J-S29044-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DUSTIN JOSEPH HANNA : : Appellant : No. 1302 WDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 20, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000400-2022
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: October 22, 2025
Appellant, Dustin Joseph Hanna, appeals from the post-conviction
court’s September 20, 2024 order denying his timely-filed petition under the
Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After review, we
affirm the denial of PCRA relief based upon the well-reasoned opinion of the
PCRA court.
Appellant was charged in 2022 with several offenses, including
possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine and violations of the
Uniform Firearms Act.1 Appellant was initially represented by Eric Padin,
Esquire, of the Venango County Public Defender’s Office. However, on October
24, 2022, Attorney Padin filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The motion ____________________________________________
1 Specifically, Appellant was charged with three counts of unlawful possession
of a firearm, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), and one count of possession with the intent to deliver (methamphetamine) (hereinafter, PWID), 35 P.S. § 780- 113(a)(30). J-S29044-25
was granted on November 15, 2022. On December 2, 2022, Appellant filed a
pro se motion to suppress. The trial court then re-appointed Attorney Padin
to serve as stand-by counsel prior to the hearing on Appellant’s suppression
motion. Suppression was denied, and Appellant filed a pro se motion to
reconsider that determination on February 13, 2024, the day before his jury
trial was scheduled to begin.
The one-day trial occurred on February 14, 2024. Initially, the trial court
denied Appellant’s motion to reconsider his suppression claims. After the trial
court bifurcated Appellant’s charges, Appellant first stood trial on the firearm
offenses. The jury convicted Appellant of all three charges. Attorney Padin
was re-appointed as counsel to represent Appellant after this trial. Thereafter,
on March 17, 2023, Appellant entered a guilty plea to the PWID charge.
Appellant was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years
of incarceration. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider his
sentence, which was denied on April 5, 2023. Appellant did not file a direct
appeal.
On April 4, 2024, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was
promptly appointed to represent Appellant, but did not file an amended
petition on his behalf. The Commonwealth filed an answer to Appellant’s
petition, and the PCRA court conducted a hearing on September 13, 2024,
addressing Appellant’s claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file
a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence. On September 20, 2024, the
court denied Appellant relief.
-2- J-S29044-25
Although Appellant was still represented by counsel, he filed a pro se
notice of appeal to this Court which was docketed on October 25, 2024.2 On
its face, this notice of appeal appears to be untimely filed. Accordingly, this
Court directed Appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be quashed
as being filed more than 30 days after the order denying him relief. See
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that a notice of appeal shall be filed within 30
days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken);
Commonwealth v. Pennybaker, No. 671 WDA 2019, unpublished
memorandum at *5 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 27, 2020) (“In order to preserve the
right to appeal a final order of the [PCRA] court, a notice of appeal must be
filed within thirty days of the entry of that order.”).3 Notably, this Court
cannot extend the time for the filing of a timely notice of appeal as a matter
of grace. Id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 105(b). The timeliness of any notice of
appeal is a prerequisite to our review: “Because the timeliness of an appeal
implicates our jurisdiction, we cannot address the merits of an appeal … before
determining whether it was timely.” Commonwealth v. Willis, 29 A.3d 393,
395 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
____________________________________________
2 We note that, even though hybrid representation is generally prohibited in a
criminal case, because a notice of appeal protects the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant, this Court is required to docket a pro se notice of appeal despite an appellant’s being represented by counsel. Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016).
3 Non-precedential Superior Court decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be
cited for their persuasive value under Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
-3- J-S29044-25
In response to the rule to show cause, counsel informed this Court that,
after the September 20, 2024 hearing, she attempted to speak with Appellant
about filing an appeal but was unable to schedule a teleconference with him,
as the prison failed to respond to her requests. Counsel then sent a letter to
Appellant on October 10, 2024, outlining his appellate options. Thereafter,
Appellant filed his notice of appeal pro se, which the lower court docketed on
October 25, 2024. Counsel noted, however, that the notice of appeal has a
handwritten date of October 18, 2024, which is within the required 30-day
period.4 By order dated January 3, 2025, this Court discharged the rule to
show cause and referred the timeliness issue to the panel for review.
Unfortunately, the certified record does not contain any independent
evidence of when Appellant’s notice of appeal was mailed. According to our
Rules of Appellate Procedure,
[a] pro se filing submitted by a person incarcerated in a correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date of the prison postmark or the date the filing was delivered to the prison authorities for purposes of mailing as documented by a properly executed prisoner cash slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence.
Pa.R.A.P. 121(f). Appellant’s type-written notice of appeal has two lines which
were completed using a pen or pencil — a “signature” line, which is topped by
Appellant’s signature, and a “date” line, which contains the handwritten
4 “[J]ustice requires the appeal to be deemed ‘filed’ on the date that the appellant deposits the appeal with prison authorities and/or places it in the prison mailbox.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997). This is called the “prisoner mailbox” rule. Id.
-4- J-S29044-25
notation of “10/18/24.” Notice of Appeal, 10/25/24. Yet Appellant did not
provide this Court with a cash slip or other verifiable evidence indicating the
date he mailed his notice of appeal or placed it in the hands of prison
authorities. In addition, the certified record does not include the envelope in
which Appellant mailed his notice of appeal to the lower court. The envelope
would have, at a minimum, established when the notice of appeal was
received by the post office for mailing.
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J-S29044-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DUSTIN JOSEPH HANNA : : Appellant : No. 1302 WDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 20, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000400-2022
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: October 22, 2025
Appellant, Dustin Joseph Hanna, appeals from the post-conviction
court’s September 20, 2024 order denying his timely-filed petition under the
Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After review, we
affirm the denial of PCRA relief based upon the well-reasoned opinion of the
PCRA court.
Appellant was charged in 2022 with several offenses, including
possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine and violations of the
Uniform Firearms Act.1 Appellant was initially represented by Eric Padin,
Esquire, of the Venango County Public Defender’s Office. However, on October
24, 2022, Attorney Padin filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The motion ____________________________________________
1 Specifically, Appellant was charged with three counts of unlawful possession
of a firearm, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), and one count of possession with the intent to deliver (methamphetamine) (hereinafter, PWID), 35 P.S. § 780- 113(a)(30). J-S29044-25
was granted on November 15, 2022. On December 2, 2022, Appellant filed a
pro se motion to suppress. The trial court then re-appointed Attorney Padin
to serve as stand-by counsel prior to the hearing on Appellant’s suppression
motion. Suppression was denied, and Appellant filed a pro se motion to
reconsider that determination on February 13, 2024, the day before his jury
trial was scheduled to begin.
The one-day trial occurred on February 14, 2024. Initially, the trial court
denied Appellant’s motion to reconsider his suppression claims. After the trial
court bifurcated Appellant’s charges, Appellant first stood trial on the firearm
offenses. The jury convicted Appellant of all three charges. Attorney Padin
was re-appointed as counsel to represent Appellant after this trial. Thereafter,
on March 17, 2023, Appellant entered a guilty plea to the PWID charge.
Appellant was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years
of incarceration. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider his
sentence, which was denied on April 5, 2023. Appellant did not file a direct
appeal.
On April 4, 2024, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was
promptly appointed to represent Appellant, but did not file an amended
petition on his behalf. The Commonwealth filed an answer to Appellant’s
petition, and the PCRA court conducted a hearing on September 13, 2024,
addressing Appellant’s claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file
a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence. On September 20, 2024, the
court denied Appellant relief.
-2- J-S29044-25
Although Appellant was still represented by counsel, he filed a pro se
notice of appeal to this Court which was docketed on October 25, 2024.2 On
its face, this notice of appeal appears to be untimely filed. Accordingly, this
Court directed Appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be quashed
as being filed more than 30 days after the order denying him relief. See
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that a notice of appeal shall be filed within 30
days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken);
Commonwealth v. Pennybaker, No. 671 WDA 2019, unpublished
memorandum at *5 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 27, 2020) (“In order to preserve the
right to appeal a final order of the [PCRA] court, a notice of appeal must be
filed within thirty days of the entry of that order.”).3 Notably, this Court
cannot extend the time for the filing of a timely notice of appeal as a matter
of grace. Id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 105(b). The timeliness of any notice of
appeal is a prerequisite to our review: “Because the timeliness of an appeal
implicates our jurisdiction, we cannot address the merits of an appeal … before
determining whether it was timely.” Commonwealth v. Willis, 29 A.3d 393,
395 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
____________________________________________
2 We note that, even though hybrid representation is generally prohibited in a
criminal case, because a notice of appeal protects the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant, this Court is required to docket a pro se notice of appeal despite an appellant’s being represented by counsel. Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016).
3 Non-precedential Superior Court decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be
cited for their persuasive value under Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
-3- J-S29044-25
In response to the rule to show cause, counsel informed this Court that,
after the September 20, 2024 hearing, she attempted to speak with Appellant
about filing an appeal but was unable to schedule a teleconference with him,
as the prison failed to respond to her requests. Counsel then sent a letter to
Appellant on October 10, 2024, outlining his appellate options. Thereafter,
Appellant filed his notice of appeal pro se, which the lower court docketed on
October 25, 2024. Counsel noted, however, that the notice of appeal has a
handwritten date of October 18, 2024, which is within the required 30-day
period.4 By order dated January 3, 2025, this Court discharged the rule to
show cause and referred the timeliness issue to the panel for review.
Unfortunately, the certified record does not contain any independent
evidence of when Appellant’s notice of appeal was mailed. According to our
Rules of Appellate Procedure,
[a] pro se filing submitted by a person incarcerated in a correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date of the prison postmark or the date the filing was delivered to the prison authorities for purposes of mailing as documented by a properly executed prisoner cash slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence.
Pa.R.A.P. 121(f). Appellant’s type-written notice of appeal has two lines which
were completed using a pen or pencil — a “signature” line, which is topped by
Appellant’s signature, and a “date” line, which contains the handwritten
4 “[J]ustice requires the appeal to be deemed ‘filed’ on the date that the appellant deposits the appeal with prison authorities and/or places it in the prison mailbox.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997). This is called the “prisoner mailbox” rule. Id.
-4- J-S29044-25
notation of “10/18/24.” Notice of Appeal, 10/25/24. Yet Appellant did not
provide this Court with a cash slip or other verifiable evidence indicating the
date he mailed his notice of appeal or placed it in the hands of prison
authorities. In addition, the certified record does not include the envelope in
which Appellant mailed his notice of appeal to the lower court. The envelope
would have, at a minimum, established when the notice of appeal was
received by the post office for mailing.
Accordingly, in an abundance of caution, and because the failure to
preserve the envelope appears to be court error, we will apply the prisoner
mailbox rule and deem Appellant’s notice of appeal to have been filed on the
handwritten date included on the notice, October 18, 2024. Thus, we will
address the claim Appellant raises on appeal.5
Appellant argues the following issue on appeal:
Whether the [PCRA] court abused its discretion in denying [Appellant’s] PCRA [petition], despite there being credible evidence that [Appellant] requested trial counsel [to] file an appeal with the Superior Court?
Brief for Appellant at 4.
“We review the denial of PCRA relief by examining whether the PCRA
court’s conclusions are supported by the record and free from legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 979 (Pa. 2023). The scope of
our review is “limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial ____________________________________________
5 Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
-5- J-S29044-25
level.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa. 2011) (citation
omitted). We defer to the factual findings of the post-conviction court which
was tasked with hearing the evidence and assessing witness credibility.
Johnson, 289 A.3d at 979.
To be entitled to PCRA relief, a petitioner must establish the applicability
of one or more of the enumerated errors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2).
Hanible, 30 A.3d at 438. Here, Appellant raises claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, one of those enumerated claims. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9543(a)(2)(ii). “[W]e begin, as we must, with the presumption that counsel
acted effectively.” Johnson, 289 A.3d at 979. To establish a claim of
ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove:
(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. … Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.
Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (citations
omitted). Finally, we note that the PCRA court’s credibility determinations are
binding on the reviewing court when supported by the record; however, this
Court will apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
conclusions. Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Here, Appellant argues the PCRA court improperly denied his claim for
relief about trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to file a requested notice
-6- J-S29044-25
of appeal. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the
analysis by the Honorable Matthew T. Kirtland, President Judge of the Court
of Common Pleas of Venango County, in his September 20, 2024 opinion, we
affirm on the basis of Judge Kirtland’s opinion. See PCRA Court Opinion,
9/20/24, at 4-6. Judge Kirtland found that Attorney Padin testified credibly
about not being asked to file a direct appeal, and the judge did not believe
Appellant’s version of events. Id. at 5-6. We find no error of law in Judge
Kirtland’s conclusions, and his credibility determinations are supported by the
record. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44. Accordingly, we affirm on the
basis of Judge Kirtland’s opinion.
Order affirmed.
10/22/2025
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