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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : EVERTON HASSAN HEDGEBETH : : Appellant : No. 2004 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 28, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0002357-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : EVERTON HASSAN HEDGEBETH : : Appellant : No. 2006 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 28, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005319-2023
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2025
Everton Hedgebeth appeals from his judgment of sentence after he was
found guilty of aggravated assault, first-degree murder, and related firearm
charges in two separate cases involving different incidents and victims. He
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S21011-25 J-S21012-25
claims that the trial court erred when it consolidated his charges from the two
cases for trial. Upon review, we affirm.
The facts of the first incident (5319-23) are as follows. On September
22, 2022, Hedgebeth went to the home of Janeya Roberts (“Janeya”) at 1227
West Ninth Street in Chester, Pennsylvania. Janeya was 5 months pregnant
with Hedgebeth’s child. Janeya and Hedgebeth got into an argument about
his relationship with another woman, which turned into a physical altercation.
As Hedgebeth was leaving Janeya’s apartment, her brother, Jasmar Roberts
(“Roberts”), showed up. Seeing that his sister was upset, Roberts confronted
Hedgebeth, and the two of them began to argue. Hedgebeth then pulled out
a gun from his pocket, shot Roberts twice, and ran off. Roberts was seriously
injured.
Detectives and officers from the Chester City Police Department arrived
at the scene of Roberts’ shooting. They found one fired cartridge casing. No
firearm was recovered.
The police submitted the fired cartridge casing to Detective Louis
Grandizio, a firearms examiner from the Delaware County Criminal
Investigation Division (“CID”). Upon examination, he determined that it was
a 9-millimeter Luger.
The police later questioned Roberts and Janeyah. However, at the time,
no one identified who shot Roberts.
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Several months later, the second incident occurred. On January 13,
2023, Janiyah Trusty (“Trusty”)1, who lived at 1231 West Ninth Street, near
Janeya, came home from work and chatted with her brother, Lorenzo Driggins
who also lived there. Janeya showed up at Trusty’s apartment and left with
Driggins to go back to her place. As they were leaving, Trusty saw from her
window two men walking up the street wearing black masks. As they got
closer, Trusty recognized them as Hedgebeth and Jason Ferguson. Trusty ran
to Janeya’s apartment, but Hedgebeth and Ferguson were already there.
Janeya’s son opened the door a little to let Trusty in, but Hedgebeth pushed
his way into Janeya’s apartment behind Trusty. Driggins tried to walk past
Hedgebeth to leave, but Hedgebeth pulled out a gun and shot Driggins
multiple times, killing him.
Detectives and officers were dispatched to the scene of the Driggins’
homicide. Janeya told police that she witnessed the shooting, identified
Hedgebeth as the shooter, and picked him out from a photographic lineup.
Trusty also gave a statement to the police positively identifying Hedgebeth as
the shooter and picked him out from a photographic lineup.
At the Driggins’ homicide scene, the police recovered three fired
cartridge casings and various bullet fragments. Again, no firearm was
recovered. At the autopsy, the medical examiner removed a bullet from
1 We observe that Trusty’s first name is spelled differently throughout the record in this case. We used her name as identified in the Commonwealth’s pretrial statement.
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Driggins’ leg. The bullet was a 9-millimeter Luger and matched a bullet
fragment recovered from the Driggins’ shooting scene.
Detective Grandizio examined the recovered fired cartridge casings and
bullet specimens related to the Driggins’ homicide. All three casings were 9-
millimeter Luger. Notably, two of the casings found at the scene had the same
unique markings.
Based on Janeya and Trusty’s identifications, Hedgebeth was arrested
for the shooting death of Driggins. On January 14, 2023, Hedgebeth was
charged with, inter alia, first degree murder, murder of the third degree,
firearms not to be carried without a license, and person not to possess a
firearm (case no. 2357-23).
Detective Grandizio was asked to take the evidence from the Driggins’
homicide and crosscheck it with the evidence from the Roberts’ shooting.
Detective Grandizio compared the fired cartridge casings from both scenes.
The casing found at the scene of the Roberts’ shooting had the same unique
markings as the two casings from the Driggins’ homicide scene. Consequently,
Detective Grandizio determined that all three casings were discharged from
the same firearm.
Eventually, in May 2023, after the Driggins’ homicide, Janeya identified
Hedgebeth as the person who shot Roberts. She positively identified
Hedgebeth in a photographic lineup. On September 13, 2023, Hedgebeth was
charged in the shooting of Roberts with multiple crimes including attempted
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homicide, aggravated assault, carrying a concealed firearm without a license,
and person not to possess (case no. 5319-23).
On December 6, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a motion to consolidate
Hedgebeth’s charges in both cases for trial. The trial court held argument on
December 15, 2023. The Commonwealth maintained that the cases should
be consolidated because the ballistics expert would testify that the fired
cartridge casings retrieved from both shooting scenes came from the same
gun. This would bolster the eyewitnesses’ testimony which identified
Hedgebeth as the perpetrator in both incidents. However, trying both cases
together would necessarily involve introducing evidence of alleged crimes in
both cases.
Hedgebeth opposed the motion, claiming that trying the two cases
together would be extremely prejudicial and outweigh the probative value of
the ballistics evidence. Hedgebeth also argued that the incidents were four
months apart, unlike other cases that permitted consolidation, involving a
much shorter periods of time between incidents.
On February 16, 2024, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s
motion for consolidation. However, trying the two cases together, the court
limited the Commonwealth’s evidence from one case to establish the identity
of the shooter in the other case. In other words, the Commonwealth could
attempt to establish the identity of the alleged shooter by showing evidence
that the fired cartridge casing recovered from the Roberts’ crime scene was
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discharged from the same gun as the cartridge casings found at the Driggins’
crime scene based on ballistics analysis.
On April 17, 2024, a jury found Hedgebeth guilty as follows: in the
Driggins’ case, murder of the first degree and firearms not to be carried
without a licenses; in the Roberts’ case, aggravated assault—causes or
attempts to cause serious bodily injury and firearms not to be carried without
a license.2 The trial court found Hedgebeth guilty of persons not to possess a
firearm in both cases.3 The jury acquitted Hedgebeth of attempted murder in
the Roberts’ case.
On June 28, 2024, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of life
in prison without the possibility of parole.
Hedgebeth filed timely, separate appeals in both cases. He and the trial
court complied with Appellate Rule 1925. 4
Preliminarily, we observe that Appellate Rule 513 provides that we may,
in our discretion, consolidate appeals in certain circumstances. Pa.R.A.P. 513;
see Always Busy Consulting, LLC v. Babford & Company, Inc., 247 A.3d
1033, 1042 (Pa. 2021). Here, both appeals arise from a single order—the trial ____________________________________________
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 2702(a)(1), and 6106(a).
3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
4 Hedgebeth’s Appellate Rule 1925(b) statement was filed well beyond the allotted 21 days. However, the trial court acknowledged that there was a breakdown in court operations which delayed the docketing and service of the order upon Hedgebeth’s counsel. Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/24, at 10. Ultimately, Hedgebeth filed his statement 3 days before the trial court’s order was docketed. Therefore, he did not waive his issue for appeal.
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court’s order consolidating Hedgebeth’s two cases for trial. Additionally, the
issue Hedgebeth raises on appeal in each case is the same. His briefs are the
same. Consequently, we consolidate Hedgebeth’s appeals sua sponte and
modify the caption accordingly. See Pa.R.A.P. 513); see also
Commonwealth v. Dunham, 319 A.3d 12, 12 (Pa. Super. 2024).
Hedgebeth raises the following single issue for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in granting Commonwealth's consolidation application in ruling that [case numbers] 2357-2023 and 5319-2023 be tried jointly?
Hedgebeth’s Brief at 4.
Hedgebeth claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it
consolidated his two cases for trial. In considering Hedgebeth’s issue, we are
mindful that the issue of whether to grant a motion to consolidate separate
indictments is within the “sole discretion of the trial court[,] and such
discretion will be reversed only for a manifest abuse of discretion or prejudice
and clear injustice to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107
A.3d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582 provides, in relevant part,
that offenses charged in separate indictments or informations may be tried
together if:
(a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion ....
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1)(a); Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 975
(Pa. Super. 2016). If the answer to these questions is “yes,” the court must
determine whether [the] defendant will be unduly prejudiced by consolidation.
See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 260 (Pa. Super. 2005).
The court has discretion to order separate trials if “it appears that any
party may be prejudiced” by consolidating the charges. Pa.R.Crim.P. 583.
Under Criminal Rule 583, the prejudice the defendant suffers due to the
joinder must be greater than the general prejudice any defendant suffers
when the Commonwealth's evidence links him to a crime. Commonwealth
v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 107 (Pa. Super. 2003). Prejudice, for purposes of
consolidation, is
that which would occur if the evidence tended to convict [the defendant] only by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid cumulating the evidence. Additionally, the admission of relevant evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for severance by itself.
Commonwealth. v. Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa. Super. 2010). The party
appealing the grant of consolidation bears the burden of establishing
prejudice. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 546 A.2d 596, 599–600 (Pa.
1988) (internal citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Gray, 296 A.3d 41,
47 (Pa. Super. 2023). The appellant must show real potential for prejudice
and not mere speculation. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 773 A.2d 131, 137
(Pa. 2001).
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Moreover, the law encourages joinder of offenses and consolidation of
indictments “‘when judicial economy can thereby be effected, especially when
the result will be to avoid the expensive and time-consuming duplication of
evidence.’” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1150 (Pa. Super.
2020) (en banc) (quoting Patterson, 546 A.2d at 600); Gray, 296 A.3d at
47.
Hedgebeth claims that the trial court abused its discretion by
consolidating his two cases. Specifically, he argues that the Commonwealth’s
purpose in requesting the court to try his cases together “was to muddy the
character of [Hedgebeth] in the minds of the jury and show his propensity to
commit the crime charged.” Hedgebeth’s Brief at 17. Hedgebeth further
maintains that the evidence presented regarding the Roberts’ shooting was
far more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 9, 17. Therefore, according to
Hedgebeth, we should reverse his judgment of sentence. 5 Id. at 18. We
disagree.
In consolidating the charges for trial from Hedgebeth’s two cases, the
trial court considered the relevant criteria for consolidation. First, the trial
court concluded that the evidence from each incident would be admissible at
separate trials to prove the identity of the shooter in each case. See Trial
Court Opinion, 11/27/24, at 18-20. The court considered the rules of
5 We note that the proper remedy for improperly joining cases for trial is to
remand for separate trials not reversing the judgment of sentence.
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evidence, in particular, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404. Id. at 15-16. This
rule provides, in relevant part:
Rule 404. Character Evidence; Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
***
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) and (2). Thus, evidence of other crimes or bad acts is not
admissible to prove that the defendant acted “in conformity with those acts or
to demonstrate a criminal propensity.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d
320, 325 (Pa. Super. 2012); Pa.R.E. 404(b). The evidence, however, may be
admissible for another, proper purpose. Brown, 52 A.3d at 325. One such
proper purpose is to establish identity of the perpetrator. “While evidence
concerning . . . distinct crimes is inadmissible solely to demonstrate a
defendant’s bad character or his propensity to commit crimes, that evidence
will be permitted to establish the identity of the perpetrator where proof of
one crime tends to prove the others.” Stiles, 143 A.3d at 975-76 (citing
Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1037 (Pa. Super. 2007).
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Here, contrary to Hedgebeth’s claim, the Commonwealth did not seek
or attempt to introduce evidence from one case to impugn his character or
show he had a propensity to commit crimes in the other case. Rather, the
Commonwealth used the ballistics evidence to establish that Hedgebeth was
the shooter in both cases and corroborate the eyewitnesses’ identification of
the shooter in each case. In fact, our courts previously have permitted
admission of the exact type of evidence presented in the instant case to
establish the identity of a perpetrator. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 626
A.2d 118 (Pa. 1993). In Reid, our Supreme Court concluded:
[Because] the circumstances of the second murder . . . place a weapon used in both murders in the hands of Reid at the time of the second murder, the question is whether a jury may draw an inference that Reid was the shooter in the first murder. Because empty shell casings from the same weapon were found at both murder scenes, and Reid was identified as the handgun shooter in the second murder, in which a ten millimeter bullet was found in the victim's head, evidence of the second murder is admissible to establish Reid's identity as the shooter in the first.
Reid, 626 A.2d at 121. Additionally, where ballistics evidence from one
murder matched ballistics evidence from another murder tended to establish
the identity of the shooter, our courts have concluded that consolidation of
the cases for trial was not an abuse of discretion. See Stiles, 143 A.3d at
976-77; Cousar, 928 A.2d at 1038-1039.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth’s presentation of this evidence did not
exceed the parameters of the consolidation order. As the trial court observed,
Detective Grandizio, an expert in forensic firearm and tool mark analysis,
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testified consistently with the prosecution's proffer in support of its
consolidation application. Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/24, at 22. Based upon
ballistics testing, “Detective Grandizio testified that per his expert opinion the
one [] expended cartridge casing recovered from the scene of the Roberts’
shooting was fired from the same weapon that discharged two [] of the fired
cartridge casings found at the Driggins’ homicide site.” Id.
Moreover, to ensure limited consideration of this evidence pursuant to
its order, the trial court instructed the jury several times during the trial
proceedings regarding the proper use of this evidence. In particular,
immediately after Detective Grandizio's direct examination, the court gave the
jury the following cautionary instruction:
THE COURT: . . . Ladies and gentlemen, you just heard Detective Grandizio testify that in his opinion[,] [t]he cartridge case he recovered [from the] September 21, 2022, alleged scene was discharged from the same firearm as certain cartridge cases secured [from the] January 13th, 2023, supposed scene. Credibility and weight of this evidence is for you.
Although you will make under each case number 2357-23 and 5319-23 separate and independent determinations of whether [] Hedgebeth has been proven by the prosecution guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all, some, or none of the at issue crimes[,] [y]ou may consider that Detective Grandizio's testimony opining the same firearm purportedly discharged [] [t]he cartridge case [] recovered from each alleged scene in both matters solely and only for the limited purpose of [the] Commonwealth, for them to establish the perpetrator's identity. This evidence offered by Detective Grandizio regarding the cartridge[] cases must not be considered by you in any other way than [except] for the purposes I've just stated. You must not regard this evidence as showing that [] Hedgebeth [is] a person of bad character or criminal tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer guilt.
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N.T., 4/16/23, at 177-78 (emphasis added). The court reiterated this
limitation during its final charge. N.T., 4/17/24, at 129. Juries are presumed
to follow the trial court's instructions, including instructions relating to joined
offenses. See Commonwealth v. Mollett, 5 A.3d 291, 313 (Pa. Super.
2010).
Next, the trial court concluded that the jury was capable of
distinguishing the two crimes from each other. See Trial Court Opinion,
11/27/24, at 28. A jury is capable of separating the evidence “[w]here a trial
concerns distinct criminal offenses that are distinguishable in time, space, and
the characters involved[.]” Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 423
(Pa. 1997).
Here, multiple factors distinguished the two incidents from each other.
These cases were filed at two separate docket numbers, one for each
shooting. Although Janeya was present for both shootings, others were
present for Driggins’ shooting, notably Trusty. Different detectives and police
officers investigated the incidents. Notably, the victims were different and
suffered different injuries to very different degrees. The incidents occurred
on separate dates, almost four months apart.
The trial court also emphasized to the jury that the trial involved
separate and distinct cases and they were to consider them as such, except
for the Commonwealth’s forensic evidence relating to identity. See Trial Court
Opinion, 11/27/24, at 26, 28. Significantly, the court cautioned the jury that:
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the evidence pertaining [to] the matter 2357-2023, the allegation [of] January 13, 2023, must not be considered by you in determining whether the Commonwealth has established [] Hedgebeth’s guilt beyond a reason[able] doubt in case number 5419-2023, the allegation on September 21, 2022. [Conversely], the evidence material [to] matter 5319-2023 regarding the allegations of [January 21, 2023] must not be considered in deciding whether the prosecution [] established beyond a reasonable doubt, [] Hedgebeth’s guilt in the case number 2357- 2023 the allegation of January 13, 2023.
N.T., 4/17/24, at 130.
Furthermore, the jury made separate findings for each charge under
each docket number. Notably, the jury acquitted Hedgebeth of attempted
murder related to the Roberts’ incident, demonstrating the jury considered
each case and each charge separately.
Lastly, the trial court rejected Hedgebeth’s claim that he was prejudiced
by consolidation of his charges for trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/24,
at 28.
As discussed above, other criminal acts are admissible to establish the
identity of the actor in each case. However, such evidence is only admissible
if its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
404(b).
Here, the trial court found the ballistics evidence related to the shootings
to be highly probative to establish the shooter in each case. Trial Court
Opinion, 11/27/24, at 28. This was particularly so given that the witnesses to
the Roberts’ shooting were very hesitant to identify Hedgebeth as the shooter.
Thus, the value of this evidence exceeded any prejudice which might arise
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from the jury being made aware that Hedgebeth may have committed another
crime. Indeed, Pennsylvania courts have found that such ballistics evidence
is very probative and outweighs the potential for any prejudice. See Cousar,
928 A.2d at 1038.
Additionally, as the trial court emphasized, it instructed the jury multiple
times on to how it should treat the two cases being tried together in order to
obviate the potential for prejudice. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/24 , at 28.
Notably, the court informed the jury that the cases were separate, that
evidence relating to each incident was to be considered separately unless it
instructed them otherwise, that certain evidence introduced for a limited
purpose could only be considered for such purpose, and that Hedgebeth’s guilt
in the two cases was to be considered separately. See id. at 22-26; see also,
N.T., 4/16/24, at 21-23, 177-78; N.T., 4/17/24, at 129-32.
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it consolidated Hedgebeth’s charges for trial. Accordingly, Hedgebeth is
not entitled to relief.
Judgments of sentence affirmed.
Date: 9/23/2025
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