Com. v. Harris, K.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided July 13, 2016·No. 2525 EDA 2014·Unpublished

Opinion

J-A11001-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v.

KEITH HARRIS,

Appellee No. 2525 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered July 30, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0048044-2013

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 13, 2016

The Commonwealth appeals from the order denying its motion to refile

criminal charges against Appellee, Keith Harris, in the above-captioned

matter after the court of common pleas determined the Commonwealth

failed to present a prima facie case to permit a trial. Upon careful review,

we reverse.

We summarize the procedural history of this case as follows. In the

early evening of December 19, 2013, Philadelphia Police were conducting

surveillance in the 2900 block of Kip Street when they observed Appellee’s

involvement with Ricardo Correa to the extent that they believed Appellee

was participating in the sale of narcotics with Mr. Correa. On December 20, ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A11001-16

2013, Appellee was charged with possession of a controlled substance,

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and conspiracy.

At a preliminary hearing held before the Honorable Nazario Jimenez of

the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County on April 16, 2014, the charges

brought against Appellee were dismissed due to lack of evidence.1 On

May 16, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a notice of refiling of the criminal

complaint against Appellee. On July 30, 2014, a preliminary hearing was

conducted before the Honorable Harold M. Kane of the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County. At the close of the hearing, Judge Kane denied

the Commonwealth’s motion to refile the charges against Appellee. The

Commonwealth then filed a motion for reconsideration on August 1, 2014,

which was never addressed. Thereafter, on August 28, 2014, the

Commonwealth filed this timely appeal.2

The Commonwealth presents the following issue for our consideration:

____________________________________________

1 It is well settled that “[a] magistrate’s decision to dismiss criminal charges after a preliminary hearing is unappealable.” Commonwealth v. Carbo, 822 A.2d 60, 64 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “Therefore, the reinstitution of charges is the only recourse available to the Commonwealth after it fails to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing.” Id. As will be discussed infra, the Commonwealth refiled the charges against Appellant, and the July 30, 2014 order from which it is now appealing essentially dismissed those charges for a second time. 2 Although not ordered to do so by the trial court, on August 28, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court has not prepared an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

-2- J-A11001-16

Properly viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, did the evidence at the preliminary hearing establish a prima facie case of possession of narcotics with intent to deliver and conspiracy?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

The Commonwealth argues that the court of common pleas erred in

denying the Commonwealth’s motion to refile the charges against Appellee,

claiming that it established a prima facie case that Appellee conspired with

Mr. Correa to sell drugs. The Commonwealth points to the evidence that

Appellee accepted a large sum of cash from Mr. Correa, repeatedly entered

an abandoned home that contained 140 vials of crack cocaine, as well as

thirty packets of heroin and $370.00, and that Appellee “stood watch” on a

street corner while Mr. Correa sold drugs to two individuals. The

Commonwealth claims that the trial court’s failure to find that Appellee’s

actions amounted to the statutory definition of conspiracy was legal error.

We are constrained to agree.

We begin by noting that “[t]he question of the evidentiary sufficiency

of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case is one of law,” and as such, our

review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 865 (Pa.

2003). In Huggins, our Supreme Court explained:

At the pre-trial stage of a criminal prosecution, it is not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, its burden is merely to put forth a prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt. A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes sufficient probable cause to warrant the belief that

-3- J-A11001-16

the accused committed the offense. The evidence need only be such that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case to go to the jury. Moreover, “[i]nferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth’s case.”

Huggins, 836 A.2d at 866 (citations omitted).

Here, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with the crimes of

possession of narcotics, possession with intent to deliver, and criminal

conspiracy. Regarding the crime of possession with intent to deliver, we

have stated the following:

To establish the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a controlled substance with the intent to deliver it. The intent to deliver can be inferred from an examination of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Factors to consider in determining whether the drugs were possessed with the intent to deliver include the particular method of packaging, the form of the drug, and the behavior of the defendant.

The Commonwealth has the option to establish actual or constructive possession.

Constructive possession requires proof of the ability to exercise conscious dominion over the substance, the power to control the contraband, and the intent to exercise such control. Constructive possession may be established by the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703, 707-708 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

-4- J-A11001-16

Further, with regard to the crime of criminal conspiracy we have

stated:

Circumstantial evidence may provide proof of the conspiracy. The conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding such conduct may create a “web of evidence” linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally:

An agreement can be inferred from a variety of circumstances including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal episode. These factors may coalesce to establish a conspiratorial agreement beyond a reasonable doubt where one factor alone might fail.

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Related

Commonwealth v. Huggins
836 A.2d 862 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2003)
Commonwealth v. McCall
911 A.2d 992 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Commonwealth v. Carbo
822 A.2d 60 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2003)
Commonwealth v. Perez
931 A.2d 703 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2007)