Com. v. Hayes, E.
This text of Com. v. Hayes, E. (Com. v. Hayes, E.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
J-S41016-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ELIGAH HAYES : : Appellant : No. 2013 EDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 22, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0505341-2006
BEFORE: BOWES, J., BECK, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2026
Eligah Hayes (“Hayes”) appeals from the order entered by the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relef Act (“PCRA”). 1 Because the petition is
untimely and Hayes has failed to establish an exception to the statutory time-
bar, we affirm.
On June 23, 2006, Hayes entered a negotiated guilty plea to possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. On July 7, 2006, the trial
court sentenced him to eleven and one-half to twenty-three months of
incarceration, followed by one year of probation.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-S41016-25
On June 24, 2007, while on parole, Hayes was arrested on new charges.
Following a hearing, on February 1, 2008, the trial court revoked Hayes’ parole
and resentenced him to eleven and one-half to twenty-three months in prison,
followed by one year of probation.
On January 31, 2009, police arrested Hayes and the Commonwealth
charged him with attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and
criminal conspiracy. A jury found him guilty of the crimes, and the trial court
sentenced him on July 30, 2010, to twenty to forty years in prison.
Subsequently, on November 16, 2010, the trial court held a violation of
probation (“VOP”) hearing based on the new convictions. The trial court found
Hayes in violation of his probation and resentenced him to five to ten years in
prison to be served consecutively to his twenty-to-forty-year sentence.
On November 22, 2010, Hayes filed a motion for reconsideration of the
VOP sentence. The trial court denied the motion. Hayes did not file a direct
appeal.
On September 20, 2022, Hayes filed a pro se PCRA petition, alleging the
VOP sentence imposed on November 16, 2010, was illegal. The PCRA court
appointed Hayes counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition. In the
amended petition, Hayes conceded his petition was untimely filed and invoked
the newly-discovered fact exception, arguing that his revocation sentence was
illegal under Commonwealth v. Simmons, 262 A.3d 512, 527-28 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (en banc) (holding that a trial court could not anticipatorily
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revoke an order of probation if the commission of a new crime occurred after
sentencing, but before period of probation had begun). 2 The PCRA court
issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and ultimately dismissed it on July 22, 2024. Hayes filed
a timely notice of appeal.
Hayes presents the following claims:
1. Whether the PCRA court was in error in denying Hayes’ PCRA petition under the newly discovered facts exception to the timeliness requirement?
2. Whether the PCRA court erred in finding Hayes[] was not serving an illegal sentence for violating his probation when [he] had not yet begun his probationary sentence and thus could not be in violation?
Hayes’ Brief at 7.
The threshold question we must answer is whether Hayes’ PCRA petition
was timely filed, or, alternatively, satisfies an exception to the statutory time
bar. Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016).
“[T]he timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is
untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief.”
Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022). “As
the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a question of law, our standard of review
2 Subsequent to the filing of the amended petition, our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Rosario, 294 A.3d 338, 356 (Pa. 2023), approved the holding in Simmons, and concluded that a defendant may not be penalized for violation of a probation term that he/she has not begun to serve.
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is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Callahan,
101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
The PCRA sets forth the following mandates governing the timeliness of
any PCRA petition:
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner provides that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United Sates or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner must file a petition invoking one of
these exceptions “within one year of the date the claim could have been
presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2).
Hayes’ judgment of sentence from the VOP hearing became final on
December 16, 2010, after the time to file a direct appeal to this Court from
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his VOP sentence expired.3 Id. § 9545(b)(3) (stating the judgment of
sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review… or at the
expiration of time seeking the review”). Therefore, the instant PCRA petition,
filed on September 20, 2022, is facially untimely.
Hayes, however, invokes the newly-discovered fact exception, relying
upon this Court’s holding in Simmons as a new fact. Hayes’ Brief at 12-13.
Specifically, Hayes argues the trial court revoked his probationary sentence
prior to the sentence actually commencing, which, pursuant to Simmons,
now constitutes an illegal sentence. Id. at 13-16.
This argument fails. It is well established that new case law does not
constitute a “new fact” for the purposes of the exceptions to the PCRA. See
Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986 (Pa. 2011) (recognizing that
allowing newly discovered case law to constitute a new fact under the PCRA
would “circumvent the PCRA filing deadline”). Therefore, Hayes has failed to
establish the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA.
Hayes raised no other exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar either below or
on appeal. As Hayes failed to sufficiently plead and prove one of the
exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement, the PCRA court did not have
3 We note that “[a] motion to modify a sentence imposed after a revocation
shall be filed within 10 days of the date of imposition.
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