Com. v. Gruff, J.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN A. GRUFF :
:
Appellant : No. 1252 MDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0002213-2015
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2026 John A. Gruff appeals pro se from the order entered dismissing his petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541- 9546. We affirm.
After being charged in 2015 and absconding for several years, Gruff was apprehended in 2024 and pleaded guilty to persons not to possess firearms.1 The court sentenced Gruff to three to six years’ incarceration with 290 days of credit for time served. See Sentencing Order, dated 11/22/24. Gruff did not appeal.
Gruff filed the instant pro se petition, his first, in March 2025. See Pro Se PCRA Petition, filed March 5, 2025. The court appointed counsel who filed
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
a Turner/Finley letter and a petition to withdraw as counsel.2 See Turner/Finley Letter, filed 4/29/25. Gruff filed a pro se amended PCRA petition, which the PCRA court dismissed as premature, on May 30, 2025. See Order Denying Amended Post-Conviction Relief, filed 5/30/25. The same day, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss Gruff’s March 2025 petition without a hearing. See Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, filed 5/30/25. Gruff did not file a response to the court’s notice. The court ultimately dismissed Gruff’s PCRA petition and granted counsel’s petition to withdraw. See Order Denying Post-Conviction Relief, filed 6/27/25. This timely appeal followed.
Gruff raises the following questions:
1. Did the Commonwealth falsely extradite [Gruff] from South Carolina under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA) without jurisdiction to do so, pertaining to due process and probable cause?
2. Per UCEA both [Gruff’s] time spent in South Carolina incarcerated, and constrained on bail count towards[] the final sentence?
Gruff’s Br. at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Gruff first claims that the Commonwealth illegally extradited him from South Carolina. For its part, the Commonwealth alleges that Gruff failed to preserve this issue in his PCRA petition. Gruff responds that the issue is preserved and directs us to “issue # 15 of [Gruff’s] PCRA Petition, the UCEA
2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
is submitted, and UCEA caselaw used as an issue.” Gruff’s Reply Br. at 1. However, a review of the petition reveals that Gruff’s petition did not challenge the legality of his extradition. Rather, he challenged the imposition of costs and the failure to give additional time-credit.
15. I ask that the Court consider the following argument, citation and discussion of authorities:
Issue #1) Excessive fine; per 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9144.1 defendant was not a federal prisoner [and] all expenses paid out of county treasury. Defendant was extradited under Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA). Interstate agreement on detainers (IAD), does not apply, defendant was not incarcerated in South Carolina on any criminal charges. Per Com. ex. Rel [sic] Osburn v. Hass, 268 A.2d 85 PA (1970), 2 It is true that Section 24 (UCEA), all costs [and] expenses shall be paid out of county treasury, in the court crime was committed.
Continued
#15) Issue #1. = Defendant would request that, most likely, in excess of $3000.00 be taken off fines [and] costs, which by the way, there was no fine, so it’s all costs.
Issue #2.) Credited time of 290 days is incorrect. Defendant could not be under, [sic] extradited, under Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), he was not incarcerated in South Carolina, no charges in that state. So he had to be extradited under Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA).
Penna. is a signee of the Act. . . .
If all time counts, then defendant has been held since October 16th, 2023. So, as of March 1st, 2025, defendant has a total of 502 days under the UCEA statutes. . . .
Defendant requests for the time served count to be adjusted from October 16th, 2023 to whatever present time is picked by courts, or 403 days time served, from October 16th, 2023 to November 22nd, 2024, sentencing day.
See PCRA Petition at 8-10. We therefore conclude that this claim is waived for failure to raise it in his PCRA petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).
Gruff’s remaining issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to grant him credit for time served during his incarceration in South Carolina as well as his time on bail. See Gruff’s Br. at 8. He fails to present any argument on this issue. As such, this claim is also waived. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 591 (Pa.Super. 2022) (stating “where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review that claim is waived”) (citation omitted).
Order affirmed.3 Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 08/18/2026
3 In his reply brief, Gruff raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
for advising Gruff to plead guilty. See Gruff’s Reply Br. at 6. However, he fails to develop this argument. As such, it is waived. See Taylor, 277 A.3d at 591. Moreover, he did not raise it in his PCRA petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
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