Com. v. Harper, I.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 7, 2026
• Docket: 1754 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Lazarus

Opinion

J-S04003-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : IRVIN HARPER : : Appellant : No. 1754 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 10, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011481-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and NEUMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED APRIL 7, 2026

Irvin Harper appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) 1

petition. After review, we affirm.

In December of 2016, Harper was charged with various offenses,

including possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (PWID),

possession of a controlled substance, possession of a firearm without a

license, and several other offenses, some of which were sexual in nature.

Harper proceeded to a jury trial on the drug charges in June and July of 2018;

the possession of a firearm without a license charge was bifurcated and set

for a separate proceeding after trial.

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S04003-26

At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Detective Daniel

O’Malley of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Special Victims Unit, as well

as Sergeant James Schuck and Officer Kevin Keys from the Narcotics Field

Unit.

Detective O’Malley testified regarding the investigation into Harper and

the execution of the arrest and search warrants for Harper and his apartment.

See N.T. Trial, 7/2/18, at 39-61. Detective O’Malley described “a large

quantity of narcotics in plain view on the kitchen table and on the floor” as

well as other items tucked away in cabinets. Id. at 61. He also identified a

handgun found in a Tupperware container inside a mirrored cabinet in Harper’s

bedroom, as well as the property receipt for the handgun. Id. at 62-63.

Additionally, Detective O’Malley testified about finding various objects that

proved the residence belonged to Harper, finding a large bowl “inside the

cabinet [] with white power[,]” and calling the Narcotics Field Unit to process

the drugs found on scene. Id. at 65-66.

Officer Keys testified as an expert in the field of narcotics. Id., 6/29/18,

at 35. He opined that the drugs recovered from Harper’s apartment were

possessed with the intent to deliver based on the amount of heroin and

cocaine found, the denominations of cash recovered, stamps used to brand

drug packaging, and the gun found in Harper’s bedroom. Id. at 40-46.

Sergeant Schuck testified that his unit was called to handle the narcotics

recovered from Harper’s apartment. Id. at 6-7. Upon arriving at the

apartment, the Special Victims Unit officers directed Sergeant Schuck and

-2- J-S04003-26

another officer assigned to him, Officer Bruce Cleaver, to the bagging

materials, scales, grinders, and bags of cocaine and heroin that were on the

kitchen table. Id. at 7. Sergeant Schuck and Officer Cleaver conducted an

additional search of the property and then prepared the evidence for transport

to police headquarters. Id. at 8. Sergeant Schuck also testified regarding

the property receipts for the evidence obtained, which included narcotics,

paraphernalia, a piece of mail, and the money recovered from Harper at the

scene. Id. at 9-11.

Following trial, on July 6, 2018, the jury found Harper guilty of PWID

and possession of a controlled substance. At a hearing on July 9, 2018, Harper

also pled guilty to the bifurcated charge of possession of a firearm without a

license. The trial court sentenced Harper to three to six years’ incarceration

for PWID and five to ten years’ incarceration for possession of a firearm

without a license, resulting in an aggregate sentence of eight to sixteen years

of incarceration.2 Harper filed a direct appeal, this Court affirmed Harper’s

judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance

of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Harper, 241 A.3d 398 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(Table).3 ____________________________________________

2 Harper’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance was nolle prossed as part of his guilty plea.

3 Though irrelevant to our current disposition, Harper filed his first PCRA petition in February of 2021. The petition was dismissed on April 29, 2021, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, and the Pennsylvania (Footnote Continued Next Page)

-3- J-S04003-26

On May 29, 2024, the Commonwealth provided Harper a disclosure

notice for Sergeant Schuck. The disclosure contained the findings of two

Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigations into Sergeant Schuck, neither of

which related directly to Harper’s case. The first investigation concluded that

Sergeant Schuck violated department policy by failing to supervise a

subordinate. The second investigation addressed a potential warrantless

search conducted by Sergeant Schuck but did not result in any finding of

misconduct.

On August 21, 2024, Harper filed the instant pro se PCRA petition

alleging a Brady4 violation. Harper’s petition alleged that the Commonwealth

failed to disclose material information regarding Sergeant Schuck based on

the IAD’s findings. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Harper’s

PCRA petition on February 6, 2025, claiming that it was meritless and should

be dismissed because Sergeant Schuck played a minimal role in Harper’s

investigation and the evidence used against Harper was lawfully obtained by

multiple investigators.

On May 8, 2025, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on of

its intent to dismiss the petition, explaining that Harper failed to show that the

disclosure of Sergeant Schuck’s alleged misconduct would have impacted

Harper’s trial strategy in a material way, or that there was a reasonable ____________________________________________

Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See id., 304 A.3d 723 (Pa. Super. 2023) (Table), appeal denied, 308 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2023) (Table).

4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

-4- J-S04003-26

probability of a different outcome at trial if the information had been presented

to the jury. The PCRA court ultimately dismissed Harper’s petition on June

10, 2025.

Harper timely appealed, and both Harper and the PCRA court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Harper now raises the following claims for our

review:

1. Whether the PCRA court was in error for not granting [Harper] a new trial based on the facts of his Brady/Giglio[ v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)] violation[?]

2. Whether the PCRA court was in error in finding that [Harper] did not meet the materiality requirement according to the rules of Brady, Giglio, Kyles v. Whitley, [514 U.S. 419 (1995)], and all the case[s] of the United States Supreme Court [regarding] Brady violations[?]

3. Whether the PCRA court was in error for failing to grant [Harper] an evidentiary hearing for the Brady/Giglio violation?

4. Whether the PCRA court was in error when it made a[n] improper analysis of materiality according to the rules set by the United States Supreme Court?

Appellant’s Brief, at 7.

Prior to addressing Harper’s claims, we must determine whether his

PCRA petition was timely filed and, if not, whether he has satisfied an

exception to the PCRA time bar. Any PCRA petition “shall be filed within one

year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

A judgment of sentence becomes final for the purposes of the PCRA “at the

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the

-5- J-S04003-26

expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. at § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not

address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely

filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Instantly, Harper’s judgment of sentence became final, for purposes of

the PCRA, on November 7, 2020, when the time expired for him to file a

petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (providing thirty days for appeal

to Pennsylvania Supreme Court after entry of Superior Court order). Thus,

Harper had until November 7, 2021, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Consequently, Harper’s instant petition, filed on

August 21, 2024, is facially untimely.

However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely petition if the

petitioner can plead and prove one of the three exceptions set forth at 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii):

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

-6- J-S04003-26

Id. Any petition invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id. at § 9545(b)(2).

It is “well-settled” that a Brady violation may fall within the governmental

interference exception. Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 28 (Pa.

2019). Nevertheless, “the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to

previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government

officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the

exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263,

1268 (Pa. 2008).

Here, we find it sufficient that the Commonwealth provided Harper with

the disclosure notice after the IAD investigation to show that Harper could not

have previously raised the claim because of government interference or

obtained the information earlier through the exercise of due diligence. See

Natividad, 200 A.3d at 29 (finding section 9545(b)(1)(ii) satisfied where

appellant filed petition based upon facts previously unknown to him until

Commonwealth provided him access to case file). Further, Harper’s petition

is timely pursuant section 9545(b)(2) because he filed it within one year of

receiving the disclosure notice from the Commonwealth. Id. Accordingly, we

turn to the merits of Harper’s appeal.5

5 Harper’s brief fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)’s requirement that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part . . . the particular point treated therein[.]” Id. Instead, Harper’s argument is presented under an (Footnote Continued Next Page)

-7- J-S04003-26

Harper argues that he suffered prejudice because his trial strategy

would have been different had the IAD investigations been disclosed to him

earlier; namely, Harper claims his strategy would have been to impeach

Sergeant Schuck’s credibility at trial. With this information, Harper claims his

attorney could have argued “to the jury that the credibility of the

Commonwealth’s entire case could not be trusted[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 16.

In particular, Harper claims that “the Brady information would [have] cast

doubt on Schuck’s testimony that officers told him the evidence was found in

the third floor apartment.” Id. at 26.

“Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining whether

the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146

A.3d 221, 226 n.9 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). “Great deference is granted

to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed

unless they have no support in the certified record.” Commonwealth v.

Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa. Super. 2007). The PCRA court’s credibility

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court;

assortment of headings, including “Legal Error[,]” “Brady Analysis[,]” and “Trial Strategy[,]” which do not correspond to his enumerated statement of questions involved. Appellant’s Brief, at 7, 11, 18, 21. While we may liberally construe pro se filings, a pro se litigant enjoys no special benefit. Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017). However, as we are able to understand the thrust of Harper’s argument, our review has not been substantially impeded by his lack of compliance, and we decline to quash his appeal. See Clark v. Peugh, 257 A.3d 1260, 1264 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2021).

-8- J-S04003-26

however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal

conclusions. Natividad, 200 A.3d at 25.

There are three elements to a Brady claim: (1) the evidence at issue

is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching;

(2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and

(3) prejudice ensued. See Natividad, 200 A.3d at 25–26 (citing Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)).

Pursuant to Brady and its progeny, the prosecutor “has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles [], 514 U.S. [at] 437 [] (1995). However, there is no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case. The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish “materiality” in the constitutional sense.

Instead, “favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” [Id.] at 433[.] A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. In evaluating whether a reasonable probability of a different outcome has been demonstrated, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” [Id.] at 434[.] A defendant thus “need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict.” Id. at 434–45[.] Rather, a defendant need only show that the favorable evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435[.]

-9- J-S04003-26

Natividad, 200 A.3d at 26 (some internal citations and quotations omitted).

“Materiality” extends to evidence that affects the credibility of witnesses,

rather than only to exculpatory evidence. Commonwealth v. Cam Ly, 980

A.2d 61, 76 (Pa. 2009) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (1972)). Additionally,

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Brady’s protection

encompasses a defendant’s ability to investigate alternate defense theories

and formulate trial strategy. Cam Ly, 980 A.2d at 76 (citing Commonwealth

v. Green, 640 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. 1994)). As to a Brady claim brought

pursuant the PCRA, “a[n appellant] must demonstrate that the alleged Brady

violation ‘so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.’” Cam Ly, 980 A.2d

at 76 (quoting Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 719 A.2d 252, 259 (Pa.

1998)).

The PCRA court concluded that Harper failed to establish a reasonable

probability of a different outcome at trial had the evidence been presented

because “[Sergeant] Schuck’s role in the [] investigation was extremely

limited.” PCRA Court Opinion, 8/5/25, at 11. The PCRA court recounted that

Detective O’Malley was the officer who applied for, received, and executed

arrest and search warrants, wherein he observed narcotics in plain view, while

another officer, conducting a further search, recovered a firearm. Id. The

PCRA court summarized Sergeant Schuck’s role as “cataloguing the narcotics

and paraphernalia that had already been seized by [the Special Victims Unit

officers.] Id. We agree.

- 10 - J-S04003-26

Harper’s argument fails because he cannot establish that he was

prejudiced by the non-disclosure of Sergeant Schuck’s misconduct prior to

trial. To establish prejudice, Harper must demonstrate a “reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Simpson,

66 A.3d 253, 264 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Clark, 961 A.2d

80, 89 (Pa. 2008)). Furthermore, when the prosecution’s failure to disclose

information relates to a witness’ credibility, the appellant must “demonstrate

that the reliability of the witness may well be determinative of his guilt or

innocence.” Simpson, 66 A.3d at 266 (quoting Commonwealth v. Morales,

701 A.2d 516, 523 (Pa. 1997)).

Based upon the testimony and evidence recounted above, even if Harper

was aware of the IAD investigations and able to use them to impeach Sergeant

Schuck at trial, there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome would

have been different. As noted by the PCRA court, Sergeant Schuck’s role in

the investigation was extremely limited, there was no allegation that he

engaged in any misconduct in Harper’s case, and the Special Victims Unit

officers conducted the search and seizure of the property, as well as

effectuated Harper’s arrest, prior to Sergeant Schuck’s arrival. Accordingly,

the PCRA court did not err in denying Harper relief on his Brady claim.

Harper’s claim that the PCRA court erred by not granting him a hearing

is, likewise, meritless, where we have determined his petition did not contain

genuine issues of material fact. Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d

- 11 - J-S04003-26

1262, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2008). Based on our conclusion that the PCRA court

properly dismissed Harper’s petition, we also find that it did not err in failing

to hold a hearing. Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying

Harper’s petition.

Order affirmed.

Date: 4/7/2026

- 12 -