-millimeter handgun from his jacket and shot [the decedent] once in the stomach. The crowd dispersed and the [Petitioner] fled the scene. At the time that this happened, Police Officers William Nagey, Shannon Dill and Brian Smith were in patrol uniform but in an unmarked vehicle driving down "C" Street right at Somerset. When those officers got to the intersection, they heard the gunshot and saw the crowd dispersing. [The decedent] was carried over to the police officers. A patrol car ... drove [the decedent] to Temple Hospital. At Temple Hospital, [the decedent] fell into a coma. He was treated for a gunshot wound to the abdomen and ultimately succumbed to his injuries on December 20, 2015. The body was taken to the Medical Examiners' Officer, and he was examined by Dr. Albert Chu, who determined the immediate cause of death to be complications of a gunshot wound to the abdomen, and the manner of death [ was J homicide. At that time, police officers began an investigation for a shooting that later turned into a homicide. [Detective Brian Peters] interviewed multiple witnesses ... Amongst these witnesses, four identified the [Petitioner] as the shooter. They described the incident between the two females in the fight and the [Petitioner] striking Gonzalez in the face. They identified the [Petitioner] by either knowing him or through a series of photographs in the photo array. Ultimately, an arrest warrant was issued for the [Petitioner] on March 25, 2016. At the crime scene, [police officers J recovered one 9-millimeter fired cartridge casing. Recovered from the body of [the decedent] was one bullet fragment consistent with a 9-millimeter handgun. No murder weapon was recovered.
2 I
After the arrest warrant was issued, the [Petitioner] left the area. The case was referred to the fugitive squad .... Eventually they located the [Petitioner] as he was riding in a car that belonged to a woman named Keneisha Wright-Carter. That vehicle was driving southbound on 76. The vehicle turned onto the Boulevard and was stopped at Fox Street. ... The [Petitioner] was identified and arrested pursuant to the arrest warrant. Wright-Carter gave consent for the officers to search the car and gave a statement indicating that the [Petitioner] had placed an item of interest in the trunk of the car. Recovered from the trunk of the car was one 9-millimeter Kel-Tec handgun loaded with an extended magazine that held 27 rounds. It was fully loaded. That weapon was submitted to ballistics and the firearms identification unit. Police Office Lawrence Flagler ... determined that the handgun was not the murder weapon. Also recovered from the [Petitioner] was his cell phone. Police Detective Thurston Lucke examined the cell phone. Recovered inside the cell phone were photographs, including multiple photographs of the [Petitioner] holding two handguns. One was the same Kel-Tec 9-millimeter with the extended magazine that was recovered and another handgun consistent with a 9-millimeter that was never recovered. These photographs depict the [petitioner] holding both of those weapons at various points and then holding them each individually.
N.T. 12/4/2017 at 23-27.
Before entering into the negotiated guilty plea, the Petitioner indicated to this Court that
he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and ADHD when he was seven years old. The Petitioner
took medication for his mental health issues, but stopped treatment when he was sixteen years
old. Id at 15-17.
PCRA Evidentiary Hearing Facts
In preparation for trial, trial counsel, Jonathan Altschuler, Esq., visited the Petitioner in I
prison on several occasions and reviewed evidence with him. Trial counsel also discussed plea
options with the Petitioner, including the important rights the Petitioner would be giving up ifhe
chose to plead guilty, as well as the specific charges, mandatory minimum sentences, and the
statutory maximum sentences that could be imposed.
3 On December 4, 2017, the day this case was listed to begin trial, this Court permitted the
Petitioner's brother to spend time with the Petitioner and trial counsel so that the Petitioner could
consult with his brother about his decision to plead guilty.2 Trial counsel reviewed and
completed the guilty plea colloquy form with the Petitioner. Trial counsel believed the Petitioner
understood the issues as he was going over them with trial counsel, as well as his legal rights and
the consequences of the plea. Trial counsel would not have permitted the Petitioner to enter into
a negotiated guilty plea if he did not believe that the Petitioner understood the ramifications of
entering into the plea. N.T. 3/1/2019 at 9-14.
Trial counsel did not observe any of the Petitioner's alleged mental health issues.
Further, the Petitioner did not have any difficulty understanding any parts of the negotiations in
the weeks leading up to his plea when trial counsel discussed all aspects of the case with him,
including possible defenses. Id. at 24, 33.
According to the Petitioner's mother, Brenda Henderson, the Petitioner was diagnosed
with ADHD, depression, and anxiety when he was seven years old. Shortly after he was
diagnosed, his father passed away from a heart attack. Henderson obtained custody of the
Petitioner and raised him after his father's passing. The Petitioner stopped taking his medication
when he was approximately fourteen years old. After the Petitioner was arrested in this case, I I
Henderson visited him a few times while he was in local custody in Philadelphia. Henderson was
unaware that the Petitioner pled guilty. Id at 37-39, 41, 48-53.
The Petitioner did not testify at the evidentiary hearing.
2 The Petitioner met with his brother and trial counsel in this Court's consultation booth. Discussion t Before addressing the merits of the Petitioner's claim, this Court must first address the
fact that the Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal for only one of his two underlying convictions
relating to this matter. An appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a trial court. I
See Pa.R.A.P. 341. When a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court
docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed. Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977
(Pa. 2018). Failure to do so will result in a quashal of the appeal. Id. I On March 1, 2019, this Court issued an order denying relief on each docket number and
dismissed the Petitioner's instant PCRA petition on docket numbers CP-5l-CR-0007623-2016 I
(Third-Degree Murder and VUFA 6105) and CP-5 l-CR-0007858-2016 (VUFA 6105). On
March 29, 2019, the Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal in CP-51-CR-0007858-2016.
Because the Petitioner failed to file a separate notice of appeal for CP-51-CR-0007623-2016, this
appeal must be quashed.
For the benefit of any future potential proceedings, this Court will briefly discuss the
merits of the Petitioner's claim as it relates to his entire sentence. The Petitioner alleges one issue
for review, alleging that his guilty plea was unknowing, unintentional, and involuntary, as a
result of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the
entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the
defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Commonwealth v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476,
478-79 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. 2007)). Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of
the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases. Id. Pleas must be taken in open court, and trial courts must conduct an on the record
colloquy to ascertain whether the defendant is aware of his rights and the consequences of his I plea. Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2008). Through its colloquy, I
the trial court must affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant understands: (I) the nature and
charges to which he pleads guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by jury; I (4) the presumption of his innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of sentences and fines; and, (6) I
that the judge is not bound by an agreement unless the defendant accepts it. Pa.R.Crim.P. 590
Comment. To be eligible for relief based on an unlawful inducement claim, a petitioner must I
I plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction resulted from "a plea of
guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the I petition to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent." See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). J I
The record reflects that the Petitioner entered into a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary I
guilty plea. At his guilty plea hearing, the Petitioner reviewed and signed a written guilty plea
colloquy form which indicated that he understood the nature of the charges he pied guilty to, the I
factual basis for his plea, his right to a jury trial, the presumption of innocence, and the
permissible range of sentences. By signing the colloquy form, the Petitioner indicated that he
wished to enter his plea on his own volition and willingly gave up defenses to the charges and
the vast majority of his appellate rights. See Written Guilty Plea Colloquy Form, attached as
"Exhibit A."
This Court supplemented the Petitioner's written colloquy form with an extensive oral
colloquy, during which this Court confirmed that the Petitioner received his high school diploma.
N.T. 12/4/2017 at 15. This Court further verified that the Petitioner understood that he was
giving up all of his rights to a trial. Id. at 19. TI1is Court described the elements and maximum
--- �---�---- ---- 6 penalties of each crime to the Petitioner. Id. at 7. Armed with this information, the Petitioner
decided to accept the Commonwealth's negotiated plea. After this Court heard a summary of the
facts and determined that the Commonwealth had sufficient evidence to prove the Petitioner's
guilt, it accepted the Petitioner's plea based on his willingness to accept responsibility for his
actions. Id. at 3 9, 41. ' The Petitioner alleged that before he plead guilty, trial counsel only visited him four ' times at the prison. The length and frequency of the consultations between a lawyer and his I client cannot alone support a finding of ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Johnson, SI A.3d 237,
244 (Pa. Super 2012). The record is clear that this Court permitted the Petitioner additional time I to speak with trial counsel in the courtroom's consultation booth prior to the guilty plea hearing
on several occasions. Id. at 4-5, 9-12. Further, this Court allowed the Petitioner an opportunity
to discuss his options with his brother before accepting the negotiated plea. Id. at 9.
The Petitioner claimed he was incompetent to enter a guilty plea, in that he was unable to
participate in his defense because of several diagnosed but unrelated medical illnesses, such as
bipolar disorder, depression and PTSD. During the guilty plea hearing, the Petitioner told this
Court he was treated for bipolar disorder and ADHD, but his treatment stopped when he was
sixteen years old. Id. at 16-17. This Court discussed the Petitioner's mental health issues with I
him during the guilty plea hearing, and did not believe it interfered with his decision to enter into I
the guilty plea. N.T.3/1/2019 at 68. The Petitioner told this Court he did not understand "nothing
[trial counsel was] talking about" in relation to his case and the guilty plea process. N.T. 12/4/2017 at 5. At that time, this Court provided the Petitioner an opportunity to gain clarity
from both this Court and trial counsel. Id. at 5-6. Before accepting the negotiated guilty plea, this
Court determined that the Petitioner was fully aware of what was happening in the courtroom
------- --- ----- 7 during the guilty plea hearing based on the questions he asked this Court and his attorney. Id. at
69.
The Petitioner failed to present any 'evidence to establish that, at the time of his guilty
plea, he was suffering from any mental health issues that prevented him from understanding the
nature of his plea or of the charges against him, Further, the Petitioner stopped taking his
medication when he was a teenager. Id. at 41. This Court's determination that the Petitioner's
guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent did not change at the conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing. This claim fails.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of this Court should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT,
Barbara A. McDermott, J
8 Commonwealth v. Khalil Henderson, CP-51-CR-0007858-2016 I PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing filing upon the person(s), and in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R. Crim. P. 114: I Philadelphia District Attorney's Office Three South Penn Square Philadelphia, PA 19107 Attn: Lawrence Goode, Esq.
Type of Service: DA 's Assigned Courthouse Box I Joseph T. Schultz, Esq. 1518 Walnut Street, Suite 808 Philadelphia, PA 19102
Type of Service: First Class Mail
Khalil Henderson, NE7152 SCI Albion 10745 Route 18 Albion, PA 16475-0001
Type of Service: Certified Mail
Dated: May 28, 2019
¥� StephieWol�
Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Barbara A. McDermott EXHIBIT ''A'' •• ·' r
'COMMONWEALTH V.
PERSONAL
years. Education: Finished / Z grades in school. I can read and write English. I have never seen a doctor or been in a hospital for any mental problems - I can understand what is going on. I am not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. I have not taken any medicine in the last week.
THE CHARGES )"-J-, . -· . �� I admit I committed the crime(s) of-M v -& c i,.._�{ l ..... ��;-� i __.._U�t _-{ V :.._A....__... -=}_(s,-"'-o_'f"--v( 7___.l"" 'o, ._.1.,._,_,f1- -' f ...... .tv _J
---------------------------, and I want to plead guilty. My lawyer told me what the elements of the crime(s) are that the District Attorney must prove to convict me. I know I can go to jail for up to 4'i> years and be fined $ '7 � Q Q.Q._ for the crimes I committed.
NO PROMISES OR THREATS Nobody promised me anything or threatened me or forced me to plead guilty. I, myself, have decided to plead guilty. I know what I say today is final.
PLEA BARGAIN OR AGREEMENT There is no plea bargain or agreement of any kind. There is no plea bargain of any kind, except that the District Attorney promised to: ···· · Recommend a-sentence of not more than �-�-'/z_ to 5" O �-- . [y��sJ (liltQ,_,_�ffl': . Make no recommendations about my sentence.
1, Drop the charges of ,A// f�Mo,i, ,'.Lt cl,!Vf}
Nobody else promised me anything if I plead guilty. I know if the judge does not agree with the plea bargain or agreement, I can withdraw my guilty. plea and have a trial before a judge and jury or·before a judge alone.
RIGHTS AT TRIAL I do not have to plead guilty, even ifI committed the crimes. I have an absolute right to plead not guilty and have a trial. I can have a Jury trial or, ifI give up my jury trial rights, I can have a trial by a judge alone. When I plead guilty, I give up my right to have a trial. IfI went to trial, I would have all the rights listed below plus others. I am presumed to be innocent. That means that I siart out innocent- and stay innocent unless the District Attorney proves I committed the crime(s). I do not have to prove anything. ' Pago Io( 4 r- · To convict me, the District Attorney must prove more than that I probably committed the crimes. The District Attorney has to prove me guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt". A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt which would cause a normal, reasonable person to hesitate or halt or refuse to take any action at all in something very important to them. I have the right to remain silent. Nobody can make me testify or talk about the case. No one can hold it against me ifI remain silent. However, ifl want to, I can testify (tell my story) at the trial. Also, I may call other people who will be my witnesses and testify for me. IfI plead guilty, I give up this right. I give up many important rights if I plead guilty. For example, if I do not plead guilty and have a trial, all the witnesses for the District Attorney must come to court and testify under oath. My lawyer may cross-examine. them. My lawyer can ask them questions to see if they are telling the truth and if what they say is correct. I give up this right to confront and cross examine witnesses and many other rights ifI plead guilty. The witnesses do not have to come in to Court- the District Attorney just reads to the judge a summary of what happened.
JURY TRIAL OR TRIAL BY JUDGE My lawyer has fully explained to me that I have a right to a jury trial. Nobody can take that right away from me. At a jury trial, twelve (12) people, all from Philadelphia, would be on the jury and hear the facts of my case. If all twelve were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that I was guilty, I would be found guilty. If all twelve were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that I was guilty, I would be found not guilty. If all twelve could not agree, I would not be convicted, although I might have another trial before a different jury. I can help pick my jurors. Each juror would be questioned to make sure they would be fair. I can keep anyone off the jury who is shown to the judge to be unfair. I can also keep (seven (7)] [ 1 ( )) people off the jury without giving any reason why I don't want them on the jury, and so can the District Attorney. My lawyer and I would decide together which people we want to keep off the jury. IfI give up my right to a jury trial, I still can be tried by a judge alone without a jury. The same rules would apply, except the judge alone decides whether or not I have been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. IfI plead guilty, I give up my right to a jury trial, and I also give up my right to have a trial by a judge who would decide the case alone without a jury. .. . . . .... - __ .. -----··---- --·--····---·--····· ·--·-····- ---------------··· .... ··- .. ' . - ----··-··------------·--· ... ·---·--·--·-···--·-·------ PRE-TRIAL RIGHTS I am also giving up my pre-trial rights. lfI went to trial, before trial my lawyer could file motions, such as motions to keep out or "suppress" evidence. That means my lawyer could try to convince the judge that some of the evidence against me cannot be used at trial. This includes: (1) statements I made to the police or other people; (2) identifications people made of roe; and (3) anything that the police or others seized to use against me. Ifl plead guilty, I also give up speedy trial rights and my right under Rule 600 to be tried with.in 180 days from the filing of the complaint. I am also giving up all other pre-trial rights I might have. IfI already had a hearing on pre-trial motions, when I plead guilty I give up my right to appeal the decisions on those motions.
30-91.(Rcv. 11/05)