Com. v. Hammond, D.

Opinion

J-S05041-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DAHMIR DARNELL HAMMOND : : Appellant : No. 1534 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 13, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005181-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 27, 2026

Appellant, Dahmir Darnell Hammond, appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County after a

jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated

assault, and two counts of firearms not to be carried without a license. 1

Appellant raises four issues on appeal. Upon careful review, we affirm.

The evidence at trial established that, on July 12, 2021, around 9:07

p.m., Police Officer Adam Youssef was dispatched to an apartment building in

Chester, Pennsylvania, after report of a shooting. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at

60-61. Officer Youssef arrived at the scene with two other officers,

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 901(a)/2502(a), 2702(a)(1), and 6106(a)(1),

respectively. J-S05041-26

encountering apartment residents screaming and yelling. See id. at 63.

Officer Youssef walked through the front doors of the apartment building, into

the lobby, observing broken glass. See id. at 65-66.

In the lobby was one victim, Najee Cain, lying in a pool of blood in front

of an elevator, having sustained fatal gunshot wounds, including one to his

head. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24. at 65-66, 73, 115. Apartment residents

directed Officer Youssef to the back ramp of the building, where he located a

second victim, Yameer McCommons, who was conscious and speaking but had

suffered multiple gunshot wounds. See id. at 66-67, 73-76. After identifying

both victims, and ensuring emergency medical services were in route, Officer

Youssef conducted crowd control. See id. at 68-69; see also Commonwealth

Exhibit C-2 (Crime Scene Report).

Afterwards, Doctor Albert Chu, the Delaware County Chief Medical

Examiner testified regarding Cain’s autopsy. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 82-

120; see also Commonwealth Exhibit C-56 (Chu Autopsy Report).2 Dr. Chu

testified that Cain sustained ten gunshot wounds, including a perforating

gunshot wound to the head. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 110 (stating head

wound caused multiple skull fractures and penetrated the brain, rendering

Cain immediately unconscious and incapacitated). Two additional gunshot

wounds struck the femoral arteries and veins in Cain’s thighs. See id. at 110- ____________________________________________

2 Dr. Bennett Preston performed the autopsy but was unable to appear at trial

due to a family emergency. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 83-84; Commonwealth Exhibit C-4 (Dr. Preston Autopsy Report).

-2- J-S05041-26

11. Dr. Chu ultimately determined that Cain died from multiple gunshot

wounds and classified the manner of death as homicide. See id. at 115.

Farrah Potts, Cain’s girlfriend, testified that Cain lived with her in the

apartment building where he was shot. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 132-33.

She added that McCommons was her cousin and frequently visited the

apartment building. See id. at 134-36. Potts testified that, on July 12, 2021,

both Cain and McCommons were coming and going from her apartment

throughout the day. See id. at 136-38. At approximately 9:00 p.m., while

Potts was in the kitchen, Cain either received a telephone call or text message

and then left the apartment with McCommons, telling Potts that he would be

right back. See id. Two minutes later, Potts heard two separate rounds of

gunshots, which sounded different from one another and were separated by a

brief pause. See id. at 138-39.

Thereafter, Potts heard screaming, looked outside, and observed

McCommons lying on the apartment building’s rear exterior ramp yelling that

he had been shot. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 139-40. Potts went downstairs

and discovered Cain’s body lying on the lobby floor. See id. at 140, 149-51.

Potts further testified that, before leaving the apartment that evening, Cain

possessed a firearm secured to a holster on the left side of his body. See id.

at 141-42, 174-75. The Commonwealth later introduced evidence establishing

that Cain had applied to purchase a Kahr CW45, .45-caliber handgun on May

12, 2021, and that the firearm was recovered in Wilmington, Delaware, on

July 20, 2022. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 303-04. At trial, Potts identified the

-3- J-S05041-26

recovered firearm as the same firearm Cain possessed before his death. See

N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 174-75.

Potts also testified that, on July 14, 2021, she identified Appellant for

the police from a still image taken from the video surveillance footage

depicting an individual inside the apartment building before the shooting. See

N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 155-58; see also Commonwealth Exhibits C-8

(Appellant Still Image) and C-30 (Camera Twelve Footage). She explained

that she recognized Appellant because she had seen him in the apartment

building nearly every day since moving there in February 2021. See N.T. Trial,

2/27/24, at 159. Although Appellant did not reside in the building, he was

associated with individuals that lived across from her apartment. See id. at

161.

Additionally, Potts recounted that, on the day before the shooting, Cain

was involved in a verbal altercation with one of the individuals who frequented

the apartment, though Appellant was not involved in the dispute. See N.T.

Trial, 2/27/24, at 165-67, 172-73. Finally, Potts explained that she witnessed

Appellant, Cain, and McCommons involved in an argument in which

McCommons brought out his firearm about one month before the shooting.

See id. at 176-79. On cross-examination, Potts confirmed that she did not

see Appellant on the day of the incident. See id. at 182. She also

acknowledged that Cain was selling Percocets in the apartment building. See

id. at 186-87.

-4- J-S05041-26

Darryl Davis testified that on the day of the incident, he observed

Appellant in the lobby of the apartment building at approximately 9:00 p.m.

and later identified Appellant to police in a photographic array and a still

photograph culled from the apartment building’s surveillance footage. See

N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 204-17; Commonwealth Exhibit C-12 (Appellant Still

Image 2). Layota Davis and Derrin Johnson testified that they heard multiple

rounds of gunfire, separated by a brief pause, on the evening of July 12, 2021,

before discovering Cain’s body in the apartment building lobby. See N.T. Trial,

2/28/24, at 7-13, 20-30. Johnson confirmed that he did not observe Cain’s

firearm on or near his body. See id. at 29. Additionally, Johnson testified that,

later that evening, police showed him a photographic array and asked him if

he recognized anyone from the building. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 36-37.

He identified Appellant in the array and identified him during his trial

testimony, stating that Appellant was also known as “Mir.” See id. at 37-38.

McCommons, the surviving victim, testified that he and Cain had been

close friends for their entire lives and were with each other nearly every day.

See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 41-42. At the time of the shooting, McCommons

was residing with his girlfriend at the apartment building. See id. at 43. On

the evening of July 12, 2021, he went to his apartment to meet Cain, the

decedent, and asked him for ride elsewhere. See id. at 43-45.

According to McCommons, he and Cain rode down the elevator to the

first floor together. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 45-46. As they exited, gunfire

erupted from the left side. See id. at 46. McCommons stated that he tried to

-5- J-S05041-26

escape through the apartment building’s back door and, while attempting to

run, his legs collapsed beneath him, and he fell onto the exterior ramp. See

id. at 47. He testified that another individual then came through the back

door, fired more shots, and retreated inside the building. See id. McCommons

maintained that only one shooter was involved and that he sustained eighteen

gunshot wounds during the incident. See id. at 51.

McCommons declined to identify Appellant as the shooter during his trial

testimony. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 49. Further, he testified that detectives

initially attempted to speak to him after the shooting, but he told them to

leave because there was “nothing to talk about.” Id. at 51-52. He asserted

that he did not recall speaking with Tunisia Patterson while he was

hospitalized. See id. at 53. Moreover, at the preliminary hearing, McCommons

testified that the shooting happened suddenly and he had little opportunity to

observe the shooter. See id. at 76-78.

McCommons acknowledged, however, that he identified Appellant as the

shooter during a police interview conducted on May 10, 2022, after the police

arrested him in connection with an unrelated matter. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24,

at 54-56; Commonwealth Exhibits C-24 (Police Interview Video) & C-25

(Police Interview Transcript). During the interview, McCommons told

Detective Raheem Blanden that “it’s one dude, [Appellant],” and he selected

Appellant from both a still photograph and photographic array. See id. at 55.

However, on February 3, 2024, McCommons provided a signed affidavit to a

defense investigator affirming that Appellant “did not shoot [him] on the date

-6- J-S05041-26

of July 2, 2021.” Commonwealth Exhibit C-52 (McCommons Affidavit); see

also N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 81-87. At trial, McCommons claimed that he did

not know who shot him, could not describe the shooter’s appearance, and did

not know what he was wearing. See id. at 95-96. He additionally

acknowledged that he had been taken into custody on a material witness

warrant to secure his testimony at both the preliminary hearing and trial. See

id. at 62-64, 91-96.

On cross-examination, McCommons testified that he was certain

Appellant did not shoot him. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 100. Moreover, when

McCommons gave his May 10, 2022 statement to the police, he had not yet

been arraigned or given bail and remained in custody for approximately five

hours while being questioned on three separate occasions. See id. at 100,

103-06, 145-47. McCommons testified that the detective became frustrated

with his refusal to identify Appellant and offered to help with his unrelated

case in exchange for information. See id. at 104-05, 119. During the first two

interviews, McCommons repeatedly denied that Appellant was the shooter and

stated there were multiple shooters. See id. at 106, 108, 113. During a third

interview, after police showed him photographs posted on social media,

McCommons identified Appellant as the shooter. See id. at 127.

Tunisia Patterson, Cains’ sister, testified that she participated in a video

chat with McCommons while he was hospitalized following the shooting. See

N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 150-52. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Patterson asked

McCommons’ mother to call her from his hospital room via FaceTime to find

-7- J-S05041-26

out what had happened. See id. at 152-53. She stated that McCommons was

intubated and had medical equipment around his mouth, neck, and throat.

See id. at 153-54. Patterson explained that when asked who injured him,

McCommons mouthed the word “Mir”, Appellant’s nickname, to her over

Facetime. See id. at 154. Then, Appellant’s counsel made a hearsay objection,

which the trial court overruled and admitted the statement as a prior

inconsistent statement. See id. at 154-55. Patterson added that she took one

screenshot memorializing the video chat, as well as two additional screenshots

during the call depicting McCommons. See id. at 157.

Afterwards, Officer Michael Smalarz testified that, after an arrest

warrant had been issued, he encountered Appellant during a June 18, 2022

vehicle stop. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 168-71.3 During the encounter,

Appellant provided the officer with a false name and date of birth. See id. at

171-73. Officer Smalarz took Appellant back to his police station and, upon

using a fingerprint scanner, discovered his real name and the arrest warrant.

See id. at 173.

Detective Louis Grandizio, an expert in firearms and toolmark

identification, testified that he examined various pieces of evidence. See N.T.

Trial, 2/28/24, at 177-232; Commonwealth Exhibit C-38 (Grandizio Ballistic

Report). He stated that twenty-one fire cartridges were found at the crime

3 An arrest warrant for Appellant was approved on August 16, 2021. See N.T.

Trial, 2/28/24, at 294-98.

-8- J-S05041-26

scene. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 185. Further, Detective Grandizio

determined that all the .45-caliber cartridges from the scene had been fired

from Cain’s semiautomatic .45-caliber pistol. See id. at 190-93. Moreover, he

examined fifteen 9mm fired cartridge casings recovered from the scene and

determined they had been fired from a single, unknown firearm. See id. at

193-95.

During direct examination, Detective Grandizio testified regarding a

brief portion of the surveillance video recovered after the shooting. See N.T.

Trial, 2/28/24, at 205-26. The footage was captured from the rear of the

apartment building, near where McCommons was found after the shooting,

and faced the adjoining stairwell. See id. at 264-65; see also Commonwealth

Exhibit C-30 (Camera Nine Footage). Defense counsel objected to Detective

Grandizio’s ability to testify to whether the appearance of the firearm’s slide

suggested that the gun in Appellant’s hand had expended all its loaded

ammunition. and argued that the Grandizio’s testimony was not included in

his expert report. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 222 (arguing Detective

Grandizio’s testimony was not included in expert report). The trial court

overruled the objection and cautioned Detective Grandizio that he could only

offer an opinion if the firearm was clearly visible in the footage. See id. at

223-25.

Timothy Deery, a police detective for Delaware County, identified the

video surveillance footage recovered from the cameras inside the apartment

building. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 233-311. Detective Derry testified that,

-9- J-S05041-26

after 9:30 p.m., he arrived at the apartment building, and the victims had

already been transported to the hospital. See id. at 239-42. He stated there

was six points of entry into the lobby of the apartment building on the day of

the shooting, and he located all available video surveillance footage covering

these entry points. See id. 251-64. He explained that, although no camera

captured the lobby itself, he tracked the path of each observed person by

switching between the various cameras. See id. at 262-65; Commonwealth

Exhibit C-32 (Surveillance Footage Compilation).

Moreover, Detective Deery testified that the footage showed Appellant

entering the building through a side exterior door before the shooting and he

was not seen again until he ran out of the front door after the shooting. See

N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 266-67. He described Appellant in the footage as

“wearing a gray hoodie with white piping down the middle, distressed jeans

[], and black [high] top sneakers with white soles.” Id. at 266. The footage

showed Cain and McCommons entering the elevator on the fifth floor at

approximately 9:05 p.m. See id. at 273-74. Detective Deery explained that

the individual in the video, Appellant, was the only person observed in the

lobby area during the period. See id. at 274-75. Further, the footage showed

Appellant reentering the building through the back door, quickly exiting

through the front door, and fleeing across the building’s parking lot at 9:06

p.m. See id. at 277-79, 307-08.

With respect to the firearm charges, the Commonwealth introduced a

certificate of non-licensure from the Pennsylvania State Police establishing

- 10 - J-S05041-26

that Appellant did not have a valid license to carry a firearm. See N.T. Trial,

2/28/24, at 338. Appellant did not testify but called his mother, Tammy

Robinson, as a character witness who testified to his reputation for being a

peaceful and law-abiding person. See id. at 340-47. After closing arguments,

the jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder for Cain’s death,

attempted murder and aggravated assault oft McCommons, and two counts

of firearms not to be carried without a license. See Verdict, 2/28/24, at 1-2.

On May 13, 2024, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, a

consecutive sentence of seven-and-one half to twenty years’ imprisonment

for attempted murder, and a consecutive sentence of one to two years’

imprisonment for each of the firearm convictions. See Certificate of Imposition

of Sentence, 5/13/24 (stating aggravated assault merged with attempted

murder for sentencing purposes); N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 5/13/24, at 10-

11. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion where he challenged the weight

and sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, which the trial court

denied on June 10, 2024. See Post-Sentence Motion, 5/13/24; Order (denying

post-sentence motion), 6/10/24. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and

he and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

1925. See Notice of Appeal 5/13/24; Rule 1925(b) Order, 7/18/24; Rule

1925(b) Statement, 8/8/24; Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/25.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

- 11 - J-S05041-26

I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of first[-]degree murder of Najee Cain, the attempted murder of Yameer [Mc]Commons, and firearms not to be carried without a license?

II. Whether the direct examination of Commonwealth expert witness [Detective] Louis Grandizio regarding the condition of the handgun seen in the video was lawful, where the subject of the condition of the handgun was not contained in the expert witness’ report?

III. Whether a pre-trial statement made by Yameer McCommons wherein McCommons uttered Appellant’s name, testified by Tunisia Patterson, was inadmissible hearsay?

IV. Whether the Appellant was denied his right to a fair trial and to due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourth, Sixth[,] and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article [I,] Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, based on the Commonwealth’s closing argument that witness Yameer McCommons lied, argument that was improper and prejudicial to [] Appellant[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted and brackets

added).

In issue one, Appellant argues that his first-degree murder, attempted

murder, and firearms not to be carried without a license convictions are based

upon insufficient evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 19-22.

We begin by noting our standard of review for sufficiency of evidence:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be

- 12 - J-S05041-26

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540-41 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en

banc) (citation omitted).

As an initial matter, we must address the Commonwealth’s contention

that Appellant failed to preserve his sufficiency claim for appellate review in

his Rule 1925(b) statement because he did not specify which elements of his

offenses he alleges went unproven at trial. See Appellee’s Brief at 24-25. It is

well-settled that our Court has held that to properly preserve a sufficiency

claim for review on appeal in a Rule 1925(b) statement, the appellant must

specify the elements upon which the evidence was insufficient or the basis for

the sufficiency claim. See Commonwealth v. McFarland, 278 A.3d 369, 381

(Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted) (finding waiver where McFarland’s

sufficiency claim included in his Rule 1925(b) statement only asserted “There

was insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant in this case.”). “Such

specificity is of particularly importance in cases where, as here, the appellant

was convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements

that the Commonwealth must prove beyond reasonable doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013). If the

- 13 - J-S05041-26

appellant does not specify such elements, the sufficiency claim is deemed

waived. See Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 (Pa. Super.

2017); see also Commonwealth v. Schofield, 312 A.3d 921, 927 (Pa.

Super. 2024) (stating our Court may waive sufficiency claim “even where trial

court issued an opinion addressing substance of claim.”).

Here, Appellant in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement, challenged

several of his convictions but did not specify the element or elements the

Commonwealth allegedly failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt or even

present a theory as to why the evidence was sufficient to sustain the

convictions. See 1925(b) Statement, 8/8/24, at 1 (“Whether the evidence was

sufficient to support the convictions of first[-]degree murder of Najee Cain,

the attempted murder of Yameer McCommons, firearms not to be carried

without a license and persons not to possess, etc., firearms?”) (unnecessary

capitalizations omitted). If Appellant merely wished to allege that he wanted

to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence proving his identity as the shooter

in this case, he should have alleged as much in his Rule 1925(b) statement,

rather than include an undefined assertion of insufficient evidence. Further,

on appeal, Appellant cites neither governing statutory provisions nor relevant

case law pertaining to the elements of the offenses for which he challenges on

appeal. See Appellant’s Brief at 20-22. Accordingly, we conclude that

- 14 - J-S05041-26

Appellant has waived his sufficiency of evidence claim for lack of specificity.

See Roche, 153 A.3d at 1072.4

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in

allowing the Commonwealth’s ballistics expert, Detective Grandizio, to testify

4 Even assuming Appellant’s sufficiency of evidence claim has not been waived, we find it is meritless. Appellant’s argument emphasizes that, “[i]n light of McCommons’ testimony under oath that Appellant was not involved, and the coercive circumstances leading to his final statement implicating Appellant, a conviction based on this evidence is speculative.” Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. Appellant also challenges the surveillance footage, asserting it did not capture the shooting, came from an unreliable camera system, and showed only a person wearing clothing similar to Appellant’s. See id. at 21 (“The footage shown to the jury was culled together from a surveillance system that was ‘in disarray.’”). He further contends the Commonwealth’s evidence and witness testimony failed to establish motive or show how Appellant knew when the victims would leave the elevator. See id. Lastly, he asserts that “the facts and circumstances [in this case] are so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Id. at 21-22 (citing Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2023)).

In essence, Appellant conflates weight and sufficiency, because analysis of the sufficiency of evidence does not include an assessment of credibility of testimony offered by the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-53 (Pa. 2000) (explaining distinctions between claim challenging sufficiency of evidence and claim challenging weight of evidence); Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2022) (stating credibility arguments “are more properly characterized as challenges to the weight of evidence.”). Moreover, Appellant’s argument does not properly address our standard of review, as it does not assess whether the evidence presented, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, adequately proved the elements of the convictions and whether they were committed by Appellant. Upon our review of the record, we agree that, upon the applicable standard of review, the evidence presented to the jury would have been sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/25, at 5-7. Accordingly, we would find Appellant’s first issue meritless.

- 15 - J-S05041-26

as to the condition of the handgun seen in the video footage where that

opinion was undisclosed in the expert report. See Appellant’s Brief at 22-26.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 which governs pre-trial

discovery states, in relevant part, as follows:

(B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth

(1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the defendant, and subject to any protective order which the Commonwealth might obtain under this rule, the Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant’s attorney all of the following requested items or information, provided they are material to the instant case. The Commonwealth shall, when applicable, permit the defendant’s attorney to inspect and copy or photograph such items.

…

(e) any results or reports of scientific tests, expert opinions, and written or recorded reports of polygraph examinations or other physical or mental examinations of the defendant that are within the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth[.]

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573.

The admission of expert testimony is a matter of discretion for the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 772 (Pa. 2014). An abuse of discretion “is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” Id. at 772–73 (citation omitted).

Expert testimony is admissible in all cases, civil and criminal alike, “when it involves explanations and inferences not within the range of ordinary training knowledge, intelligence and experience.” Id. at 788 (quoting Commonwealth v. Leslie, 227 A.2d 900, 903 ([Pa.] 1967)). Even where an expert's testimony arguably went

- 16 - J-S05041-26

beyond the scope of his or her report, the defendant still bears the burden of proving he suffered prejudice from the admission of the testimony. See Commonwealth v. Henry, 706 A.2d 313, 326– 27 ([Pa.] 1997). The trial court has broad discretion in choosing the appropriate remedy for a discovery violation. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 688 A.2d 491, 512 ([Pa.] 1995).

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 718 (Pa. 2015) (parallel

citations omitted).

Specifically, Appellant points to Detective Grandizio’s testimony that the

handgun’s slide was locked in the rear position indicating that the firearm was

empty of ammunition. See Appellant’s Brief at 22. Defense counsel objected

on the ground that this opinion was not contained in Grandizio’s expert report.

See id. (citing N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, 205). Following a sidebar discussion, the

trial court overruled the objection, “observ[ing] that facts in evidence would

support the opinion.” Id. (citing N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 222). Thereafter,

Grandizio testified that, with a semiautomatic handgun, a slide pulled fully to

the rear signifies that the magazine is empty, and he opined that the firearm

shown in the surveillance footage appeared to be in that condition. See id. at

22-23 (citing N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 224).

Appellant contends that this testimony exceeded the permissible scope

of expert testimony because the opinion regarding the firearm’s condition was

never disclosed in Grandizio’s report. See Appellant’s Brief at 24. Relying on

Commonwealth v. Roles, 116 A.3d 122 (Pa. Super. 2015), and

Commonwealth v. Williams, 241 A.3d 1094 (Pa. Super. 2020), Appellant

asserts that, although there are no rules of procedure in criminal cases

precisely governing the scope of expert trial testimony, neither party has carte

- 17 - J-S05041-26

blanche to allow an expert to testify beyond the contents of the expert report,

as doing so undermines Pennsylvania’s disclosure requirements. See id.

He emphasizes Grandizio’s report merely identified the items examined

and concluded that the nine-millimeter casings were fired from the same

firearm and that the .45-caliber casings were fired from the same firearm.

See Appellant’s Brief at 25. Appellant contends he is “prejudiced, as the

conclusion that the jury could reach from the disputed testimony, and the

conclusion that the Commonwealth sought, was that the shooter emptied the

handgun inside the lobby during the assault on [Cain], then retrieved [Cain’s]

handgun to continue the assault on McCommons.” Id. Therefore, since the

trial court erred in admitting the expert testimony of Detective Grandizio, this

caused Appellant prejudice and he is entitled to a new trial. See id. at 26. We

disagree.

As the trial court explained, Detective Grandizio was asked to review the

surveillance footage and offer an opinion regarding the firearm’s appearance,

and this supported the Commonwealth’s theory that Appellant took Cain’s

firearm to continue shooting him. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/25, at 5.

Although the report did not expressly reference the slide position, the

Commonwealth’s evidence5 and Grandizio’s disclosed report concerned the

5 Before Detective Grandizio testified, the Commonwealth provided evidence

that Cain was armed with .45-caliber firearm moments before the shooting, however, no firearm was recovered from his body. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 141-42, 174-75.

- 18 - J-S05041-26

caliber of ammunition recovered, the number of shots fired, and the absence

of a recovered firearm. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 184-89; Commonwealth

Exhibit C-38. Thus, the challenged testimony was not an entirely new theory,

but rather an interpretation drawn from evidence already admitted in the case.

Moreover, the trial court reasonably concluded that Appellant failed to

demonstrate prejudice. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/25, at 6. Defense

counsel was aware of the surveillance footage prior to trial, objected

contemporaneously to the testimony, and fully cross-examined Detective

Grandizio regarding his interpretation of the video footage and the basis of his

opinion. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 205, 221-22, 227-29. The record therefore

supports the trial court’s determination that the defense had a meaningful

opportunity to challenge the testimony and was not unfairly surprised by the

opinion offered at trial about the position of the pistol slide seen in the

admitted surveillance footage. See Poplawski, 130 A.3d at 718. Because

the opinion was grounded in Grandizio’s firearm expertise and supported by

facts already admitted into the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in permitting the testimony. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue

is meritless.

In the third issue, Appellant challenges the admission of Tunisia

Patterson’s testimony of McCommons mouthing the word “Mir,” in a FaceTime

call as an identification of the shooter. See Appellant’s Brief at 26-31. The trial

court admitted the reference as a prior inconsistent statement under Pa.R.E.

803.1(1), which Appellant contends is inadmissible hearsay. See id.

- 19 - J-S05041-26

The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only where there is a clear abuse of discretion. Our standard of review of a challenge to an evidentiary ruling is therefore limited. Abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but rather where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

Williams, 241 A.3d at 1101 (citation omitted).

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the

matter asserted and is inadmissible unless an exception applies. See Pa.R.E.

801(c); Pa.R.E. 802. Under Pa.R.E. 803.1(1), certain prior inconsistent

statements of a declarant-witness are admissible for their truth if the declarant

testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination about the prior statement.

These include a prior inconsistent statement that: “(A) was given under oath

subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in

a deposition; (B) is a writing signed and adopted by the declarant; or (C) is a

verbatim contemporaneous electronic recording of an oral statement.” Pa.R.E.

803.1(1)(A)–(C).

On the other hand, Rule 613 governs the prior inconsistent statements

for impeachment purposes. Under Rule 613, a party is permitted to introduce

extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement to impeach a

witness’s creditability if: “(1) the statement, if written, is shown to, or if not

written, its contents are disclosed to, the witness; (2) the witness is given the

opportunity to explain or deny the making of the statement; and (3) an

adverse party is given an opportunity to question the witness.” Pa.R.E. 613(b).

- 20 - J-S05041-26

As stated above, Appellant challenges Patterson’s testimony that

McCommons mouthed the name, “Mir,” as an apparent reference to Appellant,

when she asked him what happened to him over a FaceTime call. See

Appellant’s Brief at 26. Appellant contends that this testimony constituted

inadmissible hearsay and was improperly admitted as substantive evidence

under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803.1(1). See id. at 28. He argues that

McCommons’ statement was not reduced in writing, was not given under an

oath at a hearing or deposition, and Patterson did not record the exchange,

and thus the hearsay exception at Rule 803.1(1) did not apply. See id. (citing

N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 159). Although the Commonwealth admitted

screenshots that Patterson took during the exchange, the evidence of

McCommons mouthing, “Mir,” was not documented in a videotaped or

audiotaped recording. See id. (citing Commonwealth Exhibit C-21 (Hospital

Screenshot)). Since the requirements under Rule 803.1 were not met,

McCommon’s hospital statement is inadmissible for purposes of that rule. See

id.

Appellant also avers that Patterson’s testimony about McCommon’s

hospital statement was not subject to the impeachment rule under Rule 613.

See Appellant’s Brief at 29. He states the record shows that McCommons was

asked but did not recall a conversation with Patterson at the hospital. See id.

(citing N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 53). Regardless, Appellant states that

Patterson’s statement was not utilized for impeachment under Rule 613. See

- 21 - J-S05041-26

id. Appellant refers to the closing argument and jury instructions as support

for this contention:

And saying that [McCommons] kn[e]w, he told [Patterson] in the hospital, because again, she came up here [on] the stand and she goes, he mouthed the words. And if she wanted to put something on this guy, that guy. Again, put something on him but not knowing he's the real killer. So letting the killer of [Cain] run free to put something on some other guy that no relation between them. [sic] Now, thinking she could have said, [Appellant] did it, [Appellant] hadn't near me? He said it over and over, she said, and she was clear about that. She said he mapped the words. And to me it looked like [McCommons] said near, near, straightforward. She -- and you can see that the screenshot of the call, it happened. What are you talking about, we don't have evidence of it. What are talking about? We have the -- she has a screenshot from that call. This happened. That conversation happened. He told her that.

Appellant’s Brief at 29-30 (quoting N.T. Trial, 2/29/24, at 70-71).

Now you heard evidence that a witness Yameer McCommons made a statement on an earlier occasion that was inconsistent with his present [c]ourt testimony. You may[,] if you choose, regard this evidence as proof of the truth of anything the witness said in the earlier statement. You may also consider this evidence to help you [j]udge the credibility and weight of the testimony given by the witness on the stand when he testified.

Id. at 40 (quoting N.T. Trial, 2/29/24, at 96). 6 ____________________________________________

6 We note that Appellant did not object to the quoted portion of the prosecutor’s closing statement or the jury instructions. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 72, 117. Therefore, Appellant has waived his argument concerning the portions of the closing statement and jury instructions because he did not bring them before the trial court. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C) (“No portions of the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as error unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

- 22 - J-S05041-26

Appellant states that, admittedly, McCommons made a statement to

police that would meet the requirements of Rule 803.1. See Appellant’s Brief

at 30. However, he claims “the instruction given to the jury does not

differentiate between the recorded statement McCommons gave to police and

the FaceTime exchange in the hospital room.” Id. Therefore, the jury could

have concluded that the hospital exchange could be substantive evidence

because it does not meet the requirements of 803.1 and is inadmissible. See

id. at 30-31.

While the trial court determined that Patterson’s testimony satisfied the

requirements of the hearsay exception under Rule 803.1(1), and the

Commonwealth stated that use of the testimony was proper for impeachment

under Rule 613(b), upon review, we find that neither applies to the hospital

statement. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/25, at 6-7; Appellee’s Brief at 39-

43.7 We agree with Appellant that the hospital exchange does not satisfy Rule

803.1(1) because McCommons’ mouthing of the name, “Mir,” was not given,

under oath, at a trial, hearing or deposition, recorded in a writing, or document

in a verbatim contemporaneous electronic recording. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24,

at 153-56; Pa.R.E. 803.1(1)(A)-(C). In particular, the screenshots were not a

contemporaneous verbatim recording of McCommon’s hospital statement.

7 “[A]s an appellate court, we may affirm on any legal basis supported by the

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 729 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 125 A.3d 425, 433 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2015)).

- 23 - J-S05041-26

See Commonwealth Exhibit C-21; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 707 A.2d

1114, 1118 (Pa. 1998) (“[W]hen the prior inconsistent statement is a

contemporaneous verbatim recording of a witness’s statement, the recording

statement must be electronic, audiotaped or videotaped recording in order to

be considered substantive evidence.”). Additionally, McCommons never

admitted telling Patterson that “Mir” did it at trial or when he was being

interviewed by the police. See N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 49-53. Therefore, we

find the hospital statement is inadmissible under Rule 803.1(1).

Reiterating our above conclusion, we also find that the Commonwealth’s

argument that the hospital statement was subject to impeachment under

613(b) is unpersuasive. See Appellee’s Brief at 39-43. The Commonwealth

contends that, since McCommons stated that he did not recall the hospital

exchange on the stand, this fulfills the requirement under Rule 613(b) that

“the witness is given the opportunity to explain or deny the making of the

statement.” Id. at 39 (citing N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 53). However, for

impeachment purposes, our Court has held that “[t]here must be evidence

that the statement was made or adopted by the witness whose credibility is

being impeached.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 448 A.2d 1097, 1103 (Pa.

Super. 1982). In Brown, a women stated she couldn’t recall whether the

appellant was wearing glasses or not. See id. at 1102. Since defense counsel

never presented evidence that the women made or adopted a prior statement

inconsistent with her trial testimony, this Court found that the trial court

properly disallowed the use of the statement. See id. at 1103.

- 24 - J-S05041-26

Upon review of the record, we find that the Commonwealth has not

offered any evidence that McCommons made a statement to police or during

the trial regarding the hospital statement. Similar to the facts of Brown,

McCommons did not recall speaking to Patterson. Compare Brown, 448 A.2d

at 1103 with N.T. Trial, 2/28/24, at 49-53. Therefore, we find that the

hospital statement was not permissible material for impeachment and the trial

court committed error by allowing it to be presented to jury for purposes of

Rule 803.1(1).

Though we find error with the trial court’s rejection of the defense

objection to the hospital statement, that finding does not conclude our review

with respect to this issue. It is well-settled that, if a trial court abuses its

discretion in issuing an evidentiary ruling, “a verdict can still be sustained if

the error was harmless.” Commonwealth v. Yocolano, 169 A.3d 47, 53 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Further:

“An error is harmless if it could not have contributed to the verdict, or stated conversely, an error cannot be harmless if there is a reasonable possibility the error might have contributed to the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski[,130 A.3d at 716.] Harmless error occurs where:

(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis;

(2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or

(3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the

- 25 - J-S05041-26

error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.

Id. (citation omitted). “The Commonwealth has the burden of proving harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 327 A.3d 1236, 1247 (Pa. Super. 2024).

The Commonwealth argues in the alternative that, even if Patterson’s

testimony about the hospital statement constituted hearsay, any error in its

admission was harmless because the jury’s verdict rested upon overwhelming

evidence of Appellant’s guilt. See Appellee’s Brief at 41-43. In so arguing, the

Commonwealth expressly invokes the second and third prongs of the harmless

error standard. See Phillips, 327 A.3d at 1247. We agree with the

Commonwealth.

Our review of the record confirms that Patterson’s testimony was merely

cumulative of independent evidence overwhelmingly establishing Appellant’s

identity as the shooter and his consciousness of guilt. Specifically, the

Commonwealth introduced surveillance footage accounting for all six points of

entry and exit to the apartment building lobby. See N.T. Trial, 2/29/24, at

251, 259, 265; Commonwealth Exhibit C-30. The footage further

demonstrated Appellant’s presence in the building immediately before the

shooting and his flight in the immediate aftermath. See id. The

Commonwealth also introduced still photographs identifying Appellant in the

building before and after the shooting. See Commonwealth Exhibits C-8 & C-

12.

- 26 - J-S05041-26

In addition, Potts and Davis testified regarding Appellant’s familiarity

with the victims, his frequent presence in the building, and escalating tensions

between them. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/24, at 159-68, 172-73. Furthermore,

McCommons identified Appellant as the shooter on May 2022 in a recorded

statement to police. See Commonwealth Exhibits C-24 & C-25. Although

McCommons and defense counsel provided conflicting testimony, the jury was

entitled to make their own credibility determination as to Appellant’s identity

as the shooter. See Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 546 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (“The jury, as the finder of fact, ha[s] the duty to determine the

credibility of the testimony and evidence presented at trial.”)

Additionally, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Officer

Smalarz demonstrating that Appellant provided false identification to him

upon being pulled over, further indicating consciousness of guilt. See N.T.

Trial, 2/28/24, at 171-73; Commonwealth v. Calderini, 611 A.2d 206, 209

(Pa. Super. 1992) (declaring that appellant’s act of giving false name and

identification when stopped by police is “[a]n additional circumstance tending

to show consciousness of guilt.”). Therefore, Patterson’s testimony was

merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence establishing Appellant’s

identity as the shooter and supported by overwhelming evidence including

evidence of consciousness of guilty, thereby rendering the trial court’s

admission of the hospital statement harmless. See Phillips, 237 A.3d at

1247. Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue offers no relief.

- 27 - J-S05041-26

In the fourth issue, Appellant contends that he was denied a fair trial

when the trial court overruled his objection to the Commonwealth’s closing

argument that McCommons lied. See Appellant’s Brief at 31-34.

With specific reference to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in a closing statement, it is well settled that[,] “[i]n reviewing prosecutorial remarks to determine their prejudicial quality, comments cannot be viewed in isolation but, rather, must be considered in the context in which they were made.” Commonwealth v. Sampson, 900 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Our review of prosecutorial remarks and an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct requires us to evaluate whether a defendant received a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Commonwealth v. Rios, [] 721 A.2d 1049, 1054 ([Pa.] 1998).

***

It is well[-]settled that a prosecutor has considerable latitude during closing arguments and his arguments are fair if they are supported by the evidence or use inferences that can reasonably be derived from the evidence. Further, prosecutorial misconduct does not take place unless the unavoidable effect of the comments at issue was to prejudice the jurors by forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, thus impeding their ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict. Prosecutorial misconduct is evaluated under a harmless error standard.

Commonwealth v. Santiago-Burgos, 314 A.3d 535, 547-48 (Pa. Super.

2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 250 (Pa. Super.

2008)); see also Commonwealth v. Abdul-Ali, 345 A.3d 759, 782 (Pa.

Super. 2025) (“Like the defense, the prosecutor is accorded reasonable

latitude and may employ oratorical flair in arguing its version of the case to

the jury.”) (citation omitted).

- 28 - J-S05041-26

Appellant cites to the following portion of the Commonwealth’s closing

argument:

So [McCommons was] on the stand, all right. He tells us, yes, he remembers getting in the elevator, and going downstairs. He gets out, he hears shots to his left, which is wh[ere the] front door of the lobby is. And then [McCommons] feels himself getting hit and he goes and runs out the back door, crawls the person comes out, shoots him two times. I believe he sat it out in my friend. All right, so Farrah, Potts, and then who did this? And he goes, I know it wasn’t him. Okay. And then, and then I asked [McCommons], okay if it wasn’t him, tell me what you know about the person that did it. What was their race? Straightforward question. Pretty simple. I don’t know. Tell me what is their gender? I don’t know. Tell me what their height was. I don’t know. Tell me what their weight was. I don’t know. You don’t know anything, anything. You can’t give me one descriptor of the person that did it. From the stand here, you’re going to say that he somehow still don’t know it wasn’t him. That’s the most unbelievable and I got to be honest, it’s pretty despicable. It’s a despicable thing because he is so close with that family and to sit up here and lie like that –

Appellant’s Brief at 31-32 (quoting N.T. Trial, 2/29/24, at 67-68).

Appellant contends that the prosecutor improperly attacked

Commonwealth witness McCommons’ credibility by asserting that he lied

about his inability to describe the shooter. See Appellant’s Brief at 33.

According to Appellant, this accusation was not grounded in the evidence but

was instead intended to inflame the jury and distract them from the factual

record. See id. Further, he notes that the prosecutor suggested that

McCommons had violated a “sacred duty” to Cain’s family, which Appellant

contends improperly shifted the jury’s focus away from the evidence. See id.

- 29 - J-S05041-26

Appellant emphasizes that McCommons was the Commonwealth’s own

witness, not a defense witness, and that the prosecutor’s attack stemmed

from dissatisfaction with his testimony rather than any defense challenge. See

Appellant’s Brief at 33. As a result, Appellant maintains that the prosecutor’s

argument was “unduly prejudicial and inflammatory, and allowed the jurors

to form in their minds a fixed bias against McCommons’ testimony and against

[] Appellant.” Id. at 33. Based on this alleged prosecutorial misconduct,

Appellant requests that this Court grant a new trial. See id. at 34. We disagree

with his alleged entitlement to relief.

Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s remarks constituted a permissible

comment on McCommons’ credibility and the record. See Sampson, 900 A.2d

at 890. The challenged closing statement was made in direct response to

defense counsel’s attack on the reliability of McCommons’ prior identification

and his inability to provide basic identifying characteristics of the shooter. See

N.T. Trial, 2/29/24, at 22-26, 67-68. Further, the trial court properly

instructed the jury that counsel’s arguments are not evidence. See id. at 6.

Because the remarks were grounded in the evidence and reasonable

inferences therefrom, they did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. See

Santiago-Burgos, 314 A.3d at 547-48. Accordingly, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant’s objection to the Commonwealth’s

closing argument and Appellant’s fourth issue is meritless.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

- 30 - J-S05041-26

Date: 7/27/2026

- 31 -