Com. v. Harris, T.

2026 Pa. Super. 24

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 9, 2026
• Docket: 3348 EDA 2024
• Status: Published
• Author: McLaughlin

Opinion

J-S38006-25 2026 PA Super 24

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYREESE HARRIS : : Appellant : No. 3348 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000105-2023

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2026

Tyreese Harris appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following

his guilty plea to third-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, persons not to

possess firearms, and firearms not to be carried without a license. 1 He

challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

In September 2024, Harris pleaded guilty to the above-referenced

offenses. As part of the plea deal, the parties agreed that Harris’s sentence

would be “no more than 22 to 44 years in the aggregate.” N.T., Sept. 16,

2024, at 4.

At a November 2024 sentencing hearing, Harris submitted a mitigation

report, which the court read. N.T., Nov. 25, 2024, at 4, 8. The court noted

that Harris’s prior record score was a five. Id. at 4-6. It stated that the

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 903(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), and 6106(a)(1), respectively. J-S38006-25

sentencing guidelines’ standard, minimum sentence ranges for third-degree

murder and conspiracy were 210 months to the statutory maximum; for

persons not to possess firearms, they were 72 to 90 months’ incarceration;

and for firearms not to be carried without a license, they were 48 to 60

months’ incarceration. Id. at 4, 7-8. Harris’s counsel requested a mitigated

sentence of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration. He argued that Harris’s parents

“effectively abandoned” him and he had experienced “a really disrupted

childhood” in which he was separated from his siblings. Id. at 10. Counsel

further stated that Harris was the victim of “abuse within his family” and he

experienced “a lot of really extreme violence in his childhood and young

adulthood.” Id. at 11. Counsel noted that Harris suffers from depression and

anxiety, had struggled in school, and was “hypervigil[ant],” which “is

overperceiving or over-evaluating a threat or believing there is a threat where

there is not.” Id. at 12. He further pointed out that Harris had been

“incarcerated for a very long period of time,” for much of which he was “more

or less” in solitary confinement. Id. at 15.

The court then heard from the victim’s sister and from Harris, who

apologized for his actions and spoke about his childhood and incarceration.

Id. at 30-42. The court stated that it would take into account the information

presented at the plea and sentencing hearings and in exhibits submitted in

preparation of the sentencing hearing, including the presentence and

mitigation reports. Id. at 42-43. The court stated that there were “mitigating

circumstances in th[e] case,” noting Harris “had a very deprived childhood”

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and “suffer[ed] greatly.” Id. at 43-44. The court noted Harris had been

exposed to violence and had “mental health disorders and a low IQ.” Id. at

44. The court also found that there were aggravating factors. It noted that

Harris committed the crime while on state parole for a robbery conviction and

that he had had 57 misconducts during his prior incarceration. Id. The court

also pointed out that the “facts in this case . . . would not be a typical third-

degree murder,” stating “[s]omeone shooting someone through the window

of a car in the back is not a garden-variety third-degree murder case.” Id. It

further noted that at the time of the crime, Harris was on parole, out past

curfew, and drove around with a gun in his car. Id.

The court next considered the statutory factors. Regarding the need to

protect the public, the court noted that Harris expressed “what appear[ed] to

be genuine remorse,” but “based on his conduct throughout the history of

what [the court could] see from the reports here, he does appear to be a

danger to the community.” Id. at 44-45. The court then discussed the gravity

of the offense in relation to its impact on the victim and the community. It

noted it was a homicide and the “victim’s life is over,” and that the crime had

affected the victim’s family, who “suffered and continue[d] to suffer greatly

because of [Harris’s] outrageous conduct.” Id. at 45. It also stated that it had

taken Harris’s rehabilitative needs into consideration. Id.

The court concluded that it “c[ould] live with the negotiated cap that

was part of the sentencing agreement but [it could not] . . . see any reason

to go below that cap.” Id. It stated going below the cap would be “manifestly

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inappropriate given the facts of this case.” Id. The Court imposed a sentence

of 17 to 34 years’ incarceration for third-degree murder and a consecutive

term of 5 to 10 years’ incarceration for possession of a firearm by a prohibited

person. The court also imposed concurrent prison sentences of 17 to 34 years’

incarceration for criminal conspiracy and three and a half to seven years for

carrying a firearm without a license. The aggregate sentence was 22 to 44

years’ incarceration—the cap agreed to by the parties. Harris filed a post-

sentence motion, which the court denied. Harris appealed.

Harris raises the following issue:

Did the lower court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive and unreasonable sentence without adequate consideration of Tyreese Harris’ background, trauma, and rehabilitative needs, as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code?

Harris’s Br. at 2.

Harris argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. He

maintains that his agreement to a capped sentence of 22 to 44 years’

incarceration did not mean the court “could then simply impose the capped

sentence without adequate consideration of Mr. Harris’ substantial mitigation.”

Harris’s Br. at 10. Harris claims that “[d]iscretion remained with the court to

impose a sentence within the cap after proper consideration of the required

sentencing factors under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), which included consideration

of Harris’ rehabilitative needs.” Id. at 11-12. He maintains that his “mitigation

mandated a sentence well below 22 to 44 years of confinement.” Id. at 10.

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The trial court first concluded that Harris could not challenge the

discretionary aspects of his sentence because as part of the plea agreement

he agreed that the maximum sentence he could receive would be 22 to 44

years’ incarceration, and the court imposed that sentence. Trial Ct. Op., filed

Mar. 11, 2025, at 3-4. We disagree.

If a defendant has pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, whether

the defendant may challenge a discretionary aspect of the sentence “depends

upon the actual terms of the plea bargain, specifically, to what degree a

sentence agreement has been reached.” Commonwealth v. Dalberto, 648

A.2d 16, 18 (Pa.Super. 1994). A defendant may enter an open or a negotiated

guilty plea. An open guilty plea “is one in which there is no negotiated

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 363 n.1 (Pa.Super.

2005). In other words, if “there have been no sentencing restrictions in a plea

agreement, the entry of a guilty plea will not preclude a challenge to the

discretionary aspects of sentencing.” Dalberto, 648 A.2d at 20. However, if

a plea agreement involves an agreement to a particular penalty, “there is no

authority to permit a challenge to” the imposition of that penalty. Id. (citation

omitted).2

2 See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 982 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2009) (“where a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement specifying particular penalties, the defendant may not seek a discretionary appeal relating to those agreed-upon penalties.” (citing Dalberto, 648 A.2d at 20).

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There are also “hybrid” plea agreements, which “fall[] somewhere

between a negotiated plea and an open plea[.]” Id. at 21. When faced with

these agreements, “our task is to determine the effect of th[e] hybrid plea

agreement on the right to challenge the discretionary aspects of [the]

sentence.” Id. “A hybrid plea agreement does not preclude appellate review

of those discretionary aspects of the sentence that were not agreed upon in

the negotiation process.” Commonwealth v. Heaster, 171 A.3d 268, 271

(Pa.Super. 2017).

Here, Harris and the Commonwealth agreed that the aggregate

sentence would be no greater than 22 to 44 years in prison. On appeal, Harris

claims the court abused its discretion because it failed to consider his

rehabilitative needs and imposed an excessive sentence. The parties agreed

to give the court discretion to impose an aggregate sentence anywhere below

the cap, and Harris may challenge on appeal its exercise of that discretion.

See Heaster, 171 A.3d at 271 (“A hybrid plea agreement does not preclude

appellate review of those discretionary aspects of the sentence that were not

agreed upon in the negotiation process”); Brown, 982 A.2d at 1019

(defendant could pursue appeal challenging exercise of discretion with respect

to maximum term where he and Commonwealth agreed to a minimum term);

Dalberto, 648 A.2d at 21 (defendant could challenge the discretionary

aspects of his sentence when he and the Commonwealth agreed that no more

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than two of the charges would run consecutively, but he could not challenge

the imposition of the two consecutive sentences). 3

The court also found that, if Harris could appeal the sentence, it did not

abuse its discretion when imposing the sentence. Trial Ct. Op. at 5-7.

“The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence

is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018). We must

determine whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved

his issue; (3) his brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon

for allowance of an appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether

the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth

v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)

(stating that an appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a

3 See also Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 1762 EDA 2023, 2025 WL 1013435,

at *3-4 (Pa.Super. Apr. 3, 2025) (unpublished mem.) (concluding defendant could appeal discretionary aspects of sentence where he and the Commonwealth had agreed to a “high/low sentence between 20-40 and 10- 20”); Commonwealth v. Howard, No. 466 MDA 2023, 2024 WL 2153624, at *2 n.7 (Pa.Super. filed May 14, 2024) (finding appellant could appeal discretionary aspects of sentence not agreed upon where she entered a hybrid plea providing for a cap on the sentence); Commonwealth v. Tipping, No. 891 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 3992059, at *1-*2 (Pa.Super. Aug. 23, 2019) (unpublished mem.) (reviewing discretionary aspects of sentence where parties agreed to a cap on the minimum sentence). We may cite our unpublished decisions filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value. See 210 Pa. Code § 65.37(B). We find the foregoing decisions highly persuasive on this point.

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sentence “shall set forth in a separate section of the brief a concise statement

of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the

discretionary aspects of a sentence”).

Here, Harris raised the issue in a post-sentence motion and in this timely

appeal, and his brief includes a statement of the reasons relied upon for

allowance of appeal. Further, his issue—that the court imposed an excessive

and unreasonable sentence that did not account for his rehabilitative needs—

raises a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763,

770 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc) (finding a substantial question was presented

where appellant challenged “the imposition of his consecutive sentences as

unduly excessive, together with [a] claim that the court failed to consider his

rehabilitative needs . . . .”).

Sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Rominger, 199

A.3d 964, 970 (Pa.Super. 2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the

record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or

the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

When the court fashions its sentence, it must consider “the protection

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life

of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the

defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Additionally, where the court had the

benefit of a Pre-Sentence Investigation (“PSI”) report, we may “assume the

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sentencing court was aware of the relevant information regarding the

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating

statutory factors.” Commonwealth Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa.Super.

2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, when imposing its sentence, the court considered Harris’s

rehabilitative needs, as well as the gravity of the offense and the need to

protect the community. It considered the testimony and arguments from the

sentencing hearing, as well as information in the PSI and mitigation reports.

There is nothing in the record to suggest the court abused its discretion in

imposing the 22-to-44-year sentence. This claim lacks merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 2/9/2026

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