Com. v. Harley, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 3083 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Kunselman

Opinion

J-S43002-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHYNA HARLEY : : Appellant : No. 3083 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 24, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001275-2024

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2026

Chyna Harley appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after the

trial court found her guilty of simple assault. 1 She claims the evidence was

insufficient to sustain her conviction. Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the facts, based on testimony and video footage,

as follows:

On December 13, 2023, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan was on duty, in full uniform, outside of Family Court at 1501 Arch Street in the City and County of Philadelphia. While on patrol, Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan observed a number of cars parked in front of Broad Street. Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan approached a white Chevy to instruct the driver to move the vehicle and park on Arch Street. [Harley] exited the front passenger seat of the Chevy.

Immediately thereafter, a black male, later identified as [] Robinson, exited the back passenger side of the Chevy. [] Robinson cursed at Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan, threw a water bottle ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). J-S43002-25

into the middle of the street, and walked toward the entrance of the courthouse. Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan followed and approached [] Robinson to give [him] a citation for littering. As [Harley] walked inside the courthouse, [] Robinson stopped in front of the door and turned toward Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan.

While the Deputy Sheriff spoke to [] Robinson, [Harley] walked back out of the courthouse. [Harley] approached Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan and immediately shoved him with her left hand, causing the Deputy Sheriff to take a step back. [] Robinson stepped forward and shoved Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan with two hands. Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan’s partner then approached to provide assistance.

[] Robinson continued to engage in a physical altercation with Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan by grabbing, pushing, and striking him, which resulted in the Deputy Sheriff falling to the floor beside the glass door.

Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan’s partner attempted to separate them, and [Harley] tried to pull officers off of [] Robinson. During the altercation, multiple individuals approached in an effort to break up the fight and additional officers came onto the scene. [Harley] was pushed away by an officer and stepped back from the group.

[Harley again] attempted to re-engage in the altercation but was blocked from doing so. In response, [Harley] continued to push her body forward and raised her arm to block the restraint.

Following this interaction, [Harley] walked away momentarily, removed her jacket, and dropped her purse on the ground before forcefully attempting to push her way back into the fray. [Harley] used her body to press forward against those restraining her in an effort to break through. [Harley] was intercepted and pinned against the front of the courthouse by three individuals. After breaking free, [Harley] aggressively pushed against these individuals but was walked back to the other side of the sidewalk. [Harley] again attempted to re-engage and additional officers approached and intervened.

An officer attempted to place [Harley] in handcuffs. In response, she walked backward and swung her right arm in resistance before Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan successfully secured [Harley] in handcuffs.

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Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/25, at 2-4 (citations omitted). Harley was charged

with multiple offenses.

Following a bench trial, the court found Harley guilty of simple assault;

the court acquitted her of aggravated assault, conspiracy, and reckless

endangerment of another person. The court sentenced Harley to two years’

reporting probation.

Harley filed this timely appeal. She and the trial court complied with

Appellate Rule 1925.

In her sole issue on appeal, Harley challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain her conviction for simple assault. Specifically, Harley

argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that she attempted to

cause bodily injury to the deputy. Harley maintains that she just pushed the

deputy which is more akin to harassment; not all physical contact amounts to

an assault. Harley further maintains that the trial court speculated as to the

intent behind her actions and returning to the conflict. Therefore, according

to Harley, this Court should reverse her conviction and vacate her sentence.

Harley’s Brief at 4-5.

We disagree.

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court:

must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted). However, “the inferences must flow from facts and circumstances

proven in the record and must be of such volume and quality as to overcome

the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of an accused's guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Scott, 597 A.2d 1220, 1221 (Pa.

Super. 1991). “The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and

speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail even under

the limited scrutiny of appellate review.” Id. “Because evidentiary sufficiency

is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review

is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient to establish that Harley attempted to cause bodily injury to Deputy

Alanguilan and sustain her conviction for simple assault. The trial court aptly

discussed the relevant law and evidence to support this conclusion:

[T]o sustain its burden of proof for a simple assault, the Commonwealth must show that [Harley] “attempt[ed] to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to another[.]” 18 Pa. C.S. § 2701(a)(1). “Bodily injury” is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 2301. The Commonwealth need not establish that the victim actually suffered bodily injury; rather, it is sufficient to support a conviction if the Commonwealth establishes an attempt to inflict bodily injury. This intent may be shown by circumstances which reasonably suggest that a defendant intended to cause injury. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 636 A.2d at 1195, 1196 (Pa. Super. 1994) (quoting

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Commonwealth v. Polston, 616 A.2d 669 (Pa. Super. 1992)).

The Richardson Court explained further that:

To show an attempt to inflict bodily injury, it must be shown that the actor had a specific intent to cause bodily injury. A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. As noted above, this intent may be shown by circumstances which reasonably suggest that a defendant intended to cause bodily injury.

[Id.]

Here, there [was] sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to support the conviction for simple assault. [Harley] acted intentionally in an attempt to cause bodily injury when she exited the courthouse and immediately [shoved] Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan. [Harley] pushed through individuals who were restraining her, using her body to engage in the ongoing physical altercation between the Deputy Sheriff and [] Robinson. [Harley] removed her jacket and dropped her purse on the ground before forcefully attempting to push her way back into the skirmish.

[Harley’s] actions, which included shoving Deputy Sheriff Alanguilan, and pushing others to re-assert herself in the ongoing clash, demonstrate[d] her conscious object to engage in conduct capable of causing bodily injury. Given all of these circumstances, there was sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to support [Harley’s] conviction [for] simple assault.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/25, at 5-6.

As the trial court recognized, Harley’s actions went beyond just shoving

Deputy Alanguilan. The video shows that Harley repeatedly attempted to

insert herself into the conflict between Robinson and Deputy Alanguilan

multiple times and used force to do so. And, she did this even though others

endeavored to restrain her. Harley was aggressive. Based on Harley’s

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behavior, the trial court, as the fact-finder, could reasonably infer that she

attempted to cause bodily injury to the deputy.

Moreover, the cases which Harley relies on do not convince us

otherwise. Harley first cites Commonwealth v. Jackson, 339 A.3d 402 (Pa.

Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum), appeal granted, 2025 WL 2936127

(Pa. 2025), in support of her argument that there had to be “more” for the

trial court to convict her of simple assault. In Jackson, two utility revenue

officers went onto the defendant’s property to check for illegal utility use. The

defendant yelled at them to get off his property and was aggressive. In

confronting the agents, the defendant used his cane to try to strike one of the

agents, but the other agent interceded. The defendant then raised his cane

over his head to strike that agent in the head, but the agent blocked it with

his elbow, causing a bruise. A struggle ensued during which the defendant

made threats of physical harm, scratched one agent, and elbowed the other

in his eye causing it to swell. The trial court found the defendant guilty of

several offenses including simple assault. Id. at 1, 2.

On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain this conviction. This Court concluded that the evidence sufficiently

established that the defendant had the requisite intent and acted intentionally

to cause bodily injury to the agents for the court to convict him of simple

assault. Id. at 4.

Although Jackson involved direct evidence to support the conviction for

simple assault, and the intent was more apparent, as discussed above, intent

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is not always easily ascertained; it is often determined from the circumstances

surrounding an incident. The circumstantial evidence presented here, and the

reasonable inferences which the trial court could draw therefrom, were

sufficient for the trial court to ascertain Harley’s intent and find her guilty of

simple assault. Nothing “more” which Jackson exemplifies according to

Harley, was necessary here.

Harley next cites Commonwealth v. Bennett, 827 A.2d 469 (Pa.

Super. 2003), for the proposition that her conduct was more like harassment

than simple assault. In Bennett, sheriff deputies approached the defendant,

who had walked out of a bar with an open bottle of beer and asked him for

identification. The defendant did not respond but pushed one of the deputies

and attempted to leave. The deputies arrested the defendant based on this

conduct, and, upon searching him, found baggies of cocaine. The defendant

was charged with multiple offenses and found guilty of possession with intent

to deliver. Id. at 473-74.

On appeal, the defendant challenged, in part, the deputies’ authority to

initially stop him and then arrest him. This Court agreed with the trial court

that the deputies were authorized to arrest him for harassment, as a breach

of the peace. The facts showed that the defendant intended to harass, annoy,

or alarm the deputy by purposefully shoving him. Thus, there was probable

cause to arrest him for harassment. Id. 479-80.

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Harley’s reliance on this case is misplaced. First, Bennett did not

involve a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Instead, that case focused on

whether the deputies had authority to stop and then arrest the defendant. 2

More importantly, Harley’s actions in this case were much different than

those in Bennett. Harley did more than just shove Deputy Alanguilan and

attempt to leave. Instead of walking away from the incident, Harley

repeatedly sought to reinsert herself into the conflict and continue the attack

on Deputy Alanguilan. Those actions were telling of her intent to cause bodily

harm to him. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to establish the elements

of simple assault.

Harley’s sole issue fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 2/18/2026

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2 We observe that Harley’s counsel acknowledges this in the appellate brief.

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